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In 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus called out the National Guard to prevent nine 
African American teenagers from attending Little Rock Central High School. This 
dissertation examines how this watershed event has been commemorated over the last 
fifty years, and how historical narratives about the crisis have evolved in relation to debates 
about education and public policy. The struggle to desegregate Little Rock's public schools 
has been ongoing in the years since 1957, and those with a vested interest in this process 
articulate different arguments about the crisis as a historical event and its relationship to 
the present in courtrooms, political debates, state-sponsored documentary films, 
newspaper articles, memoirs, museums and other commemorative forums. 
This study places an emphasis on the contested nature of public memory, and examines 
what is at stake in these conversations about the past. The public memory of the 1957 
Little Rock school desegregation crisis has been contested since its inception and 
deployed continuously to either undermine or legitimize ongoing battles for civil rights and 
social justice in Little Rock and the nation-at-large. Civil rights advocates continue to draw 
connections between past and present, pointing to the unfinished business of the 
movement, while their opponents argue that the tensions that gave rise to massive 
resistance have long since been resolved. These debates have had an impact on school 
desegregation litigation and have had real consequences for thousands of school children 
in Little Rock and their peers across the nation. 
Consequently, this study examines the struggle over the public memory of the Little Rock 
school desegregation crisis within the context of a half-century long effort to integrate the 
Arkansas capital's schools. In doing so, it highlights the distance between the rhetoric of 
American progress and the reality of American race relations. It also illuminates how the 
city's ongoing struggles with school desegregation have shaped the memorial arena and 
vice versa. 
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THE "WON CAUSE"?: 
PUBLIC MEMORY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 
In 1957, the city of Little Rock became an international byword for American 
racial discrimination and resistance to school desegregation when Arkansas Governor 
Orval Faubus called out the National Guard to prevent nine African American teenagers 
from attending Central High School. The public memory of the 1957 Little Rock school 
desegregation crisis has been contested since its inception and deployed continuously to 
either undermine or legitimize ongoing battles for civil rights and social justice in Little 
Rock and the nation-at-large. This dissertation examines how this watershed event has 
been commemorated over the last fifty years, and how historical narratives about the 
crisis have evolved in relation to debates about education and public policy. The struggle 
to desegregate Little Rock's public schools has been ongoing in the years since 1957, and 
those with a vested interest in this process articulate different arguments about the crisis 
as a historical event and its relationship to the present in courtrooms, political debates, 
state-sponsored documentary films, newspaper articles, memoirs, museums and other 
commemorative forums. 
These debates have had real consequences for thousands of school children in 
Little Rock and their peers across the nation. Civil rights advocates continue to draw 
connections between the past and the present, pointing to the unfinished business of the 
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movement, while their opponents argue that the tensions that gave rise to massive 
resistance have long since been resolved. This "won cause" mythology can and does 
have an impact on school desegregation litigation. As federal judges make decisions 
about whether the racial separation in our schools today is a vestige of past discrimination 
or the product "natural" preferences, their determinations are written into court decisions 
that become important and binding precedent. 
This study moves discussion about the public memory of civil rights away from a 
focus on the dominance of triumphal narratives, towards an emphasis on the contested 
nature of public memory and a concrete examination of what is at stake in these 
conversations about the past. Arguably, the battle to claim the legacy of the civil rights 
movement is a key site in the present-day struggle to eliminate educational apartheid. 
Consequently, the struggle over how school segregation and integration is remembered 
and understood- and its implications for the present and the future-- is the focus of this 
study. 
"Won Cause" Mythology and Public Memory: Why It Matters 
Other scholars have emphasized the dominance of what they call the "master 
narrative" ofthe civil rights movement, and documented the prevalence of"won cause" 
mythology in museums, movies, and the media. The dominant memory of the civil rights 
movement that is reiterated and perpetuated- although not uncontested-- in popular 
histories, public celebrations, feature films, documentaries, and even national civil rights 
museums links the movement to a national narrative of ever-expanding democracy and 
2 
progress. 1 The story is narrated through of a series of clashes between good and evil-
"unimpeachable heroes and unspeakable villains"- "unequivocal rights and 
incontrovertible wrongs"- which galvanized the nation to correct injustice.2 Essentially, 
this narrative of redemption presents the movement as a unified pursuit of integration and 
voting rights that culminated in the passage of corrective legislation which brought the 
nation's practices in line with its promises.3 
In the popular memory of the black freedom struggle, there is a remarkable degree 
of consensus about which civil rights campaigns were significant and deserve to be 
commemorated, what the movement meant, and who its protagonists were. This selective 
history is preserved and reproduced in documentaries, civil rights museums, the mass 
media, and other commemorative forums.4 Chronologically, the dominant version of the 
civil rights story begins with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People's (NAACP) campaign to integrate schools and the Supreme Court's Brown v. 
Board of Education decision in 1954 and 1955. When integration did not precede "with 
all deliberate speed," civil rights activists demanded change in a series of nonviolent 
1 Glenn Eskew, "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute and the New Ideology of Tolerance," in 
The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and Leigh Raiford (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2006), 52-53. 
2 Bryan Ward, "Introduction: Forgotten Walls and Master Narratives: Media, Culture, and 
Memories of the Modem African American Freedom Struggle" in Media, Culture, and the Modern African 
American Freedom Struggle, ed. Brian Ward (Gainesville: University Press ofFlorida, 2001), 8-9. 
3 Owen J. Dwyer, "Memory on the Margins: Alabama's Civil Rights Journey as a Memorial 
Text," in Mapping Tourism, ed. Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr. (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2003), 37-38. 
4 Owen J. Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Contradiction, Confirmation, and the 
Cultural Landscape," in The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and Leigh 
Raiford (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 7. 
3 
direct action campaigns- Montgomery, Little Rock, the Sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, 
Birmingham, the March on Washington, and Selma. In this narrative, spectacular, 
confrontational campaigns orchestrated by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) attracted 
sympathetic media coverage that moved the nation and placed pressure on political 
leaders. Civil rights activism resulted in the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 
1965 Voting Rights Act. By a stroke ofthe pen, this legislation (in public memory, at 
least) put an end to segregation, political disenfranchisement, and overt racism in the 
South. 5 Attempts to move beyond token integration or efforts to dismantle anything 
other than de jure barriers to equality are marginalized in this narrative- the result is a 
selective vision of the movement that excludes consideration of some of the nation's most 
enduring racial problems and concerns. 
In the dominant narrative, noteworthy campaigns were led by national civil rights 
organizations and their charismatic leaders, particularly Martin Luther King Jr. Indeed, a 
selective vision of King's image, philosophy, and words occupies center stage in popular 
memory, overshadowing local leaders, grassroots mobilization, friction among civil rights 
organizations, and philosophical differences over the means and ends of black liberation.6 
5 Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," 
Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (March 2005), 1234. See also Dwyer, "Memory on the Margins: 
Alabama's Civil Rights Journey as a Memorial Text," 37-38. 
6 As Jacqueline Dowd Hall has noted, "Martin Luther King Jr. is this narrative's defining figure-
frozen in 1963, proclaiming "I Have a Dream" during the march on the Mall. Endlessly reproduced and 
selectively quoted, his speeches retain their majesty yet lose their political bite" (Hall, "The Long Civil 
Rights Movement," 1234). In the final years of his life, King turned his attention to economic injustice, 
poverty, and the war in Vietnam. His struggle to "redeem the soul of America" increasingly led him to call 
for a "reconstruction of the entire society, a revolution of values" and "a radical redistribution of economic 
and political power." But this King has no place in the dominant memory of civil rights. In his essay, 
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In some accounts, the trajectory of the civil rights movement seems to follow the course 
of King's life and activism. In one version of the story, the movement is born in 
Montgomery with the civil rights leader's appearance on the national stage and seems to 
die a natural death following his assassination in 1968. Alternatively, the movement self-
implodes in urban riots, student rebellions, or a virulent black nationalism which 
purportedly betrays King's integrationist dreams and nonviolent activism. 
This periodization draws sharp distinctions between legitimized civil rights 
activism in pursuit of integration and voting rights and "illegitimate" struggles for 
economic justice and political power before and during the black power era, despite the 
fact that King himself was increasingly preoccupied with these issues toward the end of 
his life. As Peniel Joseph has recently noted, "such a description creates a situation in 
which the BPM [Black Power Movement] can be conveniently blamed for the demise of 
the Civil Rights Movement, rather than being viewed as an alternative to the 
ineffectiveness of civil rights demands in critical areas of American life. "7 Although 
"Beyond Amnesia: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Future of America," Vincent Harding notes, "It appears 
as if the price for the first national holiday honoring a black man is the development of a massive case of 
national amnesia concerning who that black man really was" (Vincent Gordon Harding, "Beyond Amnesia: 
Martin Luther King Jr. and the Future of America," The Journal of American History 74, no. 2 [September 
1987]: 469). Malcolm X may be the only postwar leader who comes close to rivaling the dominance of 
King's memory in this arena. Even then, Malcolm X's memory is frequently evoked within the context of 
unflattering "Martin v. Malcolm" storylines that elevate King's "righteous" nonviolent philosophy at the 
expense of Malcolm X's legacy and teaching (Edward P. Morgan, "The Good, The Bad, and the Forgotten: 
Media Culture and the Public Memory of the Civil Rights Movement," in The Civil Rights Movement in 
American Memory, ed. Renee Romano and Leigh Raiford [Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006], 
137-166). 
7 Peniel E. Joseph, "Introduction: Toward a Historiography ofthe Black Power Movement, " in 
The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era, ed. Peniel E. Joseph (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 3. See also Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement," 1254. 
And George Lipsitz, American Studies in a Moment of Danger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2001), 78. 
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many activists have stressed the continuity between the "struggles to gain political rights 
for southern blacks and the struggles to exercise them in productive ways," these 
connections are rarely explored in the nation's commemorative spaces.8 
Within this narrative, discussion of the campaign to desegregate and integrate the 
nation's public schools is largely limited to the immediate impact of the Supreme Court's 
Brown v. Board of Education decision. The NAACP's direct attack on school 
segregation as inherently unequal is recalled and praised, but its long campaign to achieve 
educational equity before and after the end of de jure segregation is marginalized. 
Although the 1957 stand-off at Little Rock Central High is replayed in documentaries~ 
news stories, and racial reconciliation celebrations, local struggles to achieve more than 
token desegregation that lasted for decades in Arkansas' capital and countless 
communities throughout the South are neglected. Moreover, northern controversies 
about busing and community control of neighborhood schools that kept education at the 
center of public debate throughout the 1970s are not considered to be part of the civil 
rights movement- chronologically, ideologically, or geographically. Thus, the struggle to 
desegregate and integrate schools is defined as a southern issue, despite the fact that the 
most segregated school systems in the country today are located in the nation's urban 
centers- south, north, and west. Finally, the resegregation of public schools following 
Supreme Court decisions that have permitted formerly "unitary" school systems to 
dismantle desegregation plans as long as all "practicable" actions to end state-supported 
8 Clayborne Carson, "Civil Rights Reform and the Black freedom Struggle, " in The Civil Rights 
Movement in America, ed. Charles Eagles (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 28. 
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discrimination have been undertaken has no place in the dominant narrative of progress. 
This is particularly the case in cities like Little Rock where identifiably white and black 
schools have quickly re-emerged on the landscape. 
Some contemporary activists contend that the way the civil rights movement is 
remembered has fed white denial and indifference in the post-civil rights era. According 
to recent surveys, most white Americans believe that black-white integration and equality 
is an accomplished reality.9 Media and cultural studies scholars Leonard Steinhom and 
Barbara Diggs-Brown have recently suggested that "it is hard to blame people" for 
believing that racial problems are a thing of the past "when our public life is filled with 
repeated affirmations of the integration ideal and out ostensible progress towards 
achieving it."10 Pointing to past civil rights victories, many white Americans contend that 
the nation has "bent over backwards" to provide African Americans and other minorities 
with equal opportunity. Education activist Paul Street warns, 
More than simply outliving the explicit open and public racism of the past, 
it [covert racism] is partly strengthened by past civil rights victories. 
Those triumphs encourage the illusion of racism's disappearance and the 
notion that the only barriers left to black equality in the United States are 
internal to the black community and that disadvantaged African Americans 
are personally responsible for their presence at the bottom ofthe U.S. 
hierarchy. 11 
These arguments perpetuate the belief that persistent racial disparities in income, security, 
9 Paul Louis Street, Segregated Schools: Educational Apartheid in Post-Civil Rights America 
(New York: Routledge, 2005), 36-37. 
10 Leonard Steinborn and Barbara Diggs-Brown, By the Color of Our Skin: The Illusion of 
Integration and the Reality of Race (New York: Dutton, 1999). 
11 Street, Segregated Schools, quote 5-6, 36-37. See also Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil 
Rights Movement," 1237. 
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housing, health care, and education are the product of a "culture of poverty" and "self-
sabotaging" behaviors rather than enduring racism and structural inequalities.12 Certainly, 
the notion that enduring racial disparities in American education are not the vestiges or 
byproducts of discrimination but rather of "external factors" beyond the control of local 
school systems has underwritten the Supreme Court's tum away from active and ongoing 
school desegregation programs. 
The triumph of this perspective in the federal courts is not an accident. So-called 
"color blind" conservatives have actively cultivated and deployed this narrative to derail 
or reshape the hard-won victories of the civil rights era and the legislative initiatives of 
the Great Society. Claiming the legacy of the movement for themselves, color blind 
conservatives have defined its singular objective as "the elimination of racial 
classification and the establishment of formal equality before the law." In her essay, "The 
Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses ofthe Past," Jacqueline Dowd Hall 
notes that this rhetoric has been used to dismantle majority-minority voting districts, 
affirmative action, two-way busing and the court-ordered integration of schools. 
According to color blind conservatives, these "race conscious" policies betrayed the 
movement, subverted self-reliance among African Americans, and created special group 
privileges, making some people "more equal" than others. 13 More recently, this logic 
was clearly reflected in the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision in Parents 
12 More broadly, this kind of rhetoric also provides convenient camouflage for the real 
consequences ofneoliberal policies that have elevated the free market, laissez-faire economic policy, and 
privatization over democratic participation, government regulation, social justice, and public welfare 
(Lipsitz, American Studies in a Moment of Danger, 77 -78). 
13 Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement,"l235-1238. 
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Involved (2007), which held that attempts to voluntarily maintain diversity within school 
districts by acknowledging race as a factor in student assignment were a violation of the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a betrayal of the NAACP's 
original intent in Brown. 14 As Hall warns us, and as this decision illustrates, this 
interpretation of the purpose and intent of the civil rights movement and its legacy 
frequently "impoverishes public discourse, discourages investment in public institutions, 
and undermines our will to address the inequalities and injustices that surround us 
now."15 
These uses of the civil rights movement and its legacy underscore the point that 
the battle over the public memory of the black freedom struggle has significant 
ramifications. As Leigh Raiford and Renee Romano remind us in their introduction to 
The Civil Rights Movement and American Memory (2006), 
the struggles over the memory of the civil rights movement are not a 
diversion from the real political work of fighting for racial equality and 
equal rights in the United States; they are key sites of that struggle. The 
contests over the meanings of the movement must be understood as a 
crucial part of the continuing fight against racism and inequality. 16 
The stories we tell about our past become our frameworks for understanding the present 
and shaping the future, in education and other areas of American life. Consequently, 
efforts to define the meaning of the civil rights movement merit careful scrutiny and 
14 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. I, 127 Sup. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
15 Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement," 1262. 
16 Leigh Raiford and Renee C. Romano, "Introduction: The Struggle Over Memory," in The Civil 
Rights Movement and American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and Leigh Raiford (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2006), xxi. 
9 
study. 
Justice is a Perpetual Struggle: Resistance, Contest, and Controversy 
Recently, several scholars have illuminated the pervasive presence of"won cause" 
mythology in museums, movies, the media, political debate and even courtroom 
testimony. This work has pointed to significant gaps and elisions in the dominant 
narrative of the civil rights movement, underscoring the great distance between the 
popular consensus and the contradictions, complexities, and continuities that have 
emerged in civil rights historiography. Drawing on academic studies of the movement, 
scholars like Owen Dwyer, Glenn Eskew, Allison Graham, Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, and 
Brian Ward have problematized the marginalization of grassroots mobilization over 
national leadership, unknown local struggles over media-savvy national campaigns, and 
women's participation. The exclusion ofthese events and social actors limits our 
understanding of the roles that ordinary people played in the movement and the strength 
of their commitment toward changing their own communities. Scholars have also noted 
the lack of attention to struggles against economic inequality and social injustice, 
northern and urban struggles against de facto segregation, and black nationalism. It is 
precisely these narrative gaps and elisions that foster the illusion that the struggle for 
black freedom is complete, undermining serious reflection about enduring disparities and 
problems. Indeed, discussion of present-day racism is noticeably absent from the 
nation's commemorative spaces.17 
17 See Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movemenf'; Harding, "Beyond Amnesia"; 
Raiford and Romano, "Introduction: The Struggle Over Memory." On museums and public sites see 
Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Contradiction, Confmnation, And the Cultural 
10 
"Won cause" mythology serves a variety of constituencies, and although previous 
work has primarily focused on documenting the dominance of this verison of the civil 
rights story, the best of this scholarship has also turned its attention to the interests which 
sustain it. As noted earlier, Jacqueline Dowd Hall has demonstrated how "color-blind" 
conservatives utilize "won cause" mythology to support their political agenda. 18 Glenn 
Eskew and Owen Dwyer have explored how the dominant narrative serves the interests of 
heritage tourism, urban renewal, and the "new" new South. They argue that southern 
politicians have supported civil rights museums, tours, and guidebooks because they "turn 
a stigmatized past into a commercial asset," simultaneously attracting tourist dollars and 
generating positive public relations. 19 Leigh Raiford and Renee Romano have suggested 
Landscape"; Owen J. Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Place, Memory, and Conflict," 
Professional Geographer 52.4 (2000): 660-71; Dwyer, "Memory on the Margins"; Owen J. Dwyer, 
"Memorial Landscapes Dedicated to the Civil Rights Movement" (Ph. D. diss., University of Kentucky, 
2000); Eskew, "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute"; Glenn T. Eskew,"From Civil War to Civil Rights: 
Selling Alabama as Heritage Tourism," in Slavery, Contested Heritage, and Thanatourism, ed. Graham 
M.S. Dunn andA.V. Seaton (New York: Haworth Press, 2001); Glenn T. Eskew, "The Won Cause: 
Memorializing the Movement through the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute," in Mapping Tourism, ed. 
Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); 
Mariko Morita Hughes, "The National Civil Rights Museum's Memorial Message: The Cultural Politics of 
Historical Representations and the Civil Rights Movement" (B.A. thesis, Whitman College, 2005); Joseph 
Tilden Rhea, "Memory of a Nation: The Race Pride Movement and American Collective Memory" (Ph.D. 
diss., Harvard University, 1995). On film and television see Allison Graham, Framing the South: 
Hollywood, Television, and Race during the Civil Rights Struggle (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 2001); Jennifer Fuller, "Debating the Present Through the Past: Representations of the Civil Rights 
Movement in the 1990s," in The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and 
Leigh Raiford (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006). On media see Morgan, "The Good, the Bad, 
and the Forgotten"; Ward, "Introduction: Forgotten Walls and Master Narratives." On courtroom 
testimony see Leigh Raiford, ''Narratives of Redemption: The Birmingham Church Bombing Trials and the 
Construction of Civil Rights Memory," in The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee 
Romano and Leigh Raiford (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006). 
18 Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movemenf'; Lipsitz, American Studies in a 
Moment of Danger. 
19 Quote from Glenn Eskew, "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute," 29-30. See also Dwyer, 
"Memory on the Margins" and "Memorial Landscapes Dedicated to the Civil Rights Movement." 
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that ''won cause" mythology serves the state more generally- "held up as a shining 
example of the success of American democracy" the movement functions at proof of ''the 
vitality of America's legal and political institutions, and evidence of the nation's ongoing 
quest to live up to its founding ideals of egalitarianism and justice. "20 Allison Graham 
and Edward P. Morgan have suggested that this narrative generates substantial profit for 
the commercial culture industry because it fulfils the desires of white audiences, who 
wish to believe that equality has been achieved (with generous contributions from 
moderate white liberals who often star in cinematic versions of the movement).21 W. 
Fitzhugh Brundage and Joseph Tilden Rhea contend that this narrative is the product of a 
black struggle to have African American history recognized in public spaces. They argue 
that while black political power has resulted in increased awareness of the black freedom 
struggle, representations of the civil rights movement have not entirely escaped from the 
customary leitmotifs of public history and national narratives of progress. 22 
This study draws and builds upon this previous scholarship by illuminating and 
critiquing the dominant memory of school segregation and integration. In Silencing the 
Past: Power and the Production of History, Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes, "History is 
the fruit of power, but power itself is never so transparent that its analysis becomes 
superfluous. The ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility; the ultimate challenge, 
20 Raiford and Romano, "Introduction: The Struggle Over Memory," xvii. 
21 Graham, Framing the South, 13; Morgan, "The Good the Bad and the Forgotten," 138. 
22 Rhea, "Memory of a Nation," 153-168; W. Fitzhugh Brundage, The Southern Past: A Clash of 
Race and Memory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 293-306. See also Owen Dwyer 
"Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Contradiction, Confirmation, and the Cultural Landscape," 7. 
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the exposition of its roots. ,,n Indeed, rather than simply documenting the prevalence of 
''won cause" mythology, this study tracks the development of this narrative over time. 
By exploring the evolution of the public memory of the Little Rock school desegregation 
crisis over the course of more than fifty years, this project highlights the elevation of 
some narratives and memories and the suppression of others, demonstrating that specific 
coalitions of interests have coalesced and diverged, supporting or undermining dominant 
memory. This approach also permits close examination of how memories of the 1957 
crisis and other battles for educational equity have been deployed in ongoing political 
struggles from the 1950s to the present. 
Indeed, this study places contest, conflict, and controversy at the center of the 
story. Previous work has placed almost exclusive focus on dominant memory and 
popular consensus. While other scholars occasionally acknowledge that this story is 
contested, for the most part, they do not explore fissures in civil rights consensus history 
or resistance to the "master" narrative. The resulting studies analyze museum displays, 
movies, or historical novels that reiterate the dominant narrative, but they do not always 
explore their construction and reception. They also ignore or downplay alternative sites 
of memory that preserve a more radical perspective on the civil rights movement. At 
times, this scholarship presents a collective memory of the civil rights movement that is 
being imposed on the public by culture industries and political elites, but not struggled for 
by activists, intellectuals, or other concerned citizens. Ironically, the popular activism 
23 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1995), xix. 
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and agency these scholars seem so interested in incorporating into the dominant narrative 
is absent in their accounts of how the movement itself is being remembered. 
In exploring resistance to or reinterpretation of the dominant public memory of 
the civil rights movement, this study challenges some of the implications of previous 
work. For example, while it may be the case that the dominant memory of the civil rights 
movement fosters indifference and denial of current racial problems, it could also be 
argued that for some audiences even a "bowdlerized" version of the movement inspires 
direct action and participatory democracy. In Making Malcolm, Michael Eric Dyson 
notes that a history of black heroism and achievement has been "ceaselessly evoked in 
black communities in oral and written form as an inspiration to continued thought and 
action in the same vein. "24 Building on this insight, one could argue that the dominant 
narrative of civil rights triumph and progress may be received differently, pointing in 
different directions for different audiences. In Little Rock and elsewhere, those who can 
"not not know" that racism persists, whose lived experiences contradict "won cause" 
mythology, may nevertheless find hope and take inspiration from the victories of the past 
as they face the challenges of the future. 
In addition to addressing issues of reception and meaning making, I am also 
interested in locating alternative and oppositional sites of memory that preserve a broader, 
more inclusive, and more expansive version of the struggle for black freedom. These 
sites of memory cultivate what Genevieve Fabre has referred to as "memory for the 
24 Michael Eric Dyson, Making Malcolm: The Myth and Meaning of Malcolm X (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 145-146. 
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future"- commemorative traditions that are primarily concerned with using historical 
narratives "in anticipation of action to come" in order to force change and invent a more 
viable future. According to Fabre, the tone of these traditions in African American 
communities is often "subjunctive"- focused on what should have happened and what 
ought to happen as much as on what did happen.25 Similarly, in Living Black History: 
How Reimagining the African American Past can Remake America's Racial Future, 
Manning Marable has argued that African American historical traditions continue to be 
"descriptive," "corrective," and "prescriptive," connecting "scholarship with collective 
struggle, social analysis with social transformation."26 Certainly, the Little Rock Nine's 
published memoirs and efforts to use their history to address the state of American race 
relations and education in Arkansas' capital today indicate that these traditions persist and 
"won cause" mythology is not as uncontested as some of its chroniclers make it out to be. 
Moreover, it should be noted that African American communities and their allies 
are not the only groups fostering and nurturing oppositional understandings of the civil 
rights movement. White racists steeped in southern "lost cause" mythology have defined 
the civil rights movement as the "second reconstruction"- yet another example of federal 
interference and "racial engineering." For these "unreconstructed southerners," as Tony 
Horowitz has called them, the victories of the civil rights movement and the decline of 
25 Genevieve Fabre, "African American Commemorative Celebrations in the Nineteenth Century," 
in History and Memory in African-American Culture, ed. Genevieve Fabre and Robert O'Meally (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 72-73. 
26 Manning Marable, Living Black History: How Reimagining the African American Past can 
Remake America's Racial Future (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2006), 58. 
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massive resistance were the ultimate betrayal of southern heritage and white privilege. 27 
In this context, the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision is not 
heralded and celebrated, but derisively referred to as "Black Monday," and Eisenhower's 
deployment of the 101 st Airborne to enforce that decision in Little Rock is viewed as an 
unjustified federal occupation. Moreover, although scholars like Jason Sokol have 
documented the transformative impact of the black freedom movement and "interracial 
revolution" on whites and blacks throughout the nation, many whites with means 
continue to resist school desegregation and undermine educational equity through flight 
to the suburbs, gated communities, and private academies. 28 Indeed, even as the city of 
Little Rock has officially embraced the public memory of the school desegregation crisis 
and repackaged it in the name of heritage tourism and racial "reconciliation," the school 
district itself has struggled against resegregation caused by these trends. 
My approach to the public memory of the civil rights movement is informed by 
recent work in the study of collective memory, public history, and popular culture. This 
scholarship emphasizes that historical narratives created outside of the academy by 
novelists, artists, politicians, journalists, curators, movie-makers, and citizens wield 
considerable influence and merit close and careful study. Drawing upon the work of 
Antonio Gramsci, Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams and Frederick Jameson, much of this 
scholarship examines collective memory within the framework of hegemony theory, 
27 Tony Horowitz, Corifederates in the Attic: Dispatches from the Unfinished Civil War (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1998). 
28 Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-
197 5 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006). 
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envisioning popular culture and public memory as a battlefield where dominant and 
subaltern groups fight for representation.29 Dominant and politically powerful groups can 
manipulate collective memory to cultivate consent and manage resistance, using historical 
narratives to legitimate the status quo. However, as George Lipsitz has emphasized, 
hegemony is not simply imposed from the top down, it is also struggled for from the 
bottom up. In his book Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular 
Culture, Lipsitz demonstrated that people utilize residual counter-memories based on 
lived experience to challenge and interrogate the "false promises" of dominant popular 
culture. He has also argued that some alternative cultural forms "retain memories of the 
past" that "rebuke the injustices and inequities of the present."30 
Recent studies of public memory emphasize that the construction of popular 
historical narratives is a collective enterprise rooted in broader political, social, and 
cultural contexts. Within a historical discipline increasingly engaged in debate about 
historical "objectivity" and "relativism," most of this scholarship does not primarily 
concern the "accuracy" of public memory. Rather, scholars have focused on why and 
how people construct collective memories in particular places at particular times. 
Scholars like Michael Kammen, David Lowenthal, John Gillis, David Blight, W. 
29 For the theoretical foundations of this work see Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International 
Publishers, 1990); Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," in Problems 
in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays (London: NLB, 1980); Stuart Hall, ''Notes on Deconstructing 
the Popular, "in Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader, ed. Jolm Story (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1997), 443-453; Frederic Jameson, "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture," Social Text 1 
(1979): 130-148. 
30 George Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture 
(Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1990), 11, 20. See also George Lipsitz, Footsteps in the 
Dark: The Hidden Histories of Popular Music (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007). 
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Fitzhugh Brundage, Roy Rosenzweig, and David Thelen have portrayed collective 
memory as an active, ongoing process that continuously shapes and reshapes our 
understanding of the past in relation to the concerns of the present.31 This work places an 
emphasis on how public memories have been shaped by power, race, gender, and class 
hierarchies. As John Gillis has noted, these factors "determine what is remembered (or 
forgotten), by whom, and for what end." This analytical framework, which explores the 
interrelationship between past, present, and future, has challenged older definitions of 
memory as "a passive process of storing and retrieving objective recollections of lived 
experiences.'m Gillis emphasizes, "identities and memories are not things we think 
about, they are things we think with. "33 
These scholars contend that public memory both constitutes and is constituted by 
the world we live in. While recognizing the privileged position of some history-makers 
over others, scholars have also emphasized the fluidity of popular historical narratives as 
power relations change over time. As Pierre Nora has argued, "Memory is life, borne out 
of living societies founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the 
dialectic of remembering and forgetting ... vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, 
31 See Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American 
Culture (New York: Knopf, 1991); David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985); John Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American 
Memory (Cambridge: Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 2001); Brundage, The Southern Past: A 
Clash of Race and Memory; David Thelen, ed. Memory and American History (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1990). 
32 Brundage, The Southern Past, 4. 
33 Gillis, Commemorations. 
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susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived."34 Collective memory is 
contested terrain and the work George Lipsitz, John Bodnar, W. Fitzhugh Brundage, 
Genevieve Fabre, and David Blight demonstrates the importance of not only focusing on 
dominant narratives, but also acknowledging the existence of alternative and even 
oppositional frameworks that seek to shift the balance of power in the future by rewriting 
our understanding of the past. 
This study also draws upon civil rights movement historiography. In the 1970s 
and early 1980s, movement scholarship built on interpretations crafted in early media 
accounts, and was shaped by traditional institutional and biographical approaches. 
Consequently, this work emphasized the national leaders, organizations, and events that 
captured media attention in the 1950s and 1960s. Also following the media, this work 
defined the goals and successes of the movement in terms of a unified struggle for 
integration and voting rights, drawing distinctions between the activism that preceded and 
followed the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts.35 The dominant popular memory of the 
civil rights movement, as outlined above, follows the basic outlines of this early 
scholarship but is now out of date. In recent years, scholars have placed increasing 
emphasis on local activism and grassroots organization, the pursuit of economic equity, 
and the battle against de jure and de facto segregation in all parts ofthe country. This 
34 Quote translated in Framing Public Memory, ed. Kendell R.Phillips and John Lucaites 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 2. 
35 Julian Bond, "The Media and the Movement: Looking Back from the Southern Front" and Jenny 
Walker, "A Media-Made Movement? Black Violence and Nonviolence in the Historiography of the Civil 
Rights Movement" in Media, Culture and the Modern African American Freedom Struggle, ed. Brian Ward 
(Gainesville: University ofFlorida Press, 2001). See also Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights 
Movement," 1236. 
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scholarship has also complicated the periodization of the movement. After shifting the 
focus from media-savvy national campaigns, scholars have begun to sketch the outlines 
of a "long civil rights movement" or a mid-century "black freedom struggle" that places 
what has been called the "heroic period" of the civil rights era within a longer timeline of 
activism and the pursuit of social justice. 36 The result is a much more nuanced picture of 
the movement that underscores and emphasizes its relevance in relation to contemporary 
racial problems. 
My emphasis on the ongoing struggle for educational equity and integration draws 
upon this new understanding of a long civil rights movement. Despite the claims of 
color blind conservatives, school integration and equity was not achieved during the 
"heroic" period of the civil rights struggle. In many communities, including Little Rock 
itself, the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision and the stand-off at 
Central High resulted only in token integration well into the 1960s and 1970s. Protests 
against busing, attempts to counter the effects of de jure and de facto segregation, and 
debates over the community control of neighborhood schools continued to place 
education at the center of public debate well past the passage of the 1964 and 1965 Civil 
Rights Acts. Indeed, debate over these issues persists to this day. Across the nation, 
most black students still find themselves in underfunded and deteriorating majority-
36 For examples see the following historiographies and bibliographies of the long civil rights 
movement see Charles W. Eagles, "Toward New Histories of the Civil Rights Era," Journal of Southern 
History 66 no. 4 (2000): 815-848; John Dittmer, "The Civil Rights Movement," in The African American 
Experience: A Historiographical and Bibliographical Guide, ed. Arvarh Strickland and Robert J. Weems, 
Jr. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001); Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement"; 
Joseph, "Introduction: Toward a Historiography of the Black Power Movement." 
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minority schools.37 After the elimination of apartheid in South Africa, the United States 
has the dubious distinction of being the only developed country to systematically spend 
more on the education of wealthy children than poor children. 38 This privilege-
reinforcing system perpetuates race and class-based hierarchies, leading some activists 
and scholars to conclude that beyond achieving the intent of Brown v. Board of 
Education, the nation still has not met the standard of Plessy v. Ferguson! 39 
The "heroic" period of the civil rights movement associated with Brown v. Board 
and Little Rock is connected to the ongoing struggle for educational equity not only 
because of enduring concerns about equal access to public education, but also because of 
the way memory of these iconic events is deployed in public debates about the present 
and future. As noted above, activists have identified the battle over the memory and 
legacy of the heroic period of civil rights as a key site of the contemporary struggle for 
educational equity. This study examines the struggle over the public memory ofthe Little 
Rock School desegregation crisis within the context of the effort to integrate the city's 
schools. In order to do so, its analysis of lieux de memoire (sites of memory) and 
historical narratives describing the crisis are situated in their temporal context and in 
relation to the evolution of educational policy in Arkansas' capital and the rest of the 
nation. 
The long course of school desegregation in Little Rock has been reconstructed in 
37 Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, and Gary Orfield, A Multiracial Society with Segregated 
Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
38 Street, Segregated Schools, 50. 
39 Ibid, 63. 
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the pages that follow through court documents, newspaper clippings, school board 
minutes, public reports, congressional hearings, and the written recollections of school 
district officials, African American students, and others involved in the case. 1bis study 
also draws on existing scholarship related to school desegregation in the United States in 
general and Little Rock in particular. 
David Gene Vinzant's excellent dissertation, "Little Rock's Long Crisis: Schools 
and Race in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1863-2009" was not available at the time this study 
was drafted. While this dissertation and Vinzant's work both adopt a chronological 
framework to explore the development of court litigation, public opinion, and educational 
policy in the Little Rock school district, there are significant differences in emphasis and 
interpretation. Vinzant's work provides excellent context for those interested in 
educational segregation in Little Rock before the 1957 school desegregation crisis, and he 
also provides extended discussion of developments between 1957 and 1976. However, 
his study is less attentive to and less critical of the turn away from the desegregation 
paradigm that developed during those years and the weakening of court oversight over the 
course of the last three decades. Indeed, Vinzant questions whether "the struggle to 
integrate schools was the best way to help educationally disadvantaged black children" 
given the persistent achievement gap and suggests that African American students could 
achieve better educational outcomes in predominantly black schools. Vinzant also 
underscores the effect of "mandatory school assignments" on white flight. He argues that 
court-ordered desegregation effectively "drove whites out of Little Rock" and "made the 
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metropolitan area more segregated than it would have otherwise been."40 In contrast, by 
taking a closer look at the way school desegregation policy has evolved in the Little Rock 
school district since the 1980s, this study suggests that it is not court-ordered 
desegregation per se but rather the way the process of school desegregation has been 
implemented and evaded in the city that has produced white flight, disinvestment in 
public education, and persistent disparities in student achievement. 
Debating Little Rock 
Even more than fifty years later, any account of the Little Rock school 
desegregation crisis that moves beyond the most skeletal description of well-documented 
"facts" is subject to constant challenge in Arkansas' capital. Nevertheless, although 
interpretive questions continue to provoke discussion and debate in Little Rock and 
elsewhere, most'parties with a vested interest in this history can agree on a basic timeline 
of events as they unfolded over the course of the 1957 and 1958 academic years. 
In response to the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, 
which declared that school segregation was unconstitutional, the Little Rock School 
Board and Superintendent Virgil Blossom developed a plan designed to respond to the 
Court's mandate and desegregate the city's schools over the course of several years. 
Despite making a "prompt and reasonable start" towards complying with the high court's 
mandate, civic leaders in Little Rock proposed to move forward with more deliberation 
40Uavid Gene Vinzant, "Little Rock's Long Crisis: Schools and Race in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
1863-2009" (Ph.D. diss., University of Arkansas, 2010), particularly concluding remarks, p. 314-323. 
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than speed.41 School officials insisted that integration could not proceed until two new 
high school facilities were built. Previously, the high schools for white and black 
students had city-wide attendance areas. Before the inauguration of the integration plan, 
two new facilities were constructed- West End (Hall) High School in Little Rock's 
almost completely white "silk stocking" district and Horace Mann High School for black 
students on the far eastern edge of the city.42 Due to residential segregation, integration at 
the high school level would largely be limited to Little Rock's Central High School and 
would proceed at the beginning of the 1957-58 school year. After "successful 
integration" at the high school level (Grades 10-12) had been completed, it would be 
phased into junior high schools (Grades 7-9). During the third phase of the plan, 
elementary schools (Grades 1-6) would be desegregated.43 
This plan was greeted with criticism on all sides. Vocal segregationists in Little 
41 Tony A. Freyer, "Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis, 1954-1957," The Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 40, no. 3 (Autumn 1981 ); reprint, 66, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 14 7. As Freyer notes, the 
Supreme Court's order that school desegregation should unfold with "all deliberate speed" provided school 
officials in Little Rock and elsewhere with "an ambiguous mandate that could be interpreted to justify delay 
and gradualism." 
42 In order to ensure that Horace Mann would continue to be identified as an all-black educational 
institution, all faculty assigned to the school were African American and it was scheduled to open mid-year 
in February of 1956 as a segregated school. Looking forward, a transfer provision was inserted into the 
Blossom Plan to allow students to transfer out of schools where their race was a minority, providing whites 
with a way to avoid assignment at Horace Mann (Numan V. Bartley, "Looking Back at Little Rock," 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 25, no. 2 [Summer 1966]; reprint 66, no. 2 [Summer 2007]: 113; John A. 
Kirk, "The Little Rock Crisis and Postwar Black Activism in Arkansas," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56, 
no. 3 [Autumn 1997]; reprint 66, no. 2 [Summer 2007]: 239). On the other side of the city, historian 
Elizabeth Jacoway has noted that her "Uncle" Virgil Blossom "reportedly advised numerous people ... that if 
they wanted to keep their children in segregated [white] schools they should move to the Heights" to attend 
Hall High. See Elizabeth Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son: Little Rock, The Crisis that Shocked the Nation 
(New York: Free Press, 2007), 57. 
43 For the full text of the Little Rock Board of Education's "Plan of School Integration" see Aaron 
v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1956). See also Virgil T. Blossom, It Has 
Happened Here (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959); Bartley, "Looking Back at Little Rock," 113. 
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Rock opposed the introduction of any African American students into Central High, 
particularly when wealthier residents of the city would be insulated from the change by 
enrolling their children in the newly constructed Hall High School.44 The plan was also 
opposed by members of the civil rights community who objected that it did not contain a 
time table for the completion of integration in the district, nor did it define "successful 
integration." From the perspective of Daisy Bates, Arkansas State President ofthe 
NAACP, the Brown decision signaled that "the time for delay, evasion, and 
procrastination was past."45 Consequently, the civil rights organization filed a complaint 
in federal court, arguing that the plan was too vague and did not move quickly enough to 
eliminate educational apartheid in the Arkansas' capital. Nevertheless, despite these 
44 Indeed, in her interviews with former Central High School students, Beth Roy discovered that 
residual "bitterness" about the "abuse of privilege by affiuent people within their own community" colored 
the perceptions of alumni 40 years later (Beth Roy, Bitters in the Honey: Tales of Hope and 
Disappointment Across Divides of Race and Time [Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999]). C. 
Fred Williams has gone so far as to argue that working-class resentment fueled the Little Rock 
desegregation crisis more than racial animus, stating baldly, "The Little Rock School Crisis in 1957 was 
more about class than race." Williams argues that race was only a ''triggering mechanism." However, this 
dissertation argues that decades-long resistance to meaningful school desegregation in Little Rock suggests 
otherwise.©. Fred Williams, "Class: The Central Issue in the 1957 Little Rock School Crisis," Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 [Autumn 1997]: 341-344). Tony Freyer has suggested that integrating both 
Hall and Central would not only have relaxed class tensions but also would have provided the more well-
heeled and racially moderate sections of the city with an incentive to become involved in mediating the 
crisis (Freyer, "Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis,"149. If this is the case, it may only be an 
indication that well-connected political elites in the city would not have had to resort to violence in order to 
impede desegregation. Indeed, in later years when desegregation did come to Little Rock's "silk-stocking" 
district in the neighborhoods surrounding Hall High, middle-class whites and political elites in these areas 
resisted the process through court litigation and the ballot box (see Chapter Three). Historian Karen 
Anderson has recently made a valuable contribution to this debate by studying how class not only effected 
the city's working-class but also the ideology and actions of the city's middle-class and civic elite (Karen 
Anderson, Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010]). 
45 As quoted by John A. Kirk, Redefining the Color Line: Black Activism in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
1940-1970 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 73, 94-96. The Little Rock NAACP decided to 
file suit after Blossom weakened the desegregation plan in the wake of the Supreme Court's implementation 
decision in Brown II (1955). 
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challenges, the school district's plan- known as the "Blossom Plan"- was approved by 
the federal courts in August 1956.46 
Although over 200 black students lived within Central High School's attendance 
area, a handful of African American students were screened and selected from a list of 
volunteers to transfer to Central High over the course of the summer of 1957.47 As the 
beginning of the school year approached, racial tension in the city increased and 
segregationist organizations like the White Citizens' Council an~ the Mothers' League of 
Central High School placed pressure on political leaders and school officials to abandon 
their plans.48 Citing this resistance, and rumors of potential violence, Arkansas Governor 
46 Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1956). For the perspective of the 
NAACP, see Wiley A. Branton, "Little Rock Revisited: Desegregation to Resegregation," The Journal of 
Negro Education 52, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 250-269; Daisy Bates, Long Shadow of Little Rock (New 
York: D. McKay, 1962; reprint, Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1986), 51-52. See also John A. 
Kirk, "Massive Resistance and Minimum Compliance: The Origins of the 1957 Little Rock School Crisis 
and the Failure of School Desegregation in the South," in Massive Resistance: Southern Opposition to the 
Second Reconstruction, ed. Clive Webb (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); John A. Kirk, "The 
Little Rock Crisis and Postwar Black Activism in Arkansas": 239. For a comprehensive legal history of the 
litigation that came to be known as Cooper v. Aaron from the NAACP decision to initiate the suit in 1956 to 
its conclusion in 1958 see Tony A. Freyer, Little Rock on Trial: Cooper v. Aaron and School 
Desegregation (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007). 
47 Students were screened on the basis of their "scholastic ability, their general deportment, their 
character, and the health," Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1957). This 
process is described by Superintendent Virgil Blossom in his memoir It Has Happened Here (1959). For 
the perspective of the students themselves see Melba Pattillo Beals, Warriors Don't Cry: A Searing Memoir 
of the Battle to Integrate Little Rock's Central High (New York: Washington Square Press, 1994); Terrence 
Roberts, Lessons From Little Rock (Little Rock: Butler Center Books, 2009); and Carlotta Walls LaNier 
with Lisa Frazier Page, A Mighty Long Way: My Journey to Justice at Little Rock Central High School 
(New York: One World Books, 2009). See also Branton, "Little Rock Revisited": 257-258. Branton notes 
that none of the 33 original plaintiffs in Aaron v. Cooper was selected for transfer. 
48 Demographic analysis of these organizations have led several scholars to conclude that their 
membership was not large and did not include the city's traditional leadership. Nevertheless, they placed 
pressure on local and state officials through a well-orchestrated campaign. See Graeme Cope, '"A Thorn in 
the Side?': The Mother's League of Central High School and the Little Rock Desegregation Crisis of 
1957," Arkansas Historical Quarterly, 57 (Summer 1998): 160-90; Graeme Cope, "Honest White People of 
the Middle and Lower Classes? A Profile of the Capital Citizens' Council During the Little Rock Crisis of 
1957," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 61 (Spring 2002): 36-58; Bartley, "Looking Back at Little Rock," 
117; Neil R. McMillen, "The White Citizens' Council and Resistance to School Desegregation in 
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Orval Faubus intervened, stationing members of the Arkansas National Guard outside of 
Little Rock's Central High School "to maintain or restore order and to protect the lives 
and property of citizens" on the eve of the first day of classes.49 These troops were given 
orders not to protect, but to prevent the African American students who planned to enroll 
in the school from entering the campus. On September 4, 1957, ten African American 
students attempted to attend classes at Little Rock Central High School. They were 
blocked from the grounds by the National Guard. A large mob of white citizens also 
assembled outside of the building, and some of these onlookers actively harassed and 
intimidated the black students and their adult escorts in full view of the national media. 50 
In the weeks that followed, the Little Rock Nine- as they became known- were 
kept out of school while the NAACP pursued their case through the court system. Under 
the circumstances, Minnijean Brown, Elizabeth Eckford, Ernest Green, Thelma 
Mothershed, Melba Pattillo, Gloria Ray, Terrence Roberts, Jefferson Thomas, and 
Carlotta Walls tried their best to keep up with their classes. They gathered at the home of 
Daisy Bates, President of the Arkansas NAACP, for updates from the attorneys involved 
in the case and to receive assistance from educational tutors. 
Arkansas," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 30, no. 2 (Summer 1971); reprint 66, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 125-
144. 
49 For more on Faubus and his role in the crisis see his memoirs Down From the Hills (Little Rock: 
Democrat Lithographing & Printing Press, 1980) and Down From the Hills II (Little Rock: Democrat 
Printing and Lithographing Company, 1986); Jacoway, Tum Away Thy Son; Roy Reed, Faubus: The Life 
and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1997); Roy Reed, "Orval 
E. Faubus: Out of Socialism into Realism," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 54, no. 1 (Spring 1995); reprint 
66, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 167-180; Bartley, "Looking Back at Little Rock," 112-124. 
50 Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas 1957). The tenth student, Jane 
Hill elected not to pursue enrollment at Little Rock Central High School in the wake of these developments. 
She would reapply to attend the institution in 1959. 
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The stand-off at Central High School was viewed by many as a constitutional 
crisis precipitated by conflict between state and federallaw.51 Congressman Brooks 
Hays' efforts to broker a political resolution to the crisis in a conference between Faubus 
and President Eisenhower failed to produce results. 52 Soon thereafter, a federal judge 
issued an injunction directly ordering the Governor to stop interfering with the integration 
plan approved by the courts. Although the injunction explicitly stipulated that Faubus 
could maintain the National Guard outside the high school to preserve the peace as long 
as they did not interfere with the constitutional rights of the Little Rock Nine, the 
governor elected to remove the troops from outside of Central Bigh School. 53 
After weeks of stalemate, the Little Rock Nine returned to Central and attended 
classes for the first time on September 23, 1957. However, due to the large and hostile 
crowd that gathered outside the building and the inability of local police to constrain it, 
officials feared for the students' safety and they were removed from the campus before 
the end of the school day. Local officials appealed to President Eisenhower for 
assistance. In response, the President deployed members of the 101 st Airborne to Little 
Rock to support the rule of law and enforce the Brown v. Board of Education decision. 
51 Freyer, "Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis," 145. 
52 For more on Hays and his role in the desegregation crisis see his memoirs Brooks Hays, A 
Southern Moderate Speaks (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1959); A Hotbed of 
Tranquility: My Life in Five Worlds (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968); Politics is My Parish: 
An Autobiography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981). See also James T. Baker, 
Brooks Hays (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1989); Jolm Kyle Day, "The Fall of a Southern 
Moderate: Congressman Brooks Hays and the Election of 1958," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 59, no. 3 
(Autumn 2000): 241-264. 
53 Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1957). This injunction was 
affirmed in Faubus v. United States, 254 F. 2d 797 (8th Circ. 1958). 
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The 101 st established a perimeter outside of Central High and provided each of the 
African American students with an escort between classes inside the building. 54 
Despite this protection, a group of segregationist students inside the school 
continued to harass the Little Rock Nine for the duration of the school year. School 
officials adopted a policy of only punishing incidents of harassment witnessed by a 
teacher. Disciplinary problems continued after the withdrawal of the 101 st Airborne. For 
the duration of the school year, members of the federalized Arkansas National Guard 
were assigned to help maintain order inside the building. 55 Eight of the nine African 
American students who had enrolled in classes at Central in the fall completed the school 
year. Minnijean Brown was placed on probation and then expelled for responding to 
provocation from white students. 56 Ernest Green, the only senior of the group, became 
the first African American student to graduate from Little Rock's Central High School in 
May of 1958.57 
The school desegregation crisis in the city continued the following year. School 
officials contended that the educational standards ofthe school district were being 
54 Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1958), as quoted in Race 
Relations Law Reporter 3, no. 4 (August 1958), 630. See also Bartley, "Looking Back at Little Rock," 116. 
For more on this aspect of the crisis and the role of the 101 st Airborne and Arkansas National Guard see 
Robert W. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, monograph prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Department of the Army (Washington, DC: 1967). 
55 For explanation of this administrative policy see Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 
Little Rock 1957-58 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980). 
56 For Minnijean Brown Trickey's reflections on her experience in Little Rock see the documentary 
Journey to Little Rock: The Untold Story of Minnijean Brown, dir. Rob Thompson, 52 min., North East 
Productions, 2001, DVD. 
57 Green's story was used as the basis for the film The Ernest Green Story, dir. Eric Laneuville, 
101 min. Walt Disney Television, 1993. 
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"seriously impaired" by the turmoil surrounding the desegregation process, and petitioned 
the federal courts for a two-and-a-half year postponement of their integration plan. This 
delay was granted by the federal district court, which found that "popular opposition in 
Little Rock to the principle of integration" had resulted in the harassment of the nine 
African American students and the destruction of their belongings, numerous bomb 
threats, vandalism of school property, increased strain on teachers and administrators, and 
the disruption of educational standards. In balancing the personal rights of African 
American students in the district against the "public interest," the district court granted a 
"tactical delay" that would enable the conflict between federal and state law to be 
resolved in the courts and tempers to cool in the city-at-large. 58 
The district court's order was overturned by the gth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Although they acknowledged the "bedlam and turmoil" which 
had marked the 1957-58 school year, the higher courts rejected the school board's petition 
for a "cooling-off' period. The 8th Circuit found that the school district might have been 
able to ameliorate its problems if it had deployed stricter disciplinary measures inside the 
school or asked for court injunctions against those interfering with the integration plan 
outside of the school. More importantly, the Circuit Court underscored the importance of 
maintaining the rule of law. "The issue plainly comes down to the question of whether 
overt public resistance, including mob protest, constitutes sufficient cause to nullify an 
order of the Federal court directing the board to proceed with its integration plan," the 
Court wrote. "We say the time has not yet come in these United States when an order of 
58 Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1958). 
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a federal court must be whittled away, watered down, or shamefully withdrawn in the 
face of violent and unlawful acts of individual citizens." If such a delay was granted in 
Little Rock, the gth Circuit concluded, it would set a dangerous precedent, and every 
school district which met with public opposition to integration would have a ''justifiable 
excuse" for postponing the process indefinitely. This was unacceptable. 59 
The Supreme Court reviewed the arguments in the case Aaron v. Cooper in a 
special term convened to reach a decision before the beginning of the 1958-59 school 
year.60 In affirming the 8th Circuit decision, the Court found that "law and order" would 
not be restored in Little Rock "by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional 
rights," but rather by concerted state action directed at applying and enforcing the Brown 
v. Board of Education decision in the state of Arkansas. The Court rejected the school 
board's argument that additional time was needed to resolve the conflicts between state 
and federal law related to school desegregation. "Article VI of the Constitution makes 
the Constitution the 'supreme law of the land,"' the Court flatly stated; and since 
Marbury v. Madison, it had fallen to the federal judiciary ''to say what the law is." The 
Court's interpretation of the purpose and intent of the 14th Amendment and its decision in 
the Brown case were "binding .... on the States."61 
Governor Faubus remained unpersuaded by this ruling. In 1957, the Arkansas 
59 Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (81h Circ., 1958), as reproduced in Race Relations Law Reporter 
3, no. 4 (August 1958), 643-648. 
60 For briefs of the petitioners, respondents, and the Solicitor General, as well as a transcript of the 
oral arguments before the Supreme Court see, Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Constitutional Law 54: 533-731. 
61 Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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State Constitution had been amended, directing the General Assembly to "pass laws 
opposing ... the Un-Constitutional desegregation decisions ... of the United States Supreme 
Court," in reference to Brown I and Brown Il.62 In advance of the 1958-59 school year 
and in direct response to the denial of any further delay in the integration process, several 
new statutes were added to the books which provided the Governor with power to close 
schools under court order to desegregate, and allowed public money to be redirected 
private schools operated on a segregated basis. Another statute permitted students living 
in communities under integration orders to transfer to segregated school districts. The 
Assembly also outlined procedures for recalling school board members.63 
In the aftermath ofthe Supreme Court's decision in Aaron v. Cooper, Governor 
Faubus activated this newly passed legislation and closed all of Little Rock's high 
schools under court order to desegregate. In a special election, the majority of Little Rock 
voters ratified his decision by a vote of 19,000 to 7,500. With the encouragement of the 
Governor, the Little Rock School Board entered into negotiations to lease the public 
school buildings and all the instructional materials they contained to a private corporation 
established to provide segregated education in the city. In doing so, federal courts 
determined that the Board had violated their obligation to proceed with their court-
62 Brief for the Petitioners, Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), as reproduced in Landmark Briefs 
and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law, 54: 571. See also Henry 
Woods and Beth Deere, "Reflections on the Little Rock School Case," Arkansas Law Review 44, no. 4 
(1991): 972, 976. 
63 The Governor had these unsigned bills on his desk during the Supreme Court's hearings related 
to Aaron v. Cooper. His threat to sign them was the subject of discussion during oral argument, see 
"Proceedings" in Aaron v. Cooper as reproduced in Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Constitutional Law 54: 711-713. See also Sondra Gordy, Finding the Lost Year: What 
Happened When Little Rock Closed Its Public Schools (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas, 2009), 28-38. 
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approved integration plan, and they were enjoined from proceeding with the leasing 
agreement any further.64 
As a result ofthese actions, the city's high schools remained closed for the 
duration ofthe 1958-59 school year and the many of the district's students were forced to 
transfer to other schools or go without an education. 65 Moreover, public opposition to 
desegregation encouraged segregationists on the school board to fire 44 teachers who had 
shown some sympathy with the integration process. This purge and the closure of the 
schools provoked a struggle to control the school board between advocates of massive 
resistance and more moderate members of the community who did not necessarily 
support integration but promoted the importance of public education. 66 Although 
moderates gained control of the school board in a special recall election, Little Rock's 
high schools were not reopened until the fall of 1959, after federal courts declared the 
64 Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (81h Circ., 1958). See also Sondra Gordy, Finding the Lost Year, 
38-45, 50-58 
65 While a significant number of white students in the district attended hastily created private 
schools, Little Rock's black students did not. NAACP Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins urged local 
residents not to set up their own segregated private school. "We cannot ourselves finance Jim Crow schools 
for our children," he wrote, without "selling out the youngsters who endured persecution at Central High 
last year." The civil rights organization did help raise funds for students to take correspondence courses, 
and worked to help place students who were able to enter college early (Gordy, Finding the Lost Year, 93; 
Anderson, Little Rock, 162-164). 
66 Moderate forces in the city rallied behind the banner of STOP (Stop This Outrageous Purge) 
while segregationists formed CROSS (Committee to Retain Our Segregated Schools). Irving Sptizberg has 
described this development as a "watershed" moment in Little Rock's history that allowed white political 
elites in the city to reassert control over the city's racial politics (Irving J. Spitzberg, Jr., Racial Politics in 
Little Rock, 1954-1964 [New York: Garland Publishing, 1987]). For more on the "lost year" of 1958-1950 
from the perspective of the Women's Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools (WEC) see Sara 
Alderman Murphy, Breaking the Silence: Little Rock's Women's Emergency Committee to Open Our 
Schools, 19 58-1963 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1997); Vivion Lenon Brewer, The 
Embattled Ladies of Little Rock, 1958-1963 (Fort Bragg, CA: Lost Coast Press, 1999). Neil R McMillen 
captures the perspective of their opposition in "The White Citizens' Council and Resistance to School 
Desegregation in Arkansas." For a comprehensive history see Sandra Gordy, Finding the Lost Year. 
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school closing law activated by Governor Faubus unconstitutional.67 Struggles to achieve 
more than token integration in Little Rock would continue for decades to come. 
While the narrative represented in this brief outline is widely documented and 
generally accepted in the city of Little Rock and elsewhere, efforts to interpret the causes 
and effects of these events, the motivations of various actors, or to define the meaning of 
this history in relation to the present are subject to considerably more debate. 
• Was the "Blossom Plan" a cynical attempt to minimize integration in the city or 
an effort to make Little Rock a model city of compliance with the Brown v. Board 
of Education decision? 
• Did the Little Rock Nine volunteer to attend Central High School, or were they 
pressured by representatives of the NAACP or even paid to enroll? 
• Did Orval Faubus act to "preserve the peace" or to gain political advantage in his 
upcoming re-election campaign? Was there a real threat of racial violence in the 
city of Little Rock, or were the rumors orchestrated to justify Faubus' decision to 
deploy the National Guard? 
• Was Little Rock a relatively "progressive" city in the South or a stronghold of 
segregation? Were the mobs that gathered outside of Central High School 
composed of local residents or "rednecks" from more rural parts of Arkansas? 
• What kinds of harassment did the Little Rock Nine experience throughout the 
67 Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1959); Branton, "Little Rock 
Revisited," 268; Gordy, Finding the Lost Year, 156-157. Legal historian Tony A. Freyer has observed that 
politically, the court's decision did not effect Faubus because he had secured a long enough delay to last 
through the 1958 gubernatorial election. Tony A. Freyer, "The Little Rock Crisis Reconsidered," Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 367. 
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school year and who was culpable? How should the positions staked out by white 
segregationists and moderates in 1957 be viewed in retrospect? 
• Did the national media capture real scenes of massive resistance outside the high 
school or were the events staged and selectively edited by reporters or even 
communist sympathizers? 
• Should the deployment of the 1 01 st be viewed as a legitimate means of enforcing 
the edicts of the Supreme Court, or as a illegitimate use of military force to 
suppress democratic dissent? 
• Were Governor Faubus, the citizenry of Little Rock, the NAACP, or the federal 
courts responsible for the closure of the city's schools during the 1958-59 school 
year? 
• How should the effort to reclaim the school board by business elites and women's 
organizations be interpreted, in light of the fact that many of those who 
participated in this effort did not necessarily support the principle of integration? 
These and other questions continue to resonate with varying degrees of force in private 
conversations, public debates, and commemorative forums in Arkansas' capital city. 
'"Unreconstructed southerners," civil rights activists, moderates, and business and 
political elites have approached the answers to these queries differently over the course of 
the last fifty years. Their analysis of the school desegregation crisis and its immediate 
aftermath has been informed not only by their participation in or perspective on the events 
that made Little Rock famous, but also by their assessment of the legacy of the crisis in 
the present- particularly in relation to the city's schools. As circumstances in Little 
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Rock and the nation have evolved, so too have the historical narratives used to describe 
the events of 1957. 
In order to reconstruct this memorial landscape and its evolution over the course 
of the last fifty years, this study adopts an interdisciplinary approach. Public memory is 
profoundly intertextual; historical interpretations and arguments crafted in one media 
reverberate in and inform others. Consequently, this study explores and examines a 
variety of lieux de memoire, including state-sponsored documentary film, retrospective 
media coverage, political and legal debate, memoirs and oral histories, television 
docudrama, museum exhibitions, and commemorative ceremonies. During the course of 
research, I immersed myself in the public memory of the Little Rock school desegregation 
crisis while attending the 50th anniversary commemoration in 2007. The memorial 
landscape of preceding decades was reconstructed through archival collections held at the 
University of Arkansas Little Rock, University of Arkansas Fayetteville, Columbia 
University, the Library of Congress, and the National Archives. Public debate and 
discussion about the events of 1957, especially in relation to contemporary concerns, was 
also uncovered in national and local newspaper coverage, particularly the Arkansas 
Democrat, Arkansas Gazette, Arkansas Times, and Little Rock's two black newspapers 
the Arkansas State Press and Southern Mediator Journal. Over the intervening half 
century, more than a dozen published and unpublished memoirs related to the crisis have 
been written. These texts and the reactions to them provide insight not only into the 
events of the 1950s but also the historical questions and debates which animated the 
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times in which they were written. Finally, I conducted interviews with individuals 
involved with the creation of the Little Rock Central High School Visitor Center, as well 
as two members of the Little Rock Nine- Terrence Roberts and Minnijean Brown 
Trickey- to learn from their perspectives on how the memory of their experience has 
changed over time. 
Certainly, some ofLittle Rock's storytellers have more political leverage than 
others and have been able to advance their version of this history as the city's "official" 
public memory. Various iterations of"won cause" mythology have graced films and 
museum displays produced about the crisis or marked racial reconciliation celebrations. 
However, it would be difficult to describe these interpretations of the crisis as 
uncontested. 
For half a century, ongoing school desegregation litigation in the city and the glare 
of the media spotlight has revealed that Little Rock-like many communities throughout 
the nation- continues to struggle with racial disparities in student achievement and racial 
isolation in its schools. Perhaps because of its iconic status in the history of school 
desegregation, Arkansas' capital has been forced to confront its shortcomings more than 
most. Although the school district was released from court oversight in 2009, the city's 
civil rights community, and perhaps even more significantly, the Little Rock Nine 
themselves continue to point to the work that remains to be done. In this context, efforts 
to apply "lessons from Little Rock" to the present, and the tradition of "preserving 
memory for the future," have continually countered and resisted efforts to declare Little 
Rock's history a thing of the past. 
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As early as 1964, one of the first retrospective accounts of the Little Rock school 
desegregation crisis was deployed to counteract negative perceptions ofU.S. race 
relations abroad by the United States Information Agency (USIA). A decade after the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision, school desegregation still proceeded at a glacial 
pace, and communities like Little Rock continued to passively resist the full implications 
of the Supreme Court's edict by deploying strategies like pupil placement laws and 
freedom-of-choice plans designed to keep integration to a minimum. The USIA, the 
nation's "public diplomacy" agency abroad, sought to obscure these dismal statistics by 
constructing a "where are they now" documentary that focused on positive changes in 
racial attitudes in Little Rock and elsewhere in the years since 1957. In constructing this 
rosy picture, USIA filmmakers and producers knowingly misrepresented the sentiments 
of the Little Rock Nine who participated in the project and failed to acknowledge that 
only 33 black pupils were attending Little Rock's Central High School during filming. At 
a time when only 1.18% of African American students in the South were attending 
schools with their white peers, the construction ofthis misleading narrative of progress in 
1964 demonstrates how detached "won cause" mythology can be from the reality of 
school desegregation. However, surveys conducted abroad also revealed that this 
narrative was not always received as its creators intended- while foreign viewers were 
persuaded that race relations were "better" in America after seeing the film, they did not 
attribute this to positive shifts in attitude (as the USIA hoped) but rather to the forceful 
intervention of the federal government. 
During the 1970s, the terrain of the struggle to integrate American schools shifted. 
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After fmding that many urban school districts- north and south- had manipulated school 
attendance zones to maintain racial segregation, federal courts demanded that school 
districts take affirmative steps to dismantle their dual school systems, even if this meant 
busing students. As an urban school district in the South, Little Rock was one of the first 
communities to be affected by this change, and under a busing plan the city experienced 
meaningful school desegregation for the first time. However, as the focus of the black 
freedom struggle expanded to include northern communities, economic barriers, and 
efforts to exercise political power, national resistance to black activism grew. In part, this 
was expressed in attacks on school busing. As conflict erupted around the nation, in 
Boston and elsewhere, the memory of the 1957 school desegregation crisis and massive 
resistance in Little Rock functioned as a kind of rhetorical anchor- a cultural lodestone 
against which new attacks on black students and school integration efforts were 
measured. Analysis of media coverage of these events reveals the increasingly negative 
tone adopted by the white media, and the emergence of what Jacqueline Dowd Hall has 
called a "narrative breech" between efforts to achieve token integration in the South and 
more wide-ranging attempts to restructure America's educational system nationally.68 
Increasingly, distinctions were drawn between the events of 1957 and those of the 1970s, 
as reporters, cultural observers, and politicians insisted that what was at stake in busing 
cases was fundamentally different. In Little Rock, the city's black media as well as civil 
rights veterans like Daisy Bates and organizations like the NAACP attempted to cross this 
68 Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement," 1236. See also Bond, "The Media 
and the Movement," 17. 
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chasm, drawing connections and arguing that busing was a fulfillment of the goals they 
had struggled for more than a decade earlier. In making these arguments, they deployed 
the symbol of Central High School itself in public ceremonies decrying President Nixon's 
proposal to place a moratorium on school busing as a betrayal of the sacrifice of the Little 
Rock Nine and other African American pioneers. 
Despite these efforts, by the 1980s the "narrative breech" that had emerged in the 
1970s was firmly entrenched and reinforced by the passage of time. In a nation 
transformed by the Reagan revolution, many white Americans appeared eager to believe 
that the civil rights turbulence of the preceding decades was a distant relic of the past. 
Indeed, in Arkansas' capital itself, where the school district attempted to ameliorate the 
effects of white flight by aggressively pursuing an interdistrict urban-suburban remedy in 
the courts, it appeared that perhaps an important comer had been turned. In this context, 
the Little Rock school desegregation story was repackaged and marketed as "history" for 
the first time. However, as a series of memoirs, documentaries, and a made-for-tv 
docudrama appeared, debate about how and by whom this history should be told took 
hold in Arkansas' capital. The narratives that were most warmly embraced by publishers 
and producers were not those of figures like Governor Orval Faubus, who continued to 
try to justify his intervention in 1957, but those of more "moderate" southern whites like 
U.S. Congressman Brooks Hays and Central High Vice Principal of Girls Elizabeth 
Huckaby. Their stories were circulated as eyewitness accounts of"good people" who 
tried to do the right thing under difficult circumstances. Nevertheless, even Hays and 
Huckaby faced criticism that their narratives focused too much attention on 
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"embarrassing" events, and that the depiction of their heroism came at the expense of the 
majority of the citizens of Little Rock. However, by and large the valorization of 
moderates in the city continued unabated, as other "heroes" were identified including 
white members of the Women's Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools who had 
been active during the lost year of 1958-59. 
This embrace of moderation coincided with a retreat from efforts to achieve 
sweeping change in the city's school system. When federal courts ordered only a limited 
interdistrict remedy, and white enrollment and investment in the city's schools continued 
to fall, Little Rock's school administrators would recommit themselves to some of the 
principles southern "moderates" had always stood for in relation to school integration-
gradual change, minimal compliance with court orders, local control of school 
desegregation, residential school attendance, the integration of "exceptional" students in 
"special" programs, and flexible application of federal law. Increasingly they argued that 
efforts to raise test scores, address disciplinary problems, or remedy racial isolation in the 
city's schools were futile in the face of"extemal factors" like poverty that were beyond 
the control of the school district. Like their predecessors in the 1950s, they suggested, 
they were doing the best they could under difficult circumstances. 
Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s, various constituencies in the city were interested 
in marking the fortieth anniversary of the crisis. Political elites in Little Rock hoped to 
recast the 1957 stand-off, reshaping it into a symbol of the transformative changes that 
had swept the city and the south in the intervening decades. However, some members of 
the city's civil rights community believed the official anniversary commemoration was 
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little more than a public relations ploy designed to mask the real face of race relations in 
Little Rock and the problems that continued to grip the city's schools. In the midst of this 
controversy, plans to develop a visitor's center dedicated to interpreting the history of the 
crisis emerged. The planning process surrounding the museum reveals precisely how 
political and cultural elites are able to utilize their connections to dominate public 
discussion and debate and to elevate some historical narratives over others. Although a 
community-based planning committee envisioned the construction of a larger civil rights 
institute, their wishes were sidelined by the museum's board. Without control over the 
funds that would make the project a reality, the planning committee was recast as a "focus 
group" charged with responding to the work of professionals and students associated with 
University of Arkansas Little Rock's public history program. As the exhibit developed, 
museum planners strove to side-step controversy rather than providing a foru!n for debate 
and discussion of the multiple interpretations of the crisis and its legacy that continued to 
circulate in the city. However, these different perspectives emerged at the formal 
commemoration of the anniversary held on the steps of the Central High School as well 
as in editorials and op-eds that surfaced in the days at followed. 
Some of the strongest voices to emerge during the fortieth anniversary were those 
of the Little Rock Nine themselves. After decades of struggling to reconcile themselves 
to their experience, the Little Rock Nine collectively trademarked their name and 
developed a foundation dedicated to sharing the history of their experience and promoting 
the importance of academic excellence. Several of the Little Rock Nine have publicly 
asserted that they were motivated to start sharing their stories out of a desire to counteract 
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histories that downplayed the strength ofLittle Rock's commitment to segregation in 
1957 or dismissed the harassment they experienced as students. Others were troubled by 
triumphal "won cause" narratives that seemed to prevent young people from drawing 
connections between their own circumstances and those of the past. In public speeches 
and published memoirs, members of the Little Rock Nine have articulated their hope that 
their own struggle can serve as a source of inspiration in the post-civil rights era. They 
reject the fatalism that imbues most discussions of racial inequality in the nation's 
schools today, especially arguments that all "practicable" actions have been taken to 
address persistent double-digit achievement gaps and racially isolated schools. In their 
view, these problems require people of conscience to do something and take action. 
Their work falls well with the "corrective" or "prescriptive" African American historical 
tradition, and the lessons they hope to share from Little Rock are very clearly designed to 
preserve "memory for the future." 
This dissertation explores the evolution of the public memory of the Little Rock 
school desegregation crisis as it unfolded over time. Its discussion of the themes outlined 
above is coupled with analysis of the concrete conditions in Little Rock's public schools 
and the evolution of desegregation in the district. Chapters addressing the city's 
relationship to national trends in school desegregation are coupled with those that more 
explicitly address debates related to public memory. In part, this format was adopted to 
provide readers with insight into the distance between the rhetoric of American progress 
and the reality of American race relations. However, it is also rooted in the belief that the 
city's ongoing struggles with school desegregation have shaped the debates that have 
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emerged in the memorial arena and vice versa. The narratives we tell about the civil 
rights movement and its relationship to the present can have profound consequences, 




MINIMAL COMPLIANCE THROUGH PUPIL PLACEMENT, 1959-1964 
In 1958, the Supreme Court had refused to grant the Little Rock school board its 
request for a "cooling-off' period. In Cooper v. Aaron, the justices held that mob 
violence and public protest could not undermine school desegregation plans approved by 
federal courts. The court affirmed that desegregation orders could not be "whittled away, 
watered down, or shamefully withdrawn in the face of violent and unlawful acts of 
individual citizens." However, if the Court stood firmly against mob violence in 1958, it 
did provide southern segregationists with another means to whittle away and water down 
meaningful school desegregation. In Shuttlesworth v. Alabama (1958), the Court upheld 
the state of Alabama's pupil placement law, which provided local school board's with 
considerable power over student assignment. This statute, like others across the South, 
was written in race neutral language and the federal courts found that it was constitutional 
"upon its face." However, in application, pupil placement laws were designed to evade 
the full import of the Brown decision just as surely as other strategies of resistance. 1 In 
the 1960s, the Little Rock school board used its power over student assignment to hold 
integration of the city's schools at token levels. 
1Adam Fairclough, "The Little Rock Crisis: Success or Failure for the NAACP?" Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 56 no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 372; Aaron v. Cooper, No. 16034 (8th Circ., 1958), as 
reproduced in Race Relations Law Reporter 3, no. 4 (August 1958): 643-648; Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1 
(1958); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (Dist. Court, 1958); 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 358 U.S. 101 (1958). 
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Although the African American civil rights community in Little Rock was 
determined to move integration in the city's schools forward with the reopening of 
schools in 1959, school officials who wanted to minimize integration used Arkansas' 
pupil placement provisions to place obstacles in their path. Their intentions became clear 
in August when fifty-nine black students who lived in the appropriate attendance zones 
applied for admission at Central, Hall, and Technical High Schools. Most of the 
applicants were denied admission and were informed that they had been assigned to the 
all-black Horace Mann High School. In response, African American plaintiffs filed 
another complaint with the federal courts, arguing that the school board was continuing to 
discriminate against them. Concerned parents concluded that the "moderates" on Little 
Rock's school board "were genuine segregationists whose actions were just as 
unscrupulous and much more effective than those of the racists."2 They observed that the 
court-approved Blossom plan in the school district had established three clearly 
demarcated geographic attendance zones and had outlined no other qualifications for 
admission to the city's regular high schools other than residence within those zones. In 
departing from this plan, black students and their representatives argued that the school 
board was violating their constitutional rights under the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 
2 As quoted by Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 339. 
3 Norwoodv. Tucker, 287 F. 2d 798 (8th Circ., 1961). See also Minutes ofLittle Rock School 
Board (LRSB), Regular & Executive Meeting., November 23, 1959, p. 16-19. At this meeting, the board 
denied ten applications for reassignment, including that of William Henry Norwood, on the grounds that the 
argument of the black students was without merit, and that the applications had been .submitted with the 
signature of only one parent two late in the year. 
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School Reopens 
Indeed, initially, only six African American students were admitted to Little 
Rock's formerly white high schools in 1959- three at Hall High School and three at 
Central. As many observers noted, this was a reduction in the number of black pupils 
assigned to Little Rock's traditionally white schools. Moreover, with students divided 
between the two high schools, Little Rock's pioneers in school integration would find 
themselves even more isolated in classrooms and hallways. The three students admitted 
to Central were veterans of the 1957-58 school year: Elizabeth Eckford, Jefferson 
Thomas and Carlotta Wails. But two other members of the original Little Rock Nine, 
Thelma Mothershed and Melba Patillo, were denied readmission. The rest of the Little 
Rock Nine had left the state. While the schools in Little Rock were closed, graduate 
Ernest Green had enrolled at Michigan State to continue his studies, the families of 
Terrence Roberts and Gloria Ray had relocated to Los Angeles and Kansas City 
respectively, and Minnijean Brown continued to attend high school in New York the year 
after her expulsion. When the schools reopened in the fall of 1959, Eckford had earned 
enough credit through correspondence courses to graduate and only Thomas and Walls 
would return to Central. Ultimately, after making appeals to the school board, three 
additional requests for reassignment from Horace Mann to Central were approved, and 
Sybil Jordan, Frank Henderson, and Sandra Johnson would join them.4 
4 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 142-143, 160. See also Melba Pattillo Beals, White is a 
State of Mind: A Memoir (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1999). In this sequel to her more well-known 
text, Warriors Don't Cry, Beals describes her decision to leave Little Rock and the personal turmoil she 
experienced in the decade following the stand-off at Central High School. 
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In its assessment of conditions in Arkansas in August 1959, the Southern 
Regional Council (SRC) believed that conditions in Little Rock had improved over the 
proceeding two years and that city officials were better prepared to implement and 
enforce the integration plan than they had been in 1957. The organization believed that 
"disenchantment" with the course of massive resistance had emerged in the city of Little 
Rock during the school closures, and that the recall of segregationists on the school board 
provided evidence of "popular unwillingness" to follow the course of massive resistance 
outlined by Governor Faubus. The civil rights organization concluded that "the stiffening 
of local opposition" was motivated by "the growing feeling that the administration was 
irresponsible and oppressive," apprehension "over the effects of the controversy on the 
local economy," concern about the "hardship being imposed on ... children," 
acknowledgment that the federal courts were an "immovable object," and a general 
distaste for the "notoriety" that accompanied resistance to school integration. However, 
the SRC also observed that Governor Faubus continued to inflame sentiment in the city 
by predicting that the federal government would need "live ammunition" to carry out 
desegregation in Little Rock and publicly stating that he would not intervene in the event 
of violence. 5 
On the opening day of classes, a crowd of recalcitrant segregationists gathered at 
the Arkansas State Capitol to hear the Governor make a speech and then proceeded 
toward Central High School with the intention of disrupting desegregation once again. 
5 Southern Research Council (SRC), "A Background Report on School Desegregation for 1959-
60," August 10, 1959, in Desegregation, Schools General, 1959, Box 101, Part III: A Administrative File, 
1909-1969, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
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Capital Citizens' Council leader Amis Guthridge protested that the board's pupil 
placement plan was little more than a scheme designed to "deceive local white parents." 
He asserted, "If six Negroes can force their entrance unnecessarily into two white high 
schools, than 600 will have the same right."6 Sentiments like these animated the crowd of 
demonstrators. When the mob refused to disperse, Police Chief Eugene G. Smith 
unleashed fire hoses to control the crowd, and arrested two dozen of those who resisted 
his authority. Shortly thereafter, classes began at Central High School. Of the original 
Little Rock Nine, Carlotta Walls had not yet returned to the city from summer school, but 
Jefferson Thomas returned and climbed the steps of the building once again. He was 
accompanied by a friend who understood more than most what it meant to go to school 
under threat of mob violence- Elizabeth Eckford. She did not want him to have to face 
the day alone.7 
Pupil Placement and Selective Screening 
In the days, months, and years that followed, Faubus and other promoters of 
"massive resistance" would not be able to bring public education or the integration 
process in the city of Little Rock to a complete standstill ever again. In the immediate 
aftermath of Brown, southern states, including Arkansas, had adopted a wide array of 
measures to prevent any integration of the schools. Legislatures passed laws to close 
public schools or withhold state funds from districts ordered by courts to desegregate. 
6 As quoted by Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 339. 
7 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 160-162; Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 163-
165; Anthony Lewis and The New York Times, Portrait of a Decade: The Second American Revolution 
(New York: Random House, 1964), 69; Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 343-346. 
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They repealed compulsory attendance laws, and encouraged or authorized the 
development of private schools, while providing students with tuition grants to defray 
expenses. They provided public funds to school districts to fight desegregation cases in 
the courts, passed anti-barratry laws targeted at the NAACP, and authorized segregation 
committees and sovereignty commissions to investigate those calling for integration or 
even the preservation of the public school system. 8 
However, as these measures were declared unconstitutional by federal courts, an 
increasing number of states, led by the example of North Carolina, permitted token levels 
of integration to defuse the threat oflegal action. However, in doing so, they adopted 
pupil placement laws and so-called freedom-of-choice plans designed to keep 
desegregation to a minimum. The burden was placed on black parents and civil rights 
organizations, like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, to exhaust "available administrative 
remedies" and then file law suits seeking court orders to proceed with substantial 
integration. When this was accomplished, another obstacle was frequently erected in their 
place.9 
The situation was no different in Little Rock, Arkansas. As noted above, after the 
futile gesture of closing its public high schools for the 1958-1959 school year, the city 
8 For detailed information on which states adopted these measures see Reed Sarratt, The Ordeal of 
Desegregation: The First Decade (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 31-35, 42, 46, table 4. See also 
Lewis and The New York Times, Portrait of a Decade,298; Benjamin Muse, Ten Years of Prelude (New 
York: Viking Press, 1964), 67-70, 230-232. Muse notes that as "massive resistance" collapsed more and 
more states adopted a strategy of token compliance. 
9 Ibid. Indeed, Little Rock's Chamber of Commerce explicitly supported the use of pupil 
placement laws on precisely these grounds in a newspaper ad printed on March 25, 1959 (Karen Anderson, 
Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010], 
184). 
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continued to proceed with its court-ordered desegregation plan by admitting a handful of 
students to Central and Hall High Schools. However, under Little Rock's pupil 
placement plan, the number of students admitted was kept as low as possible. Students 
applying for transfer were required to fill out a 17 -section questionnaire with their parent 
or guardian and to submit to an oral examination. In the early 1960s, these applications 
were weighed individually by the school board, and requests could be denied for any 
number ofreasons. 10 The most liberal member ofthe board, Ted Lamb, publicly accused 
his colleagues of using this procedure as a "devious means" by which they hoped to "out-
trick, out-maneuver and defy the federal government."11 However, the majority of white 
moderates in the city embraced this token approach to integration. 12 
The school board adopted these procedures under Arkansas' pupil placement 
statutes. These laws were adopted to prevent the assignment of students- black and 
white- to schools based on their geographic residence alone. Although they were written 
in race-neutral language in the hope of escaping constitutional review, they were designed 
to prevent rapid desegregation. 13 The legislature argued that assignment based on the 
10 "Little Rock Moves to Spur Integration," The New York Times, March 25, 1964. 
11 Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation, 89. 
12 The editorial board of the Arkansas Gazette applauded the pupil placement procedures. See Ben 
F. Johnson III, "After 1957: Resisting Integration in Little Rock," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 66, no. 2 
(Summer 2007): 271. 
13 These measures were first promoted by Governor Orval Faubus as viable and effective 
alternatives to the interposition amendment advocated by his segregationist rival Jim Johnson in the 1956 
Democratic primary. The first Pupil Assignment Bill passed the legislature in 1955. Another Pupil 
Placement Act was also passed in the wake of the school desegregation crisis in 1959 (Freyer, "Politics and 
Law in the Little Rock Crisis," 154). Historian John A. Kirk has noted that the strategy of"minimum 
compliance" embodied in the pupil placement acts "was a diluted form of resistance, providing a subtle and 
insidious way offrustrating the process of school desegregation." He has asserted, "Although massive 
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"rigid rule of proximity of residence or in accordance solely on behalf of the pupils would 
be disruptive to orderly administration, tend to invite or induce disorganization and 
impose an excessive burden on the available resources and teaching and administrative 
personnel of the schools." The Act passed in 1959 allowed for the use of criteria like the 
"qualifications, motivations, aptitudes, and characteristics" of individual pupils to be 
considered in student registration. In 1959 and 1960, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that pupil placement laws were "facially valid" and that school boards, like 
the one in Little Rock, could utilize pupil placement criteria like these "so long as they 
are not applied in an artificial manner and for the purpose of continuing segregation."14 
However, in Little Rock, the selective criteria suggested in the pupil placement 
statutes were clearly being used to maintain a dual school system. Only the registration 
forms of African American pupils who chose not to enroll at Little Rock's black high 
school, Horace Mann, were marked with a "C/PP"- an abbreviation for "Colored/Pupil 
Placement." Forty-nine students- 32 white and 17 black- appealed their assignment 
through procedures outlined by the board. All of the African American students, but 
resistance and minimum compliance first appeared quite different approaches, in the years following Brown 
those differences quickly narrowed as the two combined to undermine the process of school desegregation 
across the South" (Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 93, 101-103). Karen Anderson has noted that the use 
of pupil placement laws as a means of minimizing change played a crucial role in the development of "race 
neutral" legal strategies that were nevertheless "suffused with racist assumptions and designed to sustain 
white supremacy." She emphasizes that these strategies developed during the civil rights struggles of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s rather than as a part of a ''white backlash" in the late 1960s and 1970s. The use 
of pupil placement laws in Little Rock and elsewhere, she contends, ''reveal with particular clarity the racial 
roots of 'race-blind' legal theory and institutional practices in the postwar era" (Anderson, Little Rock: Race 
and Resistance at Central High School, 50, 229). 
14 As noted in Norwood v. Tucker, 281 F. 2d 798 (8th Circ., 1961 ). The laws were upheld as 
"facially valid" in Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Circ., 1959) and Dove v. Parham, 282 F. 2d 256 (81h 
Circ., 1960). 
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only three of the white students, were subjected to psychological and intelligence testing, 
and home visits from social workers. 15 lbree-quarters of the white applications were 
approved, while more than four-fifths of the applications submitted by black students 
were denied. As noted above, only three additional African American students were 
assigned to Central High School as a result of this process by the beginning of the 1959-
60 school year. The racial disparity in the board's treatment of transfer requests is even 
more evident when one considers that all of the white students seeking reassignment were 
applying to attend schools outside their attendance zone, while all but one of the black 
students seeking reassignment were attempting to attend schools within their residential 
neighborhoods. 16 
While oral hearings were conducted as a routine part of reassignment procedures 
for both white and black students, only the African American students were extensively 
cross-examined. The board found several of the black applicants "'evasive,' 
'disrespectful,' 'hostile,' 'uncooperative' or as having 'improper attitudes."' One ofthe 
plaintiffs who accused the board of racial discrimination was denied reassignment on the 
grounds that "While an attitude of 'sticking up for one's rights' is normally to be 
commended, this attitude could create an unbearable problem from the standpoint of the 
Board's efficient and effective operation of the schools in an extremely difficult transition 
15 Central High student Sybil Jordan recalled being subjected to "psychological testing by someone 
in the Little Rock Public School system which included the Rorschach test followed by personal interviews 
with the school board members" (Gordy, Finding the Lost Year, 169). 
16 Norwoodv. Tucker, 287 F. 2d 798 (8th Circ., 1961). 
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period."17 Under the guise of"all deliberate speed," the Little Rock school board 
believed it had significant leeway to control the pace of change in the district. Indeed, 
this comment revealed that district officials believed their prerogatives even permitted 
them to the deny the exercise of the constitutional rights recognized in the Brown 
decision. 
These practices continued during reassignment hearings for the 1960-1961 school 
year. School board minutes reveal how "selective" criteria could be utilized to minimize 
the number of transfer requests granted. In July of 1960, tenth-grader Howard Leon 
Bryels and his mother were subjected to close questioning from school board members. 
Bryels expressed a desire to attend Central because it was closer to his home and he 
would be able to walk or ride a bus to attend classes. The board dismissed this request 
on the grounds, in part, that Bryels home was only seven blocks closer to Central than 
Mann and that proximity was "not a factor of any significance in his case." Moreover, 
despite the fact that the student had an "average academic record" and "good adjustment 
inventory," the board concluded that his transfer would be "detrimental to his best 
interests and would undoubtedly adversely affect the curriculum and academic program 
and standards and academic progress of other students at Central." Perhaps most 
significantly, the board frowned on the revelation that Bryels had attended "mass 
meetings" and consulted with Attorney John Walker, who represented African American 
plaintiffs in the school desegregation litigation, as well as L.C. Bates, the husband of the 
Little Rock Nine's mentor Daisy Bates. The board used this information to argue that 
17 Norwoodv. Tucker, 287 F. 2d 798 (8th Circ., 1961). 
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Bryels' statements in his oral hearing had been unduly influenced by outside forces and 
were not a true reflection of his preferences. Other students were also closely questioned 
about their contacts with Walker and Bates, and the purpose of any meetings they had 
attended related to their requests for reassignment. 18 District officials seemed determined 
to screen out any students who had contact with local civil rights leaders. 
School administrators insisted that the use of selective criteria, and the admission 
of only a small number of hand-picked African American students, was necessary. The 
school board consulted with high school counselors on the academic success and social 
"adjustment" of each of the black students attending Central and Hall High Schools 
during the 1959-60 school year. Oriana Hensley, a counselor at Central High, contended 
that a "selective procedure" in the admittance of African American students was critically 
important. If students were admitted on the basis of their geographic residence, "the 
entire educational program would be disrupted," she argued. In part, this was because 
Arkansas law permitted white students to transfer out of integrated classrooms into 
segregated classes. If large numbers of African American pupils were admitted to 
Centrai, Hensley contended, "scheduling would be most <Jifficult, if not impossible." 
Minnie Lee Mayhan of Hall High, argued that careful selection of the "best youngsters" 
might have a positive impact on their "acceptance" in white schools over a long period of 
time. Although both counselors acknowledged that the students who had applied for 
18 LRSB, Special Meeting, July 8, 1960; LRSB, Special Meeting Findings, August 5, 1960. As 
Karen Anderson has noted these meetings were scheduled to "inform black students of their legal rights and 
to devise strategies so that more might successfully negotiate the board's arcane review procedure" 
(Anderson, Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School, 208-209). 
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admission to white schools were motivated by a desire for better education, rather than 
"publicity," they questioned the academic ability of most black students in the district. 
Mayahan contended that the "average colored youngster can't survive at Hall." However, 
with the retention of selective admissions, both women recommended that the integration 
program should proceed at the high school level. 19 
As the complaints of the African American students wound their way through the 
federal court system, these rationalizations proved to be insufficient. Upon reviewing the 
way the pupil placement statute was being applied in the Little Rock School District, the 
gth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the school board was utilizing its procedures 
"for the purpose of impeding, thwarting, and frustrating integration." The "educational 
principles and theories" advanced by the board and school administrators in defense of 
their program could not be used to "justify such a result." Even if the pupil placement 
statutes were facially valid, their application was not. If the board intended to continue to 
assign students under the pupil placement statutes, they were responsible for applying 
them objectively in initial student assignments as well as in requests for transfer or 
reassignment. They could not treat white and black students differently. Moreover, the 
board was obligated to take "affirmative action" towards achieving "more than token" 
integration in its schools. The judges on the gth Circuit warned the district that if their 
pupil placement provisions stymied or failed to dismantle the dual education system in 
Little Rock, the board would have to develop other means to desegregate its schools.20 
19 LRSB, Special Meeting, August 5, 1960. 
20 Norwoodv. Tucker, 287 F. 2d 798 (8th Circ., 1961). 
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"Painfully Slow" Desegregation 
In response to this legal pressure, the city's junior high schools were 
"desegregated" in 1961-62. Liberal school board member Ted Lamb publicly insisted 
that it was time the board complied with the intention of federal court orders and 
"awakened" to its "moral and legal responsibilities, that are part of participating in and 
living in the Twentieth Century." The Arkansas Council on Human Relations applauded 
this stance and credited Lamb with "spearheading" the effort to expand school 
desegregation in the district.21 Even so, only 48 African American students were assigned 
to white junior and senior high schools the next year despite overcrowding in Little 
Rock's black schools. Civil rights attorney Wiley A. Branton argued that this slow 
progress hardly amounted to a serious commitment to move beyond token integration. 
For their part, school board representatives continued to argue that the success ofthe 
desegregation program should not be measured by the number of black students attending 
white schools but rather by their acceptance at those institutions.22 
In 1963, the plan was extended to the first and fourth grades, and a year later, 
African Americans students were theoretically able to apply for transfers to attend any of 
the city's formerly white schools.23 Even so, by the 1963-1964 academic year, in a school 
district with approximately 16,000 white students and 7,000 black students, only 118 
21 Correspondence from June 12, 1961-December 27, 1962, Box 8-82, Series I: Office Files, 
Arkansas Council on Human Relations Records (ACHR), MS Ar4, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. 
22 "White Schools' Negro Student Total Attacked," Arkansas Gazette, September 1, 1961, in 
Desegregation, Schools, Arkansas, General, 1956-1964, Box 98, Part ill: A Administrative File, 1909-
1969, NAACP Papers. 
23 Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation, 89. 
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black students attended classes at 15 formerly all-white schools. Seven years after the 
Little Rock Nine endured harassment inside and outside Central High School, the number 
of African American students attending classes there had only increased to 33 out of a 
student body of2,100. No white students attended any of the city's traditionally black 
schools.24 
In 1963, New York Times reporter Gertrude Samuels visited the city and 
concluded that the city's integration plan was little more than "tokenism plus." Samuels 
concluded that the school board had taken a "negative and resistant" approach to school 
integration, "doing as little as humanly possible" to comply with court orders. She found 
that the limited changes that had taken place were the result of sustained pressure from 
the black community. During her visits to Central, Samuels contended that the few black 
students there were "lost in the crowd," rebuffed by their fellow students and isolated 
during assemblies and in the cafeteria. She also reported that communication between 
white and black pupils was strained, and those few interracial friendships that developed 
in the hallways ended "at the final bell and the school door." White students who were 
interviewed said that they chose not to cross the color line because they were afraid of 
being "stigmatized or scorned by their friends. "25 
Social barriers were most frequently breached on the athletic field, but African 
American students were still discouraged from participating in other extracurricular 
24 Fred L. Zimmerman, "Little Rock Revisited: Racial Calm Marks City Once Tom by Violence," 
Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1963. 
25 Gertrude Samuels, "Little Rock Revisited- Tokenism Plus: Five years after the Battle of Central 
High, the school system is being desegregated as slowly as possible. But outside the schools the city is 
moving forward," New York Times Magazine, June 2, 1963. 
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activities like the high school's band. Moreover, no black student had ever attended a 
Central High class banquet or prom. During an interview with Samuels, graduating 
senior Leslie Jordan reflected, "I guess we will miss Central- but not like you'd normally 
miss a school." Jordan felt she had "missed a lot" during high school, but believed she 
had learned important lessons about racism in American society. She believed the 
obstacles she encountered at Central prepared her for the larger challenges that lay ahead. 
"At least we know what to expect as we go ahead now," she said.26 
The civil rights community in Little Rock was increasingly disheartened by the 
"painfully slow" pace of progress in the district. African American school patrons-
students, parents, and their friends- met once a month to discuss their grievances. The 
Committee on Better Education, as this group was called, was led by L.W. Jordan, the 
father of two students who had attended Central High School. The parents on the 
committee shared their first-hand knowledge of the conditions confronting African 
American pupils in the district with the larger civil rights community in Little Rock, 
including the NAACP, the Urban League, and the Arkansas Council on Human 
Relations. 27 
In August 1963, Little Rock's Negro Council on Community Affairs (COCA) 
formally filed a complaint based on the committee's findings with the school board, 
noting that at the present rate of progress it would take "450 years to completely 
261bid. 
27 "School Board's Concessions End Boycott Threat," Southern School News 10, no. 11 (May 
1964), in OVl: Topical File, Cartoon, Central High School, Little Rock, Part II: Oversize 1956-1964, 
NAACP Papers. 
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desegregate our school system." By the early 1960s, COCA functioned as an umbrella 
organization designed to help coordinate civil rights activity in the city.28 The 
organization urged the board to abandon its pupil assignment procedures and assign 
students to school solely on the basis of geographic residence. The organization accused 
school officials of continuing to apply selective criteria in a discriminatory manner. Even 
after the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals had issued its stem warning to city officials to apply 
its criteria with an even hand, COCA observed, "White children are always assigned to 
the 'white' school of their attendance area and run the gamut of assignment plan 
procedures only when seeking to attend a school outside their attendance area." In 
contrast, "A Negro child is always initially assigned to a segregated Negro school 
regardless ofhis proximity to a white school. He must travel the route of pupil 
assignment procedures should he choose not to attend a distant segregated [N]egro school 
even though he lives next door to a desegregated school." In essence, the civil rights 
organization was serving notice that it had not escaped their attention that these practices 
continued in direct violation of federal court orders.29 
The Council on Community Affairs also called for the correction of other 
28 At its founding, the Council on Community Affairs was composed of two representatives from 
each black community organization in the city of Little Rock with the notable exception of the NAACP, 
which continued to define its own priorities. When their goals coincided, COCA and the NAACP worked 
together cooperatively. Within a few years of its founding, COCA also appealed to representatives of 
SNCC for assistance with desegregating downtown public accommodations and placed a stronger emphasis 
on garnering "broad support" for its programs from the black community itself and not just its leadership 
(Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 134, 150-151; Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 150). 
29 Council on Community Affairs to Mr. Everett Tucker Jr., President of the Little Rock Public 
Schools Board of Education, August 29, 1963, as transcribed into the board's minutes, LRSB, Executive 
Meeting, November21, 1963. See also "Little Rock Schools Quiet," The New York Times, August 31, 
1963. 
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problems in the district. It asked the school board to recognize the constitutional right of 
African American pupils to participate in all school activities, including extracurricular 
activities and vocational training programs. The organization called for the employment 
of African American educators in administrative offices, raises for teachers and non-
professional staff working in the schools, and the development of an interracial advisory 
committee dedicated to resolving racial tension in the district. If the school board 
harbored the hope that "racial harmony" would emerge in the city without confronting 
these issues or moving "swiftly toward the noble objective of a better education for all 
children free from the eroding effects of segregation," they were mistaken. COCA 
asserted, "There is no reason to encourage the belief that Negroes will relent in their 
natural aspirations for full and complete citizenship rights." While the board might have 
adopted its pupil placement criteria to minimize integration and white resistance to 
desegregating the city's schools, the civil rights organization's perspective was different. 
"Peace is not to be desired over justice," the group wamed.30 
The school board summarily rejected this appeal in November of 1963. The 
board argued that it operated well within its bounds when it assigned students to schools 
according to its own criteria. Moreover, board members contended that assignment based 
on geographic attendance zones would result in "hundreds of children of each race" being 
"forced" at attend integrated schools regardless of their preferences.31 In other forums, 
30 Ibid. 
31 Board ofDirectors of the Little Rock School District (4-2) to Dr. W.H. Townsend, President of 
the Council on Community Affairs, November 1962, as transcribed in the board's minutes, LRSB, 
Executive Meeting, November 21, 1962. 
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district attorneys had contended that reliance on geographic attendance zones would 
produce "compulsory integration," an outcome that they believed was not mandated by 
the Brown v. Board of Education decision or desired by white or black pupils in the 
district.32 In its response to COCA's petition, the board noted that pupil placement 
procedures had not been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, nor had "non-
overlapping attendance zones" been required by the Court's decisions to date. The board 
also suggested that the low number of African American students attending classes in 
Little Rock's formerly all-white institutions was not the result of institutional 
discrimination, but rather the low number of black pupils who chose to appeal for 
reassignment. "As you know," the board wrote, ''the proper measure of progress in 
desegregation is not the number that have exercised a right to attend a school with another 
race, but the number to whom this right is available." The board also rejected COCA's 
other suggestions, contending that decisions related to employment, salary and wage 
increases, as well as decisions related to school desegregation fell within their purview 
and were not the concerns of outside organizations or an interracial advisory committee. 33 
By the spring of the 1963-1964 school year, COCA had resolved to press its 
complaint forward by other means. Without the financial or legal support of the NAACP, 
COCA was not equipped to move integration forward through court litigation. However, 
32 "White Schools' Negro Student Total Attacked," Arkansas Gazette, September 1, 1961, in 
Desegregation, Schools, Arkansas, General, 1956-1964, Box 98, Part III:A Administrative File, 1909-1969, 
NAACP Papers. 
33 Board of Directors ofthe Little Rock School District (4-2) to Dr. W.H. Townsend, President of 
the Council on Community Affairs, November 1962, as transcribed in the board's minutes, LRSB, 
Executive Meeting, November 21, 1962. 
62 
with the assistance of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the 
organization began to plan a boycott ofLittle Rock schools scheduled for April6, 1964.34 
This threat proved to be more effective in provoking the desired response from the school 
board. Three days before the boycott, the Little Rock school board issued a series of 
"policy statements" designed to demonstrate their "good faith" effort towards making 
"peaceful and satisfactory progress" with school desegregation. The board promised to 
apply pupil placement laws and comply with federal court orders "without prejudice or 
bias," and to allow students to participate in all school activities and organizations 
"provided the student meets all requirements and qualifications." Board members also 
pledged to desegregate the district's vocational programs, to increase the salaries of 
cafeteria employees, and to make "an effort to find fully qualified negro [sic] applicants 
for vacancies at the central administrative leveL" Although the board suggested that their 
statement merely reaffirmed existing policies, they had made concessions on several 
points. Nevertheless, the board continued to express "satisfaction with the pace of school 
desegregation. "35 
The board's desire to demonstrate its "good faith" in relation to school 
desegregation may have been motivated by more than the hope that it would be able to 
avert an embarrassing school boycott. By the mid-1960s, it was becoming evident that 
34 Donald Janson, "Racial Unrest Grips Little Rock as Negroes Plan School Boycott," The New 
York Times, April2, 1964, p. 19; Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 161. 
35 "Policy Statements Concerning Desegregation of the Little Rock Public School," LRSB, 
Executive Meeting, April3, 1964, p. 3-4; "School Board's Concessions End Boycott Threat," Southern 
School News 10, no. 11 (May 1964); Donald Janson, "Little Rock Bows on School Issues: Negroes Call of 
Boycott- Integration Study Starts," The New York Times, April4, 1964, p. 12. 
63 
the nation's patience with the slow pace of school desegregation in the south was wearing 
thin. Pupil placement statutes would become increasingly difficult to defend in the wake 
ofthe 1964 Civil Rights Act, which threatened to withhold funds from school districts 
that refused to comply with federal law. Indeed, in the absence of significant progress 
towards dismantling dual school systems, federal courts viewed such assignment 
procedures with increasing suspicion. By the end of the decade, the Supreme Court 
would resoundingly reject the Little Rock school board's contention that "the proper 
measure of progress in desegregation is not the number that have exercised a right to 
attend a school with another race."36 In the future, school boards would have to 
demonstrate that they were taking effective action in relation school desegregation by the 
results their plans produced. In the meantime, the sobering fact that only 1.18% of 
African American school children in the 11 former states of the Confederacy were 
attending schools with whites ten years after the Brown v. Board of Education decision 
continued to be a source of national and international embarrassment. 37 
36 As Anthony Lewis of the The New York Times observed, "By the end of the 1954-64 decade, the 
federal courts looked through the mask of intricate southern school schemes and bean demanding genuine 
equality," (Portrait of a Decade, 30 1-302). 
37 For detailed statistics provided by the Southern Education Reporting Service on school 
desegregation by state in 1964 see Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation, 359, table 1. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
"IT IS ONLY CONVINCING IF THEY SAY IT IS": 
COLD WAR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS, 
AND DOCUMENTARY FILM 
In 1964, America's propaganda arm abroad- the United States Information 
Agency (USIA)-- produced one of the first retrospective assessments of the Little Rock 
school desegregation crisis and its impact. In partnership with writer and director 
Charles Guggenheim, the agency designed the motion picture Nine From Little Rock to 
reshape the way international audiences interpreted the events of 1957, while presenting 
a picture of American progress in race relations, particularly in the field of education. 
The film adopted a biographical approach, revisiting Central High School and several 
members of the Little Rock Nine to document the opportunities they had pursued after 
graduation. The film's carefully scripted and edited vignettes were meant to demonstrate 
that the nine students, the city of Little Rock, and America itselfhad transcended the 
racial violence and discrimination that remained a "blot upon the fair name and high 
honor" of the nation. 
This narrative of progress served the interests of the state at home and abroad. As 
the civil rights movement and the Cold War unfolded concurrently, questions and 
concerns about American race relations acquired increased importance. The USIA 
struggled to reshape unfavorable foreign public opinion by recasting the way the civil 
rights movement was presented to international audiences. Rather than focusing on the 
violence and domestic unrest that marked the African American struggle for equal access 
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to educational opportunity and civil rights, the agency chose to focus on the intervention 
of the federal government and even the most modest improvements in American race 
relations. In films like Nine From Little Rock, U.S. officials did so by highlighting the 
achievements of exceptional individuals to illustrate that life for African Americans was 
improving in the United States, and that the nation's commitment to the rule oflaw and 
democratic government provided the framework for such change to take place. As 
Leigh Raiford and Renee Romano noted in their introduction to The Civil Rights 
Movement in American Memory, describing the civil rights struggle "as a shining 
example of the success of American democracy," allows the movement to become "proof 
of the vitality of America's legal and political institutions, and evidence of the nation's 
ongoing quest to live up to its founding ideals of egalitarianism and justice."1 Whether 
international audiences would embrace the USIA's reinterpretation of events in Little 
Rock remained an open question. 
Little Rock's International Impact 
The school desegregation crisis provoked international outrage when Arkansas 
Governor Orval Faubus called out the National Guard to prevent nine African American 
students from attending classes at Little Rock Central High School. As reports and 
images of the military guard and the mob that harassed the students on the school 
grounds circled the globe, the incident revealed that American race relations had not 
improved as much as the United States had led the world to believe. Within days, "Little 
Rock" became a symbol of American racism, and a standing rebuke to the United States' 
efforts to project itself as a beacon of freedom, democracy, and equality. A newspaper in 
1 Romano and Raiford, eds., The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, xvi-xvii. 
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Indonesia remarked, "Americans should ask themselves ... whether Governor Faubus 
should not be hauled before the Un-American Activities Committee for alienating half 
the world from the United States."2 While the Soviet Union made the most of the crisis, 
often simply republishing wire reports from American news organizations, editorial 
writers around the world commented on the impact the event ~ould have on nation's 
standing in the Cold War.3 
President Eisenhower himself recognized the international implications of the 
crisis in his televised address to the American people explaining his decision to intervene 
and send federal troops to Arkansas to patrol the school grounds, control the mob, and 
escort the Little Rock Nine to and from school. Eisenhower never publicly supported the 
Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision, and he only deployed the 101 st 
Airborne reluctantly after attempts to broker a solution to the crisis with Governor 
Faubus had failed.4 In his address, the President acknowledged the authority of the 
Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution and the responsibility of the Executive 
branch ofthe federal government to enforce the law as the court defined it. However, he 
also emphasized the importance of resolving the crisis in order to "restore the image of 
America" around the globe. The President asserted, "At a time when we face grave 
2 Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 122-135, quote p. 135. 
3 Mary L. Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image 
of American Democracy," Southern California Law Review 70, no. 6 (September 1997): 1670-1674, 1691. 
4 Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 73-74; Lewis and The New York Times, Portrait of a Decade, 10-
11, 46-47, 109. Lewis notes, "Eisenhower's failure to speak out for compliance with the Supreme court 
decision between 1954 and 1957 had left the moderates without leadership at a crucial time- and 
encouraged the Faubuses to think they could defY the courts ... it surely was one of the great ironies of our 
time that a President who was so genuinely reluctant to use federal power and who took so cautious and 
gradual approach to racial change should have been responsible for this great act of intervention," (I 09). 
67 
situations abroad because of the hatred that Communism bears toward a system of 
government based on human rights, it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is 
being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation in the 
world." He contended that the nation's enemies were "gloating over this incident and 
using it everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation" by suggesting that the United 
States was violating the Charter of the United Nations. America could only redeem itself 
in the "eyes of the world" by restoring the city of Little Rock to its "normal habits," and 
preserving and respecting the law.5 Radio Moscow picked up on the President's 
emphasis on this point and mockingly suggested that Eisenhower "showed more concern 
with the international repercussions of the events in Little Rock than with the actual 
violations of human rights and democratic practices there."6 Indeed, Eisenhower had not 
used the occasion to affirm the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education 
or to underscore the importance of protecting African American civil rights. 
Eisenhower's intervention received applause from some comers, but overall the 
Little Rock school desegregation crisis had a negative impact on foreign public opinion. 
An Indonesian newspaper reported that "all the patient good will garnered by the 
American Foreign Service, ICA, and USIS dissipated in a manner of minutes" when 
5 For further discussion about Eisenhower's action in response to international criticism see Azza 
Salama Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies, 1941-1960 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 109; Cary Fraser, "Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower 
Administration and the Dilemma of Race for U.S. Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 24, no. 2 (Spring 
2000): 247; Harold R. Isaacs, "World Affairs and U.S. Race Relations: A Note on Little Rock," The Public 
Opinion Quarterly 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1958): 366. 
6 Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global 
Arena (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 104. 
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news of the event reached the region. 7 The State Department received critical letters 
from a wide spectrum of individuals abroad, but the department was particularly sensitive 
to those written by "opinion makers" such as labor unions, professional organizations, 
university students, cultural elites, political parties, and government leaders. 8 In addition 
to strongly condemning the mob violence in Little Rock, these letters revealed that the 
United States' credibility and authority in international affairs had been severely 
damaged. "Before America can tackle any international problem, she should first and 
foremost show a clean record at home and we believe this is a prerequisite to American 
success abroad," the Uganda National Congress wrote President Eisenhower. "We are 
aware of the American policy of establishing influence in the emergence of African 
countries but we would like to inform you and the people of American that such attempts 
are incompatible with events in your country. Mr. President, your Congress has been 
scandalized and the American prestige and respect are at stake ... [We] will never 
cooperate with any country whose racial policy is short of equality and our emphasis is 
doubled in the event of treating [N]egroes on a standard short ofhuman dignity."9 
Likewise, figures like Nelson Mandela dismissed U.S. warnings about communist 
influence in Africa by asserting that African National Congress did "not require any 
7 As quoted in Michael Krenn, Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 
1945-1969 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 105. 
8 Azza Salama Layton, "International Pressure and the U.S. Government's Response to Little 
Rock," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 263. 
9 As quoted by Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies, 122-130. 
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school from the U.S.A., which should learn to put its own house in order before trying to 
teach everyone else."10 
Public affairs officers, American diplomats, and foreign service agents reported 
that the fallout from Little Rock was having an immediate impact on American foreign 
policy objectives abroad. Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations 
wrote the President, "Here at the United Nations I can see clearly the harm that the riots 
in Little Rock are doing to our foreign relations. More than two-thirds of the world is 
non-white and the reactions of the representatives of these people are easy to see." 
Objections to conditions in the United States were more than just rhetoric; Lodge 
suggested that the United States had lost votes on critical issues because of the crisis.n 
Moreover, the crisis had provided the Soviet Union with a counterweight to challenge the 
United States in debates over the USSR's violations of human rights in Hungary. In the 
United Nations, the Soviets questioned the sincerity of the United States' moral 
objections given the "unbelievable crimes and violations of the most elementary human 
rights taking place in the southern United States."12 Lodge advised the Eisenhower 
administration to take action to defuse the damage done to American prestige and 
influence, not by moving forward with serious reforms, but rather by extending a loan to 
India and reaching out to nonwhite dignitaries around the globe.13 
10 As quoted by Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 104. 
u Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 131. 
12 Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies, 97. 
13 Fraser, "Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock," 253, 258. 
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Average citizens abroad expressed overwhelmingly negative opinions about the 
crisis and American race relations. In a "flash" survey conducted during the first week 
of October 1957, the United States Information Agency measured reactions to the events 
in Arkansas in Amsterdam, Athens, Brussels, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Helsinki, London, 
Mexico City, New Dehli, Oslo, Paris, and Stockholm. The agency discovered that very 
large majorities (in some cases as high as 99% of those surveyed) were aware of the 
Little Rock incident and that most of these individuals were aware that the dispute 
involved racial conflict about schools. The survey also confirmed that "unfavorable 
news" about the United States had overwhelmed any positive indicators of change, like 
the civil rights legislation that had recently passed Congress. The USIA found that 
opinion varied considerably from city to city as to whether those polled believed that the 
majority of United States citizens approved or disapproved of school integration. 
However, majorities in every locale agreed that treatment of African Americans in the 
United States was poor, and that despite the efforts of the U.S. federal government, "on 
balance, Negro-white relations have been worsening rather than improving over the past 
few years. " 14 Indeed, trend indexes indicated that public opinion on American race 
relations had been suppressed prior to the Little Rock school desegregation crisis due to 
the Autherine Lucy case at the University of Alabama in 1956. According to the USIA, 
Lucy's case had become an "international cause celebre" that had lowered American 
standing on the subject of race to such a degree that it was "not readily susceptible to 
14 USIA Research and Reference Service, "Public Reactions to Little Rock in Major World 
Capitals," SR-8, October 29, 1957, in Box 1, Entry 1012, Record Group 306, United States Information 
Agency (USIA) Papers, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
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further decrease." However, the agency believed that Little Rock may have "had 
considerable effect in confirming and solidifying already held unfavorable attitudes."15 
By December 1958, the State Department concurred with this assessment and 
concluded that Little Rock was "definitely adverse to our interests." The Department 
admitted that the conflict had created a "solid target for anti-American propaganda." 
This impact of the crisis was particularly troubling in emerging nations in Asia and 
Africa. American political leaders, information agency bureaucrats, and diplomats 
identified these areas as the "critical periphery"- the places the Cold War could be won 
or lost. In nations recovering from decades of Western colonialism and racial 
discrimination, the State Department concluded that the school desegregation crisis had 
the effect of ''weakening ... our moral position as the champion of freedom and 
democracy, and in raising and reinforcing doubts as to the sincerity of our professions of 
concern for the welfare of others particularly in the non-white world." 16 
In the years that followed, the American government worked to mitigate the 
impact of the crisis and reshape international interpretations of other civil rights conflicts 
as part of its broader effort to outmaneuver the Soviet Union and communist China. 
With significant numbers of people living outside of the U.S. expressing the opinion that 
race relations in the nation had sunk to a new nadir, American diplomats faced a difficult 
road ahead. As America's propaganda arm, the United States Information Agency 
(USIA), would take the lead in charting a new course forward. In an effort to counteract 
15 "Post-Little Rock Opinion on the Treatment ofNegroes in the U.S.," PMS-23, January, 1958, in 
Box 1, Entry 1011, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
16 As quoted in Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies, 130. 
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public belief that American race relations were rapidly deteriorating, the USIA 
concentrated its efforts on demonstrating that the nation was steadily improving its record 
on civil rights. In 1964, the film Nine From Little Rock was designed to achieve this 
overarching goal, as well as to defuse the negative images that continued to be associated 
with the school desegregation crisis. 
American Race Relations on a Global Stage 
The diplomatic stakes involved in the USIA's effort to recast the Little Rock 
school desegregation crisis were high. By 1957, the U.S. had already dedicated 
significant amounts of time and resources to painting a more positive picture of 
American race relations. The USIA was established by President Eisenhower in 1953 to 
oversee "overt" propaganda activity and conduct public diplomacy. Traditionally, 
international treaties and diplomatic relationships had been developed behind closed 
doors. However, as media technologies and international information networks spread 
across the globe in the mid-twentieth century, governments began to engage in a more 
public form of diplomacy through their attempts to influence foreign public opinion. The 
United States hoped to use the mass media to create a receptive environment for 
American philosophical ideals as well as concrete foreign policy objectives. Under the 
purview of the Office ofWar Information, the State Department, and then the USIA, 
American propaganda targeted diplomats, elites, journalists, and the public-at-large with 
the expectation that mass public opinion would have a substantial effect upon the 
positions of government officials.17 
17 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle Home and Abroad 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 3-4. 
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During World War II, thousands of Americans underwent training in 
psychological warfare and propaganda operations. Moreover, it had produced a 
generation of military and political leaders who had embraced the efficacy and necessity 
of public "information" campaigns.18 As commander of Allied forces in Europe during 
World War II, President Eisenhower had witnessed the effective use of propaganda to 
undermine enemy morale and inspire local resistance movements. Eisenhower considered 
psychological warfare an important weapon in the arsenal of American democracy that 
could complement the use of military strength, economic aid, and political actions in the 
field of international relations. He was convinced these strategies had an important role to 
play in the Cold War.19 
However, Eisenhower also believed that in order for American propaganda to be 
most effective "the hand of government must be carefully concealed, and, in some cases ... 
wholly eliminated." He supported the continuation of CIA covert operations, and insisted 
that materials attributed to the United States and distributed through the USIA adopt a 
more informational tone that disguised the ideological thrust of the message distributed 
abroad in a cloak of impartiality. As Kenneth Osgood has put it, Eisenhower "wanted 
official voices of America to sound more like the seemingly neutral British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) than the propagandistic Pravda."20 In its information programs, the 
18 Osgood, Total Cold War, 12. Despite the rhetoric surrounding the importance of information 
efforts and propaganda campaigns, a very small percentage of the national defense budget went to these 
programs. See Laura Belmonte, Selling the American Way: US. Propaganda and the Cold War 
(Philadelphia: University Press of Pennsylvania, 2008), 179. 
19 Wilson P. Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US. Information Agency 
(Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 2004), 66. Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War, 3-4. 
20 Osgood, Total Cold War, 77. 
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new agency adopted the less strident and seemingly neutral tone preferred by the 
President. However, as the USIA's first director Theodore Streibert explained, "We are 
no less engaged in propaganda because we are to minimize the propagandistic." The 
agency adopted a "posture of objectivity" in order to enhance its credibility. While most 
of the information distributed in USIA pamphlets, movies, and exhibits was factually 
correct, it was carefully selected and manipulated to suit American foreign policy 
objectives. 21 
At the height of the Cold War, the USIA and its overseas posts operated across 
the globe in nearly 300 cities and towns. While the Voice of America radio broadcasts 
were its most well-known activity, the USIA also distributed thousands of press releases 
and planted news stories in local media outlets. Additionally, the agency disseminated 
magazines, pamphlets, and news bulletins in over 100 languages. It promoted the 
translation and publication of American books overseas, and operated open-stack 
libraries in 150 countries that provided free access to these publications as well as the 
work of other authors. The libraries also served as important "information centers" 
abroad. For example, the USIS invited students, community leaders, and opinion-makers 
to attend lectures or view USIA films on site. Indeed, the agency produced hundreds of 
documentary films, newsreels, television programs and even soap operas. USIA officials 
also assembled exhibits on various aspects of American life to be shown at international 
fairs and tours behind the Iron Curtain. Moreover, the agency mounted a large program 
to train English teachers abroad, oversaw exchange programs for students, academics, 
21 Ibid, 98-99. 
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artists, musicians, and other professionals, and promoted the creation of American 
Studies programs in universities all over the world.22 
Through these outlets, USIA officials attempted to discredit the Soviet Union and 
counter negative communist propaganda, while promoting the superiority of the 
"American way oflife."23 However, the agency struggled to address the subject of race 
relations. As the leader of the "free world," American public information campaigns 
touted the nation's commitment to ideals like freedom, democracy, and liberty, but 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the civil rights movement (and white resistance to it) 
exposed the long distance between America's stated ideals and daily practices. The same 
international information channels and media networks that the agency used to circulate 
positive portrayals of the nation also disseminated postwar reports about racial violence, 
segregation, and discrimination in the United States. These stories provoked criticism of 
American domestic policy and raised foreign policy concerns for emerging nations in 
Asia and Africa. Consequently, the nation's record on race relations threatened to 
undermine the USIA's efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of peoples around the 
globe.24 
After the 1955 Bandung Conference, developing countries in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America could no longer be ignored. They wielded significant influence in 
international affairs by voting as a bloc in the United Nations and placing pressure on the 
22 Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy, 4-5, 114. 
23 Osgood, Total Cold War, 3-4, quote on 367. 
24 Fraser, "Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock," 245. See also Paul Gordon Lauren, Power 
and Prejudice: The Politics of Diplomacy and Racial Discrimination, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1996), 199. 
76 
two superpowers.25 As Harold R. Isaacs observed in 1958, this new diplomatic muscle 
was precisely what lent "American race problems their sharp new international edge" in 
the Cold War era. He noted, "In vast parts of the world that have suddenly become so 
important to us, there are people who have had experience of Western white racism, 
whose whole lives and personalities, indeed, were largely shaped by it. These people 
have ceased allowing themselves to be demeaned by white foreigners in their own 
countries and they are acutely sensitive to the race aspect of all their new relationships, 
especially with Americans, heirs to the declining power of Western white man. Most of 
the reasons for Asian and African responses to the race question should leap plainly 
enough to the eye. They are not 'new' but have been present for generations. What is 
new is their new importance, their new visibility, and the fact that they can no longer be 
disregarded. "26 
Over time, the USIA shifted its resources from Europe and Japan and 
concentrated its efforts on reshaping public opinion in these regions. However, the 
agency's efforts were often stymied by reports of racial discrimination in the United 
States that raised serious questions about the nation's commitment to its stated ideals and 
the sincerity of its declared aims. Communist propaganda publicized racial incidents in 
the United States as much as possible, particularly in the non-aligned "Third World." In 
publications and radio broadcasts, the Soviet Union drew connections between 
imperialism and exploitation, and capitalism and racial discrimination. The USIA's 
25 Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies, 13; Lauren, Power and Prejudice, 221. 
26 Isaacs, "World Affairs and U.S. Race Relations," 365. 
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counterpart also pointed to parallels between the treatment of African Americans at home 
and the United States' approach to nonwhite peoples abroad. "The ideas of racial and 
national inequality find concrete expression in the policy which capitalistic governments 
adopt in connection with colonial and dependent peoples and with minorities within the 
parent countries," Pravda proclaimed.27 
The USIA feared that these arguments were gaining traction, and that America's 
record on race relations tied it to the legacy of decades of Western colonialism and cast 
the United States' influence in the world as another form ofimperialism.28 After a trip to 
Southeast Asia on the behalf of the State Department's International Educ~tional 
Exchange Program in 1955, prominent African American journalist and future director of 
the USIA Carl T. Rowan warned Americans that the U.S. was on the defensive 
throughout the region because it failed to comprehend that Asian independence 
movements were not the product of"Communist skulduggery." Instead, he argued, the 
United States' real challenge was that communists were more effectively harnessing the 
explosive power of anti-colonialist and anti-racist sentiment, and exploiting American 
vulnerabilities as "the vehicle" by which they could "ride to power in Asia today."29 
United States government representatives and diplomats believed that foreign criticism of 
American race relations was so damaging that one official asserted that attempts to 
27 As quoted in Lauren, Power and Prejudice, 200-201. See also Borstelrnann, The Cold War and 
the Color Line, 74-76; Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy, 76; Layton, International Politics and Civil 
Rights Policies, 7. 
28 Borstelrnann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 113. 
29 Carl T. Rowan, The Pitiful and the Proud (New York: Random House, 1956), 141, 418-419. 
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address the subject "interlards almost everything we do in the State Department and the 
United States Information Agency."30 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the USIA confronted this challenge directly, crafting a 
careful image of American progress in the field of civil rights that was designed to 
correct "misunderstandings" about race relations in the United States, while 
simultaneously appeasing powerful Southern Democrats in Congress. In internal 
memoranda and widely-circulated publications, broadcasts, and films, the USIA 
acknowledged that discrimination was a problem but suggested that the extent and 
significance of racial violence, segregation, and inequality had been exaggerated by 
communist propagandists. The agency pointed to statistical trends and the achievements 
of exceptional individuals to illustrate that life for African Americans was improving in 
the United States, and that the nation's commitment to the rule of law and democratic 
government provided the framework for such change to take place. 
Reshaping foreign public opinion about American race relations proved to be 
what one USIA insider has called the "information agency's most challenging policy 
problem." The agency's position, as stated to Congress, was that "the facts could not be 
denied but they could be placed in perspective."31 Instead of responding defensively to 
criticism of American practices, the USIA cultivated an image of progress that reframed 
developments in civil rights as an inspirational American success story. This approach 
was outlined as early as 1953 in a report Captain John Silvera prepared for the 
Psychological Warfare School at Fort Bragg. Silvera noted, "America's treatment of its 
30 Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies, 145. 
31 Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy, 93. 
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Negro minority has been an Achilles heel, and needlessly so." 'Through the "proper use 
of the Negro in propaganda themes," African American history and achievement could 
be transformed into the "saga of America." Silvera claimed, "It is a rags-to-riches' idyll 
which could literally inspire millions of people in other parts of the world. "32 Although 
life for most African Americans could hardly be characterized as idyllic, the USIA would 
do its best through ''judicious selection of content, audiences, and emphases" to paint a 
positive portraif.33 
An early, and frequently cited, example of the international information agency's 
approach to civil rights was the illustrated pamphlet The Negro in American Life/4 which 
was first published in 1952 and widely-circulated around the world. Written in 
collaboration with the NAACP, the text began by acknowledging that "the single aspect 
of the United States that is most disconcerting to her friends and most frequently cited by 
her enemies is the position of the Negro." Communist propagandists had cultivated this 
image by pointing to mob violence, racial segregation, black slums, and lynching. The 
USIA criticized "certain foreign writers" for picking "intemperate or even fanatical 
statements on the question of race from the lunatic fringe" and presenting this "provincial 
chauvinism" as representative of the nation as a whole. In contrast, the agency stated that 
American anthropologists, geneticists, journalists, psychologists, and sociologists were 
committed to exposing "race myths" and demonstrating that prejudice is "harmful and 
32 As quoted in Krenn, Black Diplomacy, 92-93. 
33 Osgood, Total Cold War, 255. 
34 The Negro in American Life, pamphlet distributed by the United States Information Service, 
1951, in Box 5, Entry 43, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
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unjustified." These forces had prepared the American public for change, and recent 
legislative actions and court decisions reflected this shift in American attitudes. "Honest 
and informed" observers were aware "that over the past fifty years the average Negro has 
made progress on every front- social, economic, educational- at a tremendous pace. 
This progress has been fostered by the vigorous efforts ofNegro and white citizens in 
every part of the country and supported by the programs of the United States government 
aimed at eliminating racial discrimination from national policy." 
At its core, the premise of the publication was that the state of American race 
relations in the present could only be accurately measured against conditions as they had 
existed in the past. Consequently, the pamphlet placed a large amount of emphasis on 
the tremendous strides the nation had made since the days of slavery, and like other 
USIA materials, it commented on the enormous burden the legacy of those days had on 
contemporary social relations. "The parents of men and women alive today were born 
slaves and slave owners," the agency noted. "Although they and their children scarcely 
remember those days, part of their heritage is the emotional attitude of both races passed 
on from generation." Viewed against this backdrop, the USIA hoped that the nation 
would be applauded for the steps it had made toward equality rather than derided for its 
shortcomings. 
The Negro in American Life illustrated American progress in the field of civil 
rights by documenting an increase in school attendance, literacy, and enrollment at 
institutions of higher-learning. "The Negro is well on the way to equal opportunity in the 
field of education," the USIA confidently claimed two years before the Supreme Court's 
Brown v. Board of Education decision. The pamphlet made no mention of widespread 
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school segregation in the South or the inadequate financing of black education. Instead, 
the publication emphasized that access to American educational institutions meant rising 
levels of employment and economic status for black Americans, that the gap between the 
incomes of black and white Americans was shrinking, and that African Americans were 
participating in nearly every sphere of economic and professional life. Moreover, a new 
cadre of black leaders was emerging prepared to meet the challenges of the twentieth 
century- men and women like Walter White, William Hastie, Mary McLeod Bethune, 
Alain Locke, and Ralph Bunche. 
The Negro in American Life noted that racial discrimination was still a part of life 
in America, but attempted to turn even the last "dying vestige of a post-Civil War 
vigilante spirit" into an asset. These feelings still existed because the U.S. government 
refused to make "fundamental changes in human attitudes by commands from a central 
source" and would not attempt ''to alter psychology by fiat." The USIA implied that a 
communist regime might be able to artificially impose a semblance of equality, but 
suggested that a democratic government had to nurture it through public education and 
political procedures. In this regard, the momentum of the civil rights struggle was 
moving forward not only because of"enlightened white attitudes," but also because black 
Americans were "using their votes to demand their fair share of democracy." Although 
government officials frequently frustrated African American efforts to vote, the USIA 
confidently asserted in 1952 that impediments to the free use of the franchise were being 
removed and declared unconstitutional because leaders of civil rights organizations were 
exercising the "American rights of political organization and dissent, the civil liberties 
guaranteed in the Constitution and enforced by the federal court system." Their efforts 
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were supported by the "devoted labor of members of both races." This kind of change 
evolved slowly, but it would be more lasting and far-reaching because it developed 
through a democratic process.35 
Historian Kenneth Osgood has argued that the distortions embedded in The Negro 
in American Life, as well as the publications and broadcasts that followed it, reveal the 
limits to the USIA's "campaign of truth" strategy. Although the agency retained a 
posture of objectivity through the careful deployment of statistics and its neutral tone, 
and even enhanced its credibility by openly discussing racial discrimination, Osgood 
concludes, "On this subject at least, the agency clearly privileged a factual tone over the 
actual facts." He notes that the USIA's suggestion that "African Americans were not 
impeded from voting in the South, that racial segregation did not mean worse schools for 
black children, and that racial violence was virtually nonexistent in the United States 
misrepresented the daily lives of many African Americans. "36 
The agency's desire to mask or least mitigate the reality of racial discrimination 
in the United States continued to manifest itself throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
Repeatedly, the USIA would attempt to provide "perspective" on news stories about 
racial segregation, discrimination or violence by emphasizing progress in American race 
relations. This was done directly through publications like The Negro in American Life, 
or films like Nine From Little Rock, and indirectly through the promotion of African 
35 For additional discussion of The Negro in American Life see Krenn, Black Diplomacy, 41-42; 
Belmonte, Selling the American Way, 161-164; Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 49-54. Dudziak writes 
that the publication presents "American history as story of redemption" and democratic government as 
"the vehicle for national reconciliation," ( 49). 
36 Osgood, Total Cold War, 285-287. 
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American music. The agency also adopted other tactics like including photographs of 
black citizens in USIA publications "as a normal part of the whole American society-
without drawing attention in text or caption to the Negro."37 Similarly, the Office of 
Policy and Plans urged USIA officials to show "progress in entertainment, art, housing, 
business, and government by individuals and groups, with major emphasis on 
international cooperation," but to do so "without too much obviousness."38 The USIA 
and State Department subsidized the travel of African American citizens they believed 
embodied and communicated their narrative of accomplishment, while actively silencing 
voices that threatened this carefully crafted image, canceling the passports of vocal critics 
like Paul Robeson and W.E.B. DuBois.39 These actions illustrated that despite the 
USIA's rhetoric of freedom, equality, and due process, the nation was willing to sacrifice 
these ideals in the name of national security and the imperatives of the Cold War when 
they proved to be inconvenient. 
Despite the efforts of the USIA, international public opinion polls continued to 
record persistently negative perceptions of American race relations, suggesting that 
foreign observers either ignored or saw through the United States' message. As the 1950s 
and 1960s unraveled, international pressure and Cold War politics provided an incentive 
for the American government, particularly the executive branch, to support limited 
changes in the field of civil rights. Government officials and politicians frequently 
framed their support for federal intervention and civil rights reform by stressing the 
37 Krenn, Black Diplomacy, 39. , 
38 Osgood, Total Cold War, 278-279. 
39 Borstehnann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 76-78. 
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significance of this issue around world. As early as 1948, the report of the President's 
Committee on Civil Rights made the case for the elimination of segregation in housing 
and education, anti-lynching legislation, a fair employment act, and other measures by 
warning, "The United States is not so strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal not 
so inevitable that we can ignore what the world thinks of us and our record."40 
Increasingly, civil rights activists also pressed for change within this context, pointing to 
the emergence of nations in Asia and Africa and the importance of their new role in 
international affairs. 41 These kinds of arguments, which situated civil rights reform as 
part ofthe struggle against communism in a global Cold War, cultivated what historian 
Robert Frederick Burk has called a "emerging consensus" for limited changes that would 
"cleanse the American democratic image ofthe stain ofracism."42 
However, strident anticommunism also dictated the acceptable boundaries of civil 
rights reform, limiting serious discussion about connections between race and class. 
Moreover, change motivated by a desire to placate critics created a culture in which 
symbolic gestures and tokenism stood in for more substantive reforms in American 
informational campaigns and diplomatic efforts.43 For example, in Little Rock, President 
Eisenhower had used federal troops reluctantly and forcefully, but it quickly became 
evident that their presence in the city was a political liability and he wanted them 
4° For further discussion of To Secure These Rights see Layton, International Politics and Civil 
Rights Policies, 82-83; Lauren, Power and Prejudice, 202. 
41 Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies, 22. 
42 Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1984), 11-12. 
43 Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies, 27, 108; Dudziak, Cold War Civil 
Rights, 12-13. 
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withdrawn as quickly as possible. As historian Robert Frederick Burk has noted, 
Eisenhower was "acutely aware of the political risks inherent in a public leadership role 
in civil rights," and consequently limited his administration's actions to "areas of clear 
federal jurisdiction, greatest international propaganda value, and minimum risk of 
political fallout or domestic unrest."44 Within months, protection of the nine African 
American students was turned over to a less vigilant federalized Arkansas National 
Guard. The Little Rock Nine endured physical and psychological harassment at school 
and at home for the remainder of the academic year. In the absence of more that 
symbolic action, progress with school desegregation had come to a grinding halt in 
Arkansas and elsewhere after several years of swift action in the border states. 
Nevertheless, the USIA made the most of token changes and civil rights reforms 
that gave them "a better story to tell" during this period. The agency publicized federal 
court decisions, executive orders, and legislative developments that seemed to affirm the 
narrative they were promoting abroad. As Mary L. Dudziak has noted, "While civil 
rights reform in different eras has been motivated by a variety of factors, one element 
during the early Cold War years was the need for reform in order to make credible the 
government's argument about race and democracy."45 For example, within an hour of 
the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision declaring segregation 
in public school unconstitutional, the USIA's Voice of America had broadcast the news 
44 Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 23-24. 
45 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 16, 13-14; Fraser, "Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock," 
251; Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States, 2-3. 
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in thirty-four languages to countries all over the world.46 The USIA also placed articles 
in foreign newspapers and planned to follow up with reports about how the decision 
would be implemented. Unsurprisingly, the agency described the Brown decision as "the 
logical culmination" of American progress toward racial equality.47 Later that summer, 
the National Security Council confirmed that the information agency had "exploited to 
the fullest the anti-desegregation decision of the U.S. Supreme Court." The NSC 
remarked, "the decision is regarded as the greatest event since the Emancipation 
Proclamation, and it removes from Communist hands the most effective anti-American 
weapon they had in Black Africa." By 1956, the State Department noted that criticism 
of American race relations had "markedly declined .... partly as a result of the Supreme 
Court decisions in the school desegregation cases."48 
This welcome uptick in foreign public opinion quickly dissipated as white 
resistance to the court decision mounted. While the USIA described the 1954 decision as 
a triumph of the democratic process, southern political and civic leaders publicly 
denounced it as change by dictatorial fiat. The emergence of white citizens' councils, the 
passage of new statutes throughout the South designed to preserve "separate but equal" 
public accommodations and stymie school desegregation, and the adoption of the 
Southern Manifesto in opposition to the Supreme Court's Brown decision by southern 
representatives in Congress raised questions about whether the Court's opinion really 
46 Borstelmann, The Cold War and The Color Line, 94. Layton, International Politics and Civil 
Rights Policies, 117-118. 
47 Belmonte, Selling the American Way, 165. 
48 As quoted by Mary L. Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs," 1645-1646. 
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reflected a broad change in American society. 49 In a rearguard action, the information 
agency tried to put a positive spin on public resistance to the Court's decision by framing 
it as an example of the right to dissent, petition, and seek redress for grievances in a 
democratic government. 
However, as noted above, the edifice the USIA had constructed to reassure 
foreign audiences came tumbling down in September 1957. Public opinion polls and 
surveys revealed that people around the world believed that minorities in the United 
States were treated poorly, and that American race relations had been "worsening rather 
than improving over the past few years."50 These figures indicated that the USIA's 
efforts to frame the nation's struggle with racial discrimination as an inspiring tale about 
American democracy and progress, and to discuss racial incidents as aberrations in a 
generally improving picture, were losing ground. 
Placing Little Rock in Perspective 
In effort to place the agency back on track, USIA personnel and American 
diplomats experimented with various ways to recast negative perceptions of the Little 
Rock school desegregation crisis. At first, the agency attempted to suture the crisis into 
its pre-existing narrative of progress, downplaying the extent of massive resistance to 
school desegregation and emphasizing forceful federal intervention. However, this 
approach became less tenable by the early 1960s when it was evident that progress was 
not being made in the arena of school desegregation, that resistance to the Supreme 
49 Osgood, Total Cold War, 281. 
50 USIA Research and Reference Service, "Public Reactions to Little Rock in Major World 
Capitals," SR-8, October 29, 1957, in Box 1, Entry 1012, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
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Court's mandate in Brown v. Board of Education persisted, and that the federal 
government did not act swiftly to enforce integration. In this context, a statistical or 
"factual" approach to the problem delivered in a dry "informational" tone did not serve 
the agency well. Instead, the USIA would turn to a new emphasis on the "emotional" 
aspects of desegregation in the South, and decidedly "subtle" or subjective indicators of 
social change. 
As early as October 1957, the State Department developed ''talking points" 
designed to "overcome adverse reaction to the Little Rock incident." This document 
reflected the USIA's traditional approach to dealing with American race relations. The 
Department acknowledged that public opinion about the school desegregation crisis 
could not be repaired "overnight," but urged American public affairs officers and USIS 
posts "to start the long and slow job of putting these unfortunate incidents into their 
proper perspective." Due to "sensational newspaper accounts" and communist 
propaganda, the school desegregation crisis had been "widely misunderstood and 
misinterpreted." Instead of being a symbol of American racism, Little Rock should be 
viewed as a natural byproduct of efforts to expand "freedom and equality," and American 
information efforts should stress that other countries had experienced similar racial 
conflicts when attempting to lower discriminatory barriers. Moreover, the events in 
Arkansas should not be portrayed as representative of the country as a whole. Rather, the 
school desegregation crisis would be more accurately described as a "rare misdeed" of a 
"small minority." The "overwhelming majority" of the American people and the citizens 
of Little Rock respected the law and the decisions of the federal courts. As evidence of 
this, the State Department noted that school desegregation was proceeding in other areas 
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peacefully. Of course, the document also emphasized that the United States had been 
"making progress toward integration" in recent years, and that ''tremendous strides have 
been made in removing racial barriers." Integration had "already been achieved in most 
parts of the country and would "inevitably spread" in other regions.51 
USIA officials faithfully followed these guidelines in the months that followed 
through a variety of public information campaigns. As the crisis unfolded, the USIA had 
worked diligently to "minimize the damage" by "summarizing anti-integration events on 
a factual basis, supplying facts whenever possible to balance adverse sensational news 
items, quoting editorial and official statements which indicate steady determined progress 
toward integration, and informally suggesting to friendly editors possible constructive 
treatment."52 However, in a semi-annual report to Congress a few weeks later, director 
Arthur Larson conceded that the agency had not succeeded in "blanking out... 
sensationalized stories of the issue" and that Soviet propagandists had "strongly 
publicized every anti-integration incident."53 After Eisenhower's intervention, the agency 
continued its efforts to reshape foreign public opinion about the crisis as the State 
Department suggested. USIS posts issued press releases encouraging international 
journalists to take a "second look" at school desegregation in the United States. For 
51 Krenn, Black Diplomacy, 104-105; Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs," 
1698-1699; Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 142-144; Fraser, "Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock," 
252; Osgood, Total Cold War, 282-283. 
52 As quoted by Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs," 1698; See also Dudziak, 
Cold War Civil Rights, 142. 
53 "Racial Incidents Got Play Abroad, USIA Says," Washington Post, October 14, 1957; "USIA 
Faces Race-Issue Obstacles: Agency Says Foreign Press Gave Sensationalized Views," Baltimore Sun, 
October 14, 1957; "USIA Assessing Setback on Bias: Agency Concedes Inability to Offset Reports 
Abroad on Little Rock Strife, The New York Times, October 14, 1957, in Box 10, Entry 1069, Record 
Group 306, USIA Papers. 
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example, a USIA pamphlet on successful school desegregation in Louisville, Kentucky 
was distributed as evidence that change was progressing peacefully in most parts of the 
country. These efforts resulted in favorable stories in local news outlets in Paris, Geneva, 
Rio De Janeiro, Sydney, and Port Elizabeth, South Africa. 54 Likewise, USIA broadcasts 
and newsreels incorporated information about ''typical integrated schools" to offset 
negative impressions about education in the United States. "Distinguished Negro 
personalities," like Marian Anderson, also addressed the topic of American race relations 
during tours subsidized by the agency. 55 
Although the USIA officially reported that these activities had successfully 
counteracted "false impressions" and that the program had not been "thrown off stride" 
by the school desegregation crisis, 56 others concluded that American efforts "were not 
very persuasive." John Reinhardt, an American working overseas in 1957, 
acknowledged that the USIA had "extensive programs about successful American 
blacks," but insisted that "stories about Marian Anderson and Ralph Bunche never caught 
up with Little Rock." He suggested that the agency was not successful in its attempts to 
"show progress despite bloodshed" and that there was "practically no way to overcome 
the worst racial incidents at home" when powerful images and critical American news 
reports were widely available. 57 Events in the Spring of 1958 confirmed this assessment, 
54 Osgood, Total Cold War, 282-283; Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs," 
1699-1701; Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 143-144. 
55 Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs," 1702. 
56 USIA Press Release on semi-annual report to Congress, February 27, 1958, in Box 2, Entry 
1069, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. See also Belmonte, Selling the American Way, 172-173. 
57 Krenn, Black Diplomacy, 105. 
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when Vice President Nixon's goodwill tour of South America was received by 1,500 
angry protestors at a Caracas airport in Venezuela, while people in the crowd shouted 
"Little Rock! Little Rock!"58 
The impact of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis was long lasting. Little 
Rock still seemed to operate as a cultural lodestone well into the early 1960s, and became 
the marker against which subsequent events were measured. As other civil rights crises 
unfolded-- when James Meredith attempted to integrate Ole Miss, or when Governor 
George Wallace stood in the school house door of the University of Alabama to prevent 
the enrollment of black students, or when school children were attacked by police dogs in 
the streets ofBirmingham-- reports of these events often compared to them to the crisis 
in Little Rock. For example, in 1961, a Pakistani paper suggested that violence against 
the Freedom Riders in Montgomery and Birmingham "out-Little Rocked Little Rock."59 
Like its predecessor, the Kennedy administration worked to define the civil rights 
movement and southern white resistance in different terms. A special planning task force 
was assigned to "assure proper treatment of the subject of civil rights" by working with 
international media outlets and distributing information through pamphlets, radio, film, 
and television broadcasts. According to Rollie White, the deputy special assistant for 
psychological strategy, a USIA "monitor unit" kept abreast of developments in the field 
of civil rights and the agency produced a "continuing flow of materials showing hard 
58 The protestors were angered by dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez's presence in the U.S. See 
Belmonte, Selling the American Way, 85; Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 104; Dudziak, 
"The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs," 1695. 
59 USIA Research and Reference Service, "Racial Prejudice Mars the American Image," October 
17, 1962, in Box 10, Entry 1013A, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
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evidence ofweek-in-and-week-out progress toward equality of rights and opportunities." 
Moreover, public affairs officers were feeding journalists information about racism in the 
Soviet Union and China to counter communist efforts to frame racism as a uniquely 
Western problem. All American citizens traveling abroad through the auspices of the 
Exchange Program were briefed by the Department of Justice about the "various 
considerations involved in the U.S. race relations situation," and travelers were given 
pamphlets with recommendations about how to answer questions about America's 
treatment of minorities. 60 
Although the Kennedy administration moved reluctantly to address the subject of 
civil rights at home, American information programs abroad made the most of the 
mounting victories and concessions won by demonstrators, widely distributed the 
President's public statements condemning racism and discrimination, and disseminated 
information about civil rights legislation under consideration.61 Although it took several 
years, foreign public opinion polls revealed that international audiences were 
increasingly convinced that conditions were improving in the United States. 
Nevertheless, the majority of those surveyed continued to believe that treatment of 
minorities in the United States was poor, and that changes could be attributed to the 
forceful intervention of the federal government rather than shifts in white public 
60 Krenn, Black Diplomacy, 138-139; Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy, 120; Osgood, Total 
Cold War, 246-247. 
61 Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 160-62: Melinda M. Schwenk, "Reforming the 
Negative through History: The U.S. Information Agency and the 1957 Little Rock Integration Crisis," 
Journal of Communication Inquiry 23, no. 3 (July 1999): 290-291. 
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sentiment. 52 Consequently, a 1962 summary of available survey data, press coverage, and 
comment from international leaders concluded that racial prejudice was still the "chief 
blemish on the image of the American people abroad." The USIA found that racism and 
discrimination were the "American characteristic[ s] most frequently criticized ... in both 
allied and neutral nations."63 
In relation to school desegregation, international audiences were justifiably 
skeptical about American progress in the field of education. While substantial 
desegregation had occurred in border states like Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, 
KentUcky, and Missouri during the first ten years following the Supreme Court's 
landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision, the glacial pace of change in rest of the 
South had not given the USIA very favorable news to report.64 By 1964, there had been 
little or no progress in the 11 states of the Confederacy- the Southern Education 
Reporting Service reported that only 1.18% of African American children in the region 
were attending schools with whites. 55 As Benjamin Muse of the Southern Research 
Council noted that year, "Virtually all the Negro children who had reached the third 
grade at the time of the Brown decision had graduated or left school without ever 
62 Hugh J. Parry, "America's Public Image Abroad," public speech in Providence, RI, February 
26, 1964, in Box I, Entry 1009B, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
63 USIA Research and Reference Service, "Racial Prejudice Mars the American Image," October 
17, 1962, in Box 10, Entry 1013A, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
64 On school desegregation in the border states see Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 36-37; Lewis and 
the New York Times, Portrait of a Decade, 32-33, 43. 
65 For detailed statistics provided by the Southern Education Reporting Service on school 
desegregation by state in 1964 see Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation, 359, table I. 
94 
emerging from the public-education ghetto."66 The USIA tried to disguise these statistics 
by referring to the number of school districts that had achieved token levels of 
desegregation, estimating that as many as one-third of school districts in border states 
and in the south had successfully complied with the Supreme Court's mandate by 1963. 
Measurement of this variable, rather than the number of students attending integrated 
schools, obscured the fact that only a handful of students crossed the color line in any 
given district, and that the vast majority of these were in border areas that the agency 
itself admitted had a "less rigid tradition of separation of the races" and "lower 
percentages ofNegro population." Moreover, such reports ignored the extent to which 
dual school systems- consisting of"white" and "black" schools that students were 
assigned to by default- continued to exist.67 
Internal USIA reports concurred with observers that resistance to school 
integration was accomplished through a wide array of legislative maneuvers, ranging 
from strategies designed to prevent any integration of schools to those designed to 
encourage minimal compliance and token desegregation. As noted in Chapter One, these 
measures had been so successful in Little Rock that only 118 of the district's 7,000 
African American students were attending the city's predominantly white schools during 
the 1963-64 school year.68 The picture of Central High School painted by reporters like 
66 Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 275-276. 
67 USIA Research and Reference Service, "IRS Background Facts: The Negro American, Part II. 
Desegregation in Education," R-178-63©, September 13, 1963, p. 9, 15, in Box 17, EntrY 1013, Research 
Group 306, USIA Papers. See also "IRS Background Facts: Statistical Profile of the Negro American and 
Progress in Civil Rights," March 1965, in Box 25, Entry 1013, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
68 Fred L Zimmerman, "Little Rock Revisited: Racial Calm Marks City Once Tom by Violence," 
Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1963. 
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Gertrude Samuels of the New York Times during this period was a grim one.69 In this 
context, the USIA struggled to successfully sell "tokenism plus" in Little Rock or 
elsewhere as evidence of meaningful school desegregation. 
Indeed, after reading Samuels' description of the Little Rock school board's 
"negative and resistant" approach to the integration of the city's schools, the USIA's new 
film chief George Stevens Jr. was persuaded that the agency needed to revise its strategy 
for dealing with the fallout from the 1957 Little Rock school desegregation crisis.70 
Stevens wanted to take a different approach to measuring America's progress with school 
desegregation. He believed that the films created under his purview had the potential "to 
open people's minds, get them in the frame of mind that is willing to evaluate events in 
somewhat different terms." In regards to race relations, he admitted that there was "very 
little use in making up lists of logical arguments to defend our record." Any honest 
statistical measurement of the nation's progress toward fulfilling the mandate of Brown v. 
Board of Education would fail to impress international audiences. However, Stevens 
believed that if the agency's filmmakers emphasized the "emotional aspects of the 
problem," and the "circumstances and complexities of the civil rights movement in the 
United States," viewers might "sympathize with the depth and difficulty of it."71 
In several films produced during this period, the USIA suggested that more 
amorphous indicators of change, like American attitudes toward integration, were 
69 Gertrude Samuels, "Little Rock Revisited- Tokenism Plus: Five years after the Battle of 
Central High, the school system is being desegregated as slowly as possible. But outside the schools the 
city is moving forward," New York Times Magazine, June 2, 1963. 
70 Schwenk, "Reforming the Negative through History," 293. 
71 Richard Dyer MacCann, The People's Films: A Political History of U.S. Government Motion 
Pictures (New York: Hastings House, 1973), 199-200. 
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improving. Likewise, they produced portraits of successful African Americans like 
Marian Anderson and Ralph Bunche to emphasize the opportunities that were available 
to some black citizens in the United States. Most importantly, under Stevens' 
stewardship the USIA film program would attempt to reframe the civil rights movement, 
and the racial violence that accompanied it, by presenting the struggle for racial equality 
as an example of American democracy in motion. As Mary L. Dudziak has noted, in 
doing so, the agency attempted to neutralize a "potential threat" to American 
relationships abroad and turn it into an "asset. "72 
Making a Moving Picture 
The USIA's film program sat at the center of American attempts to reach out to 
audiences abroad and influence public opinion. The International Motion Picture 
Division (IMPD) was established in 1947, when overt propaganda activities were still 
within the purview of the State Department, and continued as the Motion Picture Service 
under the USIA. The program was designed to reach millions of individuals who could 
not be persuaded through other media. Information officials believed that the "universal 
appeal" of film would help the nation engage illiterate audiences and households that did 
not own radios.73 
Moreover, motion picture advocates believed in the power of pictures. According 
to IMPD Chief Herbert T. Edwards, the use of film in the information program was 
"based on the premise that the evidence of the eye witness is the most conclusive, that 
72 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 216. 
73 Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International Motion 
Pictures Division, "IMP's Part in the Campaign of Truth," January 1952, p. 1, in Box 153, Entry 1066, 
Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
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such evidence is conclusive in human relations as in law, and that the sound motion 
picture is the nearest equivalent to direct observation and actual experience." He 
contended that the international film program was "taking America to the millions who 
cannot actual visit this country." The films served the government's purposes by 
"visualizing the American, his land, and his way of life" so that ''the people of the world 
may see for themselves."74 However carefully the American image projected abroad was 
crafted and manipulated, IMPD officials hoped that foreign audiences would accept the 
premise that the "camera doesn't lie." If they did so, the entire information program 
would be imbued with a sense of legitimacy and authenticity. 
The films selected for the program were designed to counteract Soviet 
propaganda and mainstream media reports while presenting an attractive portrait of 
American ideals, practices, and daily life. As they were outlined in 1952, the primary 
purposes of the motion picture program were: 
(1) To show that the United States is a strong, determined, progressive 
nation, conscious of its responsibilities as a leader ofthe free world; (2) 
To develop psychological resistance to communistic ideas and 
motivations, exposing the dangers of communist imperialism and pointing 
out the need for the free world to be on guard and to protect itself against 
the insidious as well as the overt tactics of communistic operations; (3) To 
promote among free nations the strength to prevent aggression and to 
secure peace through international cooperation and unification of ideas 
and action; ( 4) To demonstrate to all free nations that their interests 
coincide with the fundamental objectives of the United States, that we are 
sympathetic to their aspirations, and that we are interested in the 
74 Herbert T. Edwards, Chief of the International Motion Pictures Division, Department of State, 
"Films in the U.S. Overseas Information Program: The World Sees America," Educational Screen (The 
Magazine Devoted to Audio-Visual Materials), May 1949, p. 5, in Box 153, Entry, 1066, Record Group 
306, USIA Papers. 
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development of other peoples into strong, independent, productive 
nations.75 
To accomplish these objectives, the International Motion Pictures Division quickly 
assembled a large library of short documentary films that covered a broad array of topics. 
Portraits of regular Americans- farmers, housewives, professionals, industrial workers, 
students and teachers- were crafted to counteract images popularized by Hollywood. The 
strength of American economic institutions was portrayed through films that focused on 
the nation's small business and large industrial concerns. Documentaries that focused on 
labor unions explored the relationship between management and labor and the standard 
of living for workers. American citizens were shown voting and participating in other 
democratic processes, and emphasis was placed on the daily operations of municipal, 
state, and federal governments. The accomplishments of American artists, musicians, 
and museums were projected across the globe to demonstrate the "cultural vitality" of the 
United States. Scientific discoveries were celebrated, while other films portrayed the 
application of new technologies to improve daily life. American concern for others was 
demonstrated through "ordinary neighborliness," the activities of large philanthropic 
organizations, and the nation's support of foreign aid programs. The motion picture 
program also exposed the "false promise" of communism by distributing films that 
exposed the Soviet Union's human rights abuses in Hungary and elsewhere.76 
75 Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International Motion 
Pictures Division, "IMP's Part in the Campaign of Truth," January 1952, p. 1. 
76 Edwards,"Films in the U.S. Overseas Information Program: The World Sees America," May 
1949, p. 2. See also Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International 
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99 
The USIA Motion Pictures Service acquired films to address these topics through 
several means. From the outset, the film program inherited more than 1,000 films from 
the former Office of War Information and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs. Many of these motion pictures were re-edited and updated with new 
commentary.77 Other existing were acquired from private organizations, industries, 
newsreel companies, Hollywood studios, and other government agencies. These films 
were re-edited to suit foreign policy objectives. In order to "help make the films more 
readily understood by foreign audiences," to "bring them up to date," or to "increase the 
emphasis of their themes," new music and sound effects were created, visual material 
like maps and animation were inserted, and scenes were expanded or cuf.18 New 
voiceover narration was also recorded in dozens of languages. 79 
By the early 1950s, the majority of USIA's films were created by commercial 
producers contracted by the government, or by film officers at United States Information 
Service (USIS) posts abroad.80 As Richard Dyer MacCann noted in his history of U.S. 
Government motion pictures, "No vested interest in a free enterprise society could really 
be expected to make the documentaries needed for foreign policy themes. The 
77 Thomas M. Pryor, "Fihns Aid Truth Campaign: State Department's Own Movie Division 
Expands Production Activities in Mounting War ofldeas with Russia," New York Times, March 25, 1951, 
in Box 153, Entry 1066, Record Group 1066, USIA Papers. See also Edwards, "Films in the U.S. 
Overseas Information Program: The World Sees America," May 1949, p. 1. 
78 Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International Motion 
Pictures Division, "IMP's Part in the Campaign of Truth," January 1952, p.6. See also Pryor, "Films Aid 
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79 United States Information Agency, The Overseas Film Program, pamphlet published June 
1959, in Box 153, Entry 1066, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
80 Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy, 168-169. 
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government had to make them."81 By working with commercial producers, the film 
service was able to "make use of the full resources of America's motion picture 
industry." At the same time, USIS film officers creating documentaries on location 
abroad could connect the themes described above to local issues and problems. For 
example, they were able to spotlight the impact of American aid programs and outreach 
efforts on local communities. 82 The film program aimed to provide its overseas posts 
with enough content for a new one to one-and-a-half hour show every three weeks.83 
Consequently, by 1963, the USIA Motion Picture Service was distributing as many as 
250 short documentary films annually (not including newsreels).84 
Unfortunately, this prodigious output resulted in films that were described by 
USIA Director Edward R. Murrow as "dull"- more in keeping with the "average public 
relations film" than high-quality documentaries. 85 In 1962, Hollywood director George 
Stevens Jr. was brought into the United States Information Agency to revitalize the film 
program. Stevens believed that the agency could improve the quality of its motion 
pictures by establishing contracts with well-established producers and directors, and 
providing them with the artistic freedom to craft original films. Shortly after he assumed 
81 MacCann, The People's Films, 183. 
82 Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International Motion 
Pictures Division, "IMP's Part in the Campaign of Truth," January 1952, p.12. 
83 Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International Motion 
Pictures Division, "IMP's Part in the Campaign of Truth," January 1952, p. 5, 12. 
84 Bosley Crowther, "Films for Democracy: Why Not Home Release ofUSIA Output?," New 
York Times, October 27, 1963, in Box 153, Entry 1066, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
85 Murrow made this statement before his appointment as USIA Director. Hollis Alpert, "Movies 
That Carry the Freight," SR, December 12, 1964, in Box 153, Entry 1066, Record Group 306, USIA 
Papers. 
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his new position, the film chief asserted confidently, "Film is America's indigenous art. 
We haven't begun to realize its potential in reaching people and we have so much to tell 
them about us, about America, that's never been told."86 
To tap into the American motion picture industry's indigenous talent, Stevens 
revamped the USIA's approach to film-making. Previously, the agency had hired a 
writer to write the script, then hired a producer and director after the content of the film 
had been finalized. As Stevens described it, "there was no communication between 
these areas" and the filmmakers struggled to fulfill a vision they had no part in crafting.87 
Moreover, contracts had been awarded through a competitive bidding procedure that 
awarded work to the lowest bidder without regard for other considerations. During 
Stevens' tenure, the film chief changed this process. In order to attract more qualified 
filmmakers, he decided to match individual filmmakers to certain subjects. The USIA 
motion picture service felt it could defend this process before the Congressional 
appropriations committee and the General Accounting Office if the agency built review 
procedures into the contracts and retained budgetary control. 88 
After matching a filmmaker who had a particular "affinity" for a subject, Stevens 
allowed directors and producers to develop the films with relatively little agency 
oversight in the early stages of production. The new film chief believed that this latitude 
would result in a better product that communicated the agency's message more 
86 Article on George Stevens Jr., Washington Post Herald, September 18, 1962, in Box 153, Entry 
1066, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Richard Dyer MacCann, "Film and Foreign Policy: The USIA, 1962-67," Cinema Journa/9, 
no. 1 (Autumn 1969): 30-31. 
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effectively. As he put it, "In the interest of candidness and spontaneity .... we try never to 
trample on skill and grace." To get a project moving, Stevens' merely asked for a film 
treatment that described the filmmaker's general approach to the subject to be 
addressed. 89 In doing so, the agency allowed film producers and directors to bring their 
professional experience to a project, bringing new ideas and concepts to USIA films in 
order to maximize the potential of the medium. 
Nevertheless, filmmakers working with the agency were still expected to create 
films that "carried the freight" of the USIA's message.90 Stevens retained control over 
the subjects of the films and the foreign policy messages they were meant to 
communicate. As Richard Dyer MacCann asserted in his history of U.S. government 
films, when a filmmaker signed a contract with the agency, the artist agreed to become 
"more or less a willing propagandist ... an advocate of some part of his country's way of 
life." This meant that the director was expected to be able "to justify his efforts- before, 
during, and after production- in terms of attitudes to be reached, touched, and changed." 
MacCann noted, this could be "a wearisome, nettling and sometimes destructive burden 
for creative film-makers."91 Moreover, during later stages of the production process, the 
agency adopted more stringent oversight, requiring filmmakers to submit scripts, rough 
edits, music selections, and other materials for agency approval. Thus, films produced by 
the USIA during this period must be viewed as the product of a unique collaboration 
between the filmmakers who created them and the agency itself. 
89 Hollis Alpert, "Movies that Carry the Freight," SR, December 12, 1964. 
90 Ibid. 
91 MacCann, The People's Films, 187, 196. 
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Operating under this new system, Stevens selected filmmaker Charles 
Guggenheim to produce and direct the Little Rock project. Guggenheim operated a film 
production company in St. Louis that produced industrial, educational, and political 
documentaries. In 1956, he earned an Academy Award nomination for his film A City 
Decides, which chronicled events leading up to the integration of St. Louis public 
schools. Guggenheim's work came to Stevens' attention after the filmmaker wrote the 
USIA a strongly-worded letter criticizing the didactic tone of the films the agency was 
distributing abroad. While living in Brazil in the early 1960s, Guggenheim stopped to 
watch a documentary program at the local USIS post on the way home one evening. The 
American filmmaker was appalled by the quality of the production, and felt the film he 
saw talked down to its audience. He wrote the USIA to tell them so. Years later Stevens 
recalled, "There were shock waves around the building; people said some moviemaker 
from St. Louis was saying he'd seen a film that made him ashamed to be an American. I 
was looking for real filmmakers, and I said, 'Find that guy."'92 It may have been 
Guggenheim's previous work on the topic of school integration that led Stevens to tap the 
filmmaker to work on the Little Rock project. 
As it was explained to Guggenheim, one of the primary purposes of producing a 
film about the Little Rock school desegregation crisis and American educational 
opportunities was to "off-set the unfortunate impression existing overseas because of the 
wide publicity given the Little Rock incident." Just as it had in the months immediately 
following the crisis, the USIA hoped to stress the atypical nature of the conflict at Central 
92 Phil McCombs, "The Golden Age of Guggenheim: The Local Documentary Filmmaker, 
Keeping Focused- and Up for a Fifth Oscar," Washington Post, March 17, 1996, G01, final edition. 
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High, and to underscore the federal government's forceful intervention through the 
deployment of troops to protect the civil rights of the nine African American students.93 
Instead ofbeing a national embarrassment, the events of September 1957 could be 
interpreted as "evidence of America's commitment to freedom of the individual and 
justice under law."94 
Likewise, the USIA hoped the film would favorably depict the "continuing 
progress that has been made in the U.S. in integrating its schools." In order to do so, 
filmmakers would take a biographical approach, revisiting not just Central High school 
but also the "Little Rock Nine." The portraits of the students would demonstrate "that 
these nine pupils completed high school and either are attending colleges of their choice, 
or are working in Little Rock or elsewhere. " 95 The painfully slow "tokenism" that had 
been the focus of Gertrude Samuels' New York Times Magazine article would be 
downplayed as the film highlighted the promising prospects of Central High's first black 
students. 
Guggenheim developed an approach to the film by collecting information on each 
of the Little Rock Nine and their families from newspapers and interviews with some of 
the students. The filmmaker compiled notes about the school desegregation crisis in 
September 1957, and the experiences of the nine black students during the following 
school year. These materials provided "useful background," and the fmal film would 
93 Technical Specifications for "Nine From Little Rock," Project Number Du 4-2605, Charles 
Guggenheim Papers, in the possession of Grace Guggenheim, Guggenheim Productions Inc. 
94 Schwenk, "Reforming the Negative through History," 297. 
95 Technical Specifications for "Nine From Little Rock," Project Number Du 4-2605, 
Guggenheim Papers See also MacCann, The People's Films, 187. 
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provide a brief account of the mob riot outside Central High School and its suppression 
by presidential action. However, in an early film treatment, Guggenheim noted that an 
"account of Little Rock particulars" would be "too much of a burden for the film to 
carry." Instead, as the USIA intended, the film should focus on "the response of the nine 
students .... to their ordeal," and the "continuing efforts of [N]egroes and whites in the 
community to understand each other." Consequently, Guggenheim spoke to each of the 
students he was able to contact about their educational goals, career aspirations, 
involvement with civil rights organizations, extracurricular activities, and personal 
relationships. It appears he also spoke to the Arkansas Council of Human Relations and 
black leaders in Little Rock, including Daisy Bates, about the state of school integration 
in the city. Moreover, as a master of a visual medium, the filmmaker also wrote down 
his observations of the distinguishing features of the students' campus environments and 
college apartments, as well as Central High School itself.96 
Like other contemporary observers, Guggenheim concluded that Little Rock 
school desegregation was "far from a clear-sky picture." In his background files, he 
noted that there was "great bitterness" among black leaders over the "token nature" of the 
school board's approach to the problem, and that there were likely to be prolonged legal 
battles- and possibly even street demonstrations- in the city's future. Nevertheless, 
Arkansas' capital was no longer gripped by the "unreasoning fear" which had 
precipitated the conflict in 1957. Guggenheim acknowledged that as the feeling of panic 
abated, "apathy has replaced much of it," but he seemed pleased that there were "more 
96 Notes on "The Nine," background and early film treatment for "Ordeal in Little Rock/Recovery 
in Little Rock/Nine of Little Rock," n.d, Guggenheim Papers. 
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and more people willing to take a positive stand against the segregationist tradition." 
While the film could not be a "series of bland statements in happy circumstances," the 
filmmaker felt there had been some "substantial improvements" that could be 
highlighted. 97 
In order to enhance the credibility of the film and the USIA's message on 
American race relations, Guggenheim suggested that the film should be narrated by the 
students themselves. "If there is taking place a significant change in Little Rock, it is 
only convincing if they say it is; they're the ones who have the base for comparison. If 
each looks to his future with hope and confidence, he can say so better than anyone else, 
and if he does say so that fact becomes meaningful information about America," he 
wrote.98 As the script developed, "Jefferson Thomas" became the film's primary 
"narrator," revisiting the halls of Central High and describing the changes that had 
occurred there. Thomas would also introduce four of the other nine students to viewers, 
each of whom would reflect on the events of 1957, and describe their career ambitions, 
educational experiences, and outlook for the future in the first person. 
However, as the film developed, the rhetorical authority that conferred to the 
Little Rock Nine proved to be little more than an illusion. While the five students who 
participated in the project were members of the Little Rock Nine, the voices and 
statements attributed to them were not their own.99 The use ofvoiceover narration rather 
97 Background and early film treatment for "Ordeal in Little Rock/Recovery in Little Rock/Nine 
of Little Rock," n.d., Guggenheim Papers. 
98 Early film treatment for "Ordeal in Little Rock/Recovery in Little Rock/Nine of Little Rock," 
n.d., Guggenheim Papers. 
99 Schwenk, "Reforming the Negative through History," 295-296. 
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than lip-synched dialogue allowed the USIA to easily translate films into dozens of 
languages.100 It also allowed the agency to tailor the film's message to suit its own 
objectives, and provided for considerable flexibility in script development and editing. 
Guggenheim's notes and early film treatments reveal that some statements attributed to 
the students in the film differed substantially from the director's written record of his 
conversations with them. Moreover, some comments attributed to specific individuals in 
early film treatments were presented as the perspectives of others in the final script.101 
The use of this technique allowed the USIA to continue to frame developments in 
American race relations through a narrative of progress, while silencing some of the 
opinions and sentiments of the students themselves and obscuring the reality of 
conditions in Little Rock itself. 
The final film combined stock footage from 1957 with filmed scenes of Jefferson 
Thomas on the grounds and in the halls of Central High School, and footage ofMinnijean 
Brown, Elizabeth Eckford, Thelma Mothershed, and Ernest Green going about their daily 
routines at college. The narration that was overlaid on this footage was carefully written 
to carry the weight ofthe USIA's message about the crisis, school desegregation, and 
American race relations. Each of the vignettes carried a different burden, but they were 
designed to provide needed perspective on the crisis by emphasizing federal support for 
African American civil rights, demonstrating that the majority of the American people 
100 Wilson P. Dizard, The Strategy ofTruth: The Story of the U.S. lriformation Service 
(Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1961), 97. 
101 See Notes on "The Nine," background, and early film treatment for "Ordeal in Little 
Rode/Recovery in Little Rock/Nine of Little Rock," n.d; "Nine From Little Rock: A Film Treatment for 
the United States Information Agency," Guggenheim Papers,. See also "Nine from Little Rock" English 
script (July 17, 1964) showing changes for foreign versions (October 30, 1964), in Box 28, Entry 1098, 
Record Group 306, USIA Papers. Schwenk, "Reforming the Negative through History," 295-296. 
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had respect for the law, and illustrating that the conflict in Little Rock was not 
representative of the nation as a whole. The film also tried to underscore progress toward 
integration, and the availability of educational opportunities for African Americans in the 
United States.102 More generally, the USIA hoped the film would persuade viewers that 
American interracial relations were improving.103 Like other USIA films, the final 
product also carried messages about the superiority of the American way of life. 104 
Since it had first published The Negro in American Life in 1952, the USIA had 
measured progress in American race relations by comparing the present to the past. Nine 
From Little Rock was no exception to this rule. The film opened with Jefferson Thomas, 
one of the Little Rock Nine, observing white and black boys practicing track and field 
events at Central High School in 1964. As he watched the students running and jumping 
together from the other side of a chain-link fence, "Jefferson" explained to viewers that 
so much had changed in Little Rock since 1957 that the black and white students on this 
"ancient battlefield" attended classes and participated in sports "remembering not how it 
was in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957." The narrator conceded that some might argue 
that it would be best for the students to remain to unaware of Central High's history, and 
for the country to look toward the future, stating, "Perhaps it is best for those today to 
look where they are going and not where they have been." However, since that approach 
102 Although, notably, all of five students filmed were pursuing educational opportunities outside 
of Arkansas. Technical Specifications for "Nine From Little Rock," Project Number Du 4-2605, 
Guggenheim Papers. 
103 Research and Reference Service of the United States Information Agency, "Reaction of Indian 
University Students to 'Nine From Little Rock' Film," R-174-65, December 1964, in Box 28, Entry 1013, 
Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
104 MacCann, The People's Films, 186. 
109 
would not serve the USIA's interests, the narration underscored the importance of 
looking back to the past, particularly for a "dark man in a country where the Negro is 
demanding more and more an equal chance." The voiceover explained that as a member 
ofthe Little Rock Nine, Jefferson Thomas had a "special reason for looking back." It 
was only by examining the present in light of the past that one could determine "if you 
are really moving forward or if the world is just moving beneath your feet." 
As the narration continued, the documentary recapped the 1957 school 
desegregation crisis through archival footage of the conflict. USIA officials were well 
aware that images of the event had been distributed worldwide and had a significant 
impact on foreign public opinion. Seven years later, as producer and director Charles 
Guggenheim acknowledged in an early film treatment, Little Rock was still "remembered 
as the scene of a mob riot against [N]egro students trying to go to school. "105 If the film 
did not incorporate the most infamous and iconic images of the conflict, the credibility of 
the USIA's message could be called into question. Nine From Little Rock thus 
incorporated stock footage of the nine teenagers approaching the school, close-ups of 
men and women shouting in a mob milling front of the building, and ineffective attempts 
to control the crowd. It also featured a violent attack on a black male reporter, and white 
students leaning out of classroom windows to watch the chaos below. These scenes 
established baseline against which viewers could measure the progress of the following 
seven years. 
105 Early film treatment for "Ordeal in Little Rock/Recovery in Little Rock/Nine of Little Rock," 
n.d. Guggenheim Papers. 
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However, the film's narrator was quick to point out that this upheaval was not 
representative of the nation as a whole. Supplementary materials printed and distributed 
with the film emphasized that throughout their ordeal the Little Rock Nine maintained 
their faith that "riot and disorder were unnatural and would pass" because "in the world 
they had known" before September 1957 justice always prevailed against this "ancient 
enemy" oflaw and order. Tension surrounding school integration had developed 
because of a tradition of segregation that had taken root in the South that was "alien to 
the older and greater traditions of American democracy."106 In framing the past this way, 
the film pointedly ignored the United States' long a tortuous history of racial 
discrimination, white supremacy, slavery, and pervasive system of legal segregation and 
extralegal violence. 
Instead, the film script emphasized the singular circumstances that had generated 
the crisis. "Jefferson" explained, "This was a special morning in a special part of 
America. A place where Negro children had never gone to school with Whites before." 
Moreover, the script implied that the whites on screen represented an extreme faction 
even within the state of Arkansas, and suggested that some members of the mob were not 
from the area. In attempting to explain the relative absence of moderate or progressive 
whites, "Jefferson Thomas" simply asserted, "Hatred is easier to organize than 
understanding." 
Furthermore, although the film showed scenes of mob violence, the footage was 
carefully constructed to emphasize the intervention of the federal government and the 
106 Shelby W. Storck, "9 From Little Rock," pamphlet published by the United States Information 
Agency, n.d, p. 17, 7 in Box 12, Entry 1063, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
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protection of the students' rights. The film cut quickly to stock footage of American 
soldiers marching in front of the school, the use ofbayonets and barricades to control the 
-
crowd and remove troublemakers, and the armed escort that shuttled the Little Rock Nine 
to and from school every morning. This last scene was meant to illustrate the "warm and 
pleasant relationship" that developed between the students and the soldiers.107 
Guggenheim believed it was important to emphasize that "The mob was quelled by, 
presidential action, the students did go to school, and other [N]egroes are continuing to 
go to school there. Their paths are being made easier by the continuing efforts of 
[N]egroes and whites in the community to understand each other."108 The fmal script 
underscored the nation's commitment to the rule oflaw. "Jefferson" explained that 
President Eisenhower's intervention, and the deployment of the United States Army to 
carry out the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision, demonstrated that 
American laws were more than "just words in a book or idle talk in a classroom." 
Indeed, the intervention demonstrated that the "entire strength of the nation may be used 
to enforce in any part of the land the security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution." 
While the students were aware that many in Little Rock did not want the school to be 
integrated, the presence of the soldiers indicated that there were "millions of others who 
thought we represented something important." 
As the film shifts back to 1964, the narrator suggests that the integration of 
Central High was "both an end and that beginning." "Jefferson" explains, "From that 
107 "Nine From Little Rock: A Film Treatment for the United States Information Agency," n.d., 
Guggenheim Papers. 
108 Early film treatment for "Ordeal in Little Rock/Recovery in Little Rock/Nine ofLittle Rock," 
n.d., Guggenheim Papers. 
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moment on we would be watched- not only by those who looked at us as strangers- but 
by those who wondered if we would live up to our new opportunity." The rest of the film 
was dedicated to answering those questions affirmatively, to demonstrating that Central 
High School as an institution, and the Little Rock Nine as individuals, had made 
tremendous strides toward realizing their full potential. To this end, Guggenheim 
intercut scenes of Jefferson Thomas surveying the changes at Central High School with 
detailed portraits of four of the other Little Rock Nine attending institutions ofhigher 
learning. 
The film did not provide viewers with the kinds of statistics that had led The New 
York Times Magazine to conclude that school officials in Little Rock had been "doing as 
little as humanly possible" to comply with federal court orders to integrate. Indeed, 
instead of being "lost in the crowd" as they had been during reporter Gertrude Samuels' 
visits, the few African American students at Central were paraded in front of the film 
camera. In one scene where Thomas observes the students in the hallway changing 
classes, five black students strolled by in less than twenty seconds. Although the narrator 
acknowledged that black students at the school were outnumbered by whites, he 
indicated that this was nothing but a normal reflection of American society that would 
prepare the teenagers for life in predominantly white institutions. 
Rather than compiling "lists of logical arguments" to defend the school's record, 
Guggenheim focused on the "emotional aspects of the problem," as USIA Film Chief 
George Stevens Jr. suggested. The film did not measure Little Rock's progress through 
statistics or other quantifiable measures of change. Instead, it focused on more 
amorphous, qualitative indicators like shifts in the attitudes of white students toward 
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integration. For example, in one of the most intense scenes in Nine From Little Rock, 
I 
voiceover describes the daily terror the original nine students experienced in the 
hallways. As Jefferson Thomas walks through a crowded hall, the narrator notes, "Four 
years ago a Negro walked this hall in fear. Some of the hate outside had come inside, 
and there were a few who tried to impose their will on the many." The former student 
does not describe the abuse he and the others experienced in detail, and the film does not 
incorporate any footage of harassment inside the school because cameras were not 
permitted inside the building during the crisis.109 However, as he approaches a staircase, 
"Jefferson" alludes to these daily occurrences by stating, "When we went up a stairway 
we hung on to the railing." The scene reaches a climax as Thomas treads slowly up the 
stairs with his hand sliding up the rail and a group of white boys meets him coming 
down. The ominous music accompanying this interlude suggests that the situation is 
dangerous, and the camera cuts to Thomas' hand as it clings to the railway in anticipation 
of violence. To Thomas' apparent surprise, the white boy standing above him inquires if 
he is in need of assistance, and Jefferson hesitantly asks for directions to a teacher's 
room. After providing the location, Thomas and the white student part ways smiling and 
Thomas watches the boy proceed down the steps almost in disbelief at how much the 
racial climate had changed in the four brief years since his graduation.110 
109 Harry Ashmore, foreword to Crisis at Central High: Little Rock, 1957-58, by Elizabeth 
Huckaby (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980). 
110 USIA officials were concerned that this scene might be misinterpreted by foreign audiences 
because it was so understated. To mitigate this problem, the USIA produced slightly altered foreign 
language versions of the scene on the stairs. Here, the volume on the dialogue between Jefferson Thomas 
and the Central student was turned down, and a voiceover narration was laid over the conversation, with 
the explanation, ''Now a student will volunteer help before it is requested. Courtesy applies to everyone." 
See English script of''Nine From Little Rock" showing changes for foreign versions, October 30, 1964, in 
Box 28, Entry 1098, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
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The film also depicts other scenes of peaceful integration, and unstrained 
interactions between black and white Americans, when it revisits four of the Little Rock 
Nine at college. In each of these vignettes, the camera's lens is firmly focused on their 
individual experiences rather than the collective stories of African American students of 
their generation. This was in keeping with the USIA's general desire to redirect 
attention :from disheartening school desegregation statistics, and was in keeping with 
their long tradition of highlighting "exceptional" African American achievements. This 
approach also created relatable and engaging characters capable of capturing the attention 
of international audiences. However, as the USIA :framed the experiences of the five 
students who participated in the project, "their" stories were not only used to obscure 
broader national trends but also to camouflage the real opinions and sentiments of the 
students themselves. Guggenheim's descriptions of the students based on his interviews 
with them, and his on-the-ground assessment of conditions in the city of Little Rock, 
were often at odds with the narrative that unfolded in the film itself. 
Minnijean Brown became one of the most well-known of the Nine after she was 
expelled from Central for responding to repeated provocations. In the film, "Minnijean" 
describes herself as the oldest, but the least serious of the students that integrated Little 
Rock's flagship high school- a description that implies that she bore some responsibility 
for her expulsion :from Central High School. However, it is quickly made apparent that 
Brown has done a lot of "growing up" in the intervening seven years. She appears on 
screen as a poised young lady, graceful in her mannerisms and dress, confident, and 
engaged to be married. Like the others profiled in Nine from Little Rock, Brown is 
shown pursuing her ambitions in college by working on the school newspaper and 
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pursuing a degree in journalism. As she works in the semi-professional bustle of the 
college daily's newsroom, she exlains that her dreams were inspired by the reporters 
"who came from all over the world" to cover the school integration crisis at Little Rock. 
She suggests that the press reported the story accurately and fairly, and indicates that she 
hopes "to be able to take a story like that and put it into words" during her career. Like 
other USIA materials, this scene highlights the importance of the free press in American 
society. "Minnijean" informs viewers that she has already been offered a job when she 
graduates- a comment that points toward the opportunities awaiting her in the workforce 
as an African American and a woman. 
Throughout this segment of the film, Brown moves freely through the integrated 
environment at Southern Illinois University, interacting with white professors and a large 
group of white and black friends. She describes the friendships she has developed in 
college as "long and deep." In his notes for the film, director and producer Charles 
Guggenheim observed that Brown traveled with a "mixed crowd in which the whites are 
beat types, the kind to whom color is probably some little cachet." He also described the 
student as a "militant integrationist." He wrote, "She honestly believes that only by 
continuing to create crises is there a chance for the [N]egro to get what he wants- justice 
in this society. The boys she knows are sick of non-violence; if it doesn't pay off at a 
greater rate, they're switching over to violent revolt."111 Indeed, within a year, Brown 
would publicly criticize the 1964 Civil Rights Act as "just another token gesture" that she 
m Notes on "The Nine: Minni-Jean Brown," n.d., Guggenheim Papers. 
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believed would do little to "break down the power structure" in the absence of effective 
enforcement. 112 
These kinds of opinions do not surface in the USIA film. Instead, the utopian 
vision ofMinnijean and her friends cycling "over the river and through the woods" to a 
picnic is meant to underscore the long distance between her experience at Southern and 
the mobs that greeted her in front of Central High. In a recent interview, Minnijean 
Brown Trickey described her reluctance to get involved in the project for precisely this 
reason. Initially, she refused to be filmed because, as she put it, she didn't "want to be 
part of the propaganda machine that says 'everything is okay."' Brown was brought on 
board after several other members of the Little Rock Nine agreed to be participate. 
Nevertheless, the film's misleading characterization of Brown's views and her 
experience became manifest when a white student at Southern Illinois began hurling 
racial epithets and screaming "Go home!" at her during filming.ll3 If the USIA's 
filmmakers were shaken by this experience, it was not evident in the final edit of the 
film. Instead, while the footage shows Brown gazing across a lake on campus in the 
direction of her assailant, "Minnijean" reflects that "fear of the Negro ... was born of a 
way of life that has been dead in this country since the end of slavery" and suggests that 
the mob in Little Rock was composed of a small minority of "some Americans" who 
were afraid to let that history go. 
112 "Girl in Little Rock Crisis is Critical of Civil Rights Bill," New York Times, May 18, 1964, in 
Folder 88, Box 19, Series 1, ACHR Records. 
113 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, tape recording, 8 September 2009. 
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Like Minnijean Brown, Thelma Mothers:P.ed was also attending Southern lllinois 
University at Carbondale, and was training to be a home economics teacher. The film's 
narrator "Jefferson" introduces Mothershed to viewers as he walks through the halls of 
Central High and peeks into classrooms. He recalls, "Thelma used to say the problems 
we had getting into this school were worth it- just. to be able to take courses from some 
of the teachers." Like the example set by the journalists who covered the crisis for 
Minnijean Brown, Thomas suggests that the instructors at Central inspired Mothershed 
and others to pursue a career in education. In subsequent years, the Little Rock Nine 
have described the commendable actions of some of their teachers, but they have also 
pointed to the passive and even hostile reception they received from some instructors and 
administrators. It is just as likely that many of the students were planning on pursuing 
careers in education because it traditionally had been one of the few middle-class 
professions open to well-educated African Americans.114 Regardless, this statement also 
points to the significant leeway given to Guggenheim to attribute statements to the Nine 
in the first person. In an early draft of the script, he attributes a nearly identical sentiment 
to Gloria Ray, another one of the students. 115 This kind of flexibility was possible 
because none of the narrative voiceovers in the film were actually recorded by the Little 
Rock Nine. Instead, they were dubbed by professional actors.116 In the film, "Thelma" 
indicates that she applied to Central to prepare herself for college by getting the best high 
114 Historian John A. Kirk notes Little Rock's black professional and business class comprised 
only 3% of the city's total black population. Of that 3%, over half worked as teachers in black schools 
(Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 15). 
115 ''Nine From Little Rock: A Fihn Treatment for the United States Information Agency," n.d., 
Guggenheim Papers. 
116 Schwenk, "Reforming the Negative through History," 295-296. 
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school education offered in Little Rock. In doing so, she suggests that she was following 
in the footsteps of her parents: "Going to college is a tradition in my family." This 
statement may have been meant to point to the variety of educational opportunities 
available to African Americans in the years preceding the historic Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, while suggesting a certain degree of upward mobility. 
Moreover, the narration implies that things will only get better for future 
generations. Thelma describes the black and white children she interacts with in a 
student-teaching environment as "happy, moody, difficult, and wonderful," but most 
importantly she says, "They accept me for what I am." The narration indicates that this 
vision of the future could be- or had been- realized even in Little Rock. After outlining 
her aspirations, Thelma concludes, "After I finish college I want to apply for a job 
teaching in Little Rock- maybe someday at Central High." This statement implies that 
black teachers were welcomed in the halls of Central and other formerly segregated 
schools. However, this was not the case.117 In his production notes, Charles Guggenheim 
acknowledged that the student would "probably wind up being assigned to Horace Mann 
(still the all-[N]egro high)."118 This probability is not even alluded to in the film, nor is it 
acknowledged that Little Rock was operating under a freedom-of-choice plan that 
permitted the existence of a dual school system during filming. 
While the film merely suggested that it might be possible for Mothershed to 
instruct white students "someday," another member of the Little Rock Nine- Ernest 
117 Little Rock would not start to desegregate faculty until the 1965-66 school year. "Little Rock 
Schools Quietly Undertake Facu1ty Integration," New York Times, December 22, 1965, p. 18. 
118 Notes on "The Nine: Thehna Mothershed," n.d., Guggenheim Papers. 
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Green, the first black graduate of Central- is shown actually doing so. When 
Guggenheim and the film crew visited Green, he was pursuing a master's degree in 
sociology at Michigan State University and hoped to pursue a career with the NAACP. 119 
In the film, "Ernest" tells viewers that he plans to "work in the field of Civil Rights as a 
leader and an organizer." The student is shown participating in a demonstration on 
campus and handing out leaflets, while a recording of the protest song "We are Soldiers 
in the Army" plays in the background. Here, the narrator explains that racism is not just 
a regional southern problem and that "even in the Northern states you'll find pockets of 
discrimination-like you do all over the world." As civil rights protests accelerated in the 
North, the USIA acknowledged the presence of de facto segregation throughout the 
country, but framed it in such a way as to counter criticism from other nations who were 
struggling with similar problems. 
Nevertheless, the primary thrust of this part of the film is Green's emphasis on the 
''tide rising against" such discrimination and his desire to be a part of it. America is in 
the midst of a "revolution in thinking" that says "man, no matter how humble his birth, 
what color his skin, must be permitted to go as a far as his mind and his aspirations will 
take him." As he stands behind a lectern at the front of an integrated classroom and the 
camera pans across the faces of the students listening, "Ernest" states, "I'm convinced 
that a white American can never fully understand what motivates the Negro's desire for 
equality. But the white American is becoming more concerned, especially my 
generation, and that makes tomorrow worth dreaming about." 
119 Notes on "The Nine: Ernest Green," n.d., Guggenheim Papers. 
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Indeed, the film suggests that this kind of change can not only be affected by civil 
rights protests, but also by creation of understanding through research in the social 
sciences. In describing his participation in a study of the aspirations ofblack and white 
children in segregated in schools, "Ernest" asserts that "the tools for truth in science are 
now becoming tools for truth in human relations." The data he collects has the potential 
to build "understanding" by wielding the "power of fact against those who would exploit 
rumor and prejudice." Green was filmed computing and printing vast amounts of data, 
and the camera focuses on the American technology aiding him in this task as the whirs, 
beeps, and clicks of the machines fill the soundtrack. As the narration describes the 
power of fact and "answers that have real meaning," a large panel is shown with numbers 
blinking on and off but slowly turning from darkness to light. This segment of the film 
seems to suggest that the social sciences could play an important role in a "campaign for 
truth" waged not only against segregationists, but presumably also against communists 
who were spreading "misinformation" to some of the same audiences targeted by Nine 
from Little Rock. 
Interestingly, based on Charles Guggenheim's production notes, Green himself 
did not seem as convinced about the potential of academic social science to challenge the 
status quo. Guggenheim wrote, "He takes a philosophically critical view of Michigan 
State and American education; State is a big comfortable learning factory." According to 
the film director, Green felt that Michigan State did not teach its students to "serve 
society as critic." Rather, it offered "technical training and various kinds of 
indoctrination"; cultural critique was as "unfashionable at State" as it was "in an 
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American corporation."120 These sentiments were hardly a ringing endorsement of 
America's institutions ofhigher learning or its corporate culture. Unsurprisingly, they 
were not incorporated into the USIA film. 
Elizabeth Eckford was the only student profiled in Nine From Little Rock who 
chose to attend a predominantly black college- Central State in Ohio. The narration 
emphasized that "like most American schools," Central was integrated and that 20% of 
the faculty and student body were white. Notably, while there was no suggestion of 
difficulty or resistance at any of the predominantly white colleges featured in the film, 
"Elizabeth" explains that despite the changes at Central, ''there are still Negroes who are 
against integration" seventeen years after the school opened its doors to whites. "The 
Negro is like most Americans, possessing no monopoly on tolerance," Elizabeth 
cautions. Apparently, just as the USIA strove to demonstrate that United States was not 
the only nation struggle with racial friction in the wake of the Little Rock crisis,121 it 
wanted to underscore that it was not just white Americans who resisted integration. In 
the narration, "Elizabeth" indicates that she and the majority of Americans hope "that the 
few, the uninformed, will not be confused with the rest of us." Indeed, the students 
filmed on screen appear to have embraced integration as they gather around- white and 
black- to sing, clap and dance in a heart-shaped formation. Despite this happy scene 
conditions in Xenia, Ohio, in the southern part of the state, were far from ideal. During 
120 Notes on "The Nine: Ernest Green," n.d., Guggenheim Papers. 
121 Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs,"l698-1699; Dudziak, Cold War Civil 
Rights, 142-144. 
122 
filming, Eckford and editor Robert Pierce were refused service at a white restaurant in 
town.122 
Eckford may have been the most famous of the Little Rock Nine. She was the 
student whose lonely walk through the mob gathered in front of Central in 1957 was 
captured by photojournalists and sent around the world. As Guggenheim noted in his 
background notes, ''None of the cameras present on that morning missed this 
confrontation: Elizabeth in a pinafore dress freshened for the first day of school, with an 
armload of books, expressionless behind her dark glasses; the guardsman in battle helmet 
pointing his bayonet. Explanations of the picture that went around the world were to be 
well-reasoned and even convincing but they did not make sense, although Elizabeth did 
make the town of Little Rock world famous. "123 In the film, the narration attempted to 
complicate the story behind these iconic images. "Elizabeth" tells viewers that the mob 
was encouraged by politicians who wanted to capitalize on the emotions surrounding 
school integration. While she was "frightened" that morning, she "learned a great deal 
about people" through the experience- not only those who were there, but also about the 
"thousands who suffered with me and wrote to tell me so." The USIA wanted to 
emphasize that white reaction to school desegregation was not monolithic. There were 
some whites who turned "their heads in shame from the camera," and others who "spoke 
out against intolerance" with "brave voices." 
122 Schwenk, "Reforming the Negative through History," 296. 
123 See Notes on "The Nine," background, and early film treatment for "Ordeal in Little 
Rock/Recovery in Little Rock/Nine of Little Rock," n.d, Guggenheim Papers. 
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The film acknowledges that Eckford's traumatic experience in 1957 still affected 
her seven years later. She is featured as the most uncertain of the profiled students; she 
has not "quite decided" what she wants to do with her life. "Elizabeth" explains, "If it 
hadn't been for that morning in September 1957, I could have gone into law or education 
and not thought much of it." But in 1964, her confidence seems shaken. "The world is 
big place, and when I go out into it, I want to be sure that I go in the right direction," she 
says. Indeed, in real life, Eckford was contemplating her future and weighing her 
options. Although she would receive a bachelor's degree in education from the 
institution in 1966, her enrollment status and attendance at Central State was sporadic 
throughout the first half of the 1960s.124 Guggenheim was unable to interview her 
directly while researching the film because she had left college for the term and was 
working in Dayton.125 Nevertheless, NAACP records suggest that she had returned to 
Central in the fall of 1964.126 Eckford may have been chosen as one of the profiled 
students because of her international fame. However, the film underplayed the student's 
difficulties- perhaps because the school desegregation crisis did not have the salutatory 
effect on her that the USIA hoped to highlight. 
Designed to be only one of several short films presented during programs 
sponsored by the USIS, the film moves quickly to its conclusion. As Jefferson Thomas 
124 Dorothy Gilliam, "Pioneers of 'Breakthrough': The Children and Young People Who Faced 
Mobs at Little Rock, Clinton and Other Hot Spots Have Generally Done Well," The Washington Post 
Times Herald, May 17, 1964, E5. 
125 Notes on "The Nine: Elizabeth Eckford," n.d., Guggenheim Papers. 
126 Daisy Bates to Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, Little Rock, Arkansas, November 6, 
1964, in Desegregation, Schools, Arkansas, Little Rock, Central High, 1960-63, Box 99, Part III:A, NAACP 
Papers. 
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strolls the halls of Central, and examines the institution's awards and trophies on display, 
he informs viewers that he will be taking an exam soon to become a certified public 
accountant. "That means I'm supposed to be qualified to keep track of profits and 
losses," he says. As a trained accountant, Thomas should be able to weigh the positives 
and negatives in the school integration fight. However, the narrator demurs, "I'm not 
sure I know enough yet to say what all this adds up to." He has not been able to count 
"all the victories since that first day we went to school here." There is no mention of any 
failures that might be written on the negative side of the balance sheet. Instead, Jefferson 
points back to the evidence just presented to the audience and confidently asserts, "I 
know there's been at least nine." In the student's closing remarks, the film alludes to the 
ongoing struggle to achieve racial equality, but not directly. And like most USIA 
statements on American race relations it suggests that the country will inevitable evolve 
closer and closer to its stated ideals. As Thomas leaves the school building, and the 
camera pans over the Little Rock skyline and focuses on the dome of the Arkansas state 
capital and a church spire, Jefferson assures viewers, "In Little Rock there's a slow 
bridge taking shape over that chasm of ignorance and tolerance." That bridge will be 
built by the nation's youth, and the narrator acknowledges that "before it's finished we're 
going to have our problems." However, "if Little Rock taught us nothing more," it's that 
conflicts generated by attempts to expand and maintain freedom and equality "make us 
better- much better." 
Nine From Little Rock closely followed the USIA's new approach to underlining 
the personal, individual, and "emotional" aspects of American race relations. The film 
was designed to demonstrate that Little Rock school desegregation crisis, and the 
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perseverance of the first nine African American students to attend Central, had changed 
the city, the state of Arkansas, and the nation.127 In 1965, the information agency tested 
the effectiveness of this new kind of message with an audience of Indian university 
students and a control group to determine if Nine From Little Rock had a positive impact 
on foreign opinion about American race relations and educational opportunities in the 
United States. After collecting survey information, the USIA Research and Reference 
Service concluded that the film had a positive impact in several areas. More viewers 
than non-viewers felt that African Americans were treated "quite well" or "very well" in 
the United States. Likewise, more viewers than non-viewers believed that treatment of 
African Americans was improving and getting "better" or "much better." Those who saw 
the film also reported that they had a more favorable impression of educational 
opportunities for African American students in the United States. 
However, viewing the film did not convince the Indian students that "most 
American whites" favored school integration. Indeed, those who saw Nine From Little 
Rock were less likely to believe that the majority ofwhites favored equal rights for 
Americans. The Research and Reference Service speculated that this may have been due 
to the scenes showing resistance to integration in Little Rock in 1957, and other 
statements made about the "necessity for Negroes to struggle for equal rights." Indeed, 
while more viewers than non-viewers had a favorable opinion about the United States 
government's actions in relation to civil rights, many of those viewers seem to have 
concluded that government force was "required" to assure equality. Forty-four percent of 
127 Shelby W. Storck, "9 From Little Rock," pamphlet published by the United States Information 
Agency, n.d, 3. 
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those who saw the film believed that "Little Rock's reaction to desegregation was typical 
of what happens in other American communities faced with that situation." In short, 
many of the Indian students believed that the improvements highlighted in the film were 
the result of government action, not emotional changes or generalized shifts in white 
attitudes toward integration and African Americans. 128 The film had not accomplished 
one of the USIA's principle objectives. 
Despite this mixed report, Nine From Little Rock was translated into seventeen 
languages and distributed to ninety-seven countries. The USIA had a number of 
distribution and exhibition strategies at its disposal. Every year, the agency distributed 
thousands of prints to 200 USIS film libraries around the world. USIS film officers 
regularly screened films on location, but they could also be checked out by individuals or 
organizations with their own projection equipment. If needed, the Motion Picture 
Service worked with groups to help them select films that addressed particular topics of 
interest, and provided projection equipment and training in how to use it. Film officers 
developed relationships with government officials, such as ministers of education, 
agriculture and health, who helped promote screenings by appearing as speakers before 
the showing of films related to their work. From the beginning, schools and universities 
made extensive use of the film program in their classrooms. U.S. officials also 
encouraged representatives oflabor organizations, church groups, women's 
organizations, athletic associations, youth and community service centers, business 
128 Research and Reference Service of the United States Information Agency, "Reaction of Indian 
University Students to 'Nine From Little Rock' Fihn," R-174-65, December 1965, in Box 28, Entry 1013, 
Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
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groups and civic clubs to host screenings of their own.129 Through cooperative 
agreements with Warner Brothers, RKO, Twentieth Century Fox, and Paramount, the 
motion picture service dramatically expanded its potential audience by as much as 200 
million viewers by distributing its output through commercial channels to theaters around 
the globe.130 According to Wilson P. Dizard, the films proved to be popular with theater 
owners in Latin America, Asia, and Africa "because they were free and usually dubbed in 
the locallanguage."131 For the USIA, this channel of distribution- more than any other-
allowed the agency to conceal the hand of government since it provided the "opportunity 
for ... films to be screened in conjunction with regular theatrical programs." Likewise, in 
addition to being exhibited at international fairs, USIA films were also submitted as 
entries for international film festivals. 132 
However, the USIA's most innovative means of distributing and exhibiting prints 
of its films were its roaming "mobile units," which serviced remote rural areas. Using 
specially constructed four-wheel drive trucks built by the Jeep Willys company, U.S. film 
officers took the agency's films to nearby villages and towns within a day's distance, and 
far into the backcountry on journeys that could last as long as three months. The trucks 
129 Edwards,"Films in the U.S. Overseas Information Program: The World Sees America," May 
1949, p. 2; Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International Motion 
Pictures Division, "IMP's Part in the Campaign ofTruth," January 1952, p.7-13; United States 
Information Agency, The Overseas Film Program, pamphlet published June 1959, in Box 153, Entry 
1066, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
130 "USIA Film Audience Increased by 200 Million," Herald Tribune, August 2, 1954, in Box 
153, Entry 1066, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
131 Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy, 168-169. 
132 Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International Motion 
Pictures Division, "IMP's Part in the Campaign of Truth," January 1952, p.11. 
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were outfitted with a motion picture projector, a film strip projector, sound equipment 
and a public address system, lights, viewing screens, and a tape recorder for making new 
narrative voiceovers on location in local dialects. The roofs of the vehicles were 
reinforced to serve as a platform for the projectionist, and the unit was equipped with a 
built-in generator to power the projection equipment. An agency report described the 
projectionists as "early-day pioneers" who "travel long distances over primitive roads 
and sometimes where no roads exist." For these film officers, "Day-long deluges of 
tropical rain, miles across desert land in blazing sun and dust storms, and trips into 
mountainous territory are a routine part of the job to them. Much of the time, after a 
grueling drive, it is up to the unit's crew to visit appropriate village leaders or officials, 
gain their cooperation, and then proceed to set up equipment for the coming night's 
show." Despite these challenges, the motion picture service viewed the mobile units as a 
vital part of their operation. They were the only way to reach rural audiences in 
communities where no theater existed. These audiences, composed largely of farmers 
and agricultural workers, had "little opportunity to receive information through the 
routine means known in the United States- newspapers, magazines, books, radio." 
Moreover, those who were illiterate due to little or no formal schooling were not able to 
utilize these materials even when they had access to them. Consequently, the film service 
had a particularly important role to play in America's "battle for hearts and minds" in 
these remote areas. 133 
133 Department of State, International Information and Exchange Prograni, International Motion 
Pictures Division, "IMP's Part in the Campaign of Truth," January 1952, p.7-8. See also Edwards,"Films 
in the U.S. Overseas Information Program: The World Sees America," May 1949, p. 5. Dizard, Inventing 
Public Diplomacy, 168-169. 
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By utilizing all of these distribution channels, the USIA increased the audience 
for its films exponentially over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. In 1949, the State 
Department's International Motion Picture Division estimated that their film program 
reached 100 million annuallyY4 By 1952, the division reported that it reached 400 
million viewers with approximately 30,000 people watching a USIA film in every hour 
on any given day.135 Twelve years later in 1964, the agency expected that 750 million 
people would watch its films in more than 100 countries.136 
However, measuring the effect the films had on these audiences was harder to 
measure. USIA officials struggled to provide an adequate measure of the film program's 
impact in order to persuade recalcitrant Congressional representatives to support the 
program. Like other United States propaganda output, the tone of the agency's films 
shifted from the "hard sell" to a softer approach over the course of the 1950s. The 
agency struggled to acquire appropriations for this long-term "soft sell" approach. At 
budget hearings, congressional representatives often seemed to prefer a more direct 
message. In this context, it often appeared that the "strongest indication of the 
effectiveness of the program" was the "vicious attacks" made by the communist press on 
the content of the films. 137 Additionally, the USIA distributed supplementary materials 
134 Edwards,"Films in the U.S. Overseas Information Program: The World Sees America," May 
1949, p. 1-5. 
135 Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International Motion 
Pictures Division, "IMP's Part in the Campaign of Truth," January 1952, p.ll. 
136 Alpert, "Movies that Carry the Freight," SR, December 12, 1964, p. 69, in Box 153, Entry 
1066, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
137 Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International Motion 
Pictures Division, "IMP's Part in the Campaign ofTruth," January 1952, p.16. See also Thomas M. Pryor, 
"Films Aid Truth Campaign: State Department's Own Movie Division Expands Production Activities in 
Mounting War ofldeas with Russia," New York Times, March25, 1951; MacCann, The People's Films, 
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and discussion guides designed to underscore the messages and themes embedded in the 
motion pictures, and to "augment and sustain their impact."138 In order to determine 
whether their films would be successful at reaching key groups, the agency consulted 
anthropologists and other experts like Dr. Margaret Mead.139 Additionally, as it did with 
Nine From Little Rock, the USIA also commissioned surveys to determine whether 
audiences understood a particular film or scene, to measure the degree to which they 
were absorbing and internalizing the film's message, and to ascertain whether the films 
were having a discemable impact on foreign opinion about the United States in general. 140 
Staff members recorded the number of times a film was shown and how many viewers 
had seen it. USIA officials also sent reviews of the films printed in local newspapers 
back to W ashington.141 
Several USIS posts reported that Nine From Little Rock was well received. As 
Mary L. Dudziak noted in her book Cold War Civil Rights, USIA Director Carl Rowan 
told President Johnson, "In Africa where it is vitally important that we do our best to 
keep the United States civil rights struggle in perspective, USIS Nairobi reported that 
Nine From Little Rock was the 'best film the Agency has yet made on civil rights .... [I]t 
174, 178-180. 
138 Department of State, International Information and Exchange Program, International Motion 
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supports the high priority country objective of showing progress in the U.S. to our racial 
difficulties." This opinion was seconded by USIS officials in Kampala, Uganda, who 
declared, "This film closes the book on Little Rock and frees the mind to consider the 
changed aspects of the struggle. " 142 The film was applauded in other comers as well. 
Late in 1964, the film received the Gold Gate Award, first prize in its class, at the San 
Francisco International Film Festival.143 Shortly thereafter, Nine From Little Rock was 
acknowledged with an Academy Award for best short documentary. 
Closing the Book on Little Rock 
Back in Little Rock, however, tension surrounding the glacial pace of school 
desegregation was building. Although the USIA described Arkansas' capital as "a city 
where school desegregation has been undertaken and carried through successfully,"144 
Little Rock's Negro Council on Community Affairs and other civil rights organizations 
were less sanguine about the city's progress. As noted in Chapter One, the Council 
protested that the pace of change in Arkansas' capital was "painfully slow'' and accused 
the school board of using the placement law achieve the "barest minimum" of 
integration. The community affairs organization petitions for change were ignored, the 
council scheduled a boycott and planned public rallies in protest of token integration.145 
142 As quoted in Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 218-219. 
143 "USIA movies on race are awarded top honors," Baltimore Afro-American, November 10, 
1964, in Box 153, Entry 1066, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
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This threat produced some concessions from the board. However, generally speaking, 
the board expressed "satisfaction with the pace of desegregation" in Little Rock, and 
made no promises to move more quickly toward a unified school system.146 In the 
months and years that followed, the Council and other community organizations would 
press for additional concessions and commitments from the school board. 
Within a relatively short period, the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act And the 
1965 Elementary and Secondary School Act would provide the black community of 
Little Rock and sympathetic whites in the city with additional support for their efforts. 
For the USIA, the enactment of this legislation, as well as the Voting Rights Act, 
supplied the USIA with more ammunition in its campaign to reshape foreign opinion of 
American race relations. In its daily bulletins, broadcasts, and publications the USIA 
proudly compared the significance of this legislation to the Declaration of Independence 
and Emancipation Proclamation, asserting that the new laws resolved the "political, 
constitutional, and parliamentary" difficulties that had stymied efforts to eliminate 
prejudice and discrimination. According to the agency, the passage of these laws by 
duly-elected representatives of the American people illustrated that the majority of 
American citizens stood behind changes in the field of civil rights. While these acts 
could not resolve all of the nation's racial problems, the USIA confidently declared that 
remaining tensions would steadily "diminish" as white and black citizens interacted 
freely "in those public and private places that formerly separated them." With the 
steadfast work of organizations "dedicated to brotherhood," and appeals to the national 
146 Donald Janson, "Little Rock Bows on School Issues: Negroes Call of Boycott-Integration 
Study Starts," The New York Times, April4, 1964. 
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conscience, the agency affirmed that private citizens "in every region of the United 
States" were committed to moving the nation toward "equality for all Americans."147 
The information agency made note of these changes and their potential impact in 
the field of education in the printed supplementary materials that accompanied 
Guggenheim's film. The 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited the use of federal aid for 
education in segregated schools. The USIA and other observers in the mid-1960s hoped 
that this would provide sufficient incentive for southern school districts to move more 
quickly with their desegregation plans, particularly with the passage of the 1965 
Elementary and Secondary School Education Act which provided $1.3 billion dollars of 
aid for improvements. The USIA emphasized that southern states, with relatively lower 
standards living, could "not afford to forego" this windfall of federal money. The agency 
assured international audiences that funds would not be provided to states "until the U.S. 
Commissioner of Education is satisfied that they will not be spent for racially segregated 
pupils." In making these determinations, "token compliance with the law will not be 
enough"; the Commissioner had called for "full racial desegregation throughout the 
United States" by September 1967.148 Consequently, the supplementary brochure 9 From 
Little Rock concluded optimistically, "These new laws, and others to follow, will make 
school life easier and perhaps more rewarding for those Negro students who follow the 
Nine From Little Rock in the pursuit ofknowledge."149 
147 United States Information Agency, For the Dignity of Man: America's Civil Rights Program, 
pamphlet, 1965, in Box 12, Entry 1063, Record Group 306, USIA Papers. 
148Ibid. 
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Public opinion polling and international press coverage revealed that these 
substantive developments convinced many foreign observers that the United States 
government was throwing its "full weight" behind the protection of equal rights. 
Ultimately, it was the nation's concrete commitment to civil rights legislation that had 
the most persuasive effect- not attempts to recast the civil rights struggle as an intimate, 
emotional interaction between black and white Americans. An internal report written in 
1966 reassessed the US information agency's approach to the subject of race relations in 
this new context. "It was clear from all sources," the report stated, "that foreign peoples 
have a predominantly bad opinion of the treatment ofNegroes in the US." No other issue 
raised such "predictably and uniformly adverse" reactions or "strongly negative" 
opinions. However, increasingly, international audiences seemed to believe that 
conditions were improving. The foreign press generally supported the notion that the 
federal government was "firmly committe4" to the "full participation of the Negro in US 
life," although like the Indian students who viewed Nine From Little Rock, many 
remained skeptical that public sentiment among white American citizens supported these 
changes. But most significantly, the report suggested that persistently unfavorable views 
of American race relations seemed to have "comparatively little effect" on general 
opinions about the United States as whole, which remained predominantly positive.150 
Given these facts, the report suggested that the subject of race probably concerned 
and preoccupied the agency "more than the facts warrant." Although this thorny issue 
was a "professional problem for the propagandist," there was some danger of confusing 
150 United States Information Agency, "Racial Issues in the US: Some Policy and Program 
Indications of Research," Special Report, March 14, 1966, p. 1-2, in Box 2, Entry 1009B, Record Group 
306, USIA Papers. 
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"a kind of crusading masochism with freedom from hypocrisy" or overemphasizing the 
salience of the issue in an attempt to resolve it. Since the passage of civil rights 
legislation, the subject was "no longer so delicate to handle." With a "much more 
positive story to tell," the agency should "avoid devoting massive sections of 
programming to the issue, and responding dramatically to drama." Indeed, by placing 
too much emphasis on the civil rights movement, the "struggle" for equal rights," or 
"dramatic" change, foreign audiences might confuse the gradual evolution of the 
American conscience and the application of the democratic process for "a successful War 
of People's liberation. "1s1 
Looking to the future, the report recommended that the agency change its way of 
approaching the question of race entirely. Instead of underscoring the "special triumph 
of individual Negroes" or the civil rights movement as whole, the USIA should adopt a 
tone of"matter-of-fact acceptance," portraying black citizens in the "context and 
framework of normal American life." The USIA should no longer measure the present 
against the past since on balance "it probably serves better to remind of an unfavorable 
situation than an unfavorable one." Moreover, "before and after" statistics, measuring 
progress in education, job discrimination, housing, and the like was equally 
counterproductive since the numbers were "likely to be less than expectancy rather than 
more." The report recommended that the agency devote its resources on the issue to 
changing the perception that the white majority did not support civil rights protections by 
scrupulously avoiding "black-and-white treatment" of racial conflicts and adopting a 
Is I United States Information Agency, "Racial Issues in the US: Some Policy and Program 
Indications ofResearch," Special Report, March 14, 1966, p. 1-2, 5-6, in Box 2, Entry 1009B, Record 
Group 306, USIA Papers. 
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"low key, mulatto" approach to the problem.152 The USIA appeared to adopt this 
approach in the years that followed. As the agency shifted its resources toward 
explaining the nation's involvement in Vietnam, American race relations ceased to be a 
central focus of information programming.153 
Nine From Little Rock is a significant and important film because it is one of the 
first retrospective assessments of the 1957 school desegregation crisis and its impact. 
This documentary was commissioned by the United States Information Agency as part of 
a long term project to reshape the way foreign audiences viewed the crisis, and to help 
ameliorate negative perceptions of American race relations- perceptions that were 
viewed as damaging to America's strategic positioning during the Cold War. The film 
forwards an interpretation of the civil rights movement and the campaign to desegregate 
the nation's schools that the U.S. federal government hoped to promote at home and 
abroad. It adopted several strategies which would continue to shape public memory of 
the crisis and its impact in the years to come. 
Like other USIA films and publications, the film was not distributed in the United 
States. 154 However, as historian Kenneth Osgood has recently argued, the principle of 
152United States Information Agency, "Racial Issues in the US: Some Policy and Program 
Indications ofResearch," Special Report, March 14, 1966, p. 5-6, in Box 2, Entry 1009B, Record Group 
306, USIA Papers. 
153 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 17. 
154 Charles Guggenheim received many warm letters of congratulations from family and friends 
after he received the Academy Award. Ironically, very few of those who wrote to him had actually seen 
the film since, like other USIA films and publications, it was not distributed in the United States. When 
Ernest Green contacted the writer and director to ask him how he could view the finished product or obtain 
a copy of it, Guggenheim apologetically reported that the film could only be screened at the USIA office 
in New York. There is no evidence that any of the five students who participated in the filming ever saw 
or signed off on the final script and first-person narration or attended a screening. Ernest Green to Charles 
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"total war" that lay behind America's propaganda activities during the Cold War "made 
distinctions between propaganda intended for 'domestic' and 'international' audiences" 
meaningless. When possible, the USIA and other government agencies adopted a 
"camouflaged" approach to its information campaigns that recruited individuals, 
nonprofit organizations, independent news agencies, film producers, citizens groups and 
corporations to deliver American propaganda messages. At times, government agencies 
targeted domestic audiences and influenced public opinion to "sustain national 
morale. "155 In this context, the narrative of the civil rights movement promoted by the 
United States government abroad n;my have reflected and molded historical 
understanding at home.156 
Indeed, Nine From Little Rock's interpretation of the events of 1957 continues to 
resonate in domestic public memory today. During a period of exceptional domestic 
unrest, presenting the African American freedom struggle as "rags to riches idyll" and 
the campaign to desegregate the nation's schools as an example of democracy in motion 
served the interests ofthe state. Given the institutional resources behind this narrative, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that the Little Rock school desegregation crisis continues to be 
framed as a watershed moment in which the federal government acted firmly to ensure 
that Southern states abided by the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education 
Guggenheim, April&, 1965; Charles Guggenheim to Ernest Green, Aprill5, 1965, Guggenheim Papers. 
Minnijean Brown Trickey also asserted that she did not see the film for at least fifteen years after it was 
produced. Trickey, interview by author, 8 September 2009. 
155 Osgood, Total Cold War, 3-5. 
156 Several other ''where are they now" retrospectives appeared domestically in print around the 
time Nine from Little Rock was produced. See Dorothy Gilliam, "Pioneers of 'Breakthrough'," The 
Washington Post Times Herald, May 17, 1964, E5; Associated Press, "'Little Rock Nine': Now Adults, 
Proud of Integration Role," Arkansas Gazette, January 30, 1966, 6A. 
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decision. In public memory, the swift and forceful action of the 101 st Airborne and the 
dispersal of the mob gathered outside Little Rock Central High School set a strong 
precedent that ended southern massive resistance. What this narrative obscures is the 
long-struggle that followed the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, in Arkansas' 
capital city and elsewhere, to achieve more than token levels of integration and to realize 
the full potential of the Court's decision declaring school desegregation unconstitutional. 
Just as in the USIA film Nine From Little Rock, these facts remain hidden from view. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
"WE DON'T LIKE BUSING": 
DISTRICT-WIDE DESEGREGATION AND STUDENT TRANSPORTATION, 1964-1971 
In the early 1960s, the USIA had tried to repackage token school desegregation as 
evidence of American progress in race relations. However, in Little Rock and elsewhere, 
school boards and civic leaders designed evasive mechanisms like pupil placement acts 
and freedom-of-choice plans to keep the number of African American students attending 
historically white schools as low as possible. In 1964, nearly 99% of black pupils in the 
eleven states of the former Confederacy attended historically black schools. After a 
decade of school desegregation, dual school systems persisted throughout the South. 
Although Little Rock became known as a center of massive resistance in 1957, 
city leaders and school board members were even more committed to a policy of 
gradualism and tokenism that promised to keep desegregation to a minimum. However, 
the legal foundation undergirding this approach began to crumble in the mid-1960s as 
courts began to demand school desegregation plans that were immediately and 
demonstrably effective. As the NAACP exerted pressure on the school board through 
litigation, political elites in Little Rock were forced to respond to these new requirements. 
The Little Rock school board took a new approach to minimizing integration by adopting 
geographic attendance zones in the residentially segregated city. 
African American plaintiffs in Little Rock were dissatisfied with the zones drawn 
by the board because they perpetuated the existence of identifiably white and black 
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schools. By the late 1960s, the focus of the desegregation struggle shifted from efforts to 
place a handful of African American students in historically white schools like Central 
High to a broader initiative to achieve equitable and effective desegregation in all of the 
system's educational institutions. Increasing residential segregation in the city placed 
Little Rock on the front line of efforts to push the courts beyond racially "neutral" student 
assignment plans based on pupil placement criteria or geographic attendance zones. In 
short, the city's civil rights community was determined to secure a unitary school system 
with or without neighborhood schools. Consequently, by 1970, the Little Rock School 
District was one of the first in the country urged to consider student transportation as a 
more effective means of eliminating segregation "root and branch." 
Adopting Freedom-of-Choice 
As noted in Chapter One, Little Rock's pupil placement law had been applied to 
keep the number of African American students attending formerly all-white schools as 
low as possible in the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, with the pending passage of 
the Civil Rights Act, the school board's attorneys advised the district to revise its student 
assignment policy. Consequently, in the spring of 1964, the school board adapted its use 
of the pupil placement law to allow students in grades one, four, seven, and ten to choose 
the schools they would attend for the next three years. Previously, students had been 
assigned by the board and were required to apply for transfers to attend other schools of 
their choice. Frequently, their requests were not granted. Under this new amended plan, 
I 
over 180 African American students elected to attend formerly all-white schools and most 
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requests were granted for the 1964-65 school year. 1 
Nationwide, the pace of desegregation accelerated throughout the South as both 
Congress and the executive branch provided for vigorous enforcement of court orders for 
the first time since the Brown decision. 2 The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
enabled the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to withhold federal 
funds from school districts that refused to comply with federal school desegregation 
. 
guidelines. Combined with the threat of litigation, the availability of larger amounts of 
federal aid for education provided sufficient incentive for many communities to move 
more decisively toward integrating their schools. As many proponents of the legislation 
expected, the pace of desegregation accelerated rapidly. In just a single academic year, 
the number of black students attending integrated schools in southern states increased by 
more than seven fold. 3 
However, despite these developments and amendments to Little Rock's pupil 
placement procedures, African American residents in Arkansas' capital continued to 
encounter obstacles in their efforts to secure free access to the city's schools. In fall of 
1964, Delores Clark, a new Little Rock resident was instructed over the telephone to 
enroll her children at a white school. When she appeared in person to register, her 
1 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 369 F .2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966). 
Karen Anderson, "The Little Rock School Desegregation Crisis: Moderation and Social Conflict," The 
Journal of Southern History 70, no. 3 (August 2004): 629-631. 
2 Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1978), 6. 
3 1n 1965-66, approximately 7% ofblack students attended "integrated" schools in the region, and 
a in 1966-67 12.5%. Drew Pearson, "School Stand May Not Aid Wallace," The Washington Post Times 
Herald, April I, 1967, Dl5. 
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children were denied placement and enrolled in a black school. Clark filed suit 
challenging the district's student assignment policies.4 Under this legal pressure, and 
with the release of specific HEW school desegregation guidelines, the board formally 
adopted a "freedom-of-choice" plan in April 1965 after attorney Herschel Friday 
explained that the pupil assignment plan did not meet the requirements of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.5 Little Rock's plan was adjusted again in November 1965 to comply with a 
decision from the gth Circuit Court of Appeals and approved by Eastern District Court of 
Arkansas.6 
The district's freedom-of-choice plan required students and their parents to select 
or choose the school they wished to attend in grades one, seven, and ten, and by new 
students entering the system. The student's choice was to be honored except in cases of 
overcrowding when preference would be given to those students living closest to the 
school; remaining students would be offered a second choice.7 Students in other grades 
were allowed to transfer into other schools, but they were not compelled to indicate a 
preference and would continue to attend their current schools unless they took 
independent action.8 After the trial before the district court but before judgement, Clark's 
4 Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966). 
5 "Little Rock Adopts a New School Plan Stressing 'Choice,"' New York Times, April24, 1965, p. 
12. 
6 As noted in Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 369 F.2d 661 (8th 
Cir. 1966), new requirements were outlined in Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14 (81h Cir. 1965). 
7 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966). 
8 "Little Rock's Plan Ruled Constitutional," The Washington Post Times Herald, December 17, 
1966, p. A2. 
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four children were voluntarily reassigned to nearby predominantly white schools. With 
the adoption of a plan deemed constitutional by the federal district court and reassignment 
of her children, Clark's suit was dismissed but she appealed to the 8th circuit.9 
Although the number of black students attending predominantly white schools 
increased to 621 by the 1965-66 school year, the NAACP and the local black community 
remained skeptical that the new "freedom-of-choice" plan would produce significant 
desegregation. Nearly 7,200 black students were still attending historically black 
schools.10 L.C. Bates, Arkansas field secretary for the NAACP, suggested that the board 
would manipulate the overcrowding provision of the plan to control integration. The 
freedom-of-choice plan would not "make it any easier for Negro pupils to attend 
integrated schools," Bates contended. The field secretary noted that the school board had 
never fully complied with the court's orders, and insisted that further integration would 
only be achieved with "more litigation and the holding up of Federal funds." 11 Thelma 
Mothershed, one of the Little Rock Nine, publicly expressed her doubts that many of the 
city's black families would exercise their choice due to fear that their children would be 
harassed in virtually all-white schools. 12 
Before the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, Clark and her lawyers challenged the 
9 Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966). 
10 Statistics provided by Floyd W. Parsons, Superintendent of Schools, "Desegregation Report: 
Little Rock School District," January 1968, filed in Minutes of the Little Rock School Board (LRSB). 
11 "Little Rock Adopts a New School Plan Stressing 'Choice,"' New York Times, April24, 1965, p. 
12. 
12 "'Little Rock Nine,' Now Adults, Proud of Integration Role," Associated Press, Arkansas 
Gazette, January 30, 1966, p. 6A. 
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constitutionality of"freedom-of-choice" plans, arguing that the plan would not create a 
fully integrated school system. Given the school board's earlier commitment to moving 
toward geographic attendance zones (under the court-approved "Blossom Plan"), at best, 
"freedom-of-choice" could be considered part of an effective transition to an integrated 
system. In and of itself it did not fulfill the constitutional mandate outlined in Brown. 
Moreover, they objected to the mechanics of the approved plan, noting that students were 
not required to make an annual choice of schools and that the plan did not include 
provisions for notifying parents and students of their new options. Finally, they decried 
the district's slow progress on the desegregation of faculty and staff. The presence of 
racially homogenous staffs continued to identify schools as "black" or "white."13 
In December 1966, the 8th Circuit upheld the "freedom of choice" plan with minor 
revisions. The court concluded that a "general attack" on this form of pupil assignment 
was not "well taken at this time." The method had been tentatively approved by HEW 
and other courts, and had not been struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. According to 
the gth Circuit's reading of the evidence, a plan that provided for annual choice- even if 
that choice was not compulsory- "could prove useful in achieving a nomacially operated 
school system." While the plaintiffs complained that only 8.5 percent of black students 
were attending integrated schools during the 1965-66 school year, the court pointed to the 
annual increase of students electing to attend previously white schools with more than 13 
13 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966). 
See also Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 174-175. 
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percent of black students exercising their choice in 1966-67.14 These statistics indicated 
to the court "that the children are making effective choices that are being honored by the 
Board and the actual integration desired by the plaintiffs is, in fact, taking place at an 
accelerated pace." Moreover, the court suggested that "the system was not subject to 
constitutional objections simply because large segments of whites and Negroes chose to 
continue attending their familiar schools." Although the court acknowledged that the 
system was "open to unconstitutional abuse in its individual application," and may not 
"fully and adequately" fulfill the requirements of Brown, it had not yet "proved a failure." 
The district court was ordered to retain jurisdiction to assure that students were not being 
steered toward black or white schools, the board was required to inform parents of their 
rights under the system, and the school district was ordered to end discrimination in staff 
hiring and assignment. However, in closing, the Court of Appeals warned the school 
district that the hour for "deliberate speed" and "flexibility" was "about over." If the 
freedom-of-choice plan could not be applied in such a way to bring about "a fmal end to 
unlawful discrimination," the courts would have to intervene.15 
Considering and Rejecting Alternatives 
While this litigation moved through the federal courts during the latter half of the 
14 The pace of integration in Little Rock was generally consistent with that experienced in the Deep 
South as a whole during this period. In 1965-66, approximately 7% ofblack students attended "integrated" 
schools in the region, and a in 1966-67 12.5% (Drew Pearson, "School Stand May Not Aid Wallace," The 
Washington Post Times Herald, April1, 1967, p. D15). The statistics cited by the 8th Circuit vary from 
those provided by Superintendent of Schools Floyd W. Parson in his "Desegregation Report." Parsons 
asserted that 7.9% of black students had exercised their choice in 1965-66, and 17.1% in 1966-67 (Parsons, 
"Desegregation Report: Little Rock School District," January 1968, LRSB.) 
15Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966). 
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1960s, the Little Rock school board became "progressively more liberal," as the New 
York Times put it. At the time, educational consultants observed that "liberals" in Little 
Rock who supported desegregation were able to secure a majority on the school board 
because of their ability to mobilize an electoral coalition that included the city's African 
American community as well as sympathetic middle- and upper-class white voters from 
the city's Fifth Ward in the West End.16 With the support ofthis coalition, board 
member James M. Coates Jr. persuaded his colleagues that the district's freedom-of-
choice plan might be considered constitutionally insufficient. The board voluntarily 
decided to hire a consultant to draw up "an appropriate long-range plan" to implement 
school desegregation throughout the district in the spring of 1966. A few months later, the 
University of Oregon was selected to draw up the plan and make recommendations. 17 
At the time, these developments did not alarm the public. Indeed, in September 
1966, T.E. Patterson became the first African American elected to a seat on the board in a 
city-wide election, and the board retained a liberal majority. With the support of 
Superintendent Floyd W. Parsons, Patterson subsequently pushed through the 
appointment of an African American assistant superintendent William Harry Fowler. 
Fowler was charged with overseeing personnel, and pledged to move quickly to comply 
16 Representatives of this coalition frequently appeared at school board meetings and filed requests 
and complaints with school administrators pushing for more substantial change. The researchers concluded, 
"In terms of the scope of their influence, the effectiveness of the liberals has been impressive considering 
the small numbers they represent" (University of Oregon, School of Education, Bureau ofEducational 
Research, "A Report to the Board ofDirectors of the Little Rock School District, Little Rock, Arkansas," 
May 1967, p. 48-49, LRSB). See also Johnson, "After 1957: Resisting Integration in Little Rock," 275. 
17 Paul Fair, "Little Rock: Then and Now," Theory into Practice, 17, no. 1 (February 1978): 40. 
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with the federal court's order to desegregate the staff.18 
However, support for the liberal majority on the board began to crumble as the 
city of Little Rock approached the tenth anniversary of the 1957 crisis. The release of the 
"Oregon Plan" in early 1967 unleashed a flood of resistance to school desegregation 
strategies which moved beyond freedom-of-choice. The University of Oregon 
consultants recommended that the district spend $10 million dollars to construct a series 
of centralized educational parks to replace smaller neighborhood schools serving 
residentially segregated communities on the city's periphery. It also recommended 
supplementing the freedom-of-choice plan by guaranteeing African American students 
25% of the seats in any school regardless of overcrowding, and called for the 
establishment of a district-wide transportation system to ensure that students could reach 
the schools of their choice. The plan also called for the development of "compensatory 
education" programs for children with "educational" and "cultural deficiencies." The 
writers of the Oregon Report severely underestimated the amount of opposition that 
would greet their proposal. "The future of school integration in Little Rock appears 
promising," they predicted after concluding that leaders of the community and school 
administrators had accepted some modicum of integration,· and commenting on the lack 
of organized opposition and the absence of "real obstacle[ s ]" to change. 19 
18 "Little Rock Negro to Hire Teachers: New City School Aide Will Also Make Assignments," 
New York Times, February 9, 1967, p. 1; Herbert H. Denton, "Race Issue Still Dogs Schools in Nation, 
Conference Told," Washington Post Times Herald, February 2, 1969, p. 2. 
19 University of Oregon, School ofEducation, Bureau of Educational Research, "A Report to the 
Board ofDirectors ofthe Little Rock School District, Little Rock, Arkansas," May 1967, p. 58, 88-105, 
LRSB . 
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However, affluent citizens from the city's West End did not receive the report 
favorably. Students in this predominantly white section of Little Rock had been insulated 
from most ofthe integration in the district due to the construction of new educational 
plants in the western part of the city far from most black neighborhoods. Ten years after 
the Little Rock Nine integrated Central High School, only five black students attended the 
West End's Hall High. Traditionally, affluent citizens in the West End had developed 
alliances with black voters to support moderate, rather than segregationist, school board 
candidates. White residents more immediately affected by integration had accused 
residents in the city's "silk -stocking district" of supporting gradual desegregation only 
because their children were unaffected by it. In 1967, it appeared they were right.20 
West End residents formed the Education First Committee to rally against the 
Oregon Report, the first comprehensive desegregation plan proposed in Little Rock that 
would impact students in affluent parts of the city. Historian Ben F. Johnson has 
characterized these developments as the "gentrification of segregation" in Little Rock, 
noting that members of Education First "employed the language of neighborhood unity 
and individual freedom rather than the citizens' council rhetoric of heritage and racial 
integrity" in their effort to defeat the district's new desegregation plan at the polls. 21 
Indeed, West End residents had learned ten years earlier that efforts ~o minimize and 
control integration at the ballot box were more effective tools for shaping the school 
district's future than massive resistance. During the next school board election, two of 
20 Johnson, "After 1957: Resisting Integration in Little Rock," 258-283. 
21 Ibid, 277, 283. 
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the liberal members who had supported the plan were defeated. The results were 
interpreted as a public rejection of the principles outlined in the Oregon Report and it was 
abandoned by the board. 22 
James M. Coates Jr., the board member who had persuaded his colleagues to 
develop a long-range solution to the district's desegregation problems, lived in Little 
Rock's West End in the Fifth Ward. As one of the two board members defeated as a 
result of opposition to the Oregon Report, Coates commented on the transformation of 
school politics among Little Rock's upper-middle class "liberals" in the late 1960s. In his 
position on the board, Coates had observed the perpetuation of the dual school system. 
School officials facilitated Little Rock's suburban sprawl to the west by abandoning 
"worn-out schools to Negroes in the center of the city" while "building nice new ones for 
whites in the suburbs." Coates noted, "I live out there, too, but I know we can't keep on 
getting away with that." In the former board member's estimation, the upper-middle 
class whites in Little Rock who had demonstrated support for public education in 1959 by 
demanding the reopening of the schools did so with the understanding that they would not 
be effected by the city's integration plan, but once it threatened to touch their 
neighborhoods their attitudes suddenly shifted. "Most of the people who are raising the 
hell [over the Oregon Report] were the so-called liberals of 10 years ago," he observed. 
"They want integration for everyone but themselves- and these are my friends and 
22 Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970). 
Gene Foreman and Tucker Steinmetz, "Looking Back at 'Little Rock': How Ten Years Have Changed the 
Perspective," The National Observer, 1967, in Folder 8, Box 498, Subseries 7, Series 14, Orval Eugene 
Faubus Papers, 1910-1994 (Faubus Papers), Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, 
Fayetteville. Fair, "Little Rock: Then and Now," 40; Anderson, "The Little Rock School Desegregation 
Crisis: Moderation and Social Conflict," 620-631. 
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neighbors."23 
Despite the defeat of Coates and shifting racial politics in the city, liberals on the 
board still retained a 4-3 majority and directed Superintendent of Schools Floyd W. 
Parsons and his staff to develop a comprehensive plan that accommodated some of the 
concerns of influential white school patrons. The "Parsons Plan" called for the 
desegregation of Little Rock's high schools by closing Horace Mann, a traditionally black 
school, and busing students to the three other predominantly white high schools. This 
provision was based on Parsons' conclusion that "whites will not attend historically-
identified Negro schools," and that "integration will be a one-way street for the 
foreseeable future." Under the Superintendent's plan, no white students would be bused, 
and additions would be made to the remaining high schools to accommodate the influx of 
African American students. However, school attendance areas would be redrawn in 
"strip" zones from east to west across white and black sections of Little Rock in order to 
counteract segregated housing patterns. Junior high schools would be unaffected by the 
plan, but the creation of two elementary school "complexes" would create more racial 
balance in the eastern and central parts of the city.24 
Members of the board were reportedly "surprised" by the "extent" of Parson's 
proposals. 25 Some expressed concern that the provisions of the plan that called for the 
23 Arkansas Gazette, December 19, 1967, as quoted in Johnson, "After 1957: Resisting Integration 
in Little Rock," 277. 
24 Parsons, "Desegregation Report: Little Rock School District," January 1968, LRSB. 
25 "Little Rock is Given Busing Plan to Bring School Racial Balance," New York Times, January 2, 
1968, p. 22. 
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development of a busing system would undermine support among white school patrons 
and that the phasing out of Horace Mann would erode support among black school 
patrons. Nevertheless, they adopted the plan and placed a $5 million bond issue required 
to implement it on the school election ballot. 26 In March 1968, the bond issue was 
defeated 2-1 and two more liberal board members lost their seats, giving conservatives a 
5-to-2 majority.27 
Despite these defeats, ten years after the 1957 crisis, the pace of integration 
continued to increase under freedom-of-choice with 25% of black students choosing to 
attend predominantly white schools during the 1967-68 school year. On the high school 
level, many of these students chose to attend Central High. At Central, approximately 
19% of the student body was African American with 425 black students attending classes 
with 1,811 whites.28 This progress persuaded a UPI reporter to declare, "Today, 
segregation has been at least nominally banished from all Little Rock schools and all 
other public facilities, and the city is as integrated as any in the South."29 
26 See LRSB, Special Meeting, January 10, 1968. Concern about the closure of Horace Mann did 
divide the African American vote in the election on the millage issue (Johnson, "After 1957: Resisting 
Integration in Little Rock," 278). When the school board implemented the plan to phase out Horace Mann 
as a high school in the early 1970s, this decision continued to provoke opposition from Little Rock's civil 
rights community. For the perspective of the Save Horace Mann Group, Black United Students, Urban 
League, NAACP, and others, see LRSB, Special Meeting, May 19, 1971. 
27 "Little Rock Vetoes Integration Plan," New York Times, March 13, 1968. Clark v. Board of 
Education of the Little Rock School District 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970). Fair, "Little Rock: Then and 
Now,"40. 
28 Bert I. Campbell, "Little Rock: 2,000 Integrated After 10 Years," UPI; Gene Foreman and 
Tucker Steinmetz, "Looking Back at 'Little Rock': How Ten Years Have Changed the Perspective," 
National Observer, 1967; "'LR Story' Occurred Decade Age," Arkansas Democrat, September 3, 1967, in 
Folder 8, Box 498, Subseries 7, Series 4, Faubus Papers. 
29 Bert I. Campbell, "Little Rock: 2,000 Integrated After 10 Years," UPI. 
152 
On the tenth anniversary, local news outlets played down the tenor of massive 
resistance in 1957, making favorable comparisons between the disturbance in Little Rock 
and the race riots occurring in northern cities in the mid-1960s. Former Gov. Orval 
Faubus asserted, "if the so-called Little Rock crisis were to take place today, it would be 
so minor no one would notice it."30 The Arkansas Democrat picked up on this theme: 
The 'rioting' at CHS [Central High School] was exaggerated in press 
reports that circled the globe and made Little Rock the symbol for 
resistance to integration. Actually, crowd estimates in front of CHS never 
exceeded 1,000 most of whom were nearby residents and the curious. 
Only a handful of minor injuries occurred in scuffles. No one was shot; in 
fact, no shots were fired. By contrast, riots at Watts, Detroit, Newark and 
elsewhere recently have resulted in scores killed and property damage 
running into the hundreds of millions. Back in 1957, a bowl of chili 
spilled on a student at CHS was enough to grab headlines across the 
country.31 
This rhetoric sought to deny the moral weight of the 1957 school desegregation crisis 
while simultaneously obscuring the city's ongoing struggle over school desegregation. 
Nevertheless, even Daisy Bates contributed to this narrative, declaring that she was "as 
harmless as popcorn popper" compared to more militant activists like Stokely 
Carmichael. 32 
However, some reports did make note of the city's crumbling liberal consensus, 
and resistance to correcting the imbalance between the pace of integration in the central 
30 Ibid. 
31 "'LR Story' Occurred Decade Age," Arkansas Democrat, September 3, 1967. 
32 Gene Foreman and Tucker Steinmetz, "Looking Back at 'Little Rock': How Ten Years Have 
Changed the Perspective," National Observer, 1967. 
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part of the city and the West End.33 While Pulaski County NAACP President L.C. Bates 
noted the historical significance of the crisis and its contribution to the progress of the 
civil rights movement, his assessment of the amount of the change that had occurred in 
the Little Rock school district was grim. In his view, there had been "some 
improvement" in the schools but not "any significant amount." He contended, "In the 
face of the Supreme Court decision, supported by the 1964 Civil Rights Law, it appears to 
me that the school board even at this stage is in compliance just enough not to defY the 
law."34 While celebratory assessments of Little Rock's progress made note of the 25% of 
black students who were attending predominantly white schools, a different interpretation 
of these same statistics pointed to another reality. By the beginning of the 1968 school 
year, 75% of black students (6,000) still attended historically black schools with virtually 
no white classmates. 35 Likewise, integration on the far west side of the city had never 
exceeded more than token levels. The limitations of the city's freedom-of-choice plan, 
and the tokenism it encouraged, were becoming increasingly evident. 
Establishing Geographic Attendance Zones 
In May 1968, the Supreme Court struck down the use of :freedom-of-choice plans, 
like the one in place in Little Rock, that failed to dismantle dual school systems. Under 
Green v. New Kent County, the Supreme Court held that school districts were required to 
33 Gene Foreman and Tucker Steinmetz, "Looking Back at 'Little Rock': How Ten Years Have 
Changed the Perspective," National Observer, 1967. 
34 Bert I. Campbell, "Little Rock: 2,000 Integrated After 10 Years," UPI. 
35 In 1970, the gth Circuit Court of Appeals took this more negative view of the city's progress 
(Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District 426 F.2d 1035 [8th Cir. 1970]). 
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take affirmative steps toward establishing unitary and nondiscriminatory school systems. 
If a plan failed to eliminate segregation "root and branch," and a district retained schools 
that were identifiably white or black based on the composition of their student bodies, 
faculty, facilities or extracurricular activities, it was not sufficient. Moving forward, the 
constitutionality of desegregation plans would be measured by their efficacy in relation to 
other alternatives, such as zoning, that promised "speedier and more effective 
conversion" to unitary systems. The Court noted that Brown placed the burden for 
making this transition on school boards, not on students and their parents by using tactics 
like freedom-of-choice provisions, and that further delay under the guise of"deliberate 
speed" was intolerable. The Court declared, "The burden on a school board today is to 
come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to 
work now" [emphasis original].36 
Within a month of this decision, the plaintiffs in the Clark litigation petitioned the 
Eastern District Court of Arkansas for further relief. In July 1968, the disti:ict court set a 
hearing for the next month but specifically suggested that the school district should 
consider alternatives in the meantime, such as a geographic zoning plan for student 
assignment and a more comprehensive plan for faculty desegregation. At the August 
hearing, the school district presented an "interim" zoning plan that was "incomplete and 
36 Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). This case involved a rural county in 
Virginia with no residential segregation that operated dual school system with two schools- one black and 
the other predominantly white. Students traversed the county on overlapping bus routes to attend these 
schools. Although New Kent County had a freedom-of-choice plan, no white child had elected to attend the 
historically black school and only 15% of black children had elected to attend the formerly all-white school. 
In a footnote, the Supreme Court suggested that consolidation and zoning, although not universally 
appropriate, both promised more efficient integration than the plan in place. 
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required more study," and requested that the freedom-of-choice plan be retained for the 
1968-69 school year. This request was accepted by the court but the Little Rock school 
district was ordered to file a new desegregation plan no later than November 15, 1968. 
In the months that followed, the school board considered several options. Two members 
proposed the retention of the "freedom-of-choice" plan with seats reserved for African 
American students. However, due to the district court's unequivocal position that a 
freedom-of-choice plan would not satisfy constitutional requirements, this plan was 
rejected by the majority. John Walker, the attorney for the plaintiffs, also presented a 
plan to the board that called for grade restructuring, the pairing of predominantly white 
and black schools, and the transportation of students throughout the district to accomplish 
integration. Walker's suggestions were also rejected. On the court's deadline, the 
conservative board adopted an assignment plan based on geographic attendance zones by 
a vote of 5-to-2?7 
The plan presented to the court by the school board required nearly all students in 
the district to attend schools based on their geographic residence. The only exceptions 
were students attending the district-wide vocational school, the children of teachers, and 
students in grades 8, 10, and 11 who were completing their education at the junior and 
senior high school levels. The district court approved the plan on May 16, 1969 with 
minor changes. The court redrew the boundary of the attendance area for the West End's 
Hall High School to include 80 more African American students, and paired some 
37 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District 426 F.2d 1035 (81h Cir. 1970). 
"Whites Who Support Integration Oppose Little Rock School Plan," New York Times, November 27, 1968, 
p. 30. 
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elementary schools within a "floating zone" to enhance integration. The court also 
allowed students in the racial majority at their assigned school to transfer to a school 
where their race was in the minority, but no transportation was offered to facilitate these 
requests. 38 
This plan did not satisfy the African American plaintiffs in the Clark litigation. 
Since 1957, residential segregation in Little Rock had increased. The eastern half of the 
city was predominantly black and the western half of the city was predominantly white. 
Pockets of integration in the central city were shrinking as whites relocated to the west 
and the suburban outskirts of Little Rock, while African Americans were dislocated to the 
east by urban renewal programs. 39 Over the course of the 1960s, the population of the 
western sector of the city had increased by 26,000 and was approximately 96% white. 
The eastern section of Little Rock had lost approximately 12,000 white residents and was 
more than 90% black. 40 In this context it is hardly surprising that the Little Rock Housing 
Authority was the first public housing agency in the country to be sued by t~e Department 
of Housing and Urban Development for failure to comply with the 1964 Civil Rights 
38 Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District426 F.2d 1035 (81h Cir. 1970). 
39 Herbert H. Denton, "Race Issue Still Dogs Schools in Nation, Conference Told," Washington 
Post Times Herald, February 2, 1969, p. 2. Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District 
426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970). Johnson, III, "After 1957: Resisting Integration in Little Rock," 260-264. 
40 United States Commission on Civil Rights, School Desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
(Washington, DC: June 1977), 2. Statistics drawn from University of Arkansas, College of Business 
Administration, Industrial Research and Extension Center, "Population Changes and Migration in Arkansas 
by Color, 1950-1970," Arkansas Population Analysis Series, no. 70-73, (Little Rock, July 1974), 6-7. 
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Act.41 The use of geographic attendance zones in a city like Little Rock challenged and 
ignored the Supreme Court's insistence on the formulation and implementation of 
effective school desegregation policies. 
The school board had drawn the attendance zones under its plan from north to 
south, reinforcing these segregated residential patterns. White parents in the city's West 
End who continued to support integration sought to intervene in the Clark litigation, 
charging that the plan "mirror[ ed] the lines of presently existing patterns of racially 
segregated residential housing in Little Rock." Like the African American plaintiffs, they 
believed, "The plan accelerates and entrenches racially segregated residential housing, 
thereby foreclosing, forever, the possibility of a nonracial, unitary system."42 Notably, 
from the outset, the city had delayed implementation of even token integration until1957 
when Horace Mann, the predominantly black high school on the city's east side, and Hall 
High, the predominantly white school on the city's west side, had been constructed. It 
was widely acknowledged at the time that the construction of these two facilities within 
racially homogenous parts of the city would minimize the impact ofintegration.43 Under 
its zoning plan, it appeared that Little Rock's school board hoped to capitalize on the 
41 "Little Rock Office on Public Housing sued by U.S. on Bias," New York Times, November 22, 
1968, p. 42. The housing authority signed a consent order agreeing to desegregate public housing in 
December 1968 ("Little Rock to Desegregate," Los Angeles Times, December 8, 1968, p. B5; "Two 
separate societies: The population shift in Little Rock ... and its effects on the schools," Arkansas Democrat, 
April18, 1971, 11A). 
42 "Whites Who Support Integration Oppose Little Rock School Plan," New York Times, 
November 27, 1968, p. 30. 
43 Roy Reed, "Resegregation: A Problem in Urban South," New York Times, September 28, 1970, 
p. 1; Johnson, "After 1957: Resisting Integration in Little Rock," 264; Anderson, Little Rock: Race and 
Resistance at Central High School, 38-41. 
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foresight of its predecessors. 
Indeed, by the early 1970s some suggested that the "deliberate speed" and 
gradualism which had been the norm in Little Rock during the preceding decade had 
facilitated rather than discouraged rising rates of residential segregation. As Roy Reed, a 
reporter for the New York Times and an Arkansas native who had watched developments 
in the city, noted, "Instead of smoothing the way for desegregation, going slow has 
frequently encouraged whites to flee to all-white sanctuaries in the suburbs, secure in the 
knowledge that only those schools in the older, central parts of the cities would be 
integrated to any extent for many years to come." In Reed's view, the policy of 
gradualism had enabled residents in Little Rock to exchange the "old system of racial 
paternalism" for the northern pattern of residential segregation, "racial isolation and 
distrust. "44 
When the geographic zoning plan was put it place during the 1969-70 school 
year, 69% of black students still attended schools in which their race constituted 90% or 
more of the student body. Only 4 whites attended Horace Mann. On other side of the 
44 Roy Reed, "Resegregation: A Problem in Urban South," New York Times, September 28, 1970, 
p. I. Ben F. Johnson, III has argued that the virtually all-white character of the West End had become 
naturalized by the late 1960s and that residents of the area were "innocent as to how they had benefitted 
from concerted policies to thwart residential integration." He suggests, "The whiteness of the Fifth Ward 
was a constructed environment, but those living there believed that school integration advocates were the 
ones using social engineering to artificially turn the community inside out" (Johnson, "After 1957: 
Resisting Integration in Little Rock," 276). However, as noted earlier in this chapter, school board 
members, housing authorities, city officials, and well-connected community leaders- many of whom lived 
in Little Rock's West End- were well aware of and in some cases had helped orchestrate the policies that 
led to increased residential segregation in the city in the 1960s. And certainly, many homeowners 
consciously capitalized on these developments with the aid of real estate agents and developers. The 
argument that segregation arose from "market forces and personal choice" was carefully crafted and 
deployed in the federal courts in defense of these arrangements and was more than an expression of 
"innocence" or ignorance. 
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spectrum, only 40 black students attended Hall High. Likewise, 45 black students 
enrolled at Parkview High, a school constructed even further west to accommodate the 
influx of white residents to the area. Racially identifiable schools persisted at the junior 
high and elementary levels as well, many with even higher levels of segregation due to 
their smaller attendance areas.45 Before the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, the African 
American plaintiffs pointed to these statistics, arguing that the plan adopted by the district 
court failed to disrupt segregated attendance patterns. The plaintiffs contended that 
"neither the neighborhood school concept nor the possible necessity of busing ... excuses 
the District's failure to achieve a unitary system devoid of racially identifiable schools."46 
The school district defended its plan before the court as "constitutionally 
faultless," and contended that the attendance zones had been drawn "without regard to 
race." The district's attorneys went even one step further, arguing that any deliberate 
attempt to create "racial balance" in the schools would "itself be a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment" because it would require the assignment of students according to 
race. Indeed, the school board cross-appealed the portions of the district court decree that 
adjusted the attendance zone of Hall High school to include more African American 
students, and the pairing of elementary schools within the "floating zone" to facilitate 
integration, because they departed from this principle. The school district defended the 
neighborhood school concept as "educationally sound" and the only "feasible means" of 
45 Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970). 
Carver, Gilliam, Granite Mountain, Ish, Pfeifer, Rightsell, Stephens, and Washington all had 95% or more 
black students. See also James Scudder, "Two separate societies: The population shift in Little Rock ... and 
its effects on the schools," Arkansas Democrat, Aprill8, 1971. 
46 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970). 
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operating the school system "in view of community attitudes.'>47 
The board's sole African American member, T.E. Patterson, objected to this line 
of argument. He noted that the board had pledged to work toward a unified system as 
early as 1966, but that the current members were engaged in effort to "deter and slow 
down the process of unification" through court litigation. Patterson questioned why the 
school board had invested over $200,000 in attorney fees to defeat its own policy. He 
urged his fellow members to be more forthright about their intentions and not to cloak 
their desire to maintain segregated schools behind the rhetoric of racial neutrality. As 
recorded in the school board minutes, Patterson asserted that the board should "either 
change the policy and say it does not want the system unified, or leave the policy as 
established and work toward a unified system." He was confident that school 
administrators would be able to craft an acceptable desegregation plan if they were free to 
do so.48 
As the case was pending, President Richard Nixon leant his support to the 
majority's approach to school desegregation by publicly adopting a similar position in 
March 1970. Nixon hoped to break the Democratic stranglehold on the South and win 
some votes for the Republican party by pursuing a "southern strategy" that 
accommodated the racial anxieties and concerns of southern white voters. In response to 
growing resistance to wide-reaching school desegregation plans that went beyond 
tokenism, the Nixon administration refused to use the tools at its disposal such as 
47 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District 426 F.2d 1035 (81h Cir. 1970). 
48 LRSB, Regular Meeting, May 28, 1970, p. 15. 
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withholding federal aid or initiating lawsuits to enforce desegregation in noncompliant 
school districts. In his 1970 statement, the President insisted that the administration was 
"not backing away" from the constitutional mandate of Brown, but contended that there 
were "limits to the amount of government coercion" that could "reasonably be used" to 
effect social change. Moreover, he suggested that desegregation policy in the past had 
demanded "too much of our schools," disrupting education, causing "heightened racial 
tension," and resulting in "lasting psychic injury" to the nation's children.49 
While the Supreme Court had ordered school districts to take affirmative action to 
eliminate desegregation, Nixon argued that the Constitution did not require integration or 
the creation of an artificial and arbitrary "racial balance" in schools. Neither the "laws 
nor the institutions supported by law" should draw "invidious" distinctions based on race 
by trying to achieve some rigid "mathematical formula," he argued. Consequently, the 
President contended that lower courts that ordered districts to move beyond theoretically 
neutral geographic attendance zones had gone beyond constitutional requirements 
because segregated housing patterns were the result of "natural" choices rather than 
official actions. Until the Supreme Court itself affirmed these questionable decisions, the 
administration would "not consider them as precedents" that would shape HEW school 
desegregation guidelines. As far as the President was concerned, the "neighborhood 
school" was the "most appropriate base" for any school desegregation plan regardless of 
49 President Richard Nixon, "School Desegregation: A Free and Open Society," reprinted in School 
Busing: Constitutional and Political Developments, vol. 2: The Public Debate over Busing and Attempts to 
Restrict its Use, ed. Davison M. Douglas (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 121-151. 
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its efficacy. 5° Nixon's statements created more confusion in the city of Little Rock about 
the school board's constitutional obligations according to Superintendent Floyd W. 
Parsons. "When you have the President making his grand statement... and the Federal 
courts ordering this and that, and you have the community divided down the middle, what 
you've got is a genuine dilemma for the schoolman," he said. "Here in Little Rock, that 
sort of thing from Nixon ... just confuses people- mixes them up."51 
In May 1970, the majority on the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals provided 
clarification on the issue of geographic zoning and school desegregation, rejecting the 
President's reasoning and the legal position of the Little Rock school board. The court 
dismissed the school district's argument that the "consideration of race for the purpose of 
correcting constitutionally imposed segregated education" violated the 14th amendment. 
While the appeals court applauded the progress the school district had made in 
eliminating some segregation within its borders, the majority opinion noted, "the fmding 
of some progress does not end the inquiry into whether the particular District has satisfied 
its constitutional obligations" to produce an effective desegregation plan in light of all of 
the alternatives available. While the assignment of students to schools based on 
geographic attendance zones could be effective in some districts, such as the New Kent 
County schools assessed in the Supreme Court's Green decision, it was not a ''universal 
answer" for the "complex problems of desegregation" everywhere. The court noted that 
50 Ibid. 
51 James T. Wooten, "School Chiefs in South Perplexed on Busing," New York Times, September 
7, 1971, p. 22. The editorial board of the Arkansas Democrat applauded Nixon's "splendid statement" on 
school desegregation. See "Splendid Statement," Editorial, Arkansas Democrat, March 25, 1970. 
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any plan submitted by the district should be designed "to promote desegregation rather 
than to reinforce segregation." The Little Rock school board's plan had failed to meet 
this standard, perpetuating rather than eliminating entrenched student attendance patterns, 
and the Court of Appeals found that it was deficient and "constitutionally infirm."52 
The court noted that the school board had already considered several plans that 
would have provided for more effective desegregation. The majority opinion made 
specific note of the so-called "Parsons Plan" that had been developed by local educators, 
but abandoned due to community opposition and objections to the tax increase required to 
implement it. The court reminded the school board that the Supreme Court had outlined 
their obligations in the face of such opposition fifteen years earlier when the Little Rock 
district had tried to accommodate "community attitudes" in 1957-59. As the 8th Circuit 
interpreted Cooper v. Aaron (1958), the Supreme Court had unambiguously declared that 
"community opposition to the process of desegregation cannot serve to prevent 
vindication of constitutional rights. "53 
The 8th Circuit shaped its majority opinion within the framework established by 
Green. It merely held that the district had not satisfied its constitutional obligation to 
produce an effective desegregation plan. It did not find that geographic zoning or 
neighborhood schools were "in and of themselves either constitutionally required or 
forbidden." They did not rule on the "relative merits or demerits of the neighborhood 
52 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District 426 F.2d 1035 (81h Cir. 1970). 
Jerol Garrison, "LR School Zoning is Turned Down; New Plan Ordered," Arkansas Gazette, May 14, 1970. 
53 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District 426 F .2d I 035 (8th Cir. 1970). 
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school." Nor did they require or forbid the use of busing in the district to facilitate 
integration. However, they did note that the state of Arkansas had long used busing as a 
tool to preserve segregated schools. The case was remanded and the school board 
ordered to adopt and fully implement a plan that would eliminate segregation in the 
district "root and branch."54 
Two judges dissented :from the court's opinion in defense of the neighborhood 
school concept, arguing that "geographic attendance zones fairly laid out without racial 
discrimination by a unitary system should meet constitutional standards." The two 
dissenters favorably quoted President Nixon's statements in support of neighborhood 
schools, noting that such an arrangement was a "well-established and acceptable means of 
providing a proper educational program" and was the preferred method of school 
assignment in all sections of the country. Busing, and other means of desegregation, 
required a substantial outlay of resources and tax dollars better used for purely 
educational purposes. In closing, the minority opinion set the stage for an appeal by 
school district, asserting that the validity of neighborhood-based assignment could "only 
be authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court."55 
Desegregation through Student Transportation 
The Supreme Court took up this precise question of neighborhood schools, racial 
balance and busing in a group of cases from Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, NC; Mobile, 
AL; and Clarke County, GA. Although Little Rock also filed for a review of its school 
54 Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District 426 F.2d 1035 (81h Cir. 1970). 
55 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970). 
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desegregation plan, the high court chose not to hear arguments in the Little Rock case, 
perhaps because one of the newest justices, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, sat on the 8th 
Circuit and signed on to the majority opinion in Clark merely one week before he was 
confirmed by the Senate. 56 Nevertheless, the outcome of the litigation would effect 
school districts nationwide, including Arkansas' largest city. 
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), the Supreme 
Court provided specific guidelines for the desegregation of large metropolitan areas, such 
as Little Rock, that had maintained dual school systems and were residentially segregated. 
The Court acknowledged that rural areas with consolidated school systems could make 
the adjustments required by desegregation more easily than "metropolitan areas with 
dense and shifting population, numerous schools, congested and complex traffic 
patterns." The Court noted that shifts and changes in a city's population could neutralize 
I 
or negate steps taken to desegregate schools before they could be fully implemented. 
However, while sympathizing with the difficulty of the task facing school boards, the 
Supreme Court did not absolve school districts of their responsibilities to confront these 
complexities directly. Moreover, the Court noted that some decisions made by school 
boards- such as the closure of facilities in integrated areas and the construction of new 
buildings in racially segregated areas- frequently compounded these problems since the 
location of schools influenced "patterns of residential development" in the nation's 
56 "Supreme Court Agrees to Rule on Bussing to Gain Integration," Los Angeles Times, September 
1, 1970, p. AI; Peter Milius, "Blackmun Court Ruling Opposes Nixon," The Washington Post Times 
Herald, May 15, 1970, p. A2. 
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cities. 57 
The Court asserted that "racially neutral" student assignment plans based on 
geographic attendance zones were inadequate if they failed to "counteract the effects of 
past school segregation" and created or maintained "artificial racial separation." In school 
districts like Little Rock that deliberately used such tactics, "neighborhood zoning," and 
gerrymandering to maintain dual school systems, courts could order appropriate remedies 
such as the pairing or clustering of identifiably white and black schools, and the 
transportation of students to noncontiguous attendance zones. While not requiring 
schools to meet racial quotas, the Court suggested that the limited use of mathematical 
ratios could be a useful tool in determining the efficacy of a school desegregation plan 
and that school authorities bore the burden of explaining why any schools in a system 
remained identifiably white or black. The Court conceded that busing or other methods 
designed to effect desegregation could be "administratively awkward, inconvenient, and 
even bizarre in some situations," but affirmed that these measures were required to 
correct the effects of discrimination and eliminate constitutional violations in some cases. 
The Supreme Court urged local judges to continue to reconcile competing interests in 
desegregation cases, taking time, distance of travel, age, risks to the health of children, or 
impingements on the educational process into account when ordering the transportation 
of students. However, the Court emphasized that busing had been "an integral part of the 
57 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 91 S.Ct. 1267; 402 U.S. 1; 28 L. Ed. 2d 
554 (1971 ); "Supreme Court rules busing can be required: But ratio formula rejected," Arkansas Democrat, 
Apri120, 1971; "'Bus' Plan Legal, Broad Rulings Of Court Say: Southerners Denounce Rulings as 
'Tragic,"' Arkansas Gazette, April21, 1971. 
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public education system for years" and would not be considered an unreasonable burden 
within appropriate limits. 58 
Little Rock's liberal newspaper, the Arkansas Gazette, applauded the Supreme 
Court's "finn" stance on school desegregation. The paper agreed that the Little Rock 
school district had "stalled and dragged its feet with the best of them" through its sudden 
allegiance to the neighborhood school concept. The Gazette contended that the Swann 
decision reaffirmed the Court's commitment to rejecting the "separate but equal" 
principle that had once been legitimized by the Plessy v. Ferguson decision. "Whatever 
President Nixon and his Silent Majority, may not have learned from our national record 
of apartheid," the editorial board noted acerbically, "the Supreme Court of the United 
States has learned its own lesson full well."59 
In contrast, the Gazette 's more conservative rival the Arkansas Democrat decried 
the decision. Its editorial board lambasted the Court's vague and "fuzzy'' language about 
the use of mathematical ratios to determine the efficacy of school desegregation plans. 
This came dangerously close to authorizing the use of "racial quotas" in the Democrat's 
opinion. An effort to achieve racial balance in a district's schools threatened to make 
"school kids the creates of the state" and destroyed "the theory of individual freedom we 
prize so highly in our country."60 The Democrat admitted that the use of freedom-of-
choice plans, like the one that had been in place in Little Rock, were little more than an 
58 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 91 S.Ct. 1267; 402 U.S. 1; 28 L. Ed. 2d 
554 (1971). 
59 "The Court Stands Finn," Editorial, Arkansas Gazette, April21, 1971. 
60 "Anything Goes," Editorial, Arkansas Democrat, April21, 1971. 
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effective form of"subterfuge" designed to keep schools segregated.61 But the Democrat 
insisted that geographic zoning was inherently fair. Forcing children "to go to a different 
school- one that he wouldn't normally attend- because some judge has prescribed the 
number of whites and blacks that have to be in each school" was not mandated by the 
Constitution, the Democrat insisted. lbis rejection of the Supreme Court's interpretation 
of constitutional law contained echoes of the past and objections to the 1954 Brown v. 
Board of Education decision. But by the early 1970s, the paper's editorial board justified 
its stance by deploying the rhetoric of the civil rights movement itself. "Color shouldn't 
make any difference" in student assignment, the Democrat asserted, "Either all of us are 
equal before the law, or we aren't."62 
While the Arkansas Democrat may not have accepted the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Constitution, the lower federal courts quickly fell in line with the 
high court's mandate. In 1971, the Eastern District Court of Arkansas issued a new 
school desegregation decree shaped by the principles and guidelines outlined in Swann. 
Instead of assigning students based on geographic attendance zones, the new plan adopted 
a variety of techniques ranging from pairing and clustering to contiguous and 
noncontinguous zoning with the objective of completely dismantling the dual school 
system and eliminating racially identifiable schools. In practice, this meant that the 
balance of white and black students within each school in the district should range within 
61 "Hardly Compatible," Editorial, Arkansas Democrat, May 15, 1970. 
62 "Anything Goes," editorial, Arkansas Democrat, April21, 1971; Karr Shannon, "Court tracks 
Warren, ignores Constitution, Arkansas Democrat, April23, 1971. 
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10% of the ratio in the district as a whole. The district was ordered to institute a 
comprehensive busing program: students assigned to a school more than two miles from 
their home would be provided with transportation to and from school. The district court 
ordered complete integration for grades 6 through 12 at the beginning of the 1971-72 
school year, and elementary schools the following year.63 
Although the African American plaintiffs in the case appealed for immediate 
integration of the elementary schools and the school board cross-appealed for further 
delay, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decree. Other elements 
of the plan also survived challenge. For example, the school board objected to having to 
shoulder the additional expense of busing students, but the court of appeals determined 
that there was "no reasonable alternative" that would allow the district to meet its 
obligation to establish a "nonracial school system." For their part, the African American 
plaintiffs objected to the phasing out of the historically black Horace Mann High School 
on the east side of the city, forcing African American students to bear an "unequal share 
of the burden" of desegregation. However, the court of appeals refused to reinstate 
Horace Mann as a graduating high school, accepting the school administration's 
assurances that all secondary schools would be "sensitive to the aspirations of black 
students. "64 
Fifteen years after the Little Rock Nine registered at Central High School, and 
63 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 449 F .2d 493 (8th Cir. 1971 ); 
"Fate of three Pulaski cases no rests with gth Circuit," Arkansas Democrat, April20, 1971; "Attorneys for 
Blacks Hope to Get 'Relief By Next Fall's Term," Arkansas Gazette, April21, 1971. 
64 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 449 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1971); 
"Fate of three Pulaski cases no rests with 8th Circuit," Arkansas Democrat, April20, 1971. 
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after a decade long struggle to achieve more than token levels of integration, the Little 
Rock school district finally implemented its first comprehensive school desegregation 
program in secondary schools at the beginning of the 1971 school year. In an editorial, 
the Arkansas Gazette expressed optimism that the busing plan would create stabilized 
school patterns and discourage white flight to the west side of the city since there would 
no longer be "'black' schools for whites to run from, nor 'white' schools to be running 
However, this embrace of the student assignment plan was far from universal in 
the district. A new private school, Pulaski Academy, was built in west Little Rock as yet 
another outlet for students who wanted to avoid integration. The founder of the school, 
real estate magnate Billy Rector candidly admitted that he built the school because, "We 
don't like busing."66 As the transportation program went into place, the number of 
students bused to school jumped from 0.2% to 27.3%, one ofthe most acute increases in 
the country. The number of students attending public schools in the Little Rock school 
district simultaneously declined by over 1100 pupils- a decrease of nearly 5%. HEW 
65 Philip D. Carter, "Arkansas: Strange Blend of Yesterday and Today," The Washington Post 
Times Herald, August 4, 1971, AI. 
66 Roy Reed, "White Academies Thrive in the South: But Fewer Pupils Flee the Desegregated 
Schools," New York Times, August 29, 1971, p. 37. Rector had long enjoyed a reputation as one of the first 
businessmen to publicly oppose the Governor Orval Faubus by supporting a moderate slate of school board 
members in 1958-59. However, his support for gradual desegregation in the 1950s may have been 
motivated by more than altruism. In the 1960s, Rector's real estate developments the city's West End 
boomed as whites fled integration in the central city. Historian Ben F. Johnson III has argued that Rector 
opened Pulaski Academy because district-wide desegregation ''threatened the value" of the same suburban 
real estate years later (Johnson, "After 1957: Resisting Integration in Little Rock," 258-283). See also Roy 
Reed, "Resegregation: A Problem in Urban South," New York Times, September 28, 1970, p. 1; James 
Scudder, "Two separate societies: The population shift in Little Rock. .. and its effects on the schools," 
Arkansas Democrat, April18, 1971; James Scudder, "The role of real-estate dealers: Have they influenced 
the desegregation case?" Arkansas Democrat, April21, 1971. 
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statistics indicated that the vast majority of students exiting the system were white as the 
proportion of minority pupils in the LRSD climbed from 39.4% in 1970 to 43.8% in 
1971.67 But perhaps the most disheartening statistic from this transition was the decision 
ofjive of the seven members ofthe Little Rock School Board to enroll their children in 
the county's emerging private schools.68 
In Little Rock, civil rights activists and plaintiffs in the Clark litigation viewed 
their arguments against geographic attendance zones that perpetuated identifiably white 
and black schools as a natural extension of earlier efforts to eliminate Little Rock's dual 
school system. They viewed the school board's persistent defense of neighborhood 
schools as just one more tactic of delay in a long term strategy of resistance to school 
desegregation. It was well known that the geographic attendance zones proposed by the 
board, and the schools which had been built to serve them, had been deliberately sited to 
maximize segregation in the months immediately proceeding the integration of Central 
High School. Indeed, in part, this understanding had fueled white flight to the western 
part of the city where many families believed they could avoid desegregation altogether. 
When the African American plaintiffs in Little Rock appealed to the courts for a student 
assignment plan that permitted noncontiguous zoning, pairing, and the busing of students 
to facilitate these arrangements, they were in every sense asking for a remedy to a 
situation created and perpetuated by the school board. The courts affirmed this 
67 Statement ofHon. Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary, Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, House Subcommittee No.5 of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on the Proposed 
Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and Assignment of Public 
School Pupils, 92"d Cong., 2"d sess., 13 April1972, 1206-1207, 1227. 
68 Johnson, "After 1957: Resisting Integration in Little Rock," 281. 
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perspective, determining that there was "no reasonable alternative" that would fulfil the 
mandate of the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown, Green, and Swann. 
However, the resistance African American plaintiffs encountered in Little Rock 
would surface elsewhere as local federal judges ordered metropolitan school districts to 
adopt similar strategies in the wake of the Swann decision. Again and again, 
communities that had refused to assign students to schools based on their residential 
location, routinely busing children to distant educational plants to preserve segregation, 
suddenly decried this attack on the "neighborhood school" and the unfair burden of 
busing children long distances to ''unsafe" and purportedly "inferior" schools. This 
argument certainly surfaced in Little Rock when over 1,200 white parents signed a 
petition objecting to "unwise, discriminatory and dangerous" plans to bus their children to 
"an unsafe [African American] neighborhood ... well-known for its violence, disruptions, 
altercations, fights, stabbings and other criminal and indecent activities."69 
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court's decision in Swann, busing opponents 
nationwide continued to argue that geographic attendance zones were "constitutionally 
faultless," and that "race conscious" student assignment plans designed to eliminate all 
vestiges of segregation were themselves violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Busing opponents contended vociferously that the newest generation of school 
desegregation remedies were not natural extensions of previous efforts to dismantle dual 
school systems. Instead, in their view, federal courts were merely attempting to create 
69 Petitions Received Relating to the Court's Orders to Further Desegregate the Little Rock Public 
Schools, as filed in LRSB, Regular Meeting for August, September 3, 1970. 
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artificial racial balance in areas where residential segregation was not the product of 
official action but natural selection and the impartial operation of market forces. 
This debate raged in the nation's court rooms, legislative halls, and newspapers. 
Increasingly, comparisons and contrasts drawn between the school desegregation efforts 
of the 1950s- particularly the events in Little Rock- and the controversies of the 1970s 
functioned as means to illuminate the contours of arguments on both sides. Throughout 
the decade, the public memory of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis of 1957 was 
actively deployed in service of contemporary political ends, not only in Arkansas' capital 
but in the nation-at-large. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"FREEDOM IS SOMETHING WE MUST FIGHT FOR": 
NEGOTIATING THE NARRATIVE BREACH 
In Little Rock, African American plaintiffs and the school board argued about 
whether the implementation of"race conscious" student assignment plans (facilitated by 
busing) upheld or undermined the principle established in the Supreme Court's 1954 
Brown decision and defended by the lOPt Airborne in 1957. By the early 1970s, after a 
generation of delay and evasion, the justices on the Supreme Court and their colleagues in 
the lower courts acknowledged that a variety of "race neutral" strategies had been 
deployed to maintain racially isolated schools, particularly in residentially segregated 
urban districts. The Swann decision effectively found that "color blind" student 
assignment policies based on geographic residence alone had not been implemented as 
part of a good faith effort to integrate schools. Consequently, federal courts embraced 
busing as one of several tools that could be used to effectively dismantle segregated 
school systems that were the result of generations of urban planning and district 
gerrymandering. In the early 1970s, African American plaintiffs convinced federal jurists 
that student transportation was simply another means to achieve the equal educational 
opportunity promised by Brown. 
But the debate over busing was not just waged in the court rooms. Increasingly, 
representatives of the New Right argued that these use of"race conscious" remedies to 
address segregation were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Districts that 
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attempted to achieve a semblance of"racial balance," conservatives argued, continued to 
assign students to schools on the basis of racial classifications that abridged individual 
rights. Regardless of the intentions of school administrators or federal judges that 
instituted these remedies, the ends (completely integrated schools) did not justify the 
means. This argument was advanced with increasing force throughout the 1970s, and 
threatened to spark another constitutional crisis when President Richard Nixon suggested 
that Congress could limit the remedies deployed by courts in addressing school 
segregation. 
Nationwide, the anti-busing movement gained energy and strength as courts began 
to apply busing remedies to school districts in the North that were also found guilty of 
artificially maintaining racially isolated schools. Just as Little Rock had become a 
national symbol of massive resistance to the first phase of school desegregation in 1957, 
cities like Boston became flashpoints of resistance against busing and the authority of the 
federal courts. In the midst of this turmoil, media analysts and reporters revisited the 
Little Rock school desegregation crisis, drawing comparisons and contrasts between the 
images of violent resistance to busing in Boston and headlines from Little Rock seventeen 
years earlier. In this national conversation, the public memory of the 1957 school 
desegregation crisis served as a rhetorical anchor that allowed some to argue that the 
same fundamental issues were at stake while others contended that the circumstances 
surrounding the two cases were completely different. Although federal judges held that 
the principles at issue were the same- the meaningful implementation of school 
desegregation, the recognition of the rule of law, and the enforcement of court orders by 
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other branches of government- the debate that raged in legislative chambers and across 
editorial pages suggested that many Americans viewed systemic efforts to address racial 
discrimination as little more than illegitimate experiments in "social engineering." 
As the arguments ofthe New Right gained traction in the court of public opinion, 
a "narrative breach" surfaced in media accounts and political rhetoric regarding civil 
rights. Earlier efforts to dismantle school desegregation in the South through token 
integration or freedom-of-choice plans were increasingly embraced and celebrated, even 
in Little Rock itself. However, efforts to achieve district-wide integration on a national 
scale were not recognized or legitimized as natural extensions of these earlier campaigns. 
The emergence of a strategy designed to cast the civil rights movement as a relic of the 
past rather than an active force in the present and the future was carefully calculated not 
only to obscure the continuity between earlier demands for access to equal education and 
their reiteration in the 1970s, but also the connections between the strategies of massive 
resistance and minimal compliance and the new rhetoric of "color blind" student 
assignment. 1 
This shift in political rhetoric shaped the tone of media coverage and spectrum of 
public opinion in relation to school desegregation, and inevitably affected the position of 
the federal courts themselves. By appointing four justices to the Supreme Court during 
the course of his presidency, Richard Nixon-- and the concerns and anxieties that 
propelled him to the White House-- would have a profound impact on the future course of 
1 Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement," 1233-1263. 
177 
school desegregation litigation. 2 Civil rights activists, the black press, and sympathetic 
editors in the mainstream media recognized this threat to recently won gains and 
struggled to maintain and foster a more active memory of the civil rights movement that 
would speak to the concerns of the present, not only in the court room but among the 
American people themselves. 
Political Rhetoric: The Anti-Busing Movement Flourishes 
After the Supreme Court approved the use of busing as a desegregation remedy in 
Swann (1971 ), the federal courts found themselves increasingly isolated. The 
enforcement efforts that had marked the late-1960s, and the critical support of the 
executive and legislative branches, evaporated. A long time student of the politics of 
school desegregation, Gary Orfield observed that within a year of Swann, "many political 
leaders, much of the mass media, and some members ofthe academic community ... 
joined the opposition for the first time since 1954." In a study compiled for the 
Brookings Institution, Orfteld concluded that the busing issue had become "explosive" 
because it affected the "largest and most visible of public institutions"- the schools. 
Consequently, busing orders could effect the lives of millions of families. Student 
assignment patterns were one of the few areas of documented discrimination under the 
control of public officials that could be changed "at once" by court order.3 
Moreover, as massive evidence of illegal actions by school boards mounted in 
2 Gary Orfield, Susan E. Eaton, and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation, Dismantling 
Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal ofBrown v. Board of Education (New York: The New Press, 1996), 9-
16. 
3 Gary Orfield, Must We Bus?, 1. 
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southern and northern, rural and urban communities, school desegregation could no 
longer be viewed as a regional problem. As the historian Adam Fairclough has noted, the 
tactics of delay that unfolded across the nation in the wake of the Little Rock school 
desegregation crisis of 1957, postponed "integration long enough for a 'white backlash' 
to emerge in the North, just as the leaders ofthe Citizens' Councils ofthe 1950s had 
hoped and predicted."4 Southern segregationists believed that if school integration 
effected northern neighborhoods and communities, resistance to the Supreme Court's 
orders would spread accordingly. 
While busing opponents continued to define northern residential segregation as a 
de facto "natural" phenomenon, courts concluded in many cases that the ghettoization of 
American cities and the racial isolation of predominantly-minority schools was the result 
of de jure discrimination and action by public officials- a determination much of the 
American public never accepted. Federal busing orders were not discussed as the only 
feasible means to remedy constitutional violations. Instead, they were described in the 
mass media and public debate as an artificial and arbitrary attempt at social engineering. 
As school integration proceeded slowly in urban cities on both sides of the Mason-Dixon 
line in the 1970s, busing became a focus of public commentary as a "powerful" force of 
change in comparison to other efforts to end discrimination which were already being 
rolled back.5 
4 Adam Fairclough, "The Little Rock Crisis: Success or Failure for the NAACP?" Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 372. 
5 Orfield, Must We Bus?, I. 
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In response to the backlash against busing, politicians at the state and federal level 
considered various forms of anti-busing legislation. Anti-busing rhetoric was a 
cornerstone of Richard Nixon's "southern strategy" in his pursuit of the presidency. At 
the 1968 GOP national convention, Nixon told the southern caucus that he believed 
federal judges or federal bureaucrats were unqualified to make local school decisions, 
promised to appoint more conservative justices to the Supreme Court, and endorsed 
"freedom-of-choice" plans.6 Once in office, Nixon's Justice Department entered school 
cases calling for further delays in the implementation of desegregation plans, asking for 
higher burdens ofproofto determine constitutional violations, and opposing the use of 
transportation as a remedy.7 The administration also politicized the enforcement process; 
appointed officials in HEW refused to withhold federal aid or put pressure on 
noncompliant school districts. In 1972, the department was found guilty of subverting the 
intent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and failing to enforce recent Supreme Court decisions. 
A federal court determined that HEW had "consciously and expressly adopted a general 
policy which in is effect an abdication of its statutory duty." The Nixon administration 
had been found derelict in its responsibility to uphold and enforce the law as instituted by 
the United States Congress and interpreted by the courts. Administration officials were 
ordered to take immediate action in more than 100 school desegregation cases and report 
their fmdings to the court on an established timeline. 8 
6 Ibid, 242-244. 
7 Ibid, 319-344. 
8 Ibid, 279-294 
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Nevertheless, Nixon continued to rely on anti-busing rhetoric in his pursuit of a 
second term and in direct defiance of the authority of federal courts. After opponent 
George Wallace made a strong showing in a 1972 Florida primary, the President proposed 
a busing "moratorium" and legislation that would permit the use of busing as a remedy 
only as tool of"last resort" under "strict limitations" in a televised address. Nixon's 
Equal Educational Opportunities bill restricted the ability of courts to assign students to 
schools outside their neighborhoods. Moreover, the bill authorized school boards to 
reopen existing court orders that went beyond the standards laid out in the legislation. 
Nixon insisted school desegregation was "substantially completed" and any further 
measures must be "achieved with a greater sensitivity to educational needs" without 
"disrupting communities and imposing hardship on children." The President promised 
that additional federal resources would be made available to compensate disadvantaged 
children locked into what he acknowledged were "inferior" schools. What he did not 
reveal in his address was that these funds would be diverted from other programs 
designed to provide assistance to desegregating school districts.9 In the weeks and 
months that followed, Congress considered these proposals as well as amendments to the 
constitution that would prohibit federal courts from utilizing busing or any other race-
9 Richard Nixon, "Address to Congress, March 20, 1972," reprinted in School Busing: 
Constitutional and Political Developments, vol. 2 The Public Debate Over Busing and Attempts to Restrict 
its Use, ed. Davison M. Douglas (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 152-168; Orfield, Must We Bus?, 
104-105, 254; "Nixon asks for busing block: Urges moratorium on federal court orders," Arkansas 
Democrat, March, 17, 1972. 
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conscious remedy in school desegregation cases.10 
Civil rights activists contended that proposed anti-busing amendments and bills 
under consideration in the Congress would render the promise of Brown illusory. 
Without busing, minority students would be segregated into separate-but-unequal schools 
that lacked the funding and resources to break the cycle of racism and poverty gripping 
America's inner cities. As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted reminded 
Congress, "to restrict busing in most communities is simply to restrict desegregation." 
The Commission asserted, "What you really say to these children when you say 'no 
busing' is 'stay in your place and attend your inferior schools.' ... No amount of talk 
about new expenditures to create what, in fact, is a revision to the unconstitutional and 
bankrupt policy of 'separate but equal' will long delude minority parents or even minority 
studerij:s."11 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
insisted that the anti-busing legislation was "no different from the doctrines of 
interposition, nullification, and advocacy of defiance by manifesto"that were used to 
delay implementation of 1954 Brown decision.12 Just as those doctrines had threatened 
the balance of power between state and federal governments, the NAACP suggested that 
10 House Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on the Proposed 
Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and Assignment of Public 
School Pupils, 92"d Cong., 2"d sess., 1972. 
11 Statement of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Concerning the President's Message to 
Congress and Proposed Legislation on Busing and Equal Educational Opportunities, House Subcommittee, 
Hearings on the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and 
Assignment of Public School Pupils, 29 March 1972, 1134. 
12 Statement of Clarence M. Mitchell, Director, Washington Bureau for the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People, House Subcommittee, Hearings on the Proposed Amendments to 
the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and Assignment of Public School Pupils, 13 
April1972, 1239-1244. 
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the proposed anti-busing legislation threatened the disrupt the relationship between 
branches of the federal government by undermining the integrity of the judiciary. 
Moreover, the NAACP's General Counsel Nathaniel R. Jones warned that curbs on 
judicial authority would "be interpreted as a clear signal to Negroes" that efforts to 
produce change through the courts were futile and "that the battle for change must be 
taken underground."13 
The Nixon bills also drew criticism from other quarters. More than 500 attorneys 
signed a letter opposing the legislation as unconstitutional. The proposed moratorium 
and Equal Educational Opportunities bill even sparked revolt within the Justice 
Department. Nine black lawyers within the Civil Rights Division urged Congress not to 
adopt the proposal in a public letter. "We as ardent students of the civil rights struggle 
have concluded that the recent fervor in the area of busing is nothing more than a thinly 
veiled attempt to sacrifice the rights of minority children to racist pressure groups and 
political expedience," they asserted. Nearly 100 of their white colleagues supported their 
position and called on Congress not to enact legislation that restricted the powers of the 
courts to remedy unconstitutional segregation. 14 
In Little Rock, the progress that had been made under the city's new 
comprehensive desegregation plan would unravel if busing was eliminated as a remedy. 
Arkansas' capital was listed by the Justice Department as one of 45 school districts with 
13 Statement of Nathaniel R. Jones, Esq., General Counsel, NAACP, House Subcommittee, 
Hearings on the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and 
Assignment of Public School Pupils, 16 March 1972, 994. 
14 "Attorneys in Justice Department Rap Nixon School Policy Again," Southern Mediator Journal, 
Little Rock, AR, April28, 1972, p. 1.8. · 
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pending court orders that would be directly and immediately effected ifNixon's proposals 
became law. 15 In the aftermath of the President's address, Superintendent of Schools 
Floyd W. Parsons vocalized his belief that Little Rock qualified as one ofthe districts that 
had "been required to go beyond the Supreme Court's requirements," and expressed 
confidence that the moratorium could have the effect of halting busing completely at the 
elementary school level and scaling back the extent of the city's desegregation efforts at 
the junior and senior high schoollevel. 16 African American attorney John W. Walker 
scoffed at Parson's assertions. He noted that Nixon's proposals to provide 
"compensatory" funding to racially isolated schools only underscored the fact that 
segregated schools throughout the South were and would continue to be unequal. The 
President's proposals also exceeded the scope ofhis authority. "Obviously, the President 
cannot run the judiciary," Walker asserted. 17 In opposition to Nixon's proposals, the 
Arkansas Gazette also commented on the irony of the President's attempt to undermine 
the authority of the federal courts when he had staked so much of his reputation on his 
dedication to "law-and-order."18 
In this context, local African American leaders responded to the NAACP's 
national call to action and vocally opposed the President's anti-busing legislation. The 
15 Eric Wentworth, "25 States Seen Hit by Nixon Bus Plan," Washington Post Times Herald, April 
30, 1972, p. A3. 
16 Patsy McKown and Roger Armbrust, "Will Area busing stop?" President's proposed moratorium 
could affect LR schools," Arkansas Democrat, March 17, 1972. 
17 "Little effect in Arkansas: John W. Walker evaluates busing moratorium," Arkansas Democrat, 
March 18, 1972. 
18 "Mr. Nixon Gets Off the Fence He Helped Build," Editorial, Arkansas Gazette, March 18, 1972. 
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national civil rights organization framed the administration's actions as an attack on the 
1954 Brown decision, and urged its allies not to "stand still while the protections we have 
won at such cost are swept away by our enemies." Members were urged to write letters 
to their congressmen, senators, local newspapers, and the President himself reminding 
them that the "real issue is ending segregated education and that busing is only one way-
but often a necessary way- to end segregation."19 The national organization also urged 
local branches to schedule rallies and mass meetings in opposition to the President's 
proposals. 20 
Within days of this appeal, 200 delegates from the NAACP Region Six leadership 
conference converged in Little Rock. In a rousing address, NAACP board member Dr. 
George D. Flemmings warned his colleagues that the Nixon administration and its allies 
were not only undermining the enforcement mechanisms written into the Civil Rights 
Act, but were now devoting "a lot of time and energy ... into the idea of breaking down the 
gains we've made in recent decisions ofthe Supreme Court." There was much to be 
proud of in the arena of school desegregation and many accomplishments to celebrate, but 
Flemmings urged those gathered to remain vigilant. "Everything that's not nailed down 
is coming up," he said. "The slippage in civil rights is apparent on every hand." 
Antibusing only "means on thing ... resegregation," Flemmings asserted. Segregationist · 
sentiment had resurfaced with a vengeance and would spread "like wildfire" unless the 
19 Roy Wilkins memorandum to All Branches, Youth Councils, College Chapters, State 
Conferences, to Members of the National Board ofDirectors and to the Staff, March 17, 1972, in Folder 10, 
Box 145, Part VII, NAACP Papers. 
20 "NAACP is Ready for Busing Fight, Counsel Asserts," Arkansas Gazette, March 20, 1972. 
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NAACP and other civil rights organizations moved quickly to put it out.21 
In a public resolution read in front of Little Rock Central High School, local civil 
rights leaders responded to Flemming's address and condemned the President's anti-
busing message. Like Governor Orval Faubus fifteen years earlier, the delegates 
accused Nixon of acting "for selfish political advantage," and using his office "to 
encourage a national mood of reaction and oppression by emotional appeals and obvious 
deceit." As the delegates held hands circling the reflecting pond in :front of the school 
and sang "We Shall Overcome," Rev. C. Anderson Davis, director of the NAACP 
Houston Chapter, referred to Central as "the symbol of the Negro's struggle for 
integration in the schools." The resolution contended that Nixon's proposal threatened 
the "undermine the efforts of all those both black and white," like the Little Rock Nine 
and their mentor Daisy Bates, "who had worked for desegregation." Although she was 
no longer the president of the Arkansas state conference, Daisy Bates was still an active 
leader in the organization. She reminded those gathered around the reflecting pool of 
Elizabeth Eckford's courage as she walked in front of Central High "with a mob at her 
heels," and urged the crowd to "rededicate" themselves to the "fight for :freedom." The 
battle in Little Rock and elsewhere was not over, Bates contended: "Freedom is 
something we must fight for every day and every hour.'m Little Rock had only recently 
moved beyond token levels of integration due to court-ordered busing. Consequently, it 
21 "NAACP Director Denounces Stand ofNixon on Busing," Arkansas Gazette, March 19, 1972. 
22 Rik O'Neal, "Blacks make pilgrimage to Central High: NAACP leaders score Nixon's 
antibusing stand," Arkansas Democrat, March 19, 1972, p. 1A. 
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was hardly surprising that the delegates pledged to challenge the President in "the 
Congress and the courts" and to "appeal for justice before the nation and the world" in 
order to prevent resegregation in this symbolic city of the struggle.23 
Leo Collins, a local radio personality and weekly columnist for Little Rock's 
black newspaper The Southern Mediator Journal, also expressed his contempt for 
Nixon's attempts to use "every weapon available to the President's office to overturn the 
desegregation ruling of 1954." Collins contended that the furor over busing was just 
another vehicle for trying "to cling to the segregated past." Common sense dictated that 
integration could only be achieved with transportation for students. Nixon's quest for 
power had led him to propose irresponsible and foolish legislation that "would take years 
to undo ... while multitudes of school aged children's thinking would be tarnished and 
their education impeded." Moreover, Collins decried the "dangerous precedent" the anti-
busing proposals established. If enacted, he argued, "the country would then be geared to 
circumvent every decision the court made by a simple congressional act or by a president 
selfish enough to work the American people into a frenzy and then ask them to vote to 
butcher the constitution ... one of the greatest documents every written." The real question 
under consideration, Collins insisted, "Are we becoming a nation ruled by the simple 
wishes of those who would have the gall to treat the constitution like the bylaws of some 
fraternal organization, or are we still a nation of people willing to be governed by the 
23 Rik O'Neal, "Blacks make pilgrimage to Central High: NAACP leaders score Nixon's 
antibusing stand," Arkansas Democrat, March 19, 1972, p. 1A. 
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laws that made this empire the greatest democracy the world has ever known?"24 
As the contest over anti-busing legislation escalated, civil rights supporters 
struggled to block administration efforts to curb the authority of the federal courts and 
other attempts to divert money from school districts working through the desegregation 
process. Only the use of the filibuster prevented Nixon's Equal Educational 
Opportunities bill from becoming law. As Gary Orfield observed, the filibuster had been 
used for decades to block progress on civil rights and was now being deployed to 
preserve the gains that had been won only a few years earlier. Ironically, he wrote, 
"longtime enemies of the filibuster system joined in the delaying tactic only to hear their 
obstructionism denounced in southern accents." However, civil rights advocates in 
Congress were not successful at blocking every piece of anti-busing legislation, nor were 
the only proponents of such measures southerners. In 1972, a weakened amendment to an 
education bill passed the House and Senate in direct defiance of a Supreme Court 
decision which established that school desegregation orders should be carried out 
immediately and without delay. Section 803 read that future court orders requiring 
busing to achieve racial balance could be postponed until the appeals process was 
exhausted.25 
Federal Courts Undeterred 
This altered political climate and the passage of Section 803 emboldened the 
24 Leo Collins, "Mr. Nixon is an Odd One to Preside Over the Free World," Southern Mediator 
Journal, July 14, 1972, p. 3. 
25 Orfield, Must We Bus?, 251-255. 
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Little Rock school district to petition for further delays in desegregation at the elementary 
level and a stay of cross-town busing. Desegregation in Little Rock's elementary schools 
was scheduled to begin in September 1972, but the school board proposed a plan which 
limited integration in the lower grades as much as possible. Under the plan, all fifth 
grade students would attend predominantly white schools in the western part of the city 
and all fourth grade students would attend predominantly black schools in the eastern part 
of the city. Students in grades one through three would attend neighborhood schools. 
The board argued that the city's youngest schoolchildren would be attending "integrated" 
schools because of the presence of children of another race in the upper grade levels. 26 
Despite this attempt to capitalize on the effects ofNixon's anti-busing rhetoric 
and the strategy of delay legitimized by the U.S. Congress, the federal courts continued to 
hold their ground. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the Little Rock 
school board's argument was "without merit," and found that it was nothing less than a 
"last ditch effort to retain a segregated school system in the primary grades contrary to the 
Supreme Court's mandate that segregation be eliminated 'root and branch."' The gth 
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the stay, noting that the Supreme 
Court had already denied certiori for the integration plan in the secondary schools when 
in refused to take up the Little Rock case in 1971. Moreover, it refused to countenance 
further delay in grades four and five, arguing that the courts were not directly ordering 
busing in these grades but were merely approving a plan advanced by the board. This 
) 
was clearly splitting hairs since the board never would have advanced a busing plan for 
26 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 465 F .2d 1044 (81h Cir. 1972). 
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grades four and five if previous court decisions had not pushed it to do so. 27 
However, the school district did gain another year's delay through its petition for a 
stay of cross-town busing under Section 803 in grades one through three, which would 
now be scheduled to begin in 1973-74. This would give the school board "plenty of time 
to exhaust appeals .... before the beginning of the next school year."28 Although the Little 
Rock school district attempted to appeal the case to the court of last resort, the Supreme 
Court refused to review the 8th Circuit's decision.29 
Little Rock's black press decried this latest attempt to thwart the desegregation 
process. Leo Collins accused the district, and others like it of trying "to buck, duck, and 
outright circumvent the 1954 Supreme Court desegregation order by coming up with 
some leftover Orval Faubus schemes of how to evade the ruling." Collins expressed his 
disbelief that "this nonsense" was still an issue ''with just a fraction more than one fourth 
of the twentieth century left." He dismissed the argument of white parents that they were 
merely trying provide their children with the best education possible. If that was really 
their goal, the radio commentator and newspaper columnist insisted, they should "allow 
their children to attend school unmolested by their stereotyped thinking."30 In an 
editorial, The Southern Mediator Journal asked in exasperation, "How long will Boards 
of Education throughout the nation waste taxpayers money in filing cases and briefs 
27 Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 465 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1972). 
28 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 465 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1972). 
29 "Little Rock Busing Must Continue," Editorial, Southern Mediator Journal, June 29, 1973, p. 4. 
30 Leo Collins, "Textbooks Lie," Southern Mediator Journal, September 8, 1972, p. 3. 
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through the courts in a fruitless effort to stop the wheels of progress?" It was time to "go 
ahead" with other projects.31 
Shortly after the Supreme Court refused to consider the school board's appeal in 
June 1973, the Little Rock School District and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund finally 
agreed to their own "moratorium agreement," but the terms they agreed to were much 
different from those the President had envisioned. After running out of options, both 
sides agreed to implement the desegregation plan approved by the courts as expeditiously 
as possible. The school district accepted its obligation to desegregate all12 grades 
through cross-town busing, although kindergartens would continue to operate in 
neighborhood schools. Both sides also agreed to try to establish a one-third black/two-
third white ratio of personnel in teaching and administrative positions. The agreement led 
to the creation of a Biracial Committee to resolve problems and concerns related to 
desegregation, and the Legal Defense Fund agreed to assist the board in any way possible. 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs agreed not to initiate further litigation for at least two years 
(and for as long as the school board upheld its commitments) in order "to allow the 
school board time to implement desegregation in an atmosphere free from litigation. "32 
School Board President Robert McHenry confidently told the press that he believed the 
agreement provided a "model to be used by all districts throughout the United States.'m 
31 "Little Rock Busing Must Continue," Editorial, Southern Mediator Journal, June 29, 1973, p. 4. 
32 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 705 F.2d 265 (81h Cir. 1983). 
See also Statement of Mrs. Erma F. Hendrix, Educational Chairman of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, LRSB, Regular Meeting, June 28, 1973. 
33 "Little Rock Board Finally Approves School Settlement," New York Times, June 30, 1973, p. 30. 
See also United States Commission on Civil Rights, School Desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, 7. 
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Philip Kaplan, attorney for the plaintiffs, also expressed his optimism that the city of 
Little Rock could effectively "demonstrate the viability, flexibility, and crucial 
importance of the role of education for all persons" in an environment where the parties 
were committed to "working together."34 
When this agreement was implemented in the fall of 1973, school officials 
reported that school opened smoothly and with a minimum offriction.35 For the first 
time, all students in the Little Rock school district attended integrated schools with 
student bodies that were 39% to 77% black.36 The Southern Mediator Journal applauded 
these developments, noting that there "comes a time when people must grow up and act 
mature even though they may not always agree." The Journal adapted President Nixon's 
call for "law and order," and urged all parents in the school system to "insist that their 
children respect the rights of others and remember that our schools exist for the sole 
purpose of providing them the best education possible. There must be order and good 
conduct if a good education is to be obtained. "37 
34 Statement of Mr. Philip Kaplan, LRSB, Regular Meeting, June 28, 1973. 
35 "Busing off to a fair, faltering start: Only normal confusion for first day," Arkansas Democrat, 
August 30, 1971; Tucker Steinmetz, "Students Take Busing in Stride; Day 'Ordinary," Arkansas Gazette, 
August 31, 1971; "Blacks Praise Students and Parents for 'Standing Tall' at School Opening," Arkansas 
Gazette, September 7, 1971, 7A. 
36 According to the 81h Circuit Court of Appeals, "When the agreement was implemented in the fall 
of 1973, the Little Rock Public Schools served a total of21,095 students, 48% of whom were black. Black 
students accounted for from 41% to 77% of students in the elementary grades, from 44% to 58% in the 
middle schools, grades 6 and 7, and from 39% to 56% of students in the junior and senior high schools" 
(Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 705 F.2d 265 [81h Cir. 1983)]). 
37 "School Opening," Editorial, Southern Mediator Journal, August 31, 1973, p. 4. 
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Shifting Tone of Media Coverage 
Even as the city of Little Rock fmally complied with the mandate of the Supreme 
Court's 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision and began dismantling its dual 
school system, the national debate about busing continued with unabated ferocity. The 
anti-busing movement spread and gained momentum when federal courts ordered busing 
remedies in northern cities found guilty of manipulating attendance policies to increase 
racial isolation.38 In the midst of this upheaval, Little Rock continued to serve as a 
symbolic site of the school desegregation struggle, acting as a rhetorical anchor for 
ongoing conversations about race and educational policy, particularly in the national 
media. 
For example, in 1974, Boston became the center of the school desegregation 
storm when a federal court determined that the city school board had deliberately created 
and maintained racially imbalanced schools by concentrating minority students in inferior 
facilities sized and located to serve residentially segregated neighborhoods. The court of 
appeals affirmed, "It is beyond dispute that the defendants [the school board] took every 
opportunity to maintain segregation where it existed and to foster segregation where it did 
not. To use the Supreme Court's language, the neighborhood school concept has not 
been maintained free ofmanipulation."39 As part of his desegregat~on plan, Judge Garrity 
ordered African American students from Roxbury to be bused a short distance to nearby 
38 Keyes v. Denver School District No. I, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
39 As quoted in Nathaniel R. Jones, "Boston and Little Rock: The Issue is the Same," The 
Washington Post, January 3, 1975, p. A24. 
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South Boston. When the school buses rolled into this nearly all-white enclave known as 
Southie, mobs greeted the black students with stones, signs, and threats. The taunts and 
angry faces of the gathered crowds generated comparisons between the events of 1957 
and 1974, and Boston quickly became known as the Little Rock ofthe North. This 
comparison generated its own debate, with some arguing that the same issues and 
fundamental rights were at stake and others insisting that circumstances surrounding the 
two cases were completely different. Notably, in the course of public discussion, few 
commentators made note ofLittle Rock's own long struggle with the issue of student 
transportation. During the early half of the 1970s, it was the turmoil of 1957 that 
captured the country's imagination. It was not until the late 1970s that Little Rock's 
integration "success story" was advanced as a model for the nation. 
Little Rock's black newspaper, The Southern Mediator Journal, published a 
number of editorials and columns on events unfolding north of the Mason-Dixon Line. 
For these writers, the connections between the school desegregation crises in Little Rock 
and Boston were self-evident. Dr. J.P. Cooley, a columnist and a dean at Shorter College, 
observed, "For those who have said that the school integration crisis is behind us had 
better do some more thinking. Twenty and one-half years have passed since the U.S. 
Supreme Court has outlawed segregation in public schools. Yet, today the opposition is 
appalling." Cooley contended that the mobs in Boston had revealed unmasked 
northerners as the "greatest hypocrites of all"- African Americans who had fled injustice 
in the south and migrated north found themselves just as segregated "politically, socially, 
economically, religiously, and educationally." The "trouble" in Boston was that school 
194 
desegregation threatened the status quo in a community built "around and for white 
society" just as it had in the south. 40 Another columnist also weighed in about the 
hypocrisy of the "allegedly liberal North." Leo Collins asserted that Crispus Attucks, the 
first martyr of the American Revolution, would be horrified if reawakened to the 
"nightmare" of a city rebelling not "against foreign governments but against helpless 
black children who want to do nothing more but receive a competent high school 
education." The "ballyhoo" in Boston and the national outcry against busing revealed 
"how whites think the country over." Due to segregation, the school system had clearly 
failed to teach Americans to "live together with mutual respect for each other regardless 
of ethnic or racial differences."41 Moreover, the nation still had not learned its lesson 
from the 1957 school desegregation crisis or others like it. "It was hoped," to paper's 
editorial board wrote, that after events in Little Rock had established "the right of blacks 
to enter the public schools without segregation .... people all over the United States would 
go about the business of making democracy work in all areas." However, the board sadly 
observed, ''the Boston situation tells us that some segments of this country will never 
learn ... Truth ofthe matter is, the American people- in large numbers- do not want right 
to prevail!"42 
Sybil Stevenson, a Central High alumni who enrolled as one of a handful of black 
40 Leo Collins, weekly columnist, "Ignorance Flairs in Boston," Southern Mediator Journal, 
September 27, 1974, p. 5. 
41 Dr. J.F. Cooley, weekly column "Cooley Said It!," Southern Mediator Journal, September 27, 
1974, p. 6. 
42 "Racial Violence in Boston," Editorial, Southern Mediator Journal, October 11, 1974, p. 4. 
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students in 1959, drew even more explicit connections between the experiences of 
African American teenagers in Little Rock and the pupils riding buses into Southie. In 
her view, the children in Boston and other communities violently resisting busing were 
"change agents .... links in a chain which has been forged throughout our struggle in this 
country; a chain of blacks committed to freedom and justice." This chain of change 
agents stretched back in the past through the length and breadth of American history up 
through the twentieth century to the Little Rock Nine and those who followed them, like 
Stevenson herself, and was being carried on by a new generation of young people. Like 
their predecessors, bused students were willing to "face perils as they participate in the 
effort to bring about racial balance in our public schools" due to their commitment to 
equal rights.43 
Nationally Roger Wilkins, President Johnson's former assistant attorney general, 
described the scene in Boston as "reminiscent of hundreds of others flashed on television 
screens at the opening of school in years gone by. There were angry whites chanting their 
opposition to a Federal Court order, throwing rocks at black school children and 
screaming defiance and hatred at a symbol of the Federal will to enforce the law." The 
African American civil rights leader acerbically asserted that the only difference between 
Little Rock and Boston was "geography and federal policy." School segregation persisted 
in the North, not because the constitutional rights at stake in the region were 
fundamentally different, but because the Nixon and Ford administrations encouraged 
resistance to Northern desegregation, publicly attacked remedies designed to ameliorate 
43 Sybil Stevenson, "Reflections on Little Rock," Theory into Practice, 17, no. 2 (1978): 179-180. 
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it, and refused to withhold federal funds from institutions that supported it. A study by 
the Center for National Policy Review revealed that HEW files "literally bulge[ d) with 
documented evidence" of discrimination and segregation in school systems. However, 
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger defended his enforcement program, weakly protesting, 
"We are doing our job under very difficult circumstances where there is a very strong 
divergence of viewpoints between what the law says and what the public wants." Wilkins 
called this a "breath-taking excuse for non-enforcement of the law by a man sworn to 
uphold it." He contended that if the same policy had been followed in the fifties and 
sixties in the south, dual school systems would have remained intact there as well. In this 
context, the Wilkins concluded that the people of Boston were ''worse off than the people 
of Little Rock" because they had been misled and failed by "demagogues playing anti-
busing politics" in the legislative and executive branches of the federal govemment.44 
Indeed, President Gerald Ford was strongly criticized by Mayor Kevin White of 
Boston for voicing his opposition to busing as a school desegregation remedy in the midst 
of the violence and racial tension gripping the city. Ford told reporters at a news 
conference that busing was "not the best solution" for Boston's schools. This statement 
was widely viewed as lending "aid and comfort" to anti-busing advocates in Boston, and 
44 Roger Wilkins, "Northern Justice," New York Times, September 24, 1974, p. 1. Arkansas 
Senator John L. McClellan also protested against HEW's refusal to investigate northern school districts, 
particularly Boston. In public hearings, he had compared Boston's "open enrollment" policy to discredited 
"freedom-of-choice" plans in the South. McClellan called HEW's refusal to investigate northern school 
segregation was a "double standard" that gave preferential white students in northern states and 
"discriminated" against white students in southern cities like Little Rock. Some speculated that McClellan 
hoped to spark nationwide resistance to busing by pushing for standardized enforcement procedures (Peter 
Milius, "Apartheid in the City Schools: Boston Typifies Battle Over Integration Goals," The Washington 
Post Times Herald, April4, 1971, p. 1; See also Linda Matthews, "Why Just Us? South Asks on 
Desegregation," Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1971, p. H1). 
197 
some suggested that the President had even endangered African American school children 
by encouraging resistance. New York Times columnist Tom Wicker observed that 
President Ford's unwillingness to speak out in favor of desegregation recalled President 
Eisenhower's refusal to publicly affirm the Supreme Court's Brown decision. However, 
for Wicker the similarities ended there- Eisenhower had "recognized his duty" to enforce 
a federal court order in Little Rock, while Ford "made no move" to support judicial 
authority. This was hardly surprising considering that Ford had helped lead congressional 
attempts to limit the use of busing as a remedy in school desegregation cases. Wicker 
contended that the President's effort to "pay lip service to the law" while denouncing 
busing only served to mask the fact that he offered no viable and effective alternatives to 
student transportation. "That means there is no Federal policy for achieving 
desegregation outside the South, as Southerners never believed there would be," the 
columnist concluded.45 
However, for many who opposed busing, the comparisons outlined above failed to 
recognize the "critical difference" between the school desegregation crisis in Little Rock 
and the controversy that gripped Boston. In the 1950s, Little Rock school children and 
their parents had pursued a desegregated school system with students assigned to schools 
regardless of their race. Despite a mountain of evidence to the contrary, anti-busing 
advocates insisted that students in Boston and other northern school districts had "long 
45 Tom Wicker, "No Policy for School Integration," New York Times, October 13, 1974, p. 23. 
Indeed, the conservative Arkansas Democrat expressed its support for busing in Boston on exactly these 
grounds. The extension of desegregation orders to northern communities, and the deployment of busing to 
achieve meaningful integration, ended the "hypocrisy" that had long characterized school desegregation in 
the United States ("Double Standard Attacked," Editorial, Arkansas Democrat, July 3, 1974). 
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been assigned to schools solely on the basis of where they lived on a straight color-blind 
basis." In these cases, the courts were mistakenly deploying a "race-conscious" remedy 
to integrate schools. From this perspective, busing not only tried to impose an "artificial" 
racial balance on "naturally" segregated communities, it also violated the "color-blind" 
principle established in Brown and defended in Little Rock.46 
In the national media, this kind of rhetoric was presented as part of a legitimate 
debate over the use of busing and the authority of federal courts to implement it. This 
was a significant departure from the general tone of coverage during the Little Rock 
school desegregation crisis over seventeen years earlier. In 1957, the mainstream media-
particularly national news magazines and northern newspapers- had presented the 
conflict in Arkansas' capital as a battle between a cornerstone of American democracy-
the rule of law- and the forces of massive resistance. For many reporters who covered 
the story, these two sides of the conflict were not equal adversaries. The Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Constitution was the law of the land, while those who 
resisted its mandate were dismissed as "ri:fraff," "trash," and "unshaven men and :frowsy 
women." Governor Faubus himself was vilified and portrayed as little more than a 
"slightly sophisticated hillbilly. "47 
46 See for example, Henry S. Huntington, Letter to the Editor, "On Busing in Boston and Equal 
Opportunity," The New York Times, October 28, 1974, p. 30. See also William Raspberry, "The 
Differences Between Little Rock and Boston," The Washington Post, December 18, 1964, p. A15. 
47 Allison Graham, "Remapping Dogpatch: Northern Media on the Southern Circuit," The 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 334-340; Bond, "The Media and the Movement," 
28-29. For more on coverage of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis see Gene Roberts and Hank 
Klibanoff, The Race Beat: The Press, The Civil Rights Struggle, and The Awakening of a Nation (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2006), 43-60, 143-183, quotes from p. 169. 
199 
In 1957, Little Rock's local newspapers had not been as dismissive of the forces 
of massive resistance. With exclusive access to Governor Faubus, the conservative 
Arkansas Democrat portrayed him as a "heroic figure working under enormous stress."48 
In contrast, the Arkansas Gazette stood frrmly against Faubus' interference with Little 
Rock school desegregation plan and even went so far as to accuse him of deliberately 
cultivating violent resistance to justify his decision to deploy the National Guard in order 
to keep the black students out of Little Rock Central High School. However, this 
characterization ofFaubus' machinations implicitly depicted the Governor was a savvy 
political operator, even if he was pandering to a "small and militant minority of whites," 
not a backwoods rube.49 
If the mainstream media's depiction ofFaubus and the forces of massive 
resistance did not prevail in much of the southern press, it did help set the tone for future 
coverage of the civil rights movement by national news organizations during the late 
1950s and early 1960s. As other scholars like Julian Bond have observed, Little Rock 
established the "key conventions" of civil rights coverage- "It had drama, tension, and the 
ever-present whiff of real and threatened violence, all concentrated into a manageable 
geographic area and relatively brief time frame." Moreover, the desegregation crisis and 
48 Roberts and Klibanoff, The Race Beat, 170-173. 
49 Roberts and Klibanoff, The Race Beat, 170-173, 183. The Arkansas Gazette won a Pulitzer 
Prize for its coverage of the school desegregation crisis in 1957, as did Editor Harry Ashmore for the 
arguments outlined in his prolific editorials on the events unfolding in Little Rock's capital city. In contrast, 
the Arkansas Democrat adopted what former staff photographer Will Counts has described as an '"ostrich' 
editorial stance" choosing to "withhold comment about the city's trauma" (Will Counts, A Life is More than 
a Moment: The Desegregation of Little Rock's Central High, 50th ann. ed., [Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2007], 32). 
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other early campaigns for social justice- like the Montgomery bus boycott- generated an 
era of sympathetic coverage in which the media presented the nation's racial crisis as a 
"confrontation between the forces of justices, respectability and decency and those of 
bigotry, violence, lawlessness, and ignorance." During this period, civil rights activists 
consciously encouraged these comparisons through their appeal to democratic and 
constitutional principles, their respectable dress, and carefully orchestrated campaigns 
that were designed to heighten such contrasts. 50 
However, by the late 1960s, the news media no longer characterized the black 
freedom struggle this way. With the emergence of black power and black nationalism, 
and the wave of urban rioting that followed Watts, African American activists were no 
longer sympathetically portrayed as the forces of"justices, respectability and decency," 
but rather were increasingly maligned as the representatives of"bigotry, violence, 
lawlessness, and ignorance."51 While some have argued that this shift was precipitated 
by expressions of violence, anger, and militancy in the movement and a corresponding 
increase of white fear, others have suggested that the increasingly radical and systemic 
critiques of American society that were emerging from the black freedom struggle failed 
to resonate with white Americans, their representatives in the press corps, or the 
economic and ideological forces undergirding mass media itself. 52 
50 Bond, "The Media and the Movement," 17, 21-24, 28-29, 34; Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long 
Civil Rights Movement," 1235-1236. 
51 Julian Bond, "The Media and the Movement," 17, 34-35. 
52 Robert J. Norrell, "One Thing We Did Right: Reflections on the Movement," in New Directions 
in Civil Rights Studies, ed. Armstead L. Robinson and Patricia Sullivan (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia, 1991), 75-77; Roberts and Klibanoff, The Race Beat, 396-400; Morgan, "The Good, the Bad, and 
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If the national and mainstream media was not always overtly hostile to the 
demands of civil rights advocates in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they did tend to 
portray the nation's racial problems as a clash "between opposing forces equally 
deserving of suspicion."53 Unlike the characterization of forces represented in the Little 
Rock school desegregation crisis, the voices involved in the Boston busing crisis were 
given equal weight and legitimacy. This trend was only enhanced by the fact that anti-
busing forces enjoyed support from prominent politicians- including Presidents Nixon 
and Ford. Under the mantle of balance and objectivity, speakers on both sides of the 
debate were provided with space to express and articulate their grievances, but many 
reports did not acknowledge that the legal issues surrounding student transportation were 
already settled. 
The civil rights community's frustration with the media's approach the nation's 
latest school desegregation crisis was palpable. In an op-ed in The Washington Post, 
NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel R. Jones cautioned "writers and other 
commentators" that it was a "fundamental error" to attempt "to draw legal distinctions 
between Little Rock and Boston desegregation cases." Jones insisted that the issues were 
simple. In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled that state-imposed segregation was 
unconstitutional. Public officials had created and maintained segregated schools in Little 
Rock and Boston. Their actions violated the equal protection clause ofthe 14th 
the Forgotten,"138-140. 
53 Bond, "The Media and the Movement," 36; Morgan, "The Good, the Bad, and the 
Forgotten," 14 7-149. 
202 
Amendment, and courts were required to develop remedial plans that remove all vestiges 
of segregation from the system. In both cities, "resistance to judicial efforts" to eliminate 
segregation "root and branch" had resulted in violence. Indeed, the cases were so similar 
the Court of Appeals drew upon legal precedents established in Little Rock sixteen years 
earlier when it refused to overturn the Boston busing order because of community 
resistance and mob violence. "Rather than continuing fruitless journalistic probes for 
legal distinctions that don't exist," Jones urged reporters, "it is time for all people of 
decent instincts to come together to preserve the fragile but essential rule oflaw."54 
The Court of Public Opinion 
However, public opinion polling in the mid-1970s revealed that most white 
Americans did draw distinctions between school desegregation in general and busing. 
Polls unveiled a growing consensus in support of school desegregation, but increasing 
polarization and opposition to school busing. This contradiction led some researchers to 
conclude that factors other than racism animated the school busing debate. 55 However, 
many civil rights activists rejected this interpretation of the data. As Jesse Jackson 
54 Nathaniel R. Jones, "Boston and Little Rock: The Issue is the Same," The Washington Post, 
January 3, 1975, p. A24; Tom Wicker, "A Tale of2 Cities," New York Times, November 3, 1974, p. 24. 
55 See Jonathan Kelly, "Politics of School Busing," Public Opinion Quarterly 38, no .1 (Spring 
1974): 23-39. Kelly concluded that racism and opposition to busing were only significantly correlated 
among educational elites, not for the American public at large. See also Emmett H. Buell Jr. with Richard 
A. Brisbin Jr., School Desegregation and Defended Neighborhoods: The Boston Controversy (Lexington, 
MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982). Buell and Brisbin suggest that polls revealed that a commitment to 
neighborhood schools, particularly in "defended neighborhoods" threatened by other unwanted social 
changes such as urban renewal or gentrification, fueled the antibusing movement. This perspective did not 
exclude racism as an important factor in antibusing, but suggested it was not the motivating factor fueling 
resistance to the federal court orders. 
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insisted, "It's not the bus. It's us."56 Indeed, a 1975 Harris Survey reported that 74% of 
respondents opposed "busing school children to achieve racial balance." However, the 
children of many ofthese individuals were already being bused for other reasons. Even 
among those who opposed busing for desegregation, 9 in 1 0 reported that school busing 
was "convenient" in their experience and 7 in 8 expressed "general satisfaction" with 
their children's busing. In summary, when people were asked about desegregation, they 
insisted they were only opposed to busing, but when asked specifically about busing, it 
seemed they were only concerned about student transportation when it was required to 
integrate schools. From the perspective of civil rights advocates, reported support for 
school desegregation was superficial and facile without support for the means to achieve 
it. 57 
Others pointed to polls which revealed that some portions of the African 
American community were ambivalent about busing to demonstrate that opposition to 
student transportation was not racially motivated. However, a poll in 1970 revealed that 
even after the rise of the black power and community control movements support for 
ongoing federal enforcement of school desegregation was twice as high among African 
American respondents, with four in five calling for further action. Consequently, when 
asked questions based on the premise that desegregation in urban areas could not proceed 
without busing, African American respondents were much more likely than their white 
56 Jesse L. Jackson, "It's Not the Bus. It's Us," opinion editorial, The New York Times, March 8, 
1982, p. A19; Roy Wilkins, "Quality Education is the Answer," opinion editorial, Southern Mediator 
Journal, January 26, 1973, p. 7. 
57 As cited by Orfield, Must We Bus?, 116-117. 
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counterparts to favor busing. 58 
Civil rights activists asserted that busing opponents had overstated the strength of 
African American opposition to busing, and often failed to acknowledge the resentments 
and fears that fueled it. Busing orders often placed the heaviest burden on African 
American children and communities, with far more black children bused to white schools 
than vice versa. 59 As a result, historically black schools like Little Rock's Horace Mann 
High School were often closed, institutional traditions lost, and black teachers and 
administrators frequently lost their jobs unless federal courts intervened. Moreover, after 
twenty years of resistance to school desegregation, black parents feared for the safety of 
their children in predominantly white institutions60 
Among whites, Gary Orfield suggested that the contradiction between professed 
support for desegregation and opposition to busing was nothing new. As early as 1944, 
Gunnar Myrdal had probed the contradiction between professed ideals of racial equality 
58 For an example of how this argument was used against busing see "Blacks against busing: 
Negroes say they're tired of being guinea pigs," Arkansas Democrat, March 17. 1972. See also Orfield, 
Must We Bus?, ll1, 115-116. 
59 The Greater Little Rock Ad Hoc Committee on Minority Involvement announced its support for 
busing to achieve integration as early as 1971, provided that student transportation was a two-way 
commitment. William L. Walker, chairman of the committee and director of the Little Rock equal 
opportunity office ofthe Department of Housing and Development, asserted, "When it comes to busing, we 
have to make the same sort of sacrifices that you hear white parents describe- that is, we get up early in the 
morning, we are not as close to the school as we once were .... I think we are willing to make that sacrifice 
provided that the white community is willing to make that sacrifice also" ("Blacks Praise Students and 
Parents for 'Standing Tall' at School Opening," Arkansas Gazette, September 7, 1971, p. 7A). 
60 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights addressed busing opponents claims that minorities were 
just as opposed to busing as whites and the reasons for black resistance to busing orders in the pamphlet 
Your Child and Busing, Clearinghouse Publication No. 36 (Washington, DC: May 1972), 14-15. In Little 
Rock, Dr. J.F. Cooley articulated concern about the unequal burden of school integration and busing in his 
weekly column, see Southern Mediator Journal, October 20, 1972, p. 6. 
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and the practices of segregation in his work An American Dilemma. 61 While testifying in 
a public hearing before Congress, Orfield observed that during "each successive 
skirmish" in the school desegregation struggle, opponents of racial progress "insisted that 
they were in favor of civil rights but that the next step was simply going too far." He 
contended that many of the politicians pushing anti-busing legislation and fueling public 
resistance to its use were the "same group that had led earlier battles." Opponents of 
busing, he concluded, "were not united by something special about school buses, but by a 
common record of hostility to racial change. "62 
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights believed that public opinion had hardened 
against busing because many politicians and anti-busing advocates opposing 
desegregation had deliberately clouded the issues, and the media had not clarified them. 
The Commission stated, "The issue of busing for desegregation more than any other 
domestic issue in recent memory, has been discussed in terms that have clouded, rather 
than clarified, public understanding. Myth has been confused with reality; groundless 
fears have been substituted for fact; and appeals have been made to the baser instincts of 
the American people."63 Despite evidence to the contrary, study after study found that 
large majorities of white Americans did not believe that African Americans were 
61 Orfield, Must We Bus?, 108. 
62 Statement of Gary Orfield, Assistant Professor ofPolitics and Public Affairs, Princeton 
University, House Subcommittee, Hearings on the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and 
Legislation Relating to Transportation and Assignment of Public School Pupils, 8 March 1972, 732-736. 
63 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Your Child and Busing, 3-4. See also Statement of 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Concerning the President's Message to Congress and Proposed 
Legislation on Busing and Equal Educational Opportunities, House Subcommittee, Hearings on the 
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and Assignment of 
Public School Pupils, 29 March 1972, 1135. 
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discriminated against in public education. Consequently, many believed that the busing 
plans ordered by federal judges were arbitrary, irrational, and unnecessarily expensive. 
Many white Americans believed that integration had a minimal positive impact on the 
education of black children and had a negative impact on the education of white children. 
Moreover, it was commonly assumed that busing increased racial hostility and 
encouraged white flight to suburbs and private schools. One study found that both white 
and black respondents thought busing expenses were more than ten times their actual 
local cost and took funds away from other educational programs. 64 Many of these beliefs 
could be attributed to the public statements of anti-busing advocates.65 
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights tried to correct public misconceptions and 
worked to "dispel the unfounded fears" that fueled the busing controversy. Contrary to 
public opinion, the Commission emphasized that federal courts ordered busing to 
dismantle segregated school systems that had been found guilty of discriminating against 
students and violating the Constitution. Even in northern districts, school and housing 
"segregation did not come about by chance or free choice." Moreover, judges usually only 
ordered extensive district-wide transportation as a "essential tool" of last resort where 
64 See polling results in Orfield, Must We Bus?, 108-118. 
65 For example, when the president of an anti-busing organization testified before Congress about 
the consequences of"forced integration," he stated succinctly, "The level of education has been lowered. 
There are frequent racial disturbances. There is great fear in pupils and teachers .... No school bond issues 
are passing. Pupils are migrating rapidly to private schools. People are moving out of communities. 
Resegregation is occurring. Instead of helping integration, what is being done is causing resegregation and 
is causing more animosity and problems .... the cost of massive busing is fantastic and there is more risk of 
accidents to schoolchildren because more people are being bused. Good teachers with years of experience 
are quitting. Preference is given to minority groups in many areas" (Statement of Dr. Mitchell Young, 
National President, Unified Citizens of America, House Subcommittee, Hearings on the Proposed 
Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and Assignment of Public 
School Pupils, 1 March 1972, 341). 
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desegregation could not be accomplished without it. Even then, the Supreme Court had 
instructed local judges to take time, distance, and danger to children's health into 
consideration. By the mid-1970s, the record demonstrated that local judges had done so. 66 
The average travel time reported in districts busing for desegregation was 20 to 30 
minutes. The Commission observed that under such circumstances pupils returned home 
as soon as they would have if they walked from a neighborhood school. The Commission 
noted that the percentage of students bussed had steadily increased during the course of 
the twentieth century primarily because of school consolidation, not desegregation. In 
1972, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimated that only 2 to 4 
percent of children riding school buses were being transported for the purpose of 
desegregation. These statistics countered claims that the nation was struggling under an 
expensive "massive" busing program.67 
The Commission also tried to dispel the myth that busing was not safe and 
impaired student achievement. The National Safety Council named the school bus "the 
safest transportation in the United States," and another study found that students who 
were bused were three times less likely to be involved in an accident than those who 
66 Statement of Mr. Theodore M. Hesburg, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, House 
Subcommittee, Hearings on the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to 
Transportation and Assignment of Public School Pupils, 1 March 1972, 186-236. See also Statement of 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Concerning the President's Message to Congress and Proposed 
Legislation on Busing and Equal Educational Opportunities, House Subcommittee, Hearings on the 
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and Assignment of 
Public School Pupils, 1134-1135. 
67 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Your Child and Busing, 7-8, 14. See also statement 
ofHon. Stephen Hom, Vice Chairman, U.S. Commission of Civil Rights, House Subcommittee, Hearings 
on the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and 
Assignment of Public School Pupils, 10 May 1972, 1589, 1597. 
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walked. 68 In addressing parental fears that their students would be bused to unsafe crime-
ridden neighborhoods, the Commission stated baldly, "If a neighborhood in which a 
school is located poses a threat to school children, the school should be closed and the 
children should be sent to another school.. .. no child should be made to attend it, whether 
he walks to school or gets there by bus." Evidence of violence in desegregating schools 
"overblown"; those incidents that did occur generally took place at the beginning of the 
school year and quickly ceased.69 The Commission countered claims that the education 
suffered because of busing, noting that several studies found that black student 
achievement improved in integrated environments while white students performed as well 
or better. In contrast, the "compensatory education" programs promoted by many anti-
busing advocates had not demonstrated "lasting gains" in student achievement. 
Moreover, an integrated environment offered students lessons beyond reading, writing, 
and arithmetic- it offered instruction in "learning how to live and work with people of 
different skin colors and cultural backgrounds."7° Children's safety and academic 
achievement improved under integrated conditions. 
The US Commission on Civil Rights also highlighted school districts that made 
busing work to counter the negative images streaming out of cities like Boston and 
Pontiac, Michigan. In this context, Little Rock, once a symbol of violent resistance to 
integration, was named "one of the most successfully desegregated school systems in 
68 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Your Child and Busing, 12-13. 
69 Ibid, 13-14,17. 
' 
70 Ibid, 16, 19. 
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nation." As noted earlier, many of the comparisons drawn between Little Rock and its 
northern counterparts failed to recognize that school desegregation litigation in Little 
Rock had evolved over the course of nearly two decades. The record in Arkansas' capital 
clearly illustrated that residential segregation in the city had increased as whites fled to 
neighborhoods unaffected by early integration plans based on freedom-of-choice and 
geographic attendance zones. The courts there had determined that the only way to 
achieve a unitary school system was by abandoning the neighborhood school concept_ and 
adopting a district-wide busing program. 
In its promotional materials, the Commission hoped to capitalize on and redirect 
the comparisons that were already being drawn between Arkansas' capital and the newest 
foci of the desegregation struggle. The Commission suggested that if the city of Little 
Rock- "the example segregationists used to argue that black and white students could 
never go to school together in peace"- could transcend its divisions and successfully 
desegregate through busing, the same could be accomplished almost anywhere. 71 Ernest 
Green, Central's first African American graduate applauded the progress at the school. 
"My general impression," he said, "is that Little Rock has made a better adjustment than 
many Northern cities."72 The Commission hoped that cities experiencing racial tension 
and violent resistance to school desegregation could learn from Little Rock's experience. 
p.l. 
At the urging of John Walker, the attorney for the black plaintiffs in the Little 
71 United States Commission on Civil Rights, School Desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1. 
72 Roy Reed, "Little Rock School Now Integration Model," New York Times, September 8, 1976, 
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Rock school desegregation litigation, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) deployed 
an almost identical strategy in its effort to persuade the nation "that integration can be 
made to work." In a pamphlet titled Little Rock, 17 years after," LDF solicited 
contributions from donors, noting that the kind of progress it had fostered in Little Rock 
could only be achieved through extensive and costly court litigation. The use ofbusing, 
the LDF noted, had facilitated the shift "from token integration" to the desegregation of 
"meaningful numbers" of students in the district. The positive assessments of students, 
teachers, and administrators highlighted in the booklet were designed to counter the anti-
busing rhetoric circulating throughout the country. By the rnid-170s, the LDF argued that 
Little Rock's citizens were uniquely positioned to "speak truth to hate.'m 
Teaching by Example: An Alternative Model for the Nation? 
As Little Rock approached the twentieth anniversary ofthe 1957 crisis, school 
administrators, students, and local residents embraced their new role as a model school 
district. However, while it was precisely the city's well-known resistance to school 
desegregation that made it such a valuable symbol for the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, journalists and other commentators, many in 
Little Rock preferred to keep the spotlight squarely on the present rather than the past. 
While civil rights activists pointed to the central role played by pioneers like the Little 
Rock Nine and countless others who participated in decades long litigation in achieving 
this success, others sought to emphasize Little Rock's accomplishment and downplay the 
73 "Little Rock, 17 years later," pamphlet (New York: NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, 1974). 
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struggle required to attain it. Vague references to 1957 merely served as a foil to 
highlight the lack of racial tension in the city's schools. Moreover, the mechanics of the 
process of desegregation- including the central importance of busing- were murky in 
many public accounts, despite the efforts of civil rights organizations to place them front 
and center. Frequently, the voices of"moderation" were given just as much credit for the 
district's success as the civil rights activists who pushed for substantive desegregation 
through nearly fifteen years of litigation. In most cases, the public memory of the crisis 
seemed like little more than a dusty relic of the past. However, a more active memory of 
the crisis persisted. For those who continued to push for improvements in the school 
system and society at large, honoring the courage of the Little Rock Nine and others who 
had participated in the struggle required a similar commitment to tackling the problems 
that persisted in the city's schools. 
Two decades after the school desegregation crisis in Little Rock, the mainstream 
press focused on the signs of progress at the city's most infamous institution- Central 
High SchooL Due to the city's busing program, Central's student body was half white 
and halfblack in the mid-1970s. Although the numbers were striking, most reporters also 
made note of a spirit of racial "harmony" and "cooperation" within the schooL At the 
beginning of the 1976 school year, The New York Times reported that "racial violence had 
practically disappeared" and "tension seemed nonexistent" at CentraL 74 Superintendent 
of Schools Paul R. Fair stated proudly, "I think the problems we've experienced in the 
74 Roy Reed, "Little Rock School Now Integration Model," New York Times, September 8, 1976, 
p. 1. 
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past have been in large measure eliminated. We have an apparent attitude of cooperation 
here, not only among students but among the faculty." Teachers tried to balance the 
content of courses, developing curriculum in African American history and literature and 
Asian studies.75 Over ten years, the school had been able to narrow the "achievement gap" 
between black and white students, with black students scoring "considerably higher" and 
white students scoring "slightly better" on tests. Student government, athletic teams, and 
other organizations were completely integrated after years of delay, and both black and 
white students expressed pride in the school's accomplishments. As one student put it, 
"When the Central High Tigers are on the field, everybody sitting on our side of the 
stadium is a Tiger, regardless of what color they are."76 
Central's success was attributed to several factors. Some claimed that the "racial 
harmony" at the school was due to the fact that many of the strongest opponents of 
desegregation had moved to the city's West End during the 1960s to avoid integration. 
(Of course this may have also contributed to the change in the racial politics of the Fifth 
Ward described in Chapter Three.) Sybil Stevenson, a black alumni from the early 1960s, 
suggested that this migration helped improve the racial atmosphere at Central, but had 
probably had a negative impact on race relations in other schools in the city which still 
experienced occasional outbursts of violence. Others suggested that the relaxed 
75 "Scene of '57 U.S. Crisis Now Just a High School: Fully Integrated, Little Rock's Central High 
Recalls Crisis Over First Black Students," Los Angeles Times, November 3, 1974, p. FlO. 
76 Roy Reed, "Little Rock School Now Integration Model," New York Times, September 8, 1976, 
p. 1. As late as 1974, the Little Rock NAACP Youth Council publicly criticized the school system for 
permitting discrimination against black students in extracurricular activities such as cheerleading. See 
"NAACP Youth Says L.R. Schools Discriminate," Southern Mediator Journal, March 29, 1974, p. 1. 
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relationships between students were due to the fact that students who had reached high 
school in the mid-1970s had been attending integrated institutions since the seventh 
grade. Even though most students still socialized primarily with students of their own 
race, and interracial contact largely ended at the school doors, students had become 
comfortable attending classes and interacting with each other. 77 
Many pointed to the active efforts of students, parents, and administrators, 
particularly the school's African American principal Morris Holmes, to develop "good 
rapport" and a positive atmosphere in the building.78 Superintendent Paul Fair conceded 
that every school district had to confront its own unique challenges, but urged urban 
districts to devote considerable time and resources toward resolving racial issues. "I 
didn't believe at first that this could be done," he said. ''Now I believe anything can be 
done. It's obvious to me now that desegregation of schools is best. In order to build a 
solid, cohesive community, you have to have it." Fair asserted that this was true in all 
areas of the country. "The Constitution wasn't written to apply only to some sections and 
not to others," he said.79 
By the twentieth anniversary of the 1957 school desegregation crisis, none of the 
students attending Central High had even been born when racial turmoil in Little Rock 
77 Roy Reed, "Little Rock School Now Integration Model," New York Times, September 8, 1976, 
p.l. 
78 Ibid. 
79 John Egerton, "Little Rock, 1976: 'Going Back Would be Unthinkable,"' Southern Exposure 1 
(Summer 1979), 45-46 (excerpt from John Egerton, School Desegregation: A Report Card From the South 
[Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1976]). See also "Scene of' 57 U.S. Crisis Now Just a High School: 
Fully Integrated, Little Rock's Central High Recalls Crisis Over First Black Students," Los Angeles Times, 
November 3, 1974, p. FlO; Fair, "Little Rock: Then and Now," 39-42. 
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captured the world's attention. Several told journalists that they had difficulty 
understanding the tension in Boston and elsewhere. Greg Means, a white senior, 
explained, "Really, we talk about what happened in Louisville and Boston and we laugh 
about it.. .. We can't comprehend it. We don't see people here throwing rocks at school 
buses. We don't see parents yelling at the police in front of school. It's all so hard to 
comprehend." Pausing reflectively, he added, "Of course, none of us here can really 
comprehend 1957 either."80 
Other students admitted how little they knew about the school desegregation 
cns1s. The events of 1957 were covered only superficially in history courses, and many 
students were "surprised to learn that their school helped blaze a new frontier for the civil 
rights movement," according to the Los Angeles Times. At least one teacher reacted with 
hostility to a reporter's questions about the crisis, accusing him of"trying to relive the 
Civil War all over again." A school administrator admitted the controversy of 1957 and 
the closure of all three of the city's high schools in 1958-59 was "purposefully played 
down" because "a lot of people don't want to open up old wounds." Some expressed 
discomfort that Central's long history of academic and athletic excellence was 
overshadowed by its role in the nation's desegregation drama.81 
While the 1957 school desegregation crisis had not been forgotten, and the 
celebrated integration of Central High School in 1977 would not have been possible if not 
80 Jeff Prugh, "Little Rock 20 Years Later: Integration Violence a Bad Dream," Los Angeles Times, 
September 25, 1977, p. A5; Roy Reed, "Little Rock School Now Integration Model," New York Times, 
September 8, 1976, p. 1. 
81 Jeff Prugh, "Little Rock 20 Years Later: Integration Violence a Bad Dream," Los Angeles Times, 
September 25, 1977, p. A5. 
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for the courage of the Little Rock Nine, their parents, and Daisy Bates, the city seemed 
more interested in demonstrating that it had transcended its past than in actively 
remembering what had happened. Even the twentieth anniversary commemoration 
ceremony at Central High School, "Twenty Years of Integration: A Model for the 
Nation," was described by the Arkansas Gazette as "not so much on occasion for 
recalling the 1957 school desegregation crisis ... as it was a time for noting the progress 
that had been made since then." The ceremony was on occasion for "tuning up the choir 
and tuning up the band in salute to those who helped build what one speaker called a 
'new Central High School."' With some relief, the paper noted, "Heroes received rousing 
tributes, while the villains, mercifully, were not mentioned."82 Indeed, when Ralph 
Brodie, the student body president in 1957-58, rose to speak, he asserted that only a 
"small group of Little Rock residents were responsible for the city's bigoted, violent, and 
prejudiced image," according to the Gazette. "For most of us," he insisted, "that image 
remains entirely undeserved." Although Brodie saluted the courage of his black 
classmates who had "done much to assure the rights of others," he also paid tribute to the 
"moderate" and "quiet" voices who urged others to comply with the law. "83 
As the ceremony progressed, Ernest Green, the keynote speaker, received a 
standing ovation along with his classmates Elizabeth Eckford and Carlotta Walls LaNier. 
On the 20th anniversary of the crisis, much was made ofthe fact that Green had recently 
82 James Merriweather, "Central High Connnemorates '57," Arkansas Gazette, September 29, 
1977, in Folder 12, Box 12, Subseries 4, Series 5, Daisy Bates Papers (Bates Papers), Special Collections, 
University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. 
83 Ibid; James Scudder, "Central revisited: cheers, not jeers," Arkansas Democrat, September 29, 
1977, p. 3A. 
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been appointed Assistant Secretary of Labor for employment and training by President 
Carter, while former Governor Orval Faubus was no longer an important political figure 
and had been forced to leave retirement and take a position as a bank teller. In his 
address, Green referred to the 1957 school crisis only briefly, noting that events in Boston 
and Pontiac indicated that school desegregation remained "unfinished business." 
However, as might be expected of a man in his position, he asserted that unemployment 
had become the nation's largest domestic problem and the majority of his speech was 
dedicated to demonstrating that the Carter administration was committed to solving it. 84 
Symbolically, as he stood in front of an integrated student body at Central High School as 
a representative of the President of the United States, Green had triumphed over the 
governor who had tried to deny him equal educational opportunity. 
Many in Little Rock seemed to content to vaguely acknowledge the crisis as a 
means of highlighting the city's tremendous achievements in the intervening years. As 
one news report put it, "The turmoil of that September is easily remembered and that's 
the way everyone wants it to remain- just memories."85 However, for civil rights 
advocates, the crisis was more than "just" a memory that required little public discussion. 
Daisy Bates, in particular, insisted on the need for citizens to have a more active and 
acute understanding of the crisis and its relationship to the ''unfinished business" of 
school desegregation in Little Rock and elsewhere. "We must make certain," she said, 
84 Ibid. For comparisons between Green and Faubus see also, "Little Rock Revisited," Newsweek, 
September 3, 1977, 8; Jeff Prugh, "Little Rock 20 Years Later: Integration Violence a Bad Dream," Los 
Angeles Times, September 25, 1977, p. A5. 
85 "Scene of' 57 U.S. Crisis Now Just a High School: Fully Integrated, Little Rock's Central High 
Recalls Crisis Over First Black Students," Los Angeles Times, November 3, 1974, p. FlO. 
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"that a lot of our youngsters see clearly how our modem times have been so greatly 
influenced by these events."86 Bates acknowledged that there was "no comparison" 
between the educational system in 1957 and 1977. However, she pointed to many second 
generation integration problems in the public schools and insisted that there was "still a 
lot to be done." If Little Rock was truly to be a model for the nation, then concerned 
citizens activists should take inspiration from the courage of the Little Rock Nine to 
tackle the problems that still existed in their own communities. 87 
Bates lectured the National Black Political Caucus on these points when the 
organization gathered in Little Rock for its first meeting after the convention in Gary, 
Indiana in 1972. After days of attending discussions about economic, social, and political 
empowerment and community organizing, delegates gathered at Little Rock Central High 
School to pay tribute to Daisy Bates and the parents of the Little Rock Nine. After 
receiving a standing ovation, Bates underscored the importance of using the convention 
as an opportunity reaffirm commitment to the civil rights struggle. Nine children had 
done more to change the destiny of the country, Bates implied, than the 999 attending the 
two-hour tribute to their actions and the bravery of their families. She had seen "much 
talk but very little action" out of gatherings like the National Black Political Convention. 
She told the leaders before her it was time to "put your money where your mouth is." If 
86 Thomas A. Johnson, "19 Years Later, Effort to Integrate Little Rock School is Recalled, New 
York Times, December 12, 1976, p. 63. 
87 Dorothy Pahner, "A Tribute to Daisy Bates: Caucus meets at Central to honor leader of' 57 
integration fight," Arkansas Democrat, March 17, 1974, in Folder 13, Box 92, Subseries 5, Series 5, Bates 
Papers. 
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they were going ''to do something" [emphasis added] she would "be part ofit."88 Gary 
Mayor Richard Hatcher embraced the content of Bates' address. Days earlier, he told the 
press that Little Rock had been selected as the convention site because of "the historic 
role has played in the civil rights struggle." Even more importantly, "it was also selected 
because it is good, sometimes, to return to old battle grounds and reaffirm that 
struggle. "89 
While Daisy Bates always acknowledged Little Rock's progress in the field of 
civil rights, she continued to insist that the city had a long way to go. "We've changed 
the practice of segregation, but we don't have integration," she said. "We've changed the 
laws, now we need to change the hearts."90 Indeed, interviews conducted in February 
1976 revealed that white and black residents in Little Rock had very different views about 
the successes and failures of the school integration program. Although nearly all 
interviewees agreed that relationships between black and white students had improved 
under the plan, most similarities ended there. 
Black parents, students, and teachers generally agreed that African American 
pupils had access to better schools and instructional materials under the desegregation 
plan. Many black teachers expressed their belief that equal educational opportunity could 
only be attained through integration and agreed that the busing plan had improved 
88 Ibid. 
89 James Howard Smith, "Expect 8000 Here for National Black Meet," Southern Mediator 
Journal, February 8, 1974. 
90 "Crises give way to quiet need for Little Rock leader," The Houston Post (AP), June 6, 1976, 
24A. 
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educational equality. For their part, black students felt that "opportunity for a better for 
education for all· students" was attainable in Little Rock. Due to their access to 
educational resources, higher percentages of their peers were graduating from high school 
and finding employment. When African American interviewees expressed dissatisfaction 
with the busing plan, their complaints were primarily directed to the unequal burden they 
felt the desegregation plan placed on black families, teachers, and historically black 
educational institutions. Both parents and teachers reported that the closure of black 
neighborhood schools, such as Horace Mann High School, had created resistance to the 
busing plan within the black community and impeded the desegregation effort. Because 
of these closures, black students were more likely to be bused than their white 
counterparts to distant schools. Likewise, although the school district had been ordered 
to eliminate discrimination in the recruitment and assignment of faculty, more black 
teachers had been required to transfer to historically white institutions than vice versa.91 
White parents and teachers were more likely than their African American 
counterparts to challenge the premise that the desegregation plan improved educational 
equality in the district. Moreover, they implied that if the plan did so, it achieved this end 
at the expense of white students. Although some parents believed that desegregation plan 
had improved the school system through a general restructuring, interviewers encountered 
"parental hostility about completely desegregating the school system." Many resented 
that their children were "compelled" to attend interracial schools. Likewise, white 
91 United States Commission on Civil Rights, School Desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, 10-
16. 
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teachers were "generally pessimistic" about school desegregation, questioning whether it 
was really necessary and speculating that the plan might not work. While white teachers 
felt that black students had benefitted from the integration of schools, they indicated that 
desegregation hindered white students academically. White students themselves 
suggested that the plan gave black students access to better educational facilities and 
provided white students with the chance to meet people from other backgrounds, but they 
did not believe the plan offered them any educational benefits. For their part, school 
administrators did not believe the greatest problem facing the school system was the 
unequal burden the desegregation plan placed on the black community, but rather "the 
apathy of black students and parents, violence in and around schools, and financial 
problems." The elements of the busing plan spoken of favorably were those that reduced 
the busing of white students and allowed white pupils to continue to attend Hall and 
Parkview High Schools in the city's West End. Parents also praised the feeder system 
which allowed students to continue through elementary, middle, and high school with a 
consistent group offriends.92 
In this environment, civil rights leaders like Daisy Bates believed with some 
reason that Little Rock's public schools were still a hostile environment for black 
students. "Second Generation" desegregation problems such as academic tracking, 
inequitable discipline, and the expulsion of black students from integrated schools 
became the new focus of the desegregation effort. The Southern Regional Council 
reported that nearly 80% of suspensions from Little Rock schools during the first year of 
92 Ibid. 
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secondary school integration were African American students. This trend continued for 
the next several years.93 The Southern Mediator Journal received numerous reports that 
black children in the district were "not attending school or dropping out of school for no 
good reason. "94 The Southern Regional Council referred to many of these students as 
"pushouts" who frequently quit school because of the "intolerable hostility directed 
toward them." The inequitable discipline these statistics revealed was hardly surprising 
in a school system that insisted that the "apathy" ofblack students was one of its largest 
challenges, or in a district where large numbers of African American pupils were moved 
into historically white institutions with faculty members who were ambivalent about the 
necessity of school desegregation and "pessimistic" about the impact of black students in 
their classrooms. 
In the mid-1970s, the Southern Regional Council suggested that disproportionate 
numbers of minority suspensions and expulsions were part of a larger pattern of 
continuing resistance to school desegregation. In a survey, the council found that 
"suspensions are often imposed for reasons that do not warrant such extreme action." 
Disciplinary problems were exacerbated by the fact that black students had been 
transferred to schools dominated by white tradition. In many schools, black students 
found themselves "excluded from extracurricular activities, tracked into segregated 
classes and confronted with condescension and hostility." In some cases, "school 
93 Austin Scott, "Blacks Target of'Pushouts': Ousters ofMinority Students Bared in Survey," 
Washington Post Times Herald, November 29, 1973, p. A3; Egerton, "Little Rock, 1976: 'Going Back 
Would Be Unthinkable,"' 45-46. 
94 "Parental Responsibility and the Student in School," Editorial, Southern Mediator Journal, 
February 8, 1974, p. 4. 
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confrontations are provoked through discrimination in disciplining black students, by use 
of Confederate symbols, and the displacement of black principals, teachers and coaches 
which leaves blacks students without models. "95 The Southern Regional Council urged 
school districts to reserve suspension and expulsion for "extreme violations" of school 
rules, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund filed a number of suits around the country 
that addressed these issues.96 The Southern Mediator Journal urged black parents to 
provide their children with "proper cultural training" that would enable them to strive for 
success, maintain their self-respect and generate respect from others.97 Daisy Bates--
former publisher ofthe Mediator's rival, the militant but defunct Arkansas State Press-
clearly believed that the "proper cultural training" required was more than lessons in 
decorum and turning the other cheek. Understanding the sacrifice and perseverance of 
the Little Rock Nine in 1957 could strengthen the resolve of black pupils twenty years 
later. 
Despite these problems, by the twentieth anniversary of the crisis, the Little Rock 
school system seemed committed to the principle of desegregation. In 1977, the city 
school board publicly reaffirmed its commitment to upholding its obligations under 
95 Austin Scott, "Blacks Target of'Pushouts': Ousters ofMinority Students Bared in Survey," 
Washington Post Times Herald, November 29, 1973, p. A3. 
96 "School Desegregation Slipped in '73: Made Modest Gains, Report Says," Southern Mediator 
Journal, January 25, 1974, p. 1, 3; Drummond Ayres, Jr., "The State of Southern Schools 19 Years After 
Little Rock," New York Times, November 2, 1975, p. 217. 
97 "Parental Responsibility and the Student in School," Editorial, Southern Mediator Journal, 
February 8, 1974, p. 4. 
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federal court orders and the moratorium agreement, pledging to "provide a system of 
quality public education in a integrated school setting for the children of the Little Rock 
community." The board asserted, "The achievement of the highest quality education in 
the Little Rock Public Schools cannot be subjugated to any other policy in this District." 
In previous years, this statement could have served as the preamble to the announcement 
of yet another tactic or strategy for delaying desegregation. But in 1977, the board 
announced, "It is the conviction of this Board that this goal cannot only be achieved with 
integration but can be improved by it. A vital part of the education of any student is 
learning to live with others. Integration of our schools is essential if our children, both 
black and white, are to live in harmony in an integrated society." The alternative course, 
which the board referred to as "separatism," produced nothing but "crippling" 
consequences for generations to come. Twenty years after the Little Rock school 
desegregation crisis, the school board acknowledged that the city was still wrestling with 
"the scars" produced by massive resistance and the district's tradition of minimum 
compliance and announced its determination to follow another path.98 
In this sense, by the late 1970s, the Little Rock school district had become a 
model for a nation that continued to debate and reject meaningful and systemic school 
desegregation. If Little Rock's school board had tried to capitalize on the Nixon 
administration's anti-busing rhetoric and sought strategies of delay in the first half of the 
decade, school administrators and district officials seemed to recognize just a few years 
98 "Little Rock School District Policy Statement," LRSB, Special meeting, January 4, 1977; Fair, 
"Little Rock: Then and Now," 39-42. 
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later that the objections of white school patrons and their reservations about busing did 
not permit them to ignore the mandate of the federal courts and the constitutional 
imperatives that underwrote them. 
However, developments in Little Rock also reflected national trends. While 
school administrators seemed committed to the principle of integration, they were less 
committed to the mechanics of the school desegregation plan that had allowed them to 
achieve meaningful racial balance at Central High School. The school board's 1977 
pledge contained only a lukewarm commitment to the busing program; the document 
described student transportation as "expensive and difficult" program to administer, 
although the board promised to continue to implement it until the district was "able to 
institute a better program. "99 This disjunction reflected national discourse in the 1970s, 
which frequently paid lip-service to the idea of educational equity if not the means of 
achieving it. It also mirrored national public opinion surveys in the decade that found 
general support for school desegregation, but growing opposition to school busing. 
For civil rights activists in Little Rock this ambivalence was alarming and 
threatened to jeopardize the gains they had made to date. While Morris Holmes, the 
African American Principal of Central High School, informed visiting reporters that the 
school's guiding principle and the goal it strove for was "equity and quality" and 
applauded the city's progress, even he had to acknowledge that the institution had 
embraced the "spirit of equity" if it had not yet achieved "the fact of it. "100 This was not 
99 Ibid. 
100 John Egerton, "Little Rock, 1976: 'Going Back Would Be Unthinkable," 45-46. 
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enough for Daisy Bates or others in the city of Little Rock that had been involved in the 
prolonged litigation that had produced district-wide desegregation. They wanted the 
school district to embrace both the ends and the means of achieving school desegregation. 
For them, educational equity was more than a vague and amorphous goal; it was a 
concrete objective to achieve. They wanted school administrators to resolve the "second 
generation" desegregation problems that continued to plague the district, to commit 
themselves to fostering and cultivating an environment that encouraged the success of 
African American pupils, and to publicly acknowledge the efforts and sacrifices that had 
been required- and would continue to be required- in order to attain meaningful 
integration. 
However, in the city-at-large, the steps that had been required to achieve Little 
Rock's new status as a "model for the nation" remained obscured in shadow even during 
commemoration ceremonies. The "narrative breach" which had surfaced in the 1970s 
between the celebrated campaigns of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the present was 
manifest in Arkansas' capital as well. This willed amnesia created space for an 
alternative narrative of school desegregation to surface in the city of Little Rock. Rather 
than forthrightly acknowledging the contributions and sacrifices of the Little Rock Nine, 
their parents and families, the African American students who followed them, or the 
persistence of the civil rights community in the federal courts, some would argue that 
Little Rock had always been more progressive than the country had given it credit for. A 
selective public memory of the crisis and the years that followed- in which the forces of 
white "moderation" deserved as much credit for the city's progress as civil rights 
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advocates for the school district's achievements- would become increasingly prominent 
in the 1980s. This argument would circulate with increasing force even as white flight in 
the school district accelerated, and the city struggled to maintain any semblance of 
diversity in its schools. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A "LONG TERM REMEDY" OR A "STOP GAP MEASURE?": 
SUBURBANIZATION, WHITE FLIGHT, 
AND INTERDISTRICT DESEGREGATION, 1971-1990 
Although the introduction of district-wide busing in 1971 did not produce a 
precipitous drop in the number of white students enrolled in Little Rock's public schools, 
each year the proportion of black students in the district climbed by two or three percent. 
White families who had previously avoided desegregation by relocating to the city's 
predominantly white West End moved even further west to the suburbs or enrolled their 
children in private schools. Enrollments in Pulaski County, just outside the city, 
increased by 80% of the course of several years. 1 In the early 1960s, less than 30% of 
students enrolled in Little Rock schools were African American. In 1970, the year before 
the implementation of the busing program, Little Rock's student body was approximately 
40% black. Five years later, that number climbed to 52% and Little Rock became a 
majority-minority school district.2 Due to ongoing population shifts, by the fall of 1976, 
the number of black students at some elementary schools reached 90%.3 
The city's new superintendent of schools, Paul Masem, tried to persuade a 
1 Jeff Prugh, "Little Rock 20 Years Later: Integration Violence a Bad Dream," Los Angeles Times, 
September 25, 1977, p. A5. 
2 United States Commission on Civil Rights, School De;>egregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, 2, 9-
11. See also Egerton, "Little Rock, 1976," 45-46. 
3 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983). 
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skeptical public that these changes were not due to white flight from integrated schools. 
Masem had been selected, in part, due to his "intense devotion to desegregation" and 
probably hoped to block any attempts to roll back an integration plan that threatened to 
"resegregate" the schools as families left the system. He suggested that the decline in 
white enrollment was to due to demographic causes such as a higher birth rate among 
black families. Even if he was unpersuasive on this point, Masem reassured parents and 
newcoming families that Little Rock was defying the "old philosophy" that a 
predominantly minority school system could not achieve academic excellence. The city's 
schools scored "above the national norm" on basic skills tests and 1 0 to 15 percent higher 
on college entrance exams. Moreover, more of its students went on to institutions of 
higher education than other suburban school districts in the state.4 
But by the 1980s, school officials in Little Rock were increasingly concerned that 
the district was reaching a crucial tipping point: many feared that when the percentage of 
white pupils in the system dipped below 30% white flight would accelerate so quickly 
that the district would become virtually all black. 5 It had become increasingly apparent 
that the parents of young children and newcomers to the district were reluctant to enroll 
their children in Little Rock's schools. While secondary schools remained relatively well 
balanced throughout the 1970s, the percentage ofblack students in grades 1-3 had 
4 Mike Masterson, "Little Rock, 1979: 'There Have Been Changes," Southern Exposure (1979): 
46-47. 
5 Gallup polls from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s indicated white parents were not inclined to 
enroll their children in predominantly black schools. While only 23 percent of white northern parents 
objected to sending their children to schools where half the students were African American, 63 percent 
objected to enrolling their children in schools that were majority black (Orfield, Must We Bus?, 405-406). 
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climbed to 72% by 1981.6 
National Trends 
Little Rock was not the only city experiencing alarming levels of white flight. 
While older cities in the north and east had been segregated by race and ethnicity and 
stratified by income for decades, whites were abandoning neighborhoods in the urban 
core and relocating to the suburbs in larger and larger numbers. Moreover, as cities in the 
Sunbelt experienced unprecedented growth in the final quarter of the twentieth century, 
southern cities patterned themselves more and more after their northern. counterparts. 
Many African American residents found it difficult to leave the urban core. Due to 
discriminatory lending practices and restrictive covenants, many black families had not 
had the opportunity to purchase homes in the postwar period, and consequently were 
unable able to accrue equity or benefit from rapidly rising housing prices. Likewise, the 
pervasive practice of "steering" buyers in the housing market continued to contribute to 
the segregation of American cities. 7 
As wealthier residents moved out of the city, urban school districts across the 
country faced decreased revenues, decaying educational plants, and majority-minority 
6 Paul Masem, "Resegregation: A Case Study of an Urban School District" (Ed.D. diss., Vanderbilt 
University, 1986), 104-106. 
7 For more on these practices see Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization 
of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Thomas W. Hanchett, Sorting Out the 
New South City: Race, Class, and Urban Development in Charlotte, 1875-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1998); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in 
Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumer's Republic: 
The Politics of M~s Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Vintage Books, 2004); Kevin M. 
Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007); David M. P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban 
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
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student enrollments, while suburban districts passed millage increases, built new schools, 
and educated the nation's most privileged children. Civil rights advocates became 
increasingly alarmed by these disparities. With large numbers of minority children being 
educated in struggling urban school districts, and the majority of white children attending 
schools with little or no diversity in the suburbs, American educational institutions were 
becoming more rather than less segregated. 
By the middle of the 1970s, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and 
other advocacy organizations found themselves facing nearly intractable problems in 
urban districts. Some began to question whether it was prudent to push for the total 
desegregation of city schools if that meant that all schools in a system would be more 
than 80% black. It seemed futile to bus black students out of black neighborhoods to 
attend schools that remained racially identifiable. In the face of these realities, some civil 
rights leaders promoted a new course, turning away from desegregation and toward 
compensatory education programs. 8 However, others claimed that these stark statistics 
illustrated that states were failing to provide students with the equal opportunities the 14th 
Amendment required. If states could not discharge their responsibility to desegregate 
schools within districts, then they would have to find other means to eliminate 
segregation "root and branch" even if that meant breaching district boundaries. 
Civil rights lawyers tested this line of argument in several lawsuits, which 
culminated in the Supreme Court's decision on interdistrict remedies in Milliken v. 
8 Gary Orfield, "Turning Back to Segregation," in Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal 
ofBrown v. Board of Education, ed. Gary Orfield, Susan Eaton, and the Harvard Project on School 
Desegregation (New York: The New Press, 1996), 12. 
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Bradley (1974). In Milliken, a federal district court in Detroit determined that state and 
local school officials had fostered racial separation in the city's schools. Moreover, due 
to white flight and the large percentage of black students in the district, the court also 
found it impossible to develop an effective desegregation remedy within the district. 
Since the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the states, and education was a function of 
state government administered in cooperation with local school boards under the 
Michigan constitution, the district court determined that it was the state's responsibility to 
desegregate Detroit's schools by consolidating the city district with 53 surrounding 
suburban school systems. 
However, before the district court crafted its interdistrict remedy, the case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court. In a split 5-4 decision, the high court rejected the district 
judge's reasoning, holding that lower court's findings were based upon erroneous 
standards and its determinations were supported by insufficient evidence that the 
suburban districts had contributed to segregation within the city of Detroit. In Milliken, 
the Supreme Court held that school district boundaries were more than "arbitrary lines on 
a map drawn 'for political convenience."' Given the "deeply rooted" tradition of local 
control of schools, the Court decreed that district lines should not be breached unless 
plaintiffs demonstrated that the discriminatory actions in one district had caused 
segregation in an adjacent district or that boundary lines had been drawn or redrawn to 
segregate students. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart indicated that he would also 
support an interdistrict remedy if it could be demonstrated that discriminatory state 
housing or zoning laws had contributed to city/suburb segregation. In short, unless 
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plaintiffs demonstrated that suburban districts were culpable, or that state action had 
produced metropolitan segregation, the constitution did not require interdistrict 
desegregation. The district court's proposed remedy, Chief Justice Burger argued, 
exceeded the scope of the demonstrated constitutional violation.9 
In a stinging dissent, Justice Marshall rebuked the Court's decision. The court 
was not "limiting" the scope of the remedy to the constitutional violation at hand, he 
argued. Rather, the justices had provided "no remedy at all" to the children in Detroit, 
guaranteeing that they would continue to "receive the same separate and inherently 
unequal education in the future" as they had in the past. It was the state's duty to 
eliminate segregation, and as Justice White also noted, there was no reason why the party 
that had violated the constitution- Michigan- should be able to contain the remedial 
power of the courts within the administrative boundaries of school districts it had 
complete control over. Marshall asserted that the Court's decision was shaped by "public 
opposition" to interdistrict desegregation rather than legal precedent and "neutral 
principles of law." Four of the five votes overturning the lower courts were appointed by 
President Nixon in the midst of the turmoil surrounding busing. 10 Marshall warned, "In 
the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to 
be divided up each into two cities- one white, the other black- but it is a course, I predict, 
our people will ultimately regret."11 
9 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
10 Orfie1d, "Turning Back to Segregation," 12. 
ll Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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In the days following the decision James Nabrit ill, Associate Counsel for the 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, announced that the organization interpreted the 
decision as a "broad signal" that further petitions for interdistrict remedies were unlikely 
to succeed.12 Indeed, the heavy burden of proof now required of plaintiffs in interdistrict 
cases made them almost prohibitively expensive to litigate. At a gathering sponsored by 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to discuss the implications of the Court's decision, 
legal scholar Norman C. Amaker asserted that it would be extremely difficult to produce 
evidence ofthe kind ofinterdistrict violations the majority opinion pointed toward. 
Moreover, even on the "rare occasions" it was possible to do so, "it seems clear that one 
would have to prove purposeful conduct, which, given the sophistication of the deceptive 
art in race cases, is increasingly hard to do." Consequently, he concluded, ''the rarity of 
the instances makes this particular game not worth the candle; the vast majority of 
intrastate school district arrangements will be seen under the Milliken standard as 
innocently arrived at."13 
Others expressed more optimism that the Court's decision did not completely 
foreclose the possibility of interdistrict remedy, particularly since Justice Stewart had 
indicated that he would take discriminatory housing and zoning laws into consideration 
when weighing such a case. At another gathering, lawyers involved in litigating 
12 James Nabrit III, Associate Counsel, Legal Defense and Education Fund, responding to Norman 
C. Amaker, conference report from the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Milliken v. Bradley: The 
Implications for Metropolitan Desegregation (Washington, DC: 1974). 
13 Norman C. Amaker, "Milliken v. Bradley: The Meaning of the Constitution in School 
Desegregation Cases," conference report from the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Milliken v. 
Bradley: The Implications for Metropolitan Desegregation. 
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metropolitan cases across the country generally agreed that the best tactic moving forward 
would be to build precedent for interdistrict remedies slowly by focusing on those cases 
that offered specific and irrefutable evidence of state action that resulted in segregated 
metropolitan communities and schools. 14 This strategy proved effective in large cities 
like Louisville, Wilmington, and Indianapolis, where findings of intentional housing 
segregation and other violations allowed federal courts to order interdistrict desegregation 
even after Milliken. 15 In the early 1980s, the Little Rock School Board and African 
American plaintiffs in the city's schools sought similar relief from the effects of white 
flight by suing the surrounding suburban school district for contributing to the 
resegregation of Little Rock schools. 
White Flight and Resegregation in Little Rock 
In January 1980, administrators in the Little Rock school district formally 
acknowledged that the city's schools were suffering from "white flight" and an erosion of 
public support for the school system. "Little Rock is fast developing into a black school 
district," the report concluded. "The de jure segregation of 1957 is being replaced by de 
facto segregation in the 1980s."16 Superintendent Paul Masem believed that past 
administrations and school boards were partially responsible for the departure of white 
patrons and the "resegregation" of the district. For nearly two decades, he asserted, 
14 For example see William Taylor, Center for National Policy Review, responding to Norman C. 
Amaker, conference report from the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Milliken v. Bradley: The 
Implications for Metropolitan Desegregation. See also Orfield, Must We Bus?, 394. 
15 Orfield, "Turning Back to Segregation," 13. See also Gary Orfield, Must We Bus?, 410-411. 
16 Masem, "Resegregation," 88-89. 
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school officials in Little Rock had "established a climate that was negative toward 
desegregation." The school district had fought nearly every desegregation initiative in the 
courts, members of the school board had repeatedly stated their commitment to 
segregated schools, administrators had implemented desegregation remedies with the 
intent of limiting rather than extending their effects, and the system had failed to close 
achievement gaps between black and white students. In his doctoral dissertation, Masem 
noted, "The behavior of the Board and the administration during this period did nothing 
to eradicate the perceptions of whites concerning blacks intellectual and social inferiority. 
On the contrary, the Board's behavior tended to reinforce those views." The school board 
had done nothing to mitigate white concerns about the quality of education in the 
desegregating school district, nor had officials taken any action to address the 
"blackening" of the school system as whites fled for suburban institutions and private 
academies. 17 As resegregation became more evident, "belief in the capacity of the Little 
Rock School District to provide equal educational opportunities to all students" continued 
to shrink. 18 
In contrast to its predecessors, Superintendent Paul Masem urged the school board 
to develop a "planned response" to the problem of white flight. He proposed a slate of 
"action steps" designed to stave off further resegregation, improve the image of the city's 
school system, and develop better communication with school patrons, newcomers, and 
the general public. Masem also encouraged the board to pursue the possibility of 
17 Ibid, 242-244. 
18 Ibid, 88-89. 
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developing a voluntary school desegregation plan with the adjacent suburban school 
district, or failing that, the pursuit of an interdistrict remedy through the courts. 19 
The suburban Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) surrounded the 
Little Rock School District (LRSD). PCSSD had been created in 1927 through the 
consolidation of thirty-eight rural school districts. It covered 755 square miles, and 
included all students not enrolled in LRSD or North Little Rock School District (NLRSD) 
in the county. It also included students living in predominantly white sections of Little 
Rock that had not been deannexed to LRSD as the city itself expanded. By the early 
1980s, 40% of the city of Little Rock lay outside of the Little Rock School District's 
boundaries. In part, this situation explained how the city of Little Rock itself could be 
nearly two-thirds white, while its student body was approximately seventy percent 
black.20 In Arkansas, school district annexation and consolidation required joint 
agreement between the two districts involved. Following the implementation of the 
court's district-wide desegregation decree in the 1970s, PCSSD had stopped deannexing 
additional territory to the city. The Little Rock school board contacted their counterparts 
at PCSSD seeking a voluntary interdistrict solution to climbing black enrollments in the 
city's schools shortly after Superintendent Masem made his recommendations. Their 
overture was not well received-- board members in Pulaski County passed a resolution 
prohibiting school personnel from engaging in "cooperative efforts" with officials from 
19 Paul Masem, "Resegregation," 153; Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School 
District, 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983). 
2° Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 705 F.2d 265 (81h Cir. 1983); 
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 (81h Cir. 1985). 
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LRSD.21 
After this setback, the board and the administration set to work implementing the 
remainder ofMasem's "action steps." In an attempt to stabilize white flight, the district 
launched a public relations effort designed to retain and recruit additional white students. 
School officials helped organize a public school support group called Parents for Public 
Schools. The group, comprised of nearly 1,000 white parents, developed an advertising 
campaign, and created bumper stickers and T-shirts reading, "My heart's in the public 
school system, so are my children." Local businessman Walter Smiley, the president of 
the organization, explained that the purpose of the advocacy initiative was to assure other 
white parents that "the blackboard jungle doesn't exist."22 Likewise, schools hosted 
"open houses" to "sell" their services to parents, and urged parents to sign "enrollment 
intent" cards created to assure uncertain school patrons that a critical mass of white 
families intended to remain in the city's public schools. The district also asked real estate 
agents to encourage new families to enroll their children in public institutions.23 
To bolster these efforts, Little Rock crafted a carefully calibrated public relations 
campaign to promote the district's academic achievements. Central High School, the 
city's flagship institution, featured prominently in this effort. School officials continued 
21 For example see ''Resolution Pertaining to District Boundary Lines," LRSB, Regular Meeting, 
June 21, 1979; Masem, "Resegregation: A Case Study of an Urban School District," 5 (citing "School 
Districts Discuss Cooperation," Arkansas Gazette, March 12, 1980, p. 2A; and "County Rejects Request to 
Cooperate," Arkansas Democrat, March 13, 1980 p. IB). 
22 Gregory Jaynes, "Little Rock Schools, Trailblazers in Integration, Now Drawing Whites Back," 
New York Times, September 13, 1981, section 1, p. 30. 
23 Masem, "Resegregation," 216-218, 225. 
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to refer the high school as a "model for the whole nation," pointing to its stable racial mix 
and excellent academic reputation. The district widely publicized the school's excellent 
test scores, high percentage of students continuing to college, and large number of 
National Merit scholars. Principal Richard Maple also attempted to defuse perceptions 
that the system was crime-ridden by citing the low number of disciplinary actions and 
expulsions at Central. School officials arranged interviews for reporters with students 
who left private schools to take advantage of the unique opportunities the school 
provided, such as calculus, honors courses in English and science, advanced foreign 
languages, and specialized classes in African American literature, creative writing, stage 
management, child development and 'junior executive training."24 Indeed, as the 1980s 
progressed, some reported that the district had turned the Central into "lavishly indulged 
pet project" designed to "live down the notoriety of the past" and demonstrate that Little 
Rock's schools were capable of providing excellent educational opportunities in an 
integrated setting. "It's a black eye you've learned to live with," admitted a 
communications specialist for the school board. "You put make up on it and show the 
world that you still can look good." The New York Times noted that the school received a 
disproportionate share of resources, experienced teachers, and special programs. 25 Others 
24 See Debbye Hale, "Central High staff thankful for rebirth sparked by crisis," Arkansas 
Democrat, June 14, 1981; Gregory Jaynes, "Little Rock Schools, Trailblazers in Integration, Now Drawing 
Whites Back," New York Times, September 13, 1981, section 1, p. 30; Ron Tempest, "Little Rock Central: 
Excellence is the Legacy ofRights Crisis," Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1982; Roy Reed, "Little Rock 
a Symbol Again: The Resegregation ofSchoo1s," The New York Times, March 23, 1985, p. 1. See also 
Robert L. Brown, The Second Crisis of Little Rock: A Report on Desegregation Within the Little Rock 
Public Schools, ed. Wendy Margolis (Little Rock: Winthrop Rockefeller Foundation, 1988), 6. 
25 Ronald Smothers, "At Little Rock, 30 Years Later: Starting Over," The New York Times, 
September 27, 1987, p. 1. See also Michael White, "Colour has faded as Little Rock issue: Thirty Years 
after Faubus called out the guard to keep school segregation Arkansas has got quieter," The Guardian 
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pointed to the "quiet manipulation" of student enrollment to maintain the school's well-
balanced integration. 26 
School administrators and teachers also recommitted themselves to closing 
achievement gaps between white and black students. White parents frequently pointed to 
the lower test scores of African American pupils as an indicator that the quality of 
education in the district was declining. This initiative also responded to the concerns of 
black parents who complained that many of the celebrated honors courses were attended 
almost exclusively by whites. For example, Charles Hodge, an African American college 
professor and administrator with a daughter at Central, charged that academic tracking 
prevented Central from operating as a "truly integrated" school. "Central is a white 
school," he asserted. "The benefits there are for whites.'m Although the program was 
designed to reassure both black and white parents that quality education was possible in 
the school district, in the fmal analysis, Superintendent Masem lamented, "The effort to 
reduce racial disparity in academic performance was a huge educational success and a 
resounding political failure." White parents merely shifted the focus of their "concern" to 
the "social isolation of their children."28 Masem reported that white parents withdrawing 
their children from the schools often justified their decision by suggesting that "their 
(London), September 5, 1987. 
26 Roy Reed, "Little Rock a Symbol Again: The Resegregation of Schools," The New York Times, 
March 23, 1985, p. 1. 
27 Herbert H. Denton, "Problems of Race Persist for Schools in Little Rock," Washington Post, 
August 30, 1982, p. AI. 
28 Masem, "Resegregation." 225. 
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children would not have enough contact with their 'social and intellectual' peers if they 
continued to attend Little Rock's predominately black schools."29 
Consequently, the percentage ofblack students in the district continued to climb. 
As white students left the system, several of the city's schools threatened to become 
racially identifiable. The Little Rock school district had reached another crossroads. 
Masem urged the school board to pursue an interdistrict remedy. However he warned, 
"the political mood and the enormity of the task to be undertaken, not to mention the 
social and financial cost, dictate caution." In order to meet the heavy burden of proof 
required in interdistrict cases, the school board "would be unwise to leap ahead and seek 
an interdistrict remedy without doing all its legal and political homework." As the board 
was developing its case, Masem recommended that they consider "alternative 
desegregation plans" that might offer "more hope" of attracting and keeping white 
students in the system.30 Thus, even as the school district began to pursue an interdistrict 
remedy in the courts, it hedged its bets and reconsidered student assignment policies. 
During this period, the school board created a Patrons Reorganization Committee 
to study the various "white flight" prevention proposals offered by the administration, 
while also asking the long-standing Biracial Advisory Committee to consider the impact 
the various alternatives would have on desegregation in the district.31 Significant 
divisions between these two committees, and white and black patrons of the school 
29 Ibid, 216-218. 
30 Masem, "Resegregation," 91-92; Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 
705 F.2d 265 (81h Cir. 1983). 
31 Ibid. 
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district, developed as Little Rock considered its next steps. The Patrons Committee and 
many whites in the district tended to favor approaches that accepted the inevitability of 
some racially identifiable schools. In their view, it might be possible to stabilize white 
flight in the district if Little Rock was able to reduce the number of students bused and 
return some pupils to neighborhood schools. While such an approach would create some 
all-black schools in eastern parts of Little Rock, it would also result in more evenly 
balanced racial ratios in other city schools that would be more appealing to white parents. 
Understandably, the Biracial Advisory Committee, charged with the task of the assessing 
the impact these plans might have on desegregation in the district, looked on such 
"alternatives'' unfavorably and questioned their constitutionality under Little Rock's 
existing court orders. The Biracial Advisory Committee and most African American 
community leaders rejected most of the proposed intradistrict reorganization plans, and 
tended to favor an interdistrict remedy that would bring more white students into the 
system and create more favorable racial ratios in the schools. 32 
In June 1981, the school board received a report from its attorney Herschel Friday 
regarding the legality of an internal reorganization and the prospects for an interdistrict 
remedy. A lawsuit designed to restructure the district's boundary lines, Friday warned, 
would be "long and costly" and extremely contentious. Obtaining proof of an interdistrict 
constitutional violation with ongoing effects would require time and money. In his 
opinion, "the chances for success within a meaningful time frame" were not strong. On 
the other hand, Friday expressed optimism that the Little Rock School Board had 
32 Masem, "Resegregation," 110, 112, 228, 240. 
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demonstrated sufficient good faith in its effort to desegregate its schools after years of 
compliance with the courts' orders. If the board asked for an order vacating the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, it would have considerably more flexibility in its plans 
for reorganization. Friday indicated that the board "would stand a reasonable chance of 
success" if it made such a petition. 33 
The board tested this theory a few months later when it adopted a reorganization 
plan that would cluster white students in primary schools (grades 1-3) in homeroom 
classes until they made up at least 35% of the students in a classroom. In proposing this 
plan, board member Peter Sherrill stated his commitment to pursuing interdistrict relief 
"as a long term remedy" for the school district's problems, but stated his conviction that 
LRSD had reached a "critical point" and faced the threat of "accelerated" white flight if it 
did not alleviate the concerns of white parents that their children would be racially 
isolated in the city's schools. Superintendent Masem strongly objected to the proposal, 
noting that the plan would create 79 homeroom classes composed entirely of black 
students. Two thousand of the district's youngest pupils would be bused out of their 
neighborhoods to attend completely segregated classes. John W. Walker, attorney for the 
black plaintiffs in the Clark litigation, went to court to stop the plan the day after the 
school board approved it. After a two-and-a-half hour hearing, federal district Judge 
Overton sympathized with the difficulties the school board faced and expressed his belief 
that its members were not trying to reinstitute segregation, but ruled that the board could 
not adopt "a hurriedly conceived stopgap measure to appease white parents" by grouping 
33 1bid, 98-99 (citing LRSB, Meeting of June 25, 1981, p. 10). 
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children in classrooms on the basis of race. 34 
Shortly after the ruling, Attorney John W. Walker announced his intention to file a 
suit on the behalf of plaintiffs representing the city's African American students that 
would result in interdistrict relief for the segregation of Little Rock's schools. Walker 
indicated that he was not concerned with the mechanics of the plan- consolidation, 
boundary expansion, or an exchange of students- but wanted it to create a school system 
that was "at least something over 50 percent white." Walker rejected internal 
reorganization plans that made concessions to whites to keep them in the school system. 
However, he noted that this black clients wanted a school district with majority white 
enrollment because it would result in "more balance, more sharing of responsibility and 
more basic financial support for the public school system." While he acknowledged that 
the Little Rock school board was also considering similar legal action, Walker pledged to 
file an independent suit. He explained, "We don't know just how far they want to go" in 
pursuing an effective interdistrict remedy. Moreover, he noted, a "partial basis" for his 
suit would be the "complicity" of both the Little Rock and Pulaski County school boards 
in the resegregation ofLRSD schools.35 The Arkansas Gazette heartily endorsed 
Walker's plans in an editorial. "The unacceptable alternative a few years hence would be 
system of resegregated public schools, virtually all black and lacking adequate public 
34 "Proposal for Balancing Children in Classroom By Race," LRSB, Regular Meeting, August 27, 
1981; Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983); Masem, 
"Resegregation: A Case Study of an Urban School District," 99-1 06; Mark Oswald, "Racial Grouping Plan 
for LR School District Held Unconstitutional: Board Member Doesn't Plan to Try Appeal," Arkansas 
Gazette, September 4, 1981, in Folder 16, Box 12, Subseries 8, Series 5, Bates Papers. 
35 "Walker to File Suit, Seek White Majority in LR School District," Arkansas Gazette, September 
4, 1981, 6A, in Folder 16, Box 12, Subseries 8, Series 5, Bates Papers. 
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support," the newspaper warned. "Too many in this community, black and white, have 
worked too hard and long through adversity and historic confrontation to achieve and 
preserve desegregated schools to let them face into a civic netherworld of 
resegregation. "36 
Even as the school board solicited proposals from attorneys on how to proceed 
with its own interdistrict lawsuit, it continued to consider proposals for an internal 
reorganization. Despite the assessment of outside experts that there was no "necessary 
consensus for a basic redesign of the city's plan," doubts about the legality of the options 
under discussion, and opposition from Superintendent Masem, the Biracial Advisory 
Committee, and black community leaders, the majority of the board believed that it 
needed to take immediate action to mitigate the effects of white flight while litigation 
worked its way through the courts. 37 
On April26, 1982, the school board adopted the Partial K-6 Plan, which 
reorganized elementary schools. The plan re-established some neighborhood schools, 
creating four elementary schools in black neighborhoods that were nearly 99% black. 
The concentration of 19% of the district's black students in these schools concurrently 
reduced the black student population in six other schools in white or integrated areas. 
This time, the school board hoped to circumvent the opprobrium of the federal courts and 
claimed that the plan was not motivated by a desire to appease white parents or recruit 
white students into the school system. Rather, they suggested that the plan was designed 
36 "Desegregation or Resegregation," Editorial, Arkansas Gazette, September 5, 1981, p. lOA. 
37 Masem, "Resegregation," 114, 136. 
245 
to "preserve" better racial balance and integration in the majority of the district's schools 
while the board pursued a long-term remedy.38 Nevertheless, despite official 
protestations to the contrary, at least one public school official admitted that after nearly 
three years of defeated school tax levies and the threat of insolvency, the measure was 
designed "to provide a few more carrots to those whites who feel public schools are vital 
to the viability of the community."39 
However, when John W. Walker and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund took the 
board to court to prevent implementation of the plan, the district's attorneys adopted the 
official position that the plan was an "affirmative step taken to minimize resegregation." 
The district argued that the board's adoption of the Partial K-6 plan was "preceded not by 
recalcitrant attempts to preserve a dual system, but by nine years of desegregation," and 
there was no evidence that the board intended to discriminate against black students. 
Again, the board suggested that court supervision of the district's desegregation plans was 
no longer even necessary. The choice facing the courts, the district argued, was the 
continuation of the 1973 Plan which "would create a racially isolated district" or the 
adoption ofthe Partial K-6 Plan which "would offer hope of maintaining quality 
integrated integration." For their part, the African American plaintiffs argued that the 
plan was unconstitutional because it resegregated four elementary schools and was "not 
consistent with the School Board's obligation to dismantle the dual school system in 
38 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Masem, "Resegregation," 131. 
39 Reginald Stuart, "Schools Try to Attract Whites by Easing Integration Efforts," New York Times, 
June 1, 1982, p. AI. 
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Little Rock."40 
Although the federal courts had rejected the school board's 65-35 reorganization 
plan as a "hurriedly conceived stopgap measure to appease white parents," Judge Overton 
found the school board's arguments in favor of the Partial K-6 Plan persuasive. 
Likewise, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the district's contention that the plan 
was not designed make the school district more attractive to whites and halt white flight, 
but rather to mitigate the effects of white flight and maintain a semblance of integration. 
The court held, "Although the possibility of white flight and ... resegregation cannot 
justify a school board's failure to comply with a court order to end segregation, it may be 
taken into account in an attempt to promote integration." Notably, this assertion 
seemingly ignored the fact that the Little Rock school district was still under court orders 
to end segregation and had never been declared unitary. The 8th Circuit justified its 
decision by noting that although 19% of black students in the district would be attending 
racially identifiable schools, all of the white students in the district would be attending 
fully integrated institutions. It insisted on measures of the plan that allowed black 
students to transfer to those integrated schools at their request with transportation 
provided by the school district. Moreover, despite the fact that Brown v. Board of 
Education had declared that segregation was inherently unequal, the court also required 
the board to monitor the schools to "ensure that equality is actually maintained" in the 
racially identifiable institutions. It also urged the school board to make additional 
4° Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Masem, "Resegregation," 143. 
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overtures to Pulaski County to establish a voluntary agreement to exchange and transfer 
students across district lines, to provide some integrated learning experiences for the 
students in the four all-black schools, and to adopt measures designed to reduce 
achievement gaps between black and white students. Nevertheless, although it offered no 
comment on the interdistrict case pending in the federal courts, the court of appeals 
upheld the plan as a temporary solution while the board pursued "long-range plans to 
ensure an integrated school system. "41 
Pursuing an Interdistrict Remedy 
Indeed, the Little Rock School District had formally filed a suit against the 
Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD), the North Little Rock School District 
(NLRSD), the State of Arkansas, and the State Board of Education on November 30, 
1982, charging that the defendants were responsible for the maintenance of a dual, 
racially segregated public school system in the county and calling for the reorganization 
or consolidation of the school districts with the assistance of the state.42 After a lengthy 
the trial, the Federal District Judge Henry Woods determined that PCSSD, NLRSD, and 
the state of Arkansas had "contributed to the continuing segregation of the Little Rock 
schools, and that an interdistrict remedy was appropriate. "43 The court issued two 
41 Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983). 
42 Maseru, "Resegregation: A Case Study of an Urban School District," 145. In doing so, the Little 
Rock school board hired civil rights lawyers to represent the district, some of whom had worked with 
Attorney John Walker, the long-standing representative of African American students in the Little Rock 
school litigation (Branton, "Little Rock Revisited," 269). 
43 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. I, 778 F.2d 404 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
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separate decisions. The first, released in April 1984, focused on the constitutional 
violations uncovered by the trial. The second, issued seven months later, focused on the 
appropriate court-ordered remedy. 
The Milliken decision had provided lower federal courts with clear guidelines on 
the burden of proof required to order an interdistrict remedy. The Supreme Court held: 
"Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by 
consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district 
remedy, it must be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district 
that produces a significant segregative effect in another district." As Judge Henry 
Woods later recalled, the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing by the Little 
Rock school district more than satisfied these requirements. He wrote, "LRSD 
demonstrated beyond all peradventure that the Housing Authorities, real estate operators, 
school board members in the defendant districts, and the State of Arkansas had all 
collaborated to produced a decided trend toward an all-black Little Rock School 
District. "44 
In Little Rock v. Pulaski County, the district court determined that Little Rock had 
been effectively defined "as the school district which provided educational opportunities 
for black students." In the first half of the twentieth century, the Little Rock School 
District maintained a fully accredited high school for black students. However, both 
Pulaski County and North Little Rock failed to do so. Many black students from the 
surrounding county and the rest of the state traveled to Little Rock to attend high school. 
44 Woods and Deere, "Reflections on the Little Rock School Case," 982. 
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Pulaski County even paid the tuition and transportation costs for African American pupils 
in its district to attend schools in the city. Judge Woods concluded, "As far as the 
education of blacks was concerned, school district boundaries in Pulaski County were 
ignored." Indeed, the state of Arkansas commissioned a study which determined that 
access to quality educational facilities in Little Rock, and their absence elsewhere, drew 
black families to the urban center from the county and the rest of the state.45 
After the Brown decision and the tumultuous Little Rock school desegregation 
crisis, the pace of desegregation in Little Rock and the adjacent districts evolved 
differently. While Little Rock began the process in 1957 and finally complied with 
district-wide desegregation in 1973, Pulaski County's trajectory was much different. The 
courts determined, "During the first two decades of tumultuous desegregation in LRSD, 
PCSSD schools remained segregated and free from the problems which accompanied 
state-resisted desegregation in Little Rock." A desegregation suit was not even initiated 
in the county until1968. Moreover, at the time of trail in 1983/84, the district court 
charged that Pulaski County had "failed to comply" with the desegregation decree ordered 
by the federal courts, and Judge Woods expressed his displeasure that many of the 
PCSSD Board of Education Members who testified "were not even aware of the contents 
of the decree." Consequently, in the early 1980s, "student assignments continue[ d) to be 
made on a racially discriminatory basis" and twenty-nine of the county's fifty-one schools 
were racially identifiable. The court also found that both PCSSD and NLRSD also 
45 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
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maintained segregation by classifying large percentages of their African American pupils 
as "educably mentally retarded" and tracking them into special education classes. Whites 
who wanted to flee desegregation in Little Rock, could find a safe haven in these adjacent 
districts. Indeed, the court found that Pulaski County's school sitings even encouraged 
white flight. For example, PCSSD built Fair High School (13% black) in Little Rock just 
outside of the LRSD's boundaries and only two miles from Parkview High School (56% 
black).46 
In Milliken, the Supreme Court had also stated that an interdistrict remedy would 
be appropriate in cases where district lines had been drawn or redrawn on the basis of 
race. The Eastern District Court of Arkansas found this type of constitutional violation in 
Pulaski County as well. The federal courts heard evidence that ''the state, the Little 
Rock Housing Authority, LRSD, and PCSSD cooperated in the development of a major 
all-black housing project which was intended to channel black residential development 
toward the far southeast boundaries of the City of Little Rock, away from white 
residential areas." In 1953, five hundred segregated public housing units were built in 
Granite Mountain on land located on the eastern side of the city in PCSSD. However, 
with the cooperation of state and local officials, and the passage of special legislation by 
the Arkansas legislature, this parcel of PCSSD was transferred to LRSD- the "only 
district capable of providing education" for the future residents. The court found that this 
decision had ongoing effects. As planned, many more segregated housing units were 
46 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 (81h 
Cir. 1985). See also Woods and Deere, "Reflections on the Little Rock School Case," 980-982. 
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constructed in this area as black neighborhoods which bordered on white residential areas 
were razed. In 1983, the area was "still an essentially segregated black housing area 
served by several schools which have overwhelmingly high black enrollments ranging 
from seventy-one percent to one hundred percent black." The court also heard evidence 
on the practice of"steering" black and white buyers in the private housing market.47 
The court also found that Pulaski County's refusal to deannex territory on the 
western side of the city following the implementation of district-wide desegregation in 
Little Rock racially suspect. By 1984, the City of Little Rock occupied ninety-one square 
miles while the school district served only fifty-three square miles. The district court 
determined, "Pulaski County Special School District's acts of freezing its boundaries to 
discontinue the practice of allowing City and Little Rock School District boundaries to 
remain coterminous springs from an unconstitutional racial motive." Moreover, Judge 
Woods noted, that this policy had significant "interdistrict effects" which impacted 
enrollment figures in Little Rock by as much as ten percent. Eight-seven percent of the 
nearly 5,000 students that lived in Little Rock but attended schools in Pulaski County 
were white. The courts concluded "that the boundaries between PCSSD and LRSD had 
been maintained to keep LRSD predominantly black and PCSSD predominantly white."48 
47 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. I, 778 F.2d 404 (81h 
Cir. 1985). See also Ben F. Johnson III, "After 1957: Resisting Integration in Little Rock," 263-264, 272-
273. Indeed, John Walker- attorney for the black plaintiffs- had personally challenged this residential 
segregation as early as 1965, when he moved his family to an all-white neighborhood. Walker's family was 
not only socially ostracized, but their property was also vandalized (Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 173-
174). 
48 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. I, 778 F.2d 404 (81h 
Cir. 1985). 
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The federal courts also found the state of Arkansas responsible for the interdistrict 
segregation in Pulaski County. As noted above, state officials were aware of the lack of 
accredited facilities for African American students in the county and its impact on 
settlement patterns but did nothing to improve educational opportunities for black 
students in Pulaski County or elsewhere. Its facilitation of the Granite Mountain transfer 
had substantial interdistrict effects. Moreover, in addition to Governor Faubus' infamous 
action to prevent the integration of Central High School, the state had implemented 
numerous segregation laws designed to impede desegregation in the schools. When 
Little Rock schools were closed in 1958-59 to prevent implementation of federal court 
orders, the state legislature enacted a statute authorizing the state to pay for the 
interdistrict transfer of students from desegregated schools in Little Rock to segregated 
public schools in surrounding areas. These transfers continued to be "excessively high" 
well into the mid-1960s. Even after the state had stopped resisting desegregation, it had 
never taken affirmative action to assist local districts in their desegregation efforts or 
sought federal aid for that purpose. 49 
The district court determined that the only long-term solution to these interdistrict 
violations was consolidation ofthe three school districts. It also ordered the 
establishment of a uniform millage rate, the elimination of discriminatory practices, and 
the creation of magnet schools to enhance educational opportunities in the area. The 
State Board of Education was ordered to help oversee this process and to provide funds to 
49 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 (8th 
Cir. 1985). See also "US Judge Requires Desegregation Plan for Little Rock Area," The New York Times, 
April 14, 1984,p. 12. 
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facilitate student transportation and other remedial programs. 50 Judge Woods insisted that 
the problems facing the Little Rock School District were so dire they could not "be 
avoided by equivocation or half measures." What was at stake in the case he believed, 
was "the collapse of support for public education."51 The defendants in the case 
immediately filed an appeal. 
As the case worked its way to the gth Circuit Court of Appeals, school 
administrators in the three districts began to meet to discuss the logistics of consolidation. 
Judge Woods also ordered all three communities to host public meetings to explain the 
court's decision and the interdistrict remedy to the public. The tone of these meetings 
were very different in the city of Little Rock and its surrounding suburbs. In Little Rock, 
Superintendent Ed Kelly met with two hundred black and white parents to explain why 
the case had been filed to prevent resegregation. Many of those present voiced support 
for consolidation but expressed concern that their children would be bused far across the 
county. School officials assured parents that the busing zones contemplated under the 
plan would be smaller than any of the three districts involved in the case. In contrast, in 
Pulaski County, Superintendent Lester placated parents who strongly objected to the 
consolidation order by assuring them that the school district was prepared to appeal the 
case all the way to the Supreme Court. According to reports, parental concerns about 
50 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. I, 778 F.2d 404 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
51 "Judge Says Others Added to Little Rock Bias," The New York Times, April14, 1984, p. 29. 
Woods believed that the 61/39 white-black ratio of the consolidated districts would "stabilize the district, 
stop white flight, and end segregation in the LRSD" (Woods and Deere, "Reflections on the Little Rock 
School Case," 983). 
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long-distance busing and student assignments went unanswered. Many of the parents 
present warned that they would send their children to private schools or to public 
institutions in adjacent counties if the consolidation order was implemented. 52 
Newspapers in the Little Rock region were split on the court's orders: the 
Arkansas Gazette supported Judge Wood's decision and the Arkansas Democrat opposed 
it. The controversy surrounding school consolidation also had an impact on local politics. 
Tommy Robinson, a former sheriff from Pulaski County, was elected to the House of 
Representatives on promises that he would introduce legislation to Congress designed to 
prevent federal courts from mandating consolidation. 53 When he followed through on his 
plans, the Arkansas Gazette dismissed his efforts, noting that the bill had been referred to 
the House Judiciary Committee where it would "most likely gather dust until the end of 
time" like other legislation designed to curb the authority of the judiciary. 54 Former 
Governor Frank White also used the issue to position himself in a bid for re-election 
against incumbent Bill Clinton in 1986. White warned that consolidation would result in 
confusion and "mass exodus" of students from the public schools. He took a position 
similar to that of his "moderate" predecessors in 1957, asking for compliance with the 
federal court order but calling on parents "to speak up for their children" and make their 
52 "School Consolidation," Arkansas Gazette, January 29, 1985. 
53 Roy Reed, "Little Rock a Symbol Again: The Resegregation of Schools," The New York Times, 
March 23, 1985, p. 1. 
54 "Legislation for Forgetting," Editorial, Arkansas Gazette, January 15, 1985. 
255 
opposition known. 55 
Indeed, White joined a delegation of representatives from the defendant school 
districts who asked the Justice Department officials to file an amicus curiae brief in 
support of their legal position. 56 The Reagan Administration opposed many mandatory 
desegregation measures, including busing, and favored "parental choice" mechanisms 
such as voluntary student transfers, magnet schools, selective school closings, and 
"modest" adjustments to attendance zones. However, even as the administration touted 
the promise of magnets, it slashed federal fmancing for them by 94% in its first term. 57 
According to Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights William Bradford Reynolds, the 
federal government's responsibility in attacking segregation was limited to removing 
"remaining state-enforced racial barriers to open student enrollment." While these kinds 
of mechanisms had been dismissed by federal courts as inadequate in and of themselves 
as early as 1968, Reagan administration officials assured the public that they were 
dedicated to eliminating "disparities in the tangible components of education" that 
remained between predominantly white and predominantly black schools. This led at 
least one legal scholar to conclude that the administration sought "no less than a 
relitigation of Brown v. Board of Education."58 Indeed, under the Reagan administration 
55 James Scudder, "White, Kelly Give Opposite Views on Consolidation," Arkansas Gazette, 
January 11, 1985. 
56 "Leadership and Consolidation," Editorial, Arkansas Gazette, January 1, 1985. 
57 Jim Bencivenga, "The landmark desegregation ruling and its 30-year legacy," Christian Science 
Monitor, May 11, 1984, p. 21. 
58 Drew S. Days III, "Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights," 
Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Law Review 19, no. 2 (1984): 468-472. 
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the Justice Department did not file additional desegregation lawsuits. Instead, the civil 
rights division filed briefs in support of the some of the same school districts the 
government had formerly sued for intentional segregation, approving their appeals to 
return to racially identifiable neighborhood schools. 59 
Unsurprisingly, the Justice Department agreed to intervene in Little Rock v. 
Pulaski County. However, given the strength of the evidence, it did not challenge the 
court's findings. Instead, government officials argued that consolidation would be 
"disastrous" for the area's schools and that the proposed remedy exceeded the scope of 
the constitutional violation.60 Ultimately, based on a narrow reading of Milliken, the 8th 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this aspect of the Justice Department's position. 
On November 7, 1985, the appeals court sustained the district court's fmdings of 
fact but determined that consolidation was not the "only remedy that would effectively 
cure the interdistrict violations." While the court of appeals concurred that consolidation 
would be a "cost-effective and efficient method of desegregating the three school 
districts," it held that courts could not require consolidation and the dissolution of school 
district boundaries unless there were no other alternatives that would be sufficient. In its 
view, other "less intrusive" remedial measures were "better designed to restore the 
victims of segregation in the Pulaski County Schools to the position they would have 
59 Or:field, "Turning Back to Segregation," 17-18. 
60 "Justice Enters Rights Case," The Washington Post, March 5, 1985, p. A13; Roy Reed, "Little 
Rock a Symbol Again: The Resegregation of Schools," The New York Times, March 23, 1985. See also 
editorial on Justice Department intervention in the case, Arkansas Gazette, March 7, 1985. 
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occupied absent discriminatory conduct."61 
On remand, the court of appeals provided unusually specific instructions for 
remedying the constitutional violations uncovered in Pulaski County.62 For example, the 
court of appeals asked Judge Woods to readjust the district boundary lines, making the 
Little Rock school district boundaries coterminous with the city boundaries and 
incorporating the Granite Mountain area back into the PCSSD. Pulaski County and 
North Little Rock school districts were ordered to take appropriate intradistrict action to 
eliminate all vestiges of segregation within their boundaries, making them less attractive 
to whites fleeing similar measures in the Little Rock School District. All of the districts 
were ordered to permit voluntary majority-to-minority student transfers within and across 
boundary lines, with transportation costs to be paid by the state of Arkansas. To make 
such transfers more attractive the parties were ordered to open interdistrict magnet 
schools open to all students in the region. All three school districts were directed to 
provide compensatory and remedial educational programs to black students, and the Little 
Rock school district was told to take concrete steps to improve the quality of any 
remaining racially identifiable schools in its system. Finally, the State Board of 
Education was directed to monitor this process, providing funds for transportation, 
61 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 778 F .2d 404 (8th 
Cir. 1985). The appeals court judges who dissented from this decision were even were even more 
conservative in their assessment of the nature and scope of the interdistrict violations in this case and the 
extent of the remedy the courts should permit. See also Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County 
Special School District No. 1, 833 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1988). 
62 As Judge Woods characterized the 8th Circuit's decision- "instead of remanding the case for the 
district to determine an appropriate remedy, the remedy issued directly from the appellate court" (Woods 
and Deere, "Reflections on the Little Rock School Case," 983). 
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establishing and maintaining the interdistrict magnet schools, the compensatory and 
remedial education programs for black students in the region, and quality education 
programs in racially identifiable schools in LRSD.63 
The Little Rock School District did not appeal this decision to the Supreme 
Court.64 However, the State of Arkansas appealed the portion of the decision that found 
the state liable for fmancing many of the interdistrict educational programs. As promised, 
Pulaski County also appealed to the court of last resort. The school district challenged 
the Court of Appeals ability to adequately "tailor" a desegregation remedy- particularly 
boundary changes- based on "conjecture as to possible demographic effects" of past 
actions without "any specific evidence of actual effects."65 The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari without comment and the 8th Circuit's limited interdistrict remedy became the 
"law of the case" governing desegregation in the three school districts. 66 
Impact of the Remedy and Settlement Agreements 
Even the 8th Circuit's limited interdistrict remedy had the potential to bring 6,750 
new students into the Little Rock School District, 60% of whom were white. However, 
many school district officials were pessimistic about whether these children would enroll 
and stay in the city's public institutions. According to reports, Former Superintendent 
63 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 (8th 
Cir. 1985); Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 833 F.2d 112 (8th 
Cir. 1988). 
64 Robert Brown has observed, "That refusal by the district is said to have angered Judge Woods 
and caused problems between the district and the Judge in the future court proceedings" (Brown, The 
Second Crisis of Little Rock, 9). 
65 Masem, "Resegregation,"l55. 
66 "Arkansas School Ruling Left in Tact," Washington Post, June 17, 1986, p. AlO. 
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Paul Masem characterized the court's decree as a "band-aid measure that would do little 
to reverse the demographic trends toward an all-black district." Others also agreed that 
the remedy did not go far enough. The school board's first black president, Willie D. 
Hamilton, expressed concerns that without consolidation of the three districts, LRSD 
would be facing the same problems again within a few years.67 
Nevertheless, when Little Rock put its new desegregation plan in place for the 
1986-87 school year, referred to as "Controlled Choice," Superintendent Ed Kelly and the 
school board refused to capitulate to the demands of the city's white patrons. The 
computer-based assignment system did not privilege a student's residential location in 
their initial school assignment. Parents were able to request a transfer to an alternative 
school of their choice but the request would not be granted unless it enhanced the 
school's diversity.68 In his report on the state of desegregation in the city's schools on 
the thirtieth anniversary of the crisis, Robert L. Brown noted, 
The overriding concept embodied in the plan ... was equity, that is, equal 
access to quality education. Racial percentages in all grades would be 
strictly followed. There would be no bastions of excellence in the form of 
programs, faculty, or principals at any one school such as Central High 
School. There would be no favoritism shown to students living in any 
particular area of the city. The underlying message was that the white 
power structure would no longer govern the public schools.69 
Brown found that many whites in the district became "disenchanted" when the "school 
67 Ronald Smothers, "At Little Rock, 30 Years Later: Starting Over," The New York Times, 
September 27, 1987, p. 1; Robert Brown, The Second Crisis of Little Rock, 9. 
68 David Gene Vinzant, "Little Rock's Long Crisis: Schools and Race in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
1863-2009," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arkansas (May 2010), 275-278. 
69 Brown, The Second Crisis of Little Rock, 11; Robert L. Brown, "The Third Little Rock Crisis," 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 65, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 39-44. 
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district refused to bargain with or cater to white patrons in exchange for keeping their 
children in the public schools." He observed, "As a diminishing quantity whites were 
used to having their way," but the school district no longer accommodated them.70 
Even with this commitment to provide equal and integrated access to quality 
education in all its institutions, the district found it difficult to prevent the percentage of 
black students at some schools from drifting higher and higher. Many white parents 
categorically refused to send their children to predominantly black schools and enrolled 
their children elsewhere. As individual educational plants became racially identifiable, 
the school board refused to let the remaining white children transfer to other non-magnet 
or magnet schools. Some white parents accused the district of holding their children 
"hostage."71 In the face of this persistent hostility and unfavorable court decisions, the 
school district's stance began to crumble within a few years. 
For example, the interdistrict magnet schools required by the courts caused 
serious problems for the district. As designed by the courts, the magnets were meant to 
maintain a 50/50 black/white ratio with seats reserved for students from all three districts. 
However, too few white students from suburban Pulaski County or North Little Rock 
applied to attend the institutions. Despite the fact that white parents in Little Rock 
threatened to remove their children from the system if they could not attend the magnets, 
the district was reluctant to fill the vacancies with white students from LRSD. Their 
transfers would increase the percentages of black students in several non-magnets above 
70 Brown, The Second Crisis of Little Rock, 13-14; Brown, "The Third Little Rock Crisis," 39-44. 
71 Ibid. 
261 
80%. The Little Rock school district also argued that if it filled the seats with its own 
students, the magnets would lose their "interdistrict" character. Nevertheless, the 8th 
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the school district to fill the vacancies.72 Consequently, 
by the next school year 17% of white children emolled in Little Rock's non-magnet 
schools had either transferred to the interdistrict magnets or left the system for private 
schools.73 
Given ongoing white flight from the district and the limitations of the interdistrict 
remedy applied by the courts, some in Little Rock began to voice the opinion that it was 
time for the school district to focus its attention on providing students with "quality 
education" and "compensatory" programs designed to ameliorate the effects of 
resegregation.74 If white parents were "disenchanted" with Little Rock's desegregation 
efforts, African American parents were no less so. Black school patrons had long born a 
disproportionate share of the burden of desegregation. The closure of school plants in the 
eastern part of the city meant that African American children were more likely to be 
bused long distances at young ages to attend predominantly black schools in other parts of 
the city. Moreover, the school district's long history of catering to the demands of white 
parents, reserving seats for white students, the low percentages of black students in 
honors courses, and disparities in student discipline, led many black parents to conclude 
that their children would fare better in _neighborhood schools staffed with black principals 
72 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 833 F.2d 112 (81h 
Cir. 1988). 
73 Brown, The Second Crisis of Little Rock, 13-14. 
74 Ibid, 10. 
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and teachers. In 1987, Department of Human Services Deputy Director Thedford Collins 
reported, "The notion that neighborhood schools are not all bad is growing [among 
African Americans]." Although he acknowledged "there was a time when that would 
have been an affront to the Movement," he sensed "a real resurgence of separatism."75 
The rising currency of this approach to the district's problems was reflected in the 
"settlement plans" submitted to the courts in 1988 and 1989 by the Little Rock, Pulaski 
County, and North Little Rock school districts in the interdistrict lawsuit. Each school 
district submitted an intradistrict desegregation plan and signed onto an interdistrict 
agreement. The interdistrict plan continued to rely on voluntary student transfers across 
boundary lines to interdistrict schools. Little Rock's long-range "desegregation" plan 
designated 8 ofthe district's 31 non-magnet schools as all-black "incentive schools." The 
"incentive schools" would receive twice as much funding as other schools in the system 
and would provide compensatory education programs. The remaining schools were 
identified as "elementary academies" that would be racially balanced. Under the plan, 
sold as "controlled choice," white students were permitted to transfer to incentive schools 
if they desired, and black students could opt to attend one of the elementary academies. 
This arrangement was facilitated by the state of Arkansas' agreement to settle its 
financial liability to the district for over one hundred million dollars. 76 
75 Brown, The Second Crisis of Little Rock, 14. See also "Is LRSD Striving for Schools Without 
Identity?" editorial, Arkansas State Press, September 6, 1987, p. 4; Herbert H. Denton, "Problems of Race 
Persist for Schools In Little Rock," Washington Post, August 30, 1982, p. AI; Roy Reed, "Little Rock a 
Symbol Again: The Resegregation of Schools," The New York Times, March 23, 1985, p. I. 
76 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. I, 921 F.2d 1371 (81h 
Circ. 1990). 
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The Eastern District Court of Arkansas rejected the settlement agreements, finding 
them "facially unconstitutional" and well outside of the bounds of the court's mandate to 
dismantle desegregation "root and branch." The district judge observed that nearly one-
fourth of the elementary schools in the Little Rock school district would be all-black 
"incentive schools." Notably, this included all of the historically black elementary 
schools on the eastern side of the city. Consequently, while black children would be 
bused to the west side of the city, virtually none of their white counterparts would be 
bused to the predominantly black section of Little Rock. While the court made note of 
the "double-funding" promised to the incentive schools, it was concerned that the district 
made no effort to explain how the extra money would be spent. 77 In Judge Henry Woods 
view, although black students could opt to attend an integrated elementary academy under 
LRSD's proposed plan, this was little more than a reiteration of the "freedom-of-choice" 
plans ofthe 1960s. However, he observed that instead of relying on the threat of violence 
or social ostracization to keep black students in historically black schools, the district now 
offered "a little extra encouragement to stay at home." The promise of double-funding 
and the burden of busing would effectively discourage African American pupils from 
choosing integrated education. 78 
However, in 1990, the gth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Woods' decision 
and approved the settlement plans. According to the appeals court, since the settlement 
77 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371 (81h 
Circ. 1990); Woods and Deere, "Reflections on the Little Rock School Case," 992. 
78 Woods and Deere, "Reflections on the Little Rock School Case," 993. 
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plans had been agreed to by all of the parties including the African American plaintiffs in 
Little Rock, their local counsel, and the NAACP Legal Education and Defense Fund, the 
agreements should be "hospitably" received. Although the judges noted that the courts 
should not approve a plan "which is either manifestly unworkable or plainly 
unconstitutional," they asserted that the plans presented were "reasonable, good-faith 
efforts to solve seemingly intractable problems, efforts involving give and take on the part 
of all concerned." Although a "perfect" desegregation plan would not contain all-black 
schools, the Constitution merely required districts to "achieve integration to the 
maximum practicable extent." In order for majority black districts to maintain some well 
integrated schools, it was "necessary to tolerate a small number of all-black schools."79 
Therefore, the court of appeals approved the plan, but warned the district that its 
commitment to provide double funding to the incentive schools and the establishment of 
an independent Office of Desegregation Monitoring to make sure that the district honored 
its commitments were "crucial" in its holding that the plans were not unconstitutional. 
The 8th Circuit expressed optimism that the settlement plans would "lead to a period of 
calm ... perhaps even bring the parties a happy issue out of all of their afflictions." At the, 
very least, the court hoped the decision would enable the districts to "devote more energy 
to education, and less to litigation."80 However, from his seat on the bench of the Eastern 
79 This decision angered Judge Henry Woods who felt that the gth Circuit Court of Appeals was 
advancing a theory that '"constitutionality' is a floating concept, and that determination of the 
constitutionality of remedies depends on whether the case is settled or litigated" (Woods and Deere, 
"Reflection on the Little Rock School Case," 997-1002. 
80 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th 
Circ. 1990). 
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District Court, Judge Henry Woods was less optimistic. He worried that the districts 
would once again fail to fulfill their promises and responsibilities under the settlement 
agreements. "The problem with assuming the districts will fulfill their 'solemn 
undertakings,"' he warned, "is that the black children bear all of the risk."81 
Clearly, the Little Rock school district continued to struggle with the legacy of 
generations of segregation and discrimination throughout the 1980s. Nevertheless, the 
narrative breach that had opened in public discussions about school desegregation in the 
1970s continued to persist- and even widened- during the following decade. Although 
racial diversity: in the district was threatened by white flight, and school officials pursued 
an interdistrict remedy by arguing in court that Greater Little Rock's racial politics and 
housing patterns continued to be shaped by Jim Crow era practices and statutes, they 
distanced themselves from this legacy. By suing PCSSD, NRLSD, and the State of 
Arkansas for interdistrict relief, the Little Rock school district accused others of fostering 
and maintaining racial discrimination but did not accept its own full measure of 
responsibility. 
This distance enabled school board members and district attorneys to argue that 
proposals put before the courts during the 1980s that knowingly created racially 
identifiable schools in historically black neighborhoods were not a return to the 
segregated practices of the past. Although many black school patrons read these 
developments as the natural byproduct of the school district's long-standing 
preoccupation with appeasing white parents and their children at the expense of their 
81 Woods and Deere, "Reflections on the Little Rock School Case," 1004. 
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African American counterparts, district officials seemed to believe that a decade of 
compliance with court-ordered busing and their own determination to pursue an 
interdistrict remedy in the courts inoculated them against such charges. Indeed, they 
argued that the creation of virtually all-black "incentive schools" and compensatory 
education programs designed to make these separate institutions "more equal" were an 
indication of their commitment to integration and racial diversity. 
Little Rock, one~ labeled "a city filled with hate," had been held up as a model of 
success in the 1970s. This local story of achievement would not be abandoned willingly, 
and was easily sutured into an emerging national narrative of progress, in which the 
iconic conflicts of the civil rights movement prompted the nation to take action and pass 
corrective legislation that purportedly brought the nation's practices in line with its 
promises. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, a nation on the cusp of the Reagan 
revolution appeared ready to declare the civil rights turbulence of the 1950s and 1960s a 
relic of the distant past. This general trend was clearly evident in Arkansas' capital as 
well, even when interfered with the city's ability to fully come to terms with the 
circumstances it faced in its own schools. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
"LET YOUR MODERATION BE KNOWN": 
FIRST-HAND HISTORY, MEMOIR, AND MEDIATED MEMORY 
By the eve of its 25th anniversary, the Little Rock school desegregation crisis had 
been officially declared history. As noted in Chapter Four, the narrative breach between 
past and present that had surfaced in the 1970s created a new market and new appetites 
for retrospective accounts of the events of 1957. After a long hiatus, several first-person 
accounts of the crisis were published and broadcast in 1980-81. Unsurprisingly, the 
narratives that received the most acclaim in Little Rock were those that supported the 
contention that the city had always contained more progressive and moderate elements 
than its critics had given it credit for. However, even these narratives were not whole-
heartedly embraced by white or black residents of Little Rock. Their appearance 
provoked controversy about how the history of the crisis should be told, by whom, and to 
what end. In Little Rock, these heated debates were informed by the city's desire to 
reclaim its reputation as a progressive southern city, residual resentment of mediated 
interpretations of the crisis in 1957, and the prerogatives of the culture industries that 
circulated and distributed these accounts. 
The three accounts that provoked the most conversation in Arkansas were written 
by Governor Orval Faubus, Congressman Brooks Hays, and Central High Vice Principal 
Elizabeth Huckaby. To one degree or another, all three defmed themselves as "southern 
moderates" during 1957. The slipperiness of this term was evident in the during the 
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school desegregation crisis itself, and continued to be thirty years later. Southern 
moderates generally defined their views against the "extremism" of "die-hard" 
segregationists or "radical" integrationists. While they did not endorse the Supreme 
Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision or the principle of integration, they did 
speak out in defense of the "rule of law" and the importance of preserving public 
education. In his analysis of Little Rock's racial politics during the school desegregation 
crisis, Irving J. Spitzberg, Jr. noted that referring to oneself as a "moderate" was a 
"political expedient" in 1957. "The term 'Moderate' as a description of a person's views 
concerning race relations is opaque," he observed. "People who claimed that description 
defined it in as many different ways as there were people who claimed it." In his 
interviews with Little Rock's leadership, this term was defined so vaguely that he 
concluded it could only be applied as a ''temporal and temporary label."1 Nevertheless, 
most moderates typically promoted some form of tokenism that would enable southern 
whites to minimize and maintain control over the pace of school desegregation. In 
taking this position, moderates were accused by both segregationists and integrationists of 
supporting their opposition. 2 
By the 1980s, it was imprecision of the term "southern moderate" that allowed 
these individuals to claim their place in the annals of civil rights history. Even if they had 
1 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 27, 119-120, 168. 
2 Caldwell, John Tyler, "A Southern Moderate In Action," The Virginia Quarterly Review 35, no 
.3 (Sunnner 1959): 481-482. In relation to the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, David L. Chappell 
has suggested that the stance of southern moderates is most clearly defined not by their motives (support or 
opposition to desegregation) but rather by their public stance in support of the rule oflaw (David L. 
Chappell, "Diversity with a Racial Group: White People in Little Rock, 1957-1959," Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly 66, no. 2 [Sunnner 2007]: 183). 
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defmed themselves a "segregationists" in the 1950s, some moderates were able to 
capitalize on the accusations that they were "integrationists" thirty years later as evidence 
that they had stood on the right side of history. In Little Rock, it became increasingly 
popular to argue that white moderates, particularly business and civic leaders, had played 
an important role in resolving the Little Rock crisis and moving the city beyond racial 
stalemate in the years that followed 1957-59. 
However, while imprecise, even the term "southern moderate" was bounded by 
some limitations. The ability ofFaubus, Hays, and Huckaby to claim this label was 
mediated by several factors, including their historical reputation and the receptiveness of 
their audience. But it was also shaped by the willingness of various cultural gatekeepers-
newspaper editors, book publishers, documentary producers, screenwriters, and network 
broadcasters- to underwrite their accounts. In this context, the political memoir of 
Governor Orval Faubus, which attempted to justify his decision to block the integration 
of Central High School, was dismissed and derided as poorly-written and self-serving. 
The man who was once the most powerful political figure in the state of Arkansas was 
forced to self-publish his autobiographical account of the events of 1957. However, the 
retrospective accounts of other southern whites, like Congressman Brooks Hays who tried 
to broker a political solution to the crisis, and school administrator Elizabeth Huckaby 
who struggled to keep Central High School open and operative during a turbulent school 
year, were relatively well received and widely circulated as the eyewitness accounts of 
"good people" who tried to do the right thing under difficult circumstances. All the same, 
at times, even Hays and Huckaby faced criticism that their narratives focused too much 
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attention on "embarrassing" events, and that the depiction of their heroism and the 
definition of their "moderation" against other elements of the city's population came at 
the expense ofthe majority of the citizens ofLittle Rock. 
Orval Faubus: "I Was the Victim of a Circumstance" 
Despite the reputation that former Arkansas Governor Orval Eugene Faubus 
earned for himself when he stationed the National Guard around Little Rock Central High 
School, he had been considered an economic progressive and a moderate on racial issues 
during the frrst three years of his tenure. However, his public image underwent a 
dramatic transformation in the fall of 1957. In the city of Little Rock itself, few believed 
the governor had ~een motivated by a deeply ingrained racism or even a strong 
commitment to states' rights. Nevertheless, Faubus was branded as a political 
opportunist and a demagogue who played upon the strong emotions surrounding school 
integration in order to secure a virtually unprecedented third term in office. In the public 
memory of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, Faubus did not embody the heroic 
white southern moderate who stood up for what was right. Rather, he was the canny 
politician, manipulating events behind-the-scenes to serve his own ends with little or no 
regard for the broader consequences of his actions. 
Over the last third of his life, in the midst of financial insecurity, a troubled family 
life, and several unsuccessful attempts to regain office, Orval Faubus dedicated himself to 
reshaping his historical reputation. He tried to define himself and the position he staked 
out in 1957 in relation to what he perceived to be "extremist" elements in his state. Until 
his death in 1994, the former governor insisted that he had not deployed the National 
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Guard in defiance of the federal court order to integrate Central High School. Instead, he 
contended that he had acted to "preserve the peace" and prevent violence, and to maintain 
the appropriate balance of power between state and federal governments. He granted 
hundreds of interviews to journalists, historians, sociologists, political scientists, and 
other interested citizens in an attempt to recast his legacy, bringing his considerable 
charm and skills as a politician to this project. For example, his biographer Roy Reed had 
worked for two decidedly anti-Faubus publications during his career as a journalist: the 
Arkansas Gazette and The New York Times. Reed admitted to harboring a "lingering 
antagonism" toward the former governor, but reported that Faubus was "unfailingly civil, 
friendly, and, within the constraints we both understood, helpful" during the seventy-
seven interviews he recorded with his subject.3 Washington Post staff writer Paul 
Henderickson reflected on his own response to Faubus' appeal as the governor worked 
tirelessly at the "impossible task of revising his page in history." As he spoke with 
Faubus, Henderickson felt himself sliding into sympathy with the ailing politician. 
"What you have to watch out for is the charm," the reporter warned. "It'll snake up your 
leg, worm into your notebook. First thing you know you're liking the old guy, feeling 
sorry for the old guy, seated here with a throw-pillow behind his head in his modest living 
room in his pleasant subdivision home on the edge of this little mid-state college town." 
Those who spoke with him found it hard to remember that the leather governor's chair 
3 Rend erickson, Paul, "Orval Faubus and the Shadow of History; In the Era of a Another 
Arkansan, the Ailing Former Governor Strives to Stave Off a Segregationist Legacy," Washington Post, 
January 25, 1993, p. Bl. See also Roy Reed, Faubus: The Life and Times of an American Prodigal 
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1997), vii. 
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that symbolized twelve years of control over Arkansas politics sat in the adjacent room.4 
In addition to granting interviews, Faubus also spent innumerable hours writing 
and gathering material for his political memoirs Down From the Hills I (1980) & II 
(1985). The former governor hoped that his first-person account would effectively 
counter the analyses of his actions that had been penned and promoted by his enemies. "I 
must get some writing done as I am now trying to do," he reflected in 1973. "It would be 
tragic for me and for the history of the period in which I served as governor, if the 
principal source of material for historians and future studies should be mainly newspaper 
files such as the Arkansas Gazette. "5 Faubus' account took the form of an apologia, a 
form of autobiographical writing meant "to vindicate one's own beliefs and actions, often 
in the face of official censure or public controversy." As James Goodwin has noted, "The 
essential rationale of an apology is that the writer, in explaining the origins of ideas and 
opinions behind actions, will rectify inaccurate and unfair judgement over his or her 
conduct. "6 
In order to convince skeptics, and overturn accepted wisdom, Faubus constructed 
an unusual text. His first volume, Down .from the Hills, only addressed his first four 
years in office (1954-1958) but it exceeded 500 pages. As ifhe wanted to overwhelm his 
4 Henderickson, Paul, "Orval Faubus and the Shadow of History; In the Era of a Another 
Arkansan, the Ailing Former Governor Strives to Stave Off a Segregationist Legacy," Washington Post, 
January 25, 1993, p. Bl. 
5 Orval Eugene Faubus to O.R. Baldwin, Pastor, North Little Rock, May 31, 1973, in Folder 5, 
Box 13, Series 2, Orval Eugene Faubus Addendum (Faubus Addendum), Special Collections, University of 
Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. 
6 James Goodwin, Autobiography: The Self Made Text (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993), 5. 
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opposition, Faubus provided details on every major piece of legislation, political 
appointment, and behind-the-scenes development that marked the beginning of his 
administration. He interspersed his own account with hundreds of editorials, news 
stories, and political cartoons meant to reinforce his interpretation of events. In adopting 
this format, Faubus engaged directly with the media that had shaped his image by offering 
commentary on favorable and unfavorable press coverage. Predictably, he praised the 
journalists and publications that had supported his positions and attacked the credibility 
of those who had criticized him. As one reviewer observed, reading the text was "rather 
like thumbing through a scrapbook, while the former governor recalls events and spins 
yarns over a cup of coffee."7 
Down From the Hills offered few new revelations, but it underscored the main 
lines ofFaubus' defense as he strove to correct what he believed were distortions in the 
historical record. A large portion of his first volume was dedicated to explaining and 
justifying his actions during the most controversial episode in his career- the 1957 Little 
Rock school desegregation crisis. In his memoir, he elaborated on arguments he had 
made elsewhere in his writings, public statements, and oral history interviews. 
First and foremost, the former governor adamantly rejected the contention that he 
was a racist or an opportunist exploiting the issue of race for political gain. Rather, he 
argued, he was a progressive governor who had taken a moderate stance on integration in 
the years leading up to the school desegregation crisis. Faubus believed that the 
7 Jon Kennedy, Jon, "Much to Say: Faubus book lacks polish, but anecdotes worthwhile," 
Arkansas Democrat, January 22, 1981 in Folder 2, Box 13, Series 2, Faubus Addendwn. 
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unrelenting focus on events in Little Rock had obscured his political accomplishments as 
Arkansas' six-term governor. He insisted, "I was the most progressive governor in the 
South, perhaps in the nation, but this goes largely unnoticed in the publicity of the school 
crisis."8 In his memoir, Faubus cited the progress the state had made in the field of race 
relations during the first three years of his term. He pointed to the successful 
desegregation of colleges, universities, secondary and elementary schools during his 
tenure to emphasize that he did not intervene when communities or institutions chose 
integrate voluntarily, peacefully and without the publicity that would attract the attention 
of segregationists.9 When asked to explain his intervention in Little Rock, this preamble 
was meant to demonstrate that he had been forced to intervene due to developments not 
of his own making. 
Faubus wanted to defuse the suggestion that he had deliberately cultivated the 
desegregation crisis to create a politically profitable issue. In contrast to Arkansas 
Gazette editor Harry Ashmore's assertion that the events in Little Rock were "The Crisis 
Mr. Faubus Made," the former governor insisted he "didn't consider [the crisis] to be any 
8 The former governor tried to direct attention to his legacy by calling attention to "the amazing 
progress ... made in many fields" during his tenure, such as the creation of schools for disabled, the 
development of state parks, prison reform, the extension of medical assistance to those on welfare, the 
creation of a state retirement system, industrial development, and improvements in the field of education 
which enabled every school in Arkansas to remain open for a full nine-month term ("Questions to former 
Governor Faubus by a student on the Central High School Crisis," and Orval Eugene Faubus, The Faubus 
Years, January 11, 1955 to January 10, 1967: Progress and Improvement and Little Rock Central High 
School Crisis (N.p., 1991), p. 25, in Folder 5, Box 14, Series 2, Faubus Addendum. 
9 "Questions to former Governor Faubus by a student on the Central High School Crisis" and 
Faubus, The Faubus Years, January 11, 1955 to January 10, 1967: Progress and Improvement and Little 
Rock Central High School Crisis, 21, in Faubus Addendum. "Reminiscences of Orval Eugene Faubus," 
interview by John Luter, Eisenhower Administration Project, transcript, 1971, Oral History Research 
Office, Columbia University, New York. 
275 
part of my making." The events as they unfolded, he said, were "not my fault."1° Faubus 
maintained the he was the victim of a smear campaign, led by editors at the Arkansas 
Gazette, designed to tarnish his public image. The Gazette attempted to make him the 
scapegoat for the entire affair because he declined to accept their "friendly advice" and 
refused bow to their "overweening desire to dictate the decisions and polices of state 
government." Consequently, Faubus claimed that Ashmore had actively worked to 
"indoctrinate" members of the visiting press against him at the Little Rock Press Club 
where both the "whiskey and the conversation" flowed freely. 11 
In his memoir, Orval Faubus argued that Little Rock became a battleground in the 
arena of school desegregation long before he intervened. The city had become the "focal 
point of contest" between two opposing forces due to the irresponsible actions of school 
authorities and the "little band of white integrationists" who supported them. 
Superintendent of Schools Virgil Blossom, the school board, Congressman Brooks Hays, 
and Arkansas Gazette Editor Harry Ashmore, hoped to become "instant celebrities" and 
"overnight heroes" when Little Rock successfully desegregated. Faubus suggested that 
these men hoped "to receive credit and praise for a plan and an accomplishment that had 
10 "Reminiscences of Orval Eugene Faubus." 
11 Faubus, Down From the Hills (Little Rock: Democrat Lithographing & Printing Press, 1980), 
218, 246. Indeed, in her recent book Turn Away Thy Son, historian Elizabeth Jacoway has concurred with 
these conclusions, suggesting that Ashmore's "strategic placement as an expert at the heart of the action" 
has unduly influenced journalists and scholars for the last fifty years. In her view, the editor placed the 
blame for the crisis squarely on the governor's shoulders, while failing to point the finger at the anemic 
actions of moderates and the wide-spread and irrational fear of"race-mixing" in Little Rock's population. 
Jacoway contends that Ashmore formed his interpretation of events out of his ''preconceived theories about 
the sources of resistance to desegregation" and was misinformed about the extent of local resistance to 
desegregation (Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 27). For a more positive assessment of Ashmore's influence 
see Roberts andKlibanoff, The Race Beat, 43-60, 144,159,165,170-173. 
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been achieved by no others." Instead of accomplishing integration quietly, this fanfare 
attracted the attention of segregationists.12 Faubus recalled, "The determination among 
them grew that if the plan was to be a model for other areas and the South, they would 
bend every effort to make it a model their way."13 
Faubus' claim that he intervened in the 1957 crisis to prevent violence and a clash 
between these "opposing forces" has been challenged by skeptics since the day he placed 
the Arkansas National Guard around Central High School. Critics claim that there was 
no sign of violent resistance to the court-approved desegregation plan until the Governor 
himself suggested that there might be during his testimony in court and in televised 
speeches. For his part, Faubus insisted he deployed the Guard based on legitimate 
evidence that violence was imminent. Indeed, the governor contended that his primary 
source of information was Superintendent Blossom himself. 14 For those who suggested 
that Faubus had acted precipitously or that there would have been no difficulty if he had 
not escalated the situation, the former governor maintained that "subsequent events" and 
the violence that broke out after he was forced to remove the Guard "completely 
disproved this theory." In his writing, Faubus also grimly pointed to the racial riots and 
violence that occurred in other American cities in the years that followed. In Little Rock, 
12 Faubus, The Faubus Years, in Faubus Addendum. See also "Reminiscences of Orval Eugene 
Faubus"; Faubus, Down From the Hills, 196. 
13 Faubus, Down From the Hills, 256. See also "Reminiscences of Orval Eugene Faubus." Numan 
V. Bartley addresses Faubus' reaction to the clash between these two opposing forces in "Looking Back at 
Little Rock," reprint, Arkansas Historical Quarterly 66, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 112-124. 
14 Faubus, Down From the Hills, 197,201-203. See also "Reminiscences of Orval Eugene 
Faubus"; Bartley, "Looking Back at Little Rock," 119. 
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he said, 
there was no property damage, no one was injured sufficiently to be 
hospitalized and no one was killed. Contrast that record with the racial 
riots which followed in more than 200 American cities, none of them in 
Arkansas, in which many lives were lost, thousands were injured and 
property damage ranged into the millions of dollars, and Little Rock and 
Arkansas come out remarkably well. 
In his own estimation, his use of the National Guard created a "calm and peaceable" 
situation in the early days of September. 15 
Faubus rejected the contention that he could have prevented violence and 
protected the constitutional rights of the black students by placing the Guard around the 
school to quash any resistance to the court order. The former governor suggested that it 
would not have been possible to prevent every die-hard segregationist from venting their 
anger if the Little Rock Nine were admitted to Central High. 16 He contended that 
determined segregationists would only "heed my pleas and the pleas of others to remain 
non-violent in their activity" if they were "convinced that the battle was being fought by 
their leaders with determination and sincerity" through other channels. 17 Therefore, 
Faubus ordered the National Guard to tum the black students away ifthey appeared at the 
school. He also maintained that he gave the Guard instructions to protect the Little Rock 
Nine if any problems arose while they were in the vicinity of campus. Faubus pointed to 
the "polite" reception of the seven African American students who came to the school as 
15 Faubus, Down From the Hills, 209, 234. See also Orval Eugene Faubus, Down From the Hills 
II (Little Rock: Democrat Printing & Lithographing Company, 1985), 257, 283-284, 420, 454, 483; 
Faubus, The Faubus Years, in Faubus Addendum. 
16 Faubus, Down From the Hills, 215. 
17 Faubus, Down From the Hills, 455. 
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a group and were turned away with their adult escorts. Moreover, he callously dismissed 
the demonstration of racial hate that greeted Elizabeth Eckford when she attempted to 
enter Central as the product of a carefully engineered communist plot to create 
propaganda that reflected unfavorably on the·United States. 18 
Faubus took no responsibility for the chaos and mob violence that erupted in Little 
Rock in 1957. Instead, he insisted that it was the federal government's responsibility to 
enforce its own court orders. He suggested that he could not enforce the federal court 
order against the will of the citizens of Arkansas due to his responsibilities and 
obligations as the executive officer of that state. He emphasized that he had sworn to 
uphold both the United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution, which were at 
variance with each other on the integration issue. 19 Arkansas' recently passed anti-
integration laws and constitutional amendments remained unchallenged in court. As 
governor of Arkansas, he had a responsibility to uphold and respect state segregation laws 
until they were declared unconstitutionaL In later years, Faubus suggested that his 
action in 1957 was not meant to halt integration but delay it so that the state segregation 
measures could be litigated to their conclusion. Until then, he contended, he had an 
obligation to "uphold and enforce" the state constitution or face the "clearly written 
penalty of impeachment and removal from office ifl failed in that sworn duty." The 
former governor said that he had begged and pleaded with the Justice Department to 
18 Faubus, Down From the Hills, 209-211.See also Orval Faubus, interview by Sara Murphy, in 
Folder 19, Box 1, Series 1, Sarah Alderman Murphy Papers (Murphy Papers), Special Collections, 
University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; "Reminiscences of Orval Eugene Faubus." 
19 Faubus, Down from the Hills, 187. 
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initiate litigation but the federal authorities had refused to do so.20 
Indeed, although Faubus placed a large portion of the blame for the crisis on 
school authorities and white "integrationists" who made Little Rock a battleground 
through their public pronouncements and promises of success, he held federal authorities 
equally responsible due to their "hypocritical" and "cowardly" refusal to take 
responsibility for enforcing a federal court order or preventing violence.21 Faubus 
recalled, 
It was with utter astonishment and some consternation that I learned that 
the federal authorities would do nothing about any disorder and mob 
violence that might be created solely by reason of its own actions- the 
implementation of federal court-ordered integration- when without such 
orders all would have been completely tranquil, peaceful and orderly in the 
community. 
While many claimed that Faubus acted to thwart integration for political gain, the former 
governor suggested that it was not he who was playing political games but the national 
administration. He contended that the Justice Department's do-nothing attitude was 
calculated to "shift to others the 'dirty work' entailed by the enforcement of its almost 
universally disfavored orders" and that the Republican national administration "meant to 
avoid the unpleasant, unpopular, politically disastrous consequences of its own policies." 
If state officials stepped into the vacuum, the burden, cost, and political repercussions of 
enforcement would fall on their shoulders while "the idle hands of the federal minions 
2° Faubus, Down from the Hills, 311. See also Freyer, "Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis," 
158-159. 
21 Faubus, Down From the Hills, 455-456. 
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remained unstained and unscarred."22 Faubus acknowledged, "I was in no mood to pull 
the national administration's chestnuts out of the fire at my own political and physical 
risk without any help from it and while its forces sat idly by."23 Even as he denied 
playing political games, Faubus wrote as if the crisis centered around him and his future 
ambitions rather than the African American students and the recognition of their 
constitutional rights. 
In describing the motivations for his actions in 1957, Faubus routinely cited his 
desire to prevent violence, and his insistence that the federal government assume 
responsibility for enforcing its court orders as primary objectives. However, in some 
forums, particularly in Down From the Hills, Faubus suggested that he was also 
championing the cause of states' rights and ''the struggle to retain for the people the right 
to maintain their own schools." The central point in Faubus' states' rights argument was 
that the Supreme Court Brown v. Board decision was "law by decree"; he questioned the 
validity of the Brown decision as the product of "judicial dictatorship" rather than 
legislative process. In this line of defense, Faubus moved away from his claim that his 
hands were tied in 1957 because a conflict between state and federal law. Rather, he 
suggested that "federal law was not involved." He argued, "The dispute was over a U.S. 
22 Faubus, Down From the Hills, 197-198. See also Orval Faubus interview by Sara Murphy, in 
Murphy Papers. 
23 Faubus, Down From the Hills, 207. Legal historian Tony A. Freyer has observed that the federal 
government's reluctance to intervene provided Faubus with the room to he needed to secure political gain 
from the crisis. As Freyer has noted, "he could, in effect, get all the political benefits of going to the brink 
before retreating" (Freyer, "Little Rock Crisis Reconsidered," 361-370). 
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Supreme Court ruling. I ran into illegal federal force- not federallaw."24 Faubus 
suggested that there was no justice in the federal courts for segregationists due to 
"judicial prejudice" which resulted in the rejection of constitutional precedent and 
evidence. 25 
Although he acknowledged that those who opposed the court order were 
segregationists who thought integration was "inimical to their interests," he avoided 
positioning himself as such. He claimed that he was motivated by the desire to preserve 
local control of schools and Jeffersonian democracy, not by a desire to keep black 
children out of white institutions.26 However, as others have noted, Faubus himself 
usurped the authority of the local school board by preventing them from moving ahead 
with a voluntary desegregation plan, which had been upheld (not ordered) by the courts. 
Moreover, this rhetoric also ignored the fact that state segregation laws had been put in 
place by legislators that did not represent all of the people since widespread voter fraud, 
disenfranchisement, and the lack of a secret ballot sustained white supremacy.27 
In his final analysis, Faubus contended that he had successfully preserved the 
peace and avoided doing the federal government's dirty work, but he lamented that he 
and his constituents had been "overcome by the judicial dictatorship backed up by federal 
24 Faubus, Down From the Hills, 323. 
25 Ibid, 343. 
26 1bid, 312, 451. 
27 Karen Anderson, Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High, 92 
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force."28 As a result of the Supreme Court's action in Aaron v. Cooper, and the use of 
military force during the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, Faubus asserted that the 
people, school authorities, and law makers had lost all control of public education. He 
suggested that unpopular policies like busing were resulting in a decline in the quality of 
education for all students, black and white, and the proliferation of private schools.29 
Moreover, the use of"illegaljudicial means" and the usurpation ofthe people's rights 
"over their protests and opposition" had weakened the populace's faith in the government 
and respect for the rule of law. Consequently, the country suffered from "deep and 
disturbing divisions," a lack of "law and order," a distrust of political leaders, and 
disrespect for patriotism and government service. Faubus concluded, "Never has there 
been less hope among good citizens for the enjoyment of liberty in an atmosphere of 
decency. "30 
As noted above, these carefully constructed arguments were buttressed with 
selected newsclippings and political cartoons that placed Faubus' stance well within the 
mainstream of white southern public opinion in 1957. However, by the late 1970s, 
Arkansas' longest-serving governor had become a political pariah. After his retirement in 
1966, Faubus had never regained the influence and prestige he once accepted as his due.31 
28 Faubus, Down From the Hills 456. 
29 Ibid, 500. 
30 "Innocent Victims," in Folder 2, Box 13, Series 2, Faubus Addendum. See also "Questions to 
former Governor Faubus by a student on the Central High School Crisis." in Faubus Addendum; Faubus, 
Down From the Hills,431; Faubus, Down From the Hills II, 483. 
31 Harry S. Ashmore, "The legacy of Orval Faubus," book review, New Crisis, 104, no. 1 (October 
1997): 20. 
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Those who had backed him in his campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s, threw their 
support behind other candidates. After two unsuccessful bids for the governor's office in 
1970 and 1974, Faubus was forced to recognize that he could no longer depend on his 
former allies and that he had become "politically damaged goods." Without the 
assistance or patronage of those he once called his friends, Faubus found it difficult to 
make ends meet. As he wrote his memoir, the former governor struggled to pay off his 
mortgage and other debts while his financial circumstances spiraled out of control.32 
Under these circumstances, Faubus may have hoped that the publication of his 
apologia would not only reconstruct his historical reputation, but might also improve his 
political prospects and financial outlook. However, after sending inquiries to publishers, 
Faubus discovered that there was little interest in publishing such a large, expensive, 
overly-detailed, narrowly-focused, and unconventional memoir. Faubus' attempt to 
reshape his public persona was hampered by his inability to find a publisher willing to 
distribute his views and by the skepticism of the public-at-large. 
The governor's rhetoric- his justifications, explanations, and accusations- was 
wrought from the political arguments, propaganda, and states' rights appeals of the past. 
Down from the Hills was an apologia, not an apology. As Faubus' biographer put it, 
"Orval never recanted."33 The governor's text was mired in 1957 and did not transcend it. 
Faubus held out no hope of individual transformation, local change, or national progress. 
Instead, Faubus defiantly concluded with dire predictions about the nation's future under 
32 Reed, Faubus, 335-336. 
33 Reed, Faubus, 369. 
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the thrall of a "judicial dictatorship." His story was out-of-step with emerging, soon to be 
dominant, narratives that celebrated the success of the civil rights movement. These 
factors, combined with Faubus' political fall from grace and his status as a figure of 
public opprobrium, may have discouraged potential publishers from moving forward with 
the project. 
The Arkansas Democrat reported that after Faubus "shopped around some for a 
publisher," he "fmally decided to finance the book himself." The pro-Faubus paper tried 
to frame this turn of events favorably, noting that this gave the retired governor "complete 
freedom to write what he wanted to without editing and to use whatever material he chose 
to."34 Indeed, for a public figure frequently frustrated by mediated representations of his 
words and actions, and a master of the persuasive stump speech, this may have suited 
Faubus just fme. However, his lack of a publisher undoubtedly inhibited Faubus' ability 
to reproduce, promote, and distribute the book. Nevertheless, he resolved, "Publication 
must go forward or all the effort will have been in vain."35 
The former governor arranged for the Democrat Printing & Lithographing 
Company of Little Rock to produce the text. Struggling to stay afloat financially, Faubus 
tried to sell as many advanced copies as possible at a discounted rate. He also sent 
promotional letters and excerpts ofhis text to Arkansas media outlets, promising to send 
34 John, Kennedy, "Much to Say: Faubus book lacks polish, but anecdotes worthwhile," Arkansas 
Democrat, January 22, 1981, in Folder 2, Box 13, Series 2, Faubus Addendum. 
35 "Faubus at LR Promoting His Book on Earlier Years Of His Political Career," Arkansas 
Gazette, June 6, 1980, 15A, in Folder 5, Box 13, Series 2, Faubus Addendum. "Faubus Book Now Being 
Published," excerpt from the upcoming book and note from author; Letter to O.E. Faubus from B. W. 
Hicks, The England Democrat, August 20, 1980, in Folder 4, Box 3, Series 2, Faubus Addendum. 
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a personally autographed copy of the book if the materials were published in papers. In 
all of these communications, Faubus apologized for the high cost of the book.36 The 
Arkansas Democrat dismissed his concern; given the weight of the book, the paper 
laughingly commented, "The $25 price tag is not all that bad; that's only $8 a pound."37 
Faubus also assumed responsibility for distributing the text, from a P.O. Box in 
Little Rock. He personally autographed copies of the book if the purchaser wished, and 
wrapped and mailed them himself.38 The cost of shipping the heavy tome might have 
overwhelmed the retired governor's limited resources because he took to delivering the 
volumes personally through appearances at county courthouses throughout Arkansas in 
the spring and summer of 1981. While delivering advance orders, the governor sold and 
autographed additional copies. At one visit to the Clark County Courthouse, the local 
paper reported that Faubus "greeted a steady stream of old friends and ever-faithful 
supporters" during the four hours he spent in Arkadelphia. "This is a political book," he 
said, "and I like to sell it in a political atmosphere." Indeed, the Daily Siftings Herald 
commented that the scene was reminiscent of a "heated Democratic primary campaign in 
the 1950's or 60's."39 Faubus sold his autograph for a quarter to those who declined or 
36 Ibid. 
37 Kennedy, "Much to Say: Faubus book lacks polish, but anecdotes worthwhile," Arkansas 
Democrat, January 22, 1981. 
38 Reed, Faubus: The Life and Times of an American Prodigal, 336; "Faubus at LR Promoting 
His Book on Earlier Years Of His Political Career," Arkansas Gazette, June 6, 1980, 15A; "Faubus Book 
Now Being Published." 
39 Rex Nelson, "Orval E. Faubus, selling his book, visits Arkadelphia," Daily Siftings Herald, 
Arkadelphia, Arkansas, May 25, 1981, in Folder 2, Box 13, Series 2, Faubus Addendum. 
286 
could not afford to buy the books. 40 
Despite his efforts, Faubus' first-person account Down From the Hills was largely 
dismissed as a poorly-written and self-serving narrative after its publication. Although he 
still had some well-placed friends who promoted and praised the text in favorable 
reviews,41 most readers contended that the book offered little that had not been heard in 
the former governor's public statements before. The Arkansas Gazette rejected the 
"implied theme" that the narrative was "an objective history" of the governor's time in 
office. "Above all," reviewer Leland Duvall asserted, "it is dedicated to the sympathetic 
treatment of the author." Duvall wryly noted that those parts of the book that "could be 
considered truly autobiographical"- rather than an assortment ofnewsclippings and 
cartoons- "miss few opportunities to extol the author." Faubus offered no new 
revelations, just more spin. Duvall wrote, 
When Faubus was governor, he issued statements that served his purpose; 
on other occasions, he held his peace. This practice, generally accepted 
among politicians ... can be a bit of a disappointment to those who shell out 
$25 in the hope they will learn something new about the turbulent period. 
The best that it could be said about Down From the Hills, the reviewer concluded was 
that "on the basis of shear weight," Faubus had produced "one of the heaviest 
autobiographies produced by an Arkansan." The former governor contemptuously 
dismissed such commentary, noting that although Duvall was a credible journalist, "he 
40 Robbins, Williams, "War Eagle Journal: Trophy-Hungry Throngs in Ozarks," The New York 
Times, October 19, 1987, p. A16; Reed, Faubus, 335 
41 For example see Jones, Perrin, "Faubus writes remarkable book," citizen editor book review, 
Searcy Daily Citizen, February 11, 1981, in Folder 4, Box 13, Series 2, Faubus Addendum. 
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would have been fired if he had written anything good about me."42 
Cartoonist Jon Kennedy reviewed the book for the Gazette's rival, the Arkansas 
Democrat. True to his trade, Kennedy's analysis sparkles with humor. Hundred's ofthe 
reviewer's cartoons had been included in the text, along with those ofpro-Faubus "pen-
slingers" Cal Alley of the Memphis Commercial Appeal and Jack Knox of the Nashville 
Banner. Kennedy's own work throughout the crisis seemed to strive for objective 
neutrality by often presenting more than one perspective, or simply representing the most 
recent developments and events in an ongoing series called "Highlights of the 
Newsweek." The cartoonist was not surprised that Faubus' account did not try to strike a 
similar balance. Kennedy readily acknowledged that the former governor's book was 
undoubtedly a "self-serving account," but suggested that this would come as a surprise to 
few readers. ''No one expects a book by Orval Faubus to be objective, and this one is 
not," he wrote. Nevertheless, Down From the Hills offered readers a first-hand account of 
the "main player's" perspective on the Central High Crisis. Even with its "drawbacks," 
unusual layout, and odd "potpourri" of clippings, quotes, and cartoons, Orval's 
"explanations, opinions and background facts" were the stuff of "raw history." Kennedy 
suggested, "as the man who brought about one of the great controversies of modem 
American history, his own account of events leading up to and following the crisis has 
got to have historical value. And it does." Nevertheless, Kennedy cynically noted that the 
governor had waited until very few principle "players" remained to challenge his version 
42 Leland Duvall, '"Down From the Hills': Scrapbook With Footnotes," Arkansas Gazette, 
February 1, 1981, p. SF, newsclipping and hand-written note in Folder 4, Box 13, Series 2, Faubus 
Addendum. 
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of events. 43 
Indeed, as the Arkansas Historical Quarterly commented then, and several 
scholars have noted since, Faubus' account was at odds with other published memoirs, 
such as those of Superintendent of Schools Virgil Blossom and Congressman Brooks 
Hays. When weighing the veracity of these accounts, reviewer Walter L. Brown 
suggested the balance tipped against Faubus. Brown asserted that the governor "skews 
the facts," and selected clippings, cartoons, and columns "in defense of his well known 
reputation for becoming a hero of the resistance." While his political skills were 
legendary, his reputation for dissembling served him poorly historically. The Quarterly 
hoped that Faubus would have the "leisure and the willingness" to write a more candid, 
frank autobiography as "the work at hand leaves much to be desired."44 
Despite his ''untiring revisionism" and "endless pleading and explaining to justify 
the past to the future,"45 Faubus never quite escaped his reputation as an opportunist who 
exploited racial tension when it served his electoral returns. The arguments which had 
once been so persuasive no longer resonated with voters, readers, or reviewers. Without a 
publisher, the man who was once the most powerful political figure in the state of 
Arkansas, found himself spending the final years of his life selling his books out of the 
trunk of his car at courthouse lobbies, Civil War re-enactments, and county fairs, and 
43 Kennedy, "Much to Say: Faubus book lacks polish, but anecdotes worthwhile," Arkansas 
Democrat, January 22, 1981. 
44 Walter L, Brown, "Down From the Hills," book review, n.p., n.d., in Folder 4, Box 13, Series 2, 
Faubus Addendum. 
45 Reed, Faubus, 369. 
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speaking "charmingly and lengthily and with much cordiality to the odd reporter or 
historian or odd constituent" who sought him out.46 In 1992, Diane Blair, a professor of 
political science at the University of Arkansas reported that Faubus even "roamed the 
crowd trying to sell copies of his autobiography" when Bill Clinton announced his intent 
to run for president of the United States.47 Although the inscription ofFaubus' tombstone 
read, "When I come to this, my last earthly resting place, may it be said of me: In the rise 
from obscurity, he served his country and the people well. He forsook not his own kind-
the common people; he dealt fairly with all men; his promises were kept; his debts paid," 
the news of the governor's death was carried under the banner of"segregation's 
champion" when it was announced in the obituary pages.48 There could be no stronger 
refutation of his efforts to reclaim the mantle of political moderation and pragmatic 
necessity for himself and his legacy. 
46 Paul Henderickson, "Orval Faubus and the Shadow of History; In the Era of a Another Arkansan, 
the Ailing Former Governor Strives to Stave Off a Segregationist Legacy," Washington Post, January 25, 
1993, p. Bl. 
47 Judith Colp, "Symbol ofEra, Orval Faubus Writes, Reflects," The Washington Times, May 26, 
1992, p. El. 
48 Peter Applebome, "Orval Faubus, Segregation's Champion, Dies at 84," The New York Times, 
December 15, 1994, p. A1; "Orval Faubus, 84, dies in Arkansas; Governor battled school integration," 
Washington Times, December 15, 1994, p. A1; Martin Walker, "A Cold Gleam From Little Rock; Obituary: 
Orval Faubus," The Guardian (London), December 16, 1994, p. T21. Two more sympathetic accounts of 
Orval Faubus' career and actions during the crisis have been published posthumously: Roy Reed, Faubus: 
The Life and Times of American Prodigal (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1997), and Elizabeth 
Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son (New York: Free Press, 2007). In his biography, Reed strives to restore 
"context, nuance, and irony" to his description ofFaubus' life, and concludes that the governor's greatest 
"betrayal" was the betrayal of his own talent as "a natural man of the middle" with a "gift for compromise 
and consensus." In her book on the Little Rock crisis, Jacoway concludes that Faubus deployed the 
National Guard because of legitimate concerns about violence. Rather than cynically manipulating the 
crisis for political advantage, the historian suggests that Faubus was cornered by rising segregationist 
sentiment in his state, the federal government's refusal to act decisively to enforce its own court order, and 
the double-dealing of Virgil Blossom and the school board. Jacoway argues that Faubus was not a 
demagogue stirring up segregationist sentiment. Instead, he was responding to events "day by day" with an 
eye toward maintaining his political viability. 
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Brooks Hays: "Let Your Moderation Be Known To All Men" 
Former Congressman Brooks Hays emerged from the Little Rock School 
desegregation crisis with a much different reputation. During the fall of 1957, Hays hoped 
to broker a political solution to the school desegregation crisis, and served as a moderator 
and go-between for Governor Orval Faubus and President Eisenhower. Fourteen months 
later, as public opinion in his district became more polarized, Hays electoral support 
eroded and he lost his congressional seat in the fallout from the Little Rock crisis. 
Nationally, Hays' 1958 defeat represented the silenced voice of southern white moderates 
and the strength of segregationist massive resistance. The popular press canonized him as 
a martyr who had stood up for moral principles in the face of tremendous political 
pressure. Twenty-five years later, while Orval Faubus searched for a publisher and an 
audience for his memoirs, Hays' perspective on his own career and the events of 1957 
was widely circulated in three memoirs. The former congressman's advocacy of gradual 
change within the legal system, and his reputation as a political statesman, seemed to 
appeal to audiences in Little Rock and elsewhere. 
However, even Hays' narrative provoked controversy when it was translated into 
a documentary that incorporated archival footage of the 1957 school desegregation crisis 
in the early 1980s. Public debate about whether the program should air on Arkansas 
Educational Television (AETN) was a product of residual resentment of mediated 
accounts of the crisis and the way they had effected the public image of the city and its 
residents. Consequently, the production of Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock generated 
substantial conversation about which cultural gatekeepers should determine what kinds of 
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historical accounts and images of the crisis should circulate in the public sphere. 
Ultimately, Brooks Hays' considerable connections as former congressman enabled the 
project to move forward, secure funding, and fmd an audience. His unmarred historical 
reputation allowed him to project an image of himself as a southern "moderate" who took 
a "moral" stance on civil rights, and to claim space for himself as someone who had 
supported integration. 
Hays was one of the first "players" to publish an account of his role in the Little 
Rock desegregation crisis. His first book, A Southern Moderate Speaks (1959), was 
released after his disastrous bid for re-election in 1958. However, in his preface, the 
author claimed that the text was presented "exactly as written before the eight-day write-
in campaign that cost me my seat in Congress." Throughout the publication, Hays 
seemed to be striving to explain his positions on civil rights and his role as a moderator in 
the Little Rock school desegregation crisis to his constituents. 49 The congressman 
claimed that his stance on American race relations had been "distorted" as reported by the 
press and his speeches taken out of context. Consequently, he noted, "On occasion I have 
even been judged harshly by my follow Southerners for suggesting possible alteration of 
Southern patterns and have not been credited outside the South." Indeed, the desire to set 
the record straight and achieve proper "credit" for his activities may explain his decision 
to publish the book after he lost his congressional seat. A Southern Moderate Speaks not 
only explained his actions and decisions in the past, but also could serve as an appropriate 
launching pad for the moderate course of action he hoped to pursue through political 
49 Baker, Brooks Hays, 174-176. 
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appointments and other endeavors in the future. 50 
In the text, Hays articulated the political and moral philosophy that guided his 
conduct throughout his career. A dedicated Democrat and New Dealer, refused to align 
himself with Southern Democratic conservatives in Congress. As his biographer James 
T. Baker noted, Hays saw himself 
in the role of spokesman for a new, emerging, moderate South, a South 
that would accept progress and change if it could be sure the fabric of its 
society would not be tom. He could imagine himself the man of reason 
and sanity, standing forthrightly between Southern conservatives and 
Northern liberals, between whites and blacks, offering a better, a moderate 
way, and being heard, heeded, and perhaps even chosen to lead the 
movement toward racial reconciliation. He would be the Southern 
moderate. 51 
Politically, Hays defined his moderation within the framework of a "states' rights 
liberalism" that largely preserved white southern prerogatives by retaining local control 
over the pace of change in American race relations. 52 
In Hays' view, the question of civil rights was primarily an ethical and moral 
problem best addressed by local civic and religious organizations, which had the 
influence to shape public sentiment and create lasting change. From this perspective, it 
was not the government's, particularly the federal government's, role to legislate social 
change. 53 Rather, Hays believed it was more appropriate for the government to create a 
50 Brooks Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1959), viii. 
51 Baker, Brooks Hays, 146-147. 
52 Ibid, 144-145. 
53 Day, "The Fall of a Southern Moderate," 242-243; Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 222-
224. 
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climate for change, in which southern states would be counseled, educated, and 
encouraged to make progress on civil rights issues and would be given the space and time 
to come to terms with such changes on their own timetable. Hays argued that any law 
which violently tore apart the fabric of Southern life not only violated the nation's "dual 
form of government with some powers reserved to the states," but also was destined to 
produce nothing but frustration without the "sentiment of the people" sustaining it. 54 
Therefore, gradual programs of change that allowed for adjustment, acceptance, and 
education in the region produced less "bitterness and distrust" and would ultimately be 
more effective in creating the change his conscience demanded. If this kind of approach 
came at the expense of America's black citizens, Hays believed that the long-term 
benefits outweighed any short-term sacrifice. 55 
Brooks Hays' ability to walk this political tightrope unraveled following the 
Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision (1954). A lawyer first and 
foremost, Hays recognized the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution but signed 
the infamous "Southern Manifesto" as an expression of dissent, a decision he later 
regretted. 56 In the months that followed, Hays expressed hope that the South could come 
54 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 84. 
55 Ibid, 19-20, 30-31. 
56Brooks Hays, as well as Arkansas liberals Rep. James W. Trimble and Sen. J. William Fulbright, 
all signed the Southern Manifesto. While Fulbright later defended his decision as a political necessity, Hays 
did not. The congressman admitted that he had been persuaded to sign after Gov. Orval Faubus 
convincingly argued that if Hays and other southern moderates did not swing into line by pledging to 
exhaust "all lawful means to bring about a reversal" of the Brown decision, "racists and radicals" would 
soon replace them in office. In his historical assessment Tony Badger argues that signing the Manifesto 
galvanized rather than appeased the state's strident segregationists. Instead of defusing the "extremist 
threat," Faubus discovered "that in a battle where one side is prepared to mount a righteous crusade to defY 
the Supreme Court and the other wants to keep quiet, the extremists are going to win" (Tony Badger, "'The 
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into compliance with the decision through a policy of "permissive integration" that placed 
responsibility for school desegregation with local communities and school boards most 
familiar with conditions in their respective localities. 57 For the Congressman, the school 
desegregation plan put forward by Little Rock Superintendent Virgil Blossom and 
approved by the school board represented the best hope for a moderate solution to the 
racial crisis precipitated by Brown. Little Rock's school board was actively complying 
with the court decision and respecting the rule of law, but controlling and directing the 
pace of change in accordance with local conditions. Therefore, Hays and other moderates 
hoped that the city's "slow, gradual, and voluntary integration plan could serve as a 
model for many cities in the South. "58 Had the plan been successful, it might have 
validated Hays' own political philosophy that the proper role of the federal government 
was to encourage the states to preserve civil rights and liberties, and that gradual change 
was the best means of promoting racial "good will" and lasting improvement.59 
Instead, Little Rock's struggle came to symbolize a titanic struggle between 
southern massive resistance to and federal enforcement of the school desegregation 
decision. Hays had been working to avert such a conflict for sixteen years, but in 1957 
the "clash between state and federal authority" unfolded in his own district. As a lawyer 
and legislator, a states' rights liberal and southern moderate, Hays framed the conflict at 
Forerunner of Our Opposition': Arkansas and the Southern Manifesto of 1956," Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly 56, no. 3 [Autumn 1997]: 353-360). 
57 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 94-96. 
58 Ibid, 130. 
59 Ibid, 162. 
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Central High School as a constitutional crisis that generated questions about the proper 
balance of power in a federalized form of government. 60 He felt obliged to intervene as a 
U.S. Congressman, the President of the Southern Baptist Convention, and as a mediator 
between the state and federal authorities. In arranging the Newport Conference between 
President Eisenhower and Governor Faubus, Hays was acting in accordance with his 
long-held views; he wanted to avoid overt federal intervention and enforcement of court 
orders in Arkansas. Like Faubus, he hoped the President would grant a "cooling off' 
period, or an appropriate period of delay to study national and state laws regarding race 
relations in order to resolve the conflicts between them and determine how the Supreme 
Court decision could be interpreted with sensitivity to local southern "traditions. "61 
Even after Newport failed to produce a resolution to the crisis, Hays hoped that 
state and local government could be persuaded to assume responsibility for preserving 
law and order, upholding the gradual desegregation plan ofthe duly elected school board, 
and admitting the nine black students to Central High School.62 He only facilitated 
requests for the use of federal marshals and appeals for troops when mobs threatened to 
break down police barricades and undermine the rule of law. He regretted that his 
"struggle to prevent the federal use of troops" was unsuccessful, but conceded that local 
police "did not have sufficient manpower to preserve order" and praised the 101 st 
60 Ibid, 135-136. 
61 Ibid, 144. 
62 Ibid, 155-157. 
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Airborne's efficiency in dispersing the mob.63 
Hays' long held belief that "extremists" were pushing the nation toward crisis 
seemed to have been realized in Little Rock.. He expressed impatience with partisans 
from "other states" who were determined to stir up resistance to the desegregation in the 
city.64 He maintained hope that Arkansas' capital "could yet become a symbol for 
harmonious race relations" if its citizens worked to resolve the conflict through the 
orderly processes oflaw.65 In speeches before civic groups and in conversations with 
community leaders, Hays tried to cultivate a spirit of conciliation, moderation, and 
respect for law and order. 
Ever the "moderate," Hays tried to avoid being labeled as a segregationist or an 
integrationist. In his comments, he recalled, "I could honestly admit my opposition to 
integration by military force, but when I spoke in support of the courts, I met with some 
resistance." The congressman noted, "Some interpreted my attitude as fence straddling, 
an accusation one must live with when one's personal views are not altogether popular 
and one is trying to be persuasive and discreet. "66 Indeed, while some southern 
newspapers praised Hays' initiative, others accused him of betraying his southern heritage 
and labeled him an integrationist for abandoning the course of massive resistance, the 
NAACP accused him of"trying to tum back the clock of integration." Indeed, in 
63 Ibid, 157-174 
64 Ibid, 181. 
65 Ibid, 176. 
66 Ibid, 176-178. 
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retrospect, the legal "deliberation" of moderates like Hays proved more effective than 
massive resistance at slowing the pace of change in the south to a crawl. Although Hays 
said he was "grieved" by these "bitter attacks," he was resolved to "stick to a course that I 
believed provided the only hope for lasting racial peace."67 
In the midst ofhis 1958 re-election campaign, Hays faced charges that he was a 
"race-mixer" and "fence straddler" betraying the southern way oflife. When the Newport 
Conference failed, many voters assumed Hays had participated in the unpopular decision 
to deploy the 1 01 st Airborne, an accusation the congressman vigorously denied. 68 
Regardless, as the community became more polarized and voices of moderation were 
silenced, Brooks Hays' electoral support steadily eroded. In the Democratic primary in 
1958, Hays was able to successfully refute Capital Citizens' Council leader Amis 
Guthridge's attempts to paint him as a "radical integrationist" and an ally of the 
NAACP.69 However, during Dr. Dale Alford's eight-day challenge for his seat in the 
general election, Hays found it more difficult to counter charges that he had adopted a 
weak-kneed approach to the racial crisis.70 Alford argued that appeals for moderation 
were "cowardly" calls for "surrender" during a time which called for "positive and 
decisive action." In his own book The Case of the Sleeping People, Alford quoted at 
67 1bid, 190. 
68 Ibid, viii. 
69 Day, "The Fall of a Southern Moderate," 245. See also "Arkansas: Victory without Hate?," 
Time, June 23, 1958, p. 28. 
70 "By Telephone from Little Rock: Representative Brooks Hays, Democrat of Arkansas," U.S. 
News & World Report, November 14, 1958. 
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length a tract titled "The Curse of Moderation," which suggested, "The cult of 
'moderation' is the cult of communism, though many who preach it are too stupid to 
know it." Alford accused Hays of playing both sides of political issues while favoring the 
federal government's positions in his actions. This kind of"fence-straddling," he 
charged, was not enough to preserve the southern way of life. Alford stated, "I am 
opposed to our officials speaking out in terms of moderation when we know that 
moderation ends only in integration for us here at home.'m Ultimately, Alford was able 
to define Hays' moderation as a liability and he successfully defeated the incumbent. 
However, if Hays' moderation was a liability in the local political arena, it was an 
asset in the national sphere. Ironically, the congressman's loss generated more respect for 
the political risks that he and other southern moderates took by simply calling for the 
preservation of constitutional government and the rule oflaw. On Face the Nation, 
Howard K. Smith queried, "Mr. Hays, some of us did not realize how strong the feeling 
was in your state and how antagonistic to any moderate course, and we felt that you were 
sticking too near the southern shore. Would you admit the election confirmed your 
judgement that the situation was serious?" Hays, with typical aplomb responded, "Yes, I 
certainly would. Few people outside Arkansas realized just how serious it was. I was 
like the hypochondriac who had difficulties getting any attention or sympathy. But he 
had the last word, after all, for he directed that there be inscribed on his tombstone: I told 
71 Dale Alford and L'Moore Alford, The Case of the Sleeping People (Finally Awakened by Little 
Rock School Frustrations) (Little Rock: Pioneer Press, I959), 85-90, 94, I 00-I 0 I. On the I958 election 
see Day, "The Fall of a Southern Moderate," 254-258. 
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you I was sick. "72 The former congressman was canonized by the press as a political 
martyr for standing up for his "principles" though little mention was made of what those 
principles were, and little attempt was made to elucidate what Hays stood for as a states' 
rights liberal. 73 
Hays reputation as a "hero-martyr of moderation" served him well for the 
remainder of his career. He reflected, "I had unintentionally became a momentary symbol 
of something that would bring pride and satisfaction to a far greater degree than 
continuation in office could have produced."74 He may have been defeated, but he noted, 
"my moral position was impregnable."75 Although he never held elected office again, 
Hays was able to capitalize on this publicity to secure appointments under the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Even after he left government, and 
took positions at Rutgers University and Wake Fore~t Ecumenical Institute, he was 
celebrated as a true statesman and a moral force in politics. 
This embrace of Hays, built on a lack of analysis by the press, would have 
important implications for his legacy. In acting as a mediator in the Little Rock crisis, 
Hays was above all fighting for the Little Rock school board's desegregation plan because 
he believed that allowing local officials to control and define "all deliberate speed" would 
72 Brooks Hays, A Hotbed of Tranquility: My Life in Five Worlds (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1968), 45-46. 
73 Day, "The Fall of a Southern Moderate," 243. 
74 Brooks Hays, Politics is My Parish (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 193-
194. 
75 Baker, Brooks Hays, 95. 
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create the most "flexible" application of federal law. 76 He was trying to avoid a 
Constitutional showdown between state and federal power, which he knew would 
ultimately result in overt federal intervention and enforcement of the Supreme Court 
decision. 77 Although he recognized the Constitutional rights of the Little Rock Nine, he 
was not their advocate. At best, Hays hoped that token desegregation and minimal 
compliance would appease the federal courts and satisfy civil rights organizations so that 
the region could avoid "immediate" and "massive" integration.78 When trouble arose in 
Little Rock, he even spoke in favor of a "cooling off' period and the postponement of the 
token desegregation plan to some time in the future that might be more favorable. 79 
However, over the years, Hays emphasized the liberal aspects of his record and 
suggested that his moderate positions were a smokescreen for more progressive 
inclinations. In his final memoir, Politics is My Parish (1981), Hays suggested that he 
adopted a moderate stance in order to "induce" his southern colleagues to move toward 
fulfilling the "aspirations of our black minority for complete equality."80 1bis belief was 
76 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 94-96, 130,217,225. 
77 1bid, 137, 174,223. 
78 In the late 1950s, the congressman never moved beyond an embrace of token desegregation. 
Hays suggested that the "gradual removal of formal barriers" would in itself give the African American 
community a sense of"psychological release" from oppressive legal discrimination. As he interpreted the 
Supreme Court's decision, Brown did not insist on integration. Hays believed that local communities would 
be able to comply with court orders if they met the following criteria: (1) African American children were 
not required to travel to other communities for their education due to a lack of schools in their district, (2) 
qualified students were able to attend white schools for specialized courses not available in their own 
schools, and (3) "exceptional Negro students" were able to take advantage of the "higher'' educational 
standards prevalent at white schools (Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 94-96, 157, 180-181, 224-230). 
79 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 144, 187-190, 193-194. 
80 Hays, Politics is My Parish, 180. 
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not articulated in his early writings. Nevertheless, these kinds of statements led Hays' 
biographer, James T. Baker, to conclude that Hays was a unqualified "liberal" who 
merely masked his views while he was an elected official. 81 Whether or not this is the 
case, in his twilight years Hays was able to take advantage of the accusations leveled at 
him by his opponents- that as a moderate he had been an integrationist who took a 
"moral" position on civil rights during the school desegregation crisis. 
Indeed, Hays hoped to preserve this legacy and his reputation as a moral force in 
American politics when he returned to these themes in a documentary titled "Brooks 
Hays: Return to Little Rock" produced by David Solomon, a young filmmaker and 
former student at Wake Forest University, in 1980. In the post-Watergate era, Solomon 
envisioned a film on Hays' life as part of a series called "Moral Crises in Government" 
that would focus on politicians who took principled stands in the midst of the "moral 
ambiguities" of most "political situations." Solomon believed Hays epitomized the kind 
of politician he wanted to highlight in his series. The filmmaker described Hay as "an 
eminent American at the summit of his career" who had adhered to his belief that 
"political responsibility and moral commitment are inseparable" even when it cost him 
his seat in Congress. Moreover, Hays made an ideal interview subject because of his 
warm sense of humor and reputation as an engaging storyteller. As a retired politician 
with no desire to run for office again, he was also "free" to review "his own role and the 
role of others with genuine candor, forming the moral conclusions about events that must 
81 Baker, Brooks Hays, 54-55. 
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be formed if past events are to have any meaning for present and future. "82 
As the project developed, Solomon elaborated on his interpretation of Brooks 
Hays' role in the Little Rock school desegregation crisis of 1957. In holding the ex-
Congressman up as a man of"moral courage," the filmmaker idealized Hays' "moderate" 
stand for law and order in the crisis. Solomon contended that Hays' willingness to serve 
as a mediator between Governor Orval Faubus and President Ike Eisenhower was an act 
of bravery and self-sacrifice for the greater good. From the filmmaker's perspective, 
Hays refused to compromise his principles, and as a result, had been "brought down by a 
whirlwind he alone had the courage to face." As Solomon noted, the basic premise of his 
film was that Hays' embodied a "certain kind of moral stubbornness," "an ability to set 
aside personal ambition and even personal welfare to affirm a moral principle in the face 
of hostility and rejection and even hatred."83 The focus of the film was to be Brooks 
Hays, the sources of influence and inspiration that had informed his actions in 1957, and 
the example he set for the present and future, not the crisis itself. Solomon asserted that 
instead of"trying to dissect a tragedy," the film would build a "positive portrait of a 
man." This approach, the filmmaker believed, would be instructive and inspiring.84 
82 David Solomon, proposal, "Moral Crises in Government" series, and "Brooks Hays: The Moral 
Impulse" film, n.d., in Folder 9, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Brooks Hays Supplementary Papers (Hays 
Supplement), Special Collections, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. See also Linda Brinson, "A Star at 
82: He's a Former Everything, And Now Subject of A Film," The Sentinel, Winston-Salem, NC, September 
10, 1980; Elizabeth F. Shores, "Ex-congressman starring in film on school crisis," Arkansas Democrat, July 
25, 1979, p. 6F, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
83 David Solomon, proposal, "Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock," 1978, in Folder 10, Box 4, 
Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
84 David Solomon to Hon. Thomas O'Neill, Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, November 7, 
1979, in Folder 9, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
303 
While developing the project, Solomon drew extensively on Hays' political 
contacts. Although Solomon claimed that he had "gotten more rejection letters and been 
kicked down more flights of stairs that you can imagine" while pursuing sponsors, 
Brooks Hays' vast network of friends and associates helped get the project off the 
ground. 85 When applying for a grant from the Arkansas Endowment of Humanities 
(AEH), the Former Members of Congress, an organization Hays had founded in 1970, 
wrote a letter of recommendation in support ofthe project.86 The AEH ultimately granted 
$18,000 toward the production of the film. As it moved toward production, "Brooks 
Hays: Return to Little Rock" was sponsored by the Arkansas chapter of the National 
Conference of Christians and Jews, an organization Hays had been affiliated with for 
decades. 87 Likewise, another nonpartisan organization the congressman had founded in 
order to bring young people to the nation's capital to see government at work, called 
Close-Up, contributed a couple thousand dollars to the project.88 These avenues of 
funding and influence clearly illustrate why Brooks Hays was the subject of one of the 
first documentaries to address the Little Rock school desegregation crisis. 
After securing funding, Solomon assembled a director, scriptwriter, and associate 
85 Linda Brinson, "A Star at 82: He's a Former Everything, And Now Subject of A Film," The 
Sentinel, Winston-Salem, NC, September 10, 1980. 
86 To Dr. Anthony Dube, Executive Director of the Arkansas Endowment for the Humanities, from 
Former Members of Congress, June 22, 1979, in Folder 9, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement; 
Baker, Brooks Hays, 198-99. 
87 "$18,000 Grant Approved for Film on Brooks Hays, LR's 1957 Crisis," Arkansas Gazette, July 
26, 1979, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
88 Shores, "Ex-congressman starring in film on school crisis," Arkansas Democrat, July 25, 1979, 
p. 6F, in Hays Supplement. 
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producer to make his vision a reality. The filmmaker planned to intercut archival NBC 
footage outside of Central High School in 1957, and scenes of the city, the school, and its 
students in the late 1970s, with interviews of Hays' friends, including Eisenhower aide 
Sherman Adams, Arkansas Gazette Editor Harry Ashmore, and House Speaker Tip 
O'Neill. Kennedy aide and historian Arthur Schlesinger, a long-time friend of Hays, was 
also recruited to give the historical documentary the "armor of authority."89 Solomon 
reported that he had few problems persuading interview subjects to participate in the 
project. "Brooks is like magic," he said. "A phone call from him can do just about 
anything."90 
The film producer hoped to distribute his final product to high schools and 
colleges for instruction, but he also wanted to create a film that would be appropriate for 
broadcast on public television. However, Solomon's celebratory portrait of Hays would 
generate controversy in the congressman's native state when Arkansas Educational 
Television (AETN) threatened not to air the program if it proved to be "embarrassing" to 
the state of Arkansas or portrayed a "biased" portrait of the Little Rock school 
desegregation crisis. These warnings provoked a storm of commentary about the role of 
public television, mediated representations of the 1957 desegregation crisis, and the 
appropriate balance oftragedy and transformation in historical accounts of those events. 
89 Shores, "Ex-congressman starring in film on school crisis," Arkansas Democrat, July 25, 1979, 
p. 6F, in Hays Supplement. David Solomon to Dr. Schelsinger, November 7, 1979; David Solomon to Hon. 
Thomas O'Neill, Speaker of the House of Representatives, November 7, 1979, in Folder 9, Box 4, 
Subseries 2, Series I, Hays Supplement. 
90 Brinson, "A Star at 82: He's a Former Everything, And Now Subject of A Film," The Sentinel, 
Winston-Salem, NC, September I 0, 1980, in Hays Supplement. 
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In the early 1980s, most commercial networks refused to air documentaries that 
had not been produced in-house. Consequently, independent filmmakers turned to public 
television as the sole outlet for their work. However, as Solomon would discover, 
negotiating relationships with programmers at local television stations or the national 
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) was frequently a process fraught with difficulty.91 
Unlike European public-television networks, like the BBC, American public television is 
a decentralized system of loosely federated stations or affiliates that tap into a national 
"library" ofprograms.92 1bis system has its roots in public television's inception, was 
codified by the 1967 Public Broadcasting Act, and was reinforced by the Nixon 
Administration, which channeled money to the local (and presumably more conservative) 
stations in order to decrease the influence of national programming centers that the 
President perceived to be "dangerously liberal."93 Some observers have praised the 
democratic nature of this system as a network of "independent, interrelated" affiliates in 
which "each station would be locally controlled and a source of programming," enabling 
them to serve the needs of their specific communities while "guarding against the abuses 
and limitations of centralization."94 However, others have suggested that this system has 
crippled public television's potential, creating a "bureaucratic monster" that stifles 
91 James Day, The Vanishing Vision: The Inside Story of Public Television (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1995), 316. 
92 B. J. Bullert, Public Television: Politics and the Battle over Documentary Film (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 15. 
93 Day, The Vanishing Vision, 5-6, 121, 170-171, 216-218; Bullert, 19. 
94 Ibid, 27. 
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creativity and steers away from controversy.95 
Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, southern public television stations sometimes 
refused to broadcast nationally-distributed programs that addressed civil rights and race 
relations. In 1966, the Alabama Educational Television Network declined to air Jack 
Willis' Lay My Burden Down, which focused on the lives of rural African Americans in 
the state one year after the Selma-to-Montgomery March. Local programmers claimed 
the program did not merit broadcast because of its "insufficient educational value." The 
same affiliate also refused to air Black Journal, a series produced by African Americans 
for a black audience in 1970. After fielding complaints from angry citizens, the FCC 
originally ruled that the station's programming decisions were "a matter of taste and 
judgement," but reversed itself four years later and threatened to revoke the state's license 
unless it made necessary reforms.96 Since 1975, PBS affiliates had agreed to support a 
"core schedule" of programs, largely consisting of series like NOVA, Masterpiece 
Theatre, or the McNeil-Lehrer News Hour, but they could still decline to air other 
nationally distributed programs not suited to local tastes.97 
The filmmakers hoped to complete "Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock" by late 
1979 and planned to premiere the film in Arkansas. Solomon sent his prospectus and 
other materials related to the project to station programmers at Arkansas Educational 
95 Ibid, 4-5. 
96 Ibid, 89, 182. 
97 Day, The Vanishing Vision, 257. Solomon initially secured support for his program with the 
producers on Bill Moyers' Journal, but this collaboration did not work out. See correspondence located in 
Folder 9 and 10, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
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Television (AE1N). The film producer told reporters that he anticipated distributing the 
program, which was being funded by the Arkansas Endowment of Humanities, to public 
schools and libraries after "one or two initial viewings on public television." He also 
indicated that the United States Information Agency might be interested in distributing it 
abroad.98 However, when AETN program director Fred Schmutz was informed that 
Solomon planned to use archival footage from NBC, and was going to "utilize the 
services of man in the News Department of NBC who would describe the difficulties 
their news crew had experienced in Little Rock during the 1957 crisis," he took 
"exception to this particular part of the film" and indicated that he would review the film 
closely and would not air it on the network if there was "anything embarrassing to 
Arkansas" in the final product. 
Schmutz had worked for Little Rock's NBC affiliate KARK-TV in 1957. After 
shooting footage outside Central High School, NBC News had edited and transmitted 
programming to the network in New York from the local outlet. Schmutz recalled, 
[T]he local outlet had no control over the content of the NBC film 
segments. I personally was on the scene at the time the film was shot, I 
was with the members of the NBC crew as they edited the film and 
prepared it for transmission. On many occasions, I questioned the 
particular incident which was featured, and suggested other incidents 
which presented a more sane and intelligent approach to the problem. At 
no time were my suggestions accepted, and on one early morning hour, 
between hourly feeds to the NBC "Today" program, the newsman, Mr. 
Frank McGee, informed me that those incidents which I had suggested 
'would not sell.' In other words, they were interested only in that which 
was sensational. As a result, I feel that the coverage originated by NBC 
98 Shores, "Ex-congressman starring in fihn on school crisis," Arkansas Democrat, July 25, 1979, 
p. 6F; Elizabeth Shores, "Crisis documentary begins: Fihn on Brooks Hays to show 'moral courage,"' 
Arkansas Democrat, September 12, 1979, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series I, Hays Supplement. 
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was definitely biased.99 
In a letter to David Solomon and the Arkansas Endowment of Humanities, Schmutz 
informed them that if the "sensationalism" of the NBC reports was incorporated into the 
film, through footage "showing violence without showing the other side," AETN "would 
have no interest in showing it."100 Lee Reaves, a Faubus appointee and the director of the 
Arkansas Educational Television Commission, subsequently told commission members 
and reporters that he and Schmutz would review the documentary and would not air it if 
they found it "biased," "unfair," or "embarrassing."101 
If AETN refused to broadcast the film, it was unlikely that Solomon would be 
able to find another broadcast outlet in the state. Moreover, without the support of the 
local public television affiliate, it was unlikely that the film would be broadcast on public 
television anywhere since affiliates screen and recommend programs for national 
99 "Schmutz speaks out on Brooks Hays documentary," Arkansas Democrat, September 24, 1979, 
in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
100 "AETN May Bar Film on LR Crisis," Arkansas Gazette, September 20, 1979, p. 1A, in Folder 
12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. The Little Rock school desegregation crisis was one of 
the first events to be extensively broadcast on network news. In their history of the media coverage of the 
crisis, Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff observed that several reporters breached ethical boundaries, even 
urging the crowd gathered outside Central High School to re-enact events if they hadn't captured them on 
camera. Roberts and Klibanoffnote, "Here in Little Rock, where a domestic confrontation ofunsurpassing 
importance was unfolding, where journalistic propriety and the lack of it were being put on public display, 
reporters who were inches from the drama found themselves making up rules as they went along and doing 
it in front of everyone in a volatile situation with a hot, erratic new technology" (Roberts and Klibanoff, The 
Race Beat, 160). Because of these incidents, some residents ofLittle Rock argue that the iconic images 
associated with the crisis were manufactured-- not captured-- on film. Schmutz' charge was less explosive-
he was primarily concerned with the selection and editing of images filmed outside the school not their 
historical authenticity. 
101 "Desegregation film may not air in the state," Arkansas Democrat, September 19, 1979, 
morning edition, p. lB; "AETN May Bar Film on LR Crisis," Arkansas Gazette, September 20, 1979, p. 
1A, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
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distribution.102 In this decentralized system, gatekeepers like Fred Schmutz and Lee 
Reaves have tremendous influence over which topics and perspectives are broadcast on 
public television. In his study of PBS, B.J. Bullert found that programmers who made 
these decisions were guided by their own biases as well as the perceived biases of their 
viewers and subscribers.103 Nevertheless, Bullert concluded that it was the gatekeepers 
themselves who frequently became the most "active participants in debates about 
contested social issues by deciding which views of reality will contend on the airwaves, 
when they will be broadcast, and in what context."104 While Schmutz and Reaves may 
have been concerned that a documentary which examined the crisis through the lens of 
the national media would alienate local viewers, subscribers and taxpayers (who paid 
station bills), it seemed to be Schmutz' personal relationship to the construction ofNBC 
news footage that drove him to warn Solomon and the Arkansas Endowment of the 
Humanities about his objections and his intent. Relatively powerless in the centralized 
structure of a commercial network, where the "local outlet had no control over the content 
of the NBC film segments," Schmutz had considerably more power to control content as 
a programmer of a local affiliate within the decentralized public television system. 105 
Within a broadcasting system that celebrated "localism," he argued that national 
perspectives on the crisis should not be privileged over local experiences. 
102 Bullert, 23-24. 
103 Ibid, 2, 189. 
104 Ibid, 38. 
105 "Schmutz speaks out on Brooks Hays documentary," Arkansas Democrat, September 24, 1979. 
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In articulating their concerns, Schmutz and Reaves suggested that a documentary 
which incorporated the sensationalism of the NBC reports (which purportedly featured 
"violence without showing the other side") would be "biased" and unbalanced, and not 
suitable for broadcast on AE1N.106 In the 1967 Public Broadcasting Act, the public 
television system was charged with the responsibility to develop and air programs "with 
strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of 
controversial nature."107 Since its codification, this clause has been used by politicians, 
taxpayers, special interest groups, programmers and local affiliates to attack programs 
they object to. It should be noted that the standard of"strict adherence to balance and 
objectivity" goes beyond the requirements for "fairness and accuracy" imposed by the 
FCC on all broadcasters.108 Media critics have charged that these ambiguous standards 
have created a "logic of safety" and a "culture of timidity inside public television." 
Consequently, they argue, the system has avoided addressing some of the country's most 
pressing social problems in favor of producing safe, noncontroversial programs.109 
Moreover, in his review of controversial independent documentaries on public television, 
Bullert found that once the private deliberations and negotiations between stations and 
producers entered the public sphere, charges of"unfairness" and "lack ofbalance" were 
frequently used to undermine the filmmaker's credibility, and ''to shape perception of the 
106 "AETN May Bar Film on LR Crisis," Arkansas Gazette, September 20, 1979, p. lA. 
107 Day, The Vanishing Vision, 121. 
108 Ibid, 326-330. 
109 Bullert, Public Television, 4. 
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work in question."110 Thus, charges that a film "lacked balance" or was "biased," as those 
terms were defined by station programmers, carried significant weight within the system, 
particularly when applied to the work of a relatively young, unknown independent 
producer. 
In response, Brooks Hays publicly defended the project, noting that his life and 
career were to be the focus of the film, not the desegregation crisis itself. The former 
congressman insisted that the producers planned present the 1957 desegregation drama as 
"part of the pattern of my whole life ... one whole event in my whole career." The film 
would depict the moderate stance of a states' rights liberal, a statesman working to 
support the rule oflaw. Consequently, he contended, "the total view will be favorable 
and our image as law-abiding people will be preserved." He assured reporters that the 
documentary would be "faithful to history."m At the annual banquet of the Arkansas 
Endowment for the Humanities, Hays urged his audience to ''trust" the filmmakers. He 
asked those present not to "entertain fears that Little Rock and Arkansas will be presented 
in any except a favorable light" and suggested that emphasis would be placed on the 
state's progress with school desegregation. 112 "I love my city," he asserted, "and I was 
proud of the rapidity with which it healed wounds and moved into compliance with the 
110 Ibid, 4-8, 13-14, 188-189. 
111 George Wells, "Hays Says Film 'Favorable' on LR," Arkansas Gazette, October 28, 1979, p. 
7A, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
112 Elizabeth F. Shores, "Hays predicts favorable view of state in film," Arkansas Democrat, 
October 12, 1979, p. 14B, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
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law."113 In making his appeals, Hays suggested that the film would not reproduce a one-
dimensional image of the crisis. Rather, it would counteract it by emphasizing the 
moderate forces at work within the city. This argument, combined with the film's 
proposed focus on Hays' "return" to a dramatically different Little Rock, appealed to 
those who wished to reclaim the city's progressive reputation. 
AETN's warning to the film's producers became a front-page news story, and the 
subject of editorials and letters to the editor in both the Arkansas Gazette and the 
Arkansas Democrat. Schmutz and Reaves were accused of acting as a "self-appointed" 
"two-man censorship board." Their approach to "Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock" 
was identified as only one of a series of decisions made to suppress information that 
might be considered "objectionable" or "unacceptable."114 Many observers expressed 
concern that the network had threatened not to air the production before filming even 
began. The Arkansas Gazette noted, "It is regrettable that Schmutz and Reaves elected to 
interfere in the production of this film, for all they have done with their threats of 
censorship is to complicate the exercise ofthe producer's judgement. Solomon will have 
to do his best both to maintain his professional integrity against the censors and avoid 
113 Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock, prod. David Solomon, Arkansas Region of the National 
Conference of Christians and Jews, 1980, videocassette. 
114 "Association Board is 'Concerned' about AETN's Censorship Policies," Arkansas Gazette, 
September 10, 1979; "The Way it Was at Little Rock," editorial, Arkansas Gazette, September 22, 1979; 
Richard Stein, Letter to the Editor, "Screening Out Undesirable History," Arkansas Gazette, September 30, 
1979; Pine Bluff Commercial, editorial, reprinted in "The Arkansas Press: Educational Television and 
Citizenship," Arkansas Gazette, October 21, 1979, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays 
Supplement. 
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over-reaction in the process."115 
Several editorial boards questioned how an "unbiased" and historically accurate 
documentary addressing the 1957 crisis could be anything but "embarrassing" to the state. 
The Gazette asserted, "a film on 'Little Rock' cannot rewrite or scrub up that melancholy 
chapter in our national history, nor make it appear that popular opinion in Arkansas was 
not grievously in error at the time." Sensationalism, the paper noted, "is a highly 
subjective term," but "one must concede that the performance of the rowdy crowd at 
Central High was pretty sensational material, as was the first test of whether racism was 
to prevail over the rule oflaw in this country." The crowd outside Central "was engaged 
in something other than peaceful demonstration on a September mom," the Gazette 
observed.116 Columnist Richard E. Yates, conceded that the film would be embarrassing 
to "many public men who played a leading role in attempting to defy the public courts" 
and the "thousands of Arkansas voters who continued to support these public men," but 
insisted that confronting the past would be a cathartic experience good for the state's 
"soul." The film would be a valuable civics lessons for those too young or too forgetful 
to remember the events of 1957-1958 and learn from them.117 
Some suggested that Schmutz's concern that the film would focus on 
m "The Way it Was at Little Rock," editorial, Arkansas Gazette, September 22, 1979; Yates, 
Richard E., "Show the film- Contribution is good for our state soul," Arkansas Democrat, October 7, 1979, 
in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
116 "The Way it Was at Little Rock," editorial, Arkansas Gazette, September 22, 1979, in Hays 
Supplement. 
117 Yates, Richard E., "Show the fihn- Contribution is good for our state soul," Arkansas 
Democrat, October 7, 1979, in Hays Supplement. 
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sensationalism- but not the "other side" of moderate, law-abiding approaches to the issue 
of school desegregation- made little sense. The entire purpose of showing the mob 
scenes outside Central High School was to illustrate what Hays, and the state of 
Arkansas, had transcended. Hays "was and is the very symbol of 'the other side,' as a 
leading advocate of settling the Little Rock crisis peacefully within the rule oflaw."118 
Furthermore, the Tulsa World and others noted that it would be hard for viewers to 
understand why Brooks Hays' "moderate" stance for law and order was so controversial 
"without recalling the Great Faubusfear he rose above." Likewise, it would be difficult to 
measure the state's "progress" without showing the "depths" to which it had 
descended. 119 As one editorial commented, the Brooks Hays story "is one that began 
badly," but "ended happily in Hays' emergence as a figure of national stature and, finally, 
in the exemplary desegregation ofthe high school, Central, which was the scene of the 
historic confrontation."120 
Because AETN was a state-financed public television network, Schmutz's and 
Reaves' threat not to air the film also provoked commentary about the purpose of public 
television. Hays himself expressed surprise that criticism of the project had come from 
the public broadcasting network instead of"hard-core" segregationists. He stated, "I 
118 "The Way it Was at Little Rock," editorial, Arkansas Gazette, September 22, 1979; Greenberg, 
Paul, "A Whiff of the Old Days," opinion, Tulsa World, September 26, 1979, in Folder 12, Box 4, 
Sub series 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
119 Greenberg, Paul, "A Whiff of the Old Days," opinion, Tulsa World, September 26, 1979, in 
Hays Supplement. 
120 "A Word from Clinton," editorial, Arkansas Gazette, December 19, 1979, p. 28A, in Folder 12, 
Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
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assumed they would understand the purpose and substance ofit."121 In a letter to the 
editor, Richard Stein wrote, 
the concept behind programming on PBS stations is to offer an alternative 
to entertainment and documentaries that are aired on commercial stations. 
Many PBS programs are controversial in nature, but they are designed to 
enlighten viewers on subjects that many times are too touchy to air on 
commercial stations because of the involvement of sponsors who pay 
millions of dollars for a 30-second spot. 
Since AETN was "financed by public funds," Stein asserted that it was "morally unjust, 
and perhaps even unconstitutional, for one or two men to dictate public television policy 
to the citizens of Arkansas."122 The Dumas Clarion concurred that public television 
programs should challenge viewers and "stimulate the mind." The paper contended that 
viewers needed to be confident that the network's programs were not being censored 
because a handful of officials did not agree with the viewpoints or perspectives 
expressed. 123 
Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton responded to the growing controversy by 
assigning a member ofhis staff to investigate AETN's policies and its statements about 
the Brooks Hays' film. Clinton told reporters he was uncomfortable with Reaves and 
Schmutz's "premature" pronouncements about the film, and felt that Arkansas 
Educational Television commissioners on the network's board should have renounced the 
121 George Wells, "Hays Says Film 'Favorable' on LR," Arkansas Gazette, October 28, 1979, p. 
7A, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series I, Hays Supplement. 
122 Richard Stein, Letter to Editor, "Screening Out Undesirable History," Arkansas Gazette, 
September 30, 1979, in Hays Supplement. 
123 The Dumas Clarion, editorial, reprinted in "The Arkansas Press: Educational Television and 
Citizenship," Arkansas Gazette, October 21, 1979, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays 
Supplement. 
316 
programmers' position. The governor acknowledged that AETN had an obligation to 
review programs to determine if they were acceptable for broadcast, but asserted that the 
commission overseeing programming decisions should adopt a clear set of guidelines and 
familiarize the public with its standards. From the governor's perspective, it was 
"important" for Arkansans to learn about their recent history. "The idea that we should 
not know about it or learn about it or see it is ridiculous," he said. The eight 
commissioners on the network's board served by gubernatorial appointment and Clinton 
told reporters that the controversy had given him a "keen awareness" of his responsibility 
to appoint members that were "not interested in undue censorship."124 With two of the 
commissioners' terms expiring, the Arkansas Gazette editorial board hoped that Clinton's 
remarks would put an end to "any further talk of not putting on the show." The paper 
quipped, "A word to the wise is supposed to be sufficient."125 
As these events unfolded, Solomon and his production team continued to work on 
the project, scouting locations for filming in Russellville, Hays' hometown, and Little 
Rock in the a fall of 1979. During Hays' "return" to the Arkansas capitol, the filmmakers 
wanted to capture him speaking with young people about the desegregation crisis, his role 
in events, and the future of Central High School. The team decided to select a small 
group of students to speak with Hays about these issues in a seminar-style setting. The 
thirteen students were selected "on the basis of their interest in politics or government and 
124 Jim Allen, "Clinton blasts AETN for comments on Hays film," Arkansas Democrat, December 
10, 1979, p. 2B, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
125 "A Word from Clinton," editorial, Arkansas Gazette, December 19, 1979, p. 28A, in Hays 
Supplement. 
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for their ability to vocalize." Hays explained his "moderate" position during the session, 
expressed pride that he took the "right tum" during the crisis, and claimed that he was a 
supporter of a "morally correct law which ruled out segregation."126 The crew also filmed 
footage during a large pep rally where Hays' tried to charm the crowd by telling 
humorous stories about his own youth. Film director Steven Jacobson and producer 
David Solomon hoped to create visual excitement with shots from the pep rally scene, 
stock footage from local TV stations and CBS's Face the Nation, as well as slow pans 
across newspaper stills. 127 
In the end, "Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock" was ready for release in August 
1980. Given the controversy the production had provoked, Hays told the media he was 
relieved that the film would be shown after the primary elections because his son Steele 
Hays was running for a seat on the Arkansas Supreme Court. 128 Presumably, the former 
congressman did not want another Hays paying the political price for his position in the 
1957 crisis. On August 9, 1980, Brooks Hays' 82nd birthday, approximately 250 guests 
gathered at Second Baptist Church in Little Rock to view the film for the first time. After 
a standing ovation, Hays expressed pride in his actions in 1957, declaring, "We did the 
126 Elizabeth Shores, "Producers seek morality play in Hays film story," Arkansas Democrat, 
September 16, 1979; Roosevelt Thompson, "Television Crew to Visit for Film on Brooks Hays," The Tiger, 
Little Rock Central High School newspaper, October 12, 1979; Roosevelt Thompson, "Former 
Congressman Hays Visits To Gain Scenes for Documentary," The Tiger, Little Rock Central High School 
newspaper, November 9, 1979, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. See also 
Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock, videocassette. 
127 Shores, "Producers seek morality play in Hays film story," Arkansas Democrat, September 16, 
1979, in Hays Supplement. 
128 Frank Fellone, "Controversial Hays film apparently will air in LR," Arkansas Democrat, n.d. in 
Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
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right thing- those of us who took this position." Filmmaker David Solomon, Arkansas 
Endowment for the Humanities (AEH) Co-President Bob Terry, and Steven Janger of the 
Close-Up Foundation also made remarks, and Arkansas Attorney General Steve Clark 
spoke on the behalf of Governor Clinton. Congratulatory letters and telegrams from 
President Carter, United States Senators Dale Bumpers and David Pryor, United States 
Representative Ed Bethune, and others were read during the ceremony. The film's 
sponsor, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, hosted a reception in honor of 
Hays' and his wife. Marion Hays expressed gratitude that she and her husband had lived 
long enough to "reap the rewards" of their "tolerance and faith" in the people of 
Arkansas. 129 
After premiers in Little Rock and Winston-Salem, the film was shown on AETN 
and WFMY in North Carolina. In retrospect, Solomon suggested that the controversy 
was "the best free publicity" the producers "could have gotten."130 However, reviews of 
the production were mixed. While some asserted that the film fulfilled its promise, 
producing an "account of Hays' courage, devotion and inspiration" and reminded its 
audience of "both the heroic and tragic" events of 1957,131 others asserted that it fell far 
129 Bill Clinton, Governor of Arkansas, to Arkansas Endowment of Humanities, August 7, 1980, in 
Folder 11, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. Frantz, Susan, "250 Attend LR Premiere of 
Film Detailing Hays' Role in School Crisis," Arkansas Gazette, August 10, 1980; "Return to Little Rock," 
newsletter, Arkansas Endowment for the Humanities, August 1980, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 
1, Hays Supplement. 
130 Brinson, "A Star at 82: He's a Former Everything, And Now Subject of A Film," The Sentinel, 
Winston-Salem, NC, September 10, 1980, in Hays Supplement. 
131 Frantz, "250 Attend LR Premiere of Film Detailing Hays' Role in School Crisis," Arkansas 
Gazette, August 10, 1980; Erwin L. McDonald to Brooks Hays, "When Duty Calls," typescript for The 
Daily Courier-Democrat, August 15, 1980; McEvoy, Don, Senior Vice President of the National 
Conference of Christians and Jews, "Keeping the Dream Alive," n.d., in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, 
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short of the mark. In placing the spotlight on Hays rather than the school desegregation 
crisis, at least one viewer asserted that the film illuminated "almost nothing of what 
prompted Mr. Hays and the Gazette to take their courageous stand .... I was left none the 
wiser on the school crisis, how it was resolved, or even what Mr. Hays actually did." In a 
letter the editor, the writer continued, "It seems incredible that this could be the same film 
that some want to keep AETN (Channel 2) from showing. What could be controversial 
about an encomium to Mr. Hays, whose stand time has shown to have been correct?"132 
Journalist Elizabeth Shores had followed the development ofthe project since its 
inception. She also asserted that the film was fatally flawed because it barely explored 
''the social forces and moral dilemma that made Hays career so courageous." In addition 
to downplaying historical context, Shores contended that the film sidestepped Hays own 
"ambivalence" about southern race relations, and his internal conflict about whether and 
how to support the Supreme Court's decision that violated traditional social practices and 
his own political philosophy as a states' rights liberal. Solomon's portrait, the journalist 
wrote, was "incomplete"- "without some suggestion of the political dilemma, the 
personal crisis of conviction challenged by unstoppable change is unclear." Moreover, 
Shores suggested that the film lacked a "modem perspective" on events, and Hays 
"return" consisted of nothing more than a "few brief scenes" shot at Central High 
Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
132 William W. Stead, Letter to the Editor, "Unfulfillment of the Brooks Hays Film," Arkansas 
Gazette, August 17, 1980, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
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School.133 
While a film which explored Hays' ambivalence toward school desegregation and 
the political dilemma the congressman faced in 1957 might have been a worthwhile 
project, it was not David Solomon's project. Instead, "Brooks Hays: Return to Little 
Rock" was meant to enhance the congressman's reputation as a man of moral courage. It 
idealized his moderate stand for "law and order" and gradual change, and celebrated the 
ultimate triumph of his ideals in the capital city of his native state. Although residual 
resentment of national news coverage in 1957 provoked threats of censorship and 
stimulated controversy, the film was not suppressed. Politicians, papers, and historical 
organizations did not hesitate to come to the defense of a man whose moral reputation 
was "impregnable," and unlike Governor Orval Faubus, Hays and Solomon were able to 
find an outlet to distribute their message. The film's defenders acknowledged that 
"Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock" explored potentially "embarrassing" incidents 
surrounding the school desegregation crisis. However, it did so to highlight the heroism 
of more moderate forces in the city and to illuminate the extent of Little Rock's progress 
in the field of race relations. Discussing the crisis in this context had the potential to tum 
a tragedy into a source of inspiration. However, within a few months, the controversy 
surrounding another first-hand account of the crisis would reveal that some white 
residents in the city felt that even this carefully contained narrative was being constructed 
at their expense. 
133 Elizabeth F. Shores, "Brooks Hays film skims over social forces, moral dilemma of career," 
Arkansas Democrat, August 11, 1980, in Folder 12, Box 4, Subseries 2, Series 1, Hays Supplement. 
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Elizabeth Huckaby: "You Should Know Your Responsibilities" 
Elizabeth Huckaby, Central High School's Vice Principal of Girls, had spent 39 
years of her adult life working at the city's flagship educational institution. In her 
administrative role, she had been responsible for investigating incidents, counseling 
students, and enforcing discipline among the female student body. Throughout the school 
desegregation crisis, Huckaby wrote daily bulletins urging students to practice "good 
citizenship," recorded reports of racial conflict in the school, and mediated disputes 
between students. Unsurprisingly, the vice principal had regular contact with the Little 
Rock Nine during the 1957-58 school year, particularly the six girls who reported to her 
regularly- Elizabeth Eckford, Carlotta Walls, Minnijean Brown, Melba Patillo, Thelma 
Mothershed, and Gloria Ray. 
The school administrator also kept a meticulous record of her experience. 
Huckaby was a faithful diary keeper and recorded the day-to-day details of her life in a 
small desk calendar usually used for keeping appointments. She also preserved daily 
bulletins, written reports of "racial incidents" in the school, and other administrative 
materials. Her quickly written notes preserve her immediate thoughts on the crisis, 
students, events inside the school, as well as a more mundane record of what she made 
for dinner and how many squirrels her husband Glen bagged on weekend hunting trips. 134 
134 Indeed, aside from her involvement in the school desegregation crisis, her diary is a remarkable 
chronicle of the life of a working woman in the 1950s. Journals, vol. 1, 1957; vol. 2, 1958, in Folder 1, Box 
1, Series 1, Elizabeth Paisley Huckaby Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, 
Fayetteville (Huckaby Papers UAF). Diary and Notes, 1959, in Folder 11, Box 2, Elizabeth Huckaby 
Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Little Rock (Huckaby Papers UALR). See 
also Huckaby as quoted in Bob Wisehart, "A reluctant, 'little' hero," The Times-Picayune, February 1, 
1981, in Folder 6, Box 4, Huckaby Papers UALR. 
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In time, these records, as well as letters written to her brother living in New York, and 
clippings from the Arkansas Gazette and Arkansas Democrat would serve as the basis of 
her memoir. 
After decades of reflecting on her experience, Huckaby published a first-hand 
account ofthe tumultuous 1957-58 school year in 1980. Throughout the text, the vice 
principal portrayed herself as a pragmatist struggling to keep Central High School open 
and operable during the school desegregation crisis. Her account of the administration's 
efforts in the midst of overt hostility and general apathy provoked significant debate in 
Little Rock about the culpability of vocal segregationists and silent bystanders in 1957. 
After Huckaby's book was published and adapted for television in nationally broadcast 
docudrama, she faced charges that her memoir offered the public a "distorted" version of 
events that vilified the community-at-large and white students in the school in order to 
glorify the efforts of the administration to maintain calm and order. Several critics, 
particularly representatives of Central's student body, argued that Huckaby's narrative 
and the television adaptation of it lionized the administration at their expense and unfairly 
characterized their actions. In defining her own pragmatic position against the stance 
adopted by the majority of Little Rock's citizens, and using the dark days of segregation 
to underscore the city's progress in more recent years, these reviewers asserted that 
Huckaby obscured the generally progressive and "moderate" tone of the city's race 
relations twenty-five years earlier. 
Huckaby began writing a complete account of events inside Central "as soon as 
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school was out" during the summer of 1958.135 Fully expecting to return to her duties as 
an administrator when school reconvened, she suddenly found herself with more time to 
write on her hands when Governor Orval Faubus activated newly passed legislation in the 
fall of 1958 and closed all of the high schools in the city. Throughout Little Rock's "lost 
year," teachers reported to school and were paid as usual, but they sat in empty 
classrooms. In order to boost morale, they taught each other the subjects they specialized 
in, worked on curriculum development and other projects.136 As Huckaby noted, 
"freedom from paper grading and discipline of students" gave her time to write her 
memoir. She finished a draft of her manuscript and submitted it to a literary agent by 
May 1959.137 
The first version of Huckaby's manuscript was titled "Letters to Bill." The draft 
basically consisted of transcribed letters Huckaby had written to her brother in New York. 
The school administrator filled in narrative gaps and provided necessary context by 
interspersing "explanatory material" gleaned from newsclippings throughout the text. 138 
135 Elizabeth Huckaby, "The Gun Cabinet and Chance on the Long Road to the Publication of 
CRISIS AT CENTRAL HIGH 1957-1958," n.d., in Folder 10, Box 9, Huckaby Papers UALR. 
136 For more on the "Lost Year" see Sara Alderman Murphy, Breaking the Silence: Little Rock's 
Women's Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools, 1958-1963 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas 
Press, 1997); Vivion Lenon Brewer, The Embattled Ladies of Little Rock. 1968-1963: The Struggle to Save 
Public Education at Central High (Fort Bragg, CA: Lost Coast Press, 1999); Sondra Gordy, Finding the 
Lost Year: What Happened When Little Rock Closed its Public Schools (Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas, 2009). 
137 Huckaby, "The Gun Cabinet and Chance on the Long Road to the Publication of CRISIS AT 
CENTRAL HIGH 1957-1958," n.d., Huckaby Papers UALR. Sondra Gordy chronicles Huckaby's 
activities during the "Lost Year" of 1958-59 extensively in Finding the Lost Year, 24. 
138 Elizabeth Paisley Huckaby, "Letters to Bill," n.d., in Folder 13, Box 1, Series 1, Huckaby 
Papers UAF. 
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This rather uninspired and stilted format may have hampered Huckaby's efforts to find a 
publisher, or she may have thought better of it. The vice principal was one of 44 teachers 
fired by segregationist members of the Little Rock School Board during the year of the 
school closures for being "integrationists" or "collaborators." This controversial move 
outraged members of the community that had otherwise remained silent throughout the 
school crisis, and voters recalled the school board extremists. Huckaby and most of the 
other teachers were reinstated. 139 Nevertheless, this experience may have made the vice 
principal of girls reluctant to publish an account which compared the situation in Little 
Rock to Nazi Germany and contained her relatively unvarnished opinions of students, 
their parents, fellow administrators, the United States Army and the National Guard, the 
NAACP and the White Citizens' Council, and members of the community at large. After 
her brief flirtation with a literary agent, Huckaby put her manuscript away in her 
husband's gun cabinet for the duration ofher career at Central High School. She wrote, 
"Feelings were too high in Little Rock, the town too disrupted for me to consider trying to 
publish my account. I wanted to keep my job at Central, as I did till I retired in 1969."140 
However, in retirement, Huckaby found time to rework her manuscript into a 
more traditional narrative format. The vice principal framed her account as a "success 
story," which illustrated how the school administration persevered, protected the students, 
and kept the school open. It must be noted that in Huckaby's narrative, the "crisis" at 
139 For more on the reaction to the teacher purge see Murphy, Breaking the Silence; Brewer, The 
Embattled Ladies of Little Rock. 
140 Huckaby, "The Gun Cabinet and Chance on the Long Road to the Publication of CRISIS AT 
CENTRAL HIGH 1957-1958," n.d., Huckaby Papers UALR. 
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Central High School was first and foremost an administrative crisis, not a constitutional 
showdown. Consequently, in her view, the important question to be answered about the 
1957-58 school year was not whether the federal government had forcefully intervened to 
protect the constitutional rights of the nine black students, or even whether the school 
board's integration plan had been accepted and actively supported by the community, but 
whether the school administration was able to maintain some semblance of normalcy in 
the absence of these things. As she later explained, "the problem to be resolved," in both 
the written and filmed versions of Crisis at Central High, "is to maintain Central High as 
a school, in spite of organized opposition, for its 1800 students, including nine black 
students." In her view, the narrative presented "a success story in that this is 
accomplished, with many setbacks, by the students, teachers, and community."141 She 
contended that Central High's diverse student body in 1980 was a "living memorial to 
those students and adults whose fortitude helped it endure" through one of its greatest 
challenges. 142 
In her memoir, Huckaby presented a school under siege. While she and her 
colleagues struggled to make the best of a difficult situation, the vice principal suggested 
that others abdicated their responsibilities. Successful school desegregation was nearly 
impossible in the face of ongoing obstruction and harassment from the state government, 
the indifference of businessmen and civic leaders, the active opposition of segregationists, 
141 Untitled document typed from notes written in Huckaby's hand, n.d., in Folder 1, Box 10, 
Huckaby Papers UALR. 
142 Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at Central High (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1980), 222. 
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and "half-hearted" support from the Eisenhower administration in the form of inadequate 
numbers of troops and poorly enforced court injunctions. If Little Rock Central High 
School faced a "crisis" for the duration of the 1957-58 school year, it was because the 
school board and school administration carried the "complete burden" of trying to make 
school desegregation work with little or no help and plenty of interference from 
outsiders.143 
Elizabeth Huckaby knew from the moment the school board announced its 
desegregation plan that she would be involved in the implementation of the policies and 
procedures outlined by Superintendent Blossom. In Crisis at Central H~gh, Huckaby 
suggested that she "was eager to play [her] proper role in the integration of Central High 
School." Raised by a Presbyterian minister who proclaimed the value and common 
humanity of each individual, Huckaby felt "that the decision of the Supreme Court on 
May 17, 1954, had been eminently fair and just, that no public school system segregated 
by law on the basis of race was consistent with democracy."144 Before opening day in 
September 1957, she believed that integrating a southern high school would be a "new 
and exciting experience."145 However, while Huckaby may have been committed to 
making the school desegregation plan a success, her first loyalty lay with Central High 
School. As Little Rock's flagship institution, Central High had a reputation of academic 
and athletic achievement. Throughout the school year, the administrator was primarily 
143 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 218. 
144 lbid, 2. 
145 lbid, 12-13. 
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concerned with maintaining the school's high educational standards and keeping things 
running smoothly. She noted, "As public school teachers and administrators we felt that 
education was our major responsibility and integration a secondary problem in the social 
revolution of our times."146 Huckaby described the decisions and actions of school 
administrators from this perspective. 
As Vice Principal of Girls, Huckaby had been responsible for investigating 
incidents, counseling students, and enforcing discipline among the female student body. 
Consequently, her account necessarily focused on the day-to-day harassment of the Little 
Rock Nine, the punishment or dismissal of segregationist perpetrators, as well as the 
anxiety of the faculty and staff as they searched the building after bomb threats, tried to 
keep the school year on an even keel, and were harassed by segregationists and the state 
police. Throughout, Huckaby defends controversial decisions made by school officials, 
including the decision to only punish offenses witnessed by adults, but also the expulsion 
ofMinnijean Brown after she responded to repeated provocation and the reinstatement of 
a segregationist student leader. 147 Although she presented a litany of disciplinary 
problems and incidents created by the school's strident segregationists in her memoir, the 
vice principal also offered praise for the restraint of the majority of Central's students and 
a vigorous defense of the administration's policies. 
For example, early in the school year, Principal Matthews and Vice Principals 
146 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 48. This perspective was also evident in a conversation 
Huckaby had with Daisy Bates (Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 94-95). 
147 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High. 
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Huckaby and Powell agreed to punish only those offenses that had been witnessed by an 
adult. In practice, this meant that unless a teacher or a guard witnessed white students 
harassing the Little Rock Nine, nothing was done- even when evidence that harassment 
had taken place was presented (stolen books, scratches and bruises, ink spilled on 
clothing, spit, etc.), a black student could identify their assailant, and when the 
administrators themselves believed that a repeat offender was responsible. Although 
teachers were able to maintain their authority in classrooms for the most part, 
segregationist students took advantage of the administration's policy by isolating the 
African American students in dark comers, stairwells, bathrooms, and the twisting 
hallways of Central High to avoid detection. Students who were known to be "hard core" 
segregationists and "repeaters" were frequently "counseled" about their behavior but 
rarely suspended or expelled. 
In her memoir, Huckaby acknowledged the administration's disciplinary 
procedures "seems very little to have done," but defended the policy on two grounds. She 
suggested that if the administration had decided to punish the actions of white students 
without "teacher verification," they would have also had to punish reported actions of 
black students. She argued that this position would have quickly resulted in the expulsion 
of all nine African American students. She wrote, 
Had we ever begun accepting those reports without teacher verification, 
they would have been manufactured so fast and would have been so 
heinous that, in no time at all, no black student would have been in school. 
To protect [emphasis added] the Nine from such tactics, we frequently had 
to leave them vulnerable to indignities, except for the vigilance of teachers 
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and guards. 148 
She also contended that given the prevailing racial climate in Little Rock, school 
administrators had to be prepared to defend the suspension or expulsion of a white 
student because of an incident involving a black student without any doubt about what 
had transpired. Segregationist students and their parents often challenged such 
punishments, and segregationist organizations in the city decried and publicized them. 149 
Given this policy, the Little Rock Nine endured an endless litany of harassment 
during their year at Central High School. While they reported many of these incidents, 
especially when they involved vandalized lockers and stolen books (which were replaced 
by Huckaby), ruined clothing, and violent physical assault, they quickly learned that little 
came of such reports. Moreover, they were urged not to respond to provocation by their 
parents, the NAACP, and the school administrators. Huckaby counseled the African 
American students to "avoid physical retaliation" so that administrators "could be clear in 
labeling these occurrences as attacks, rather than scuffles."150 
148 Ibid, 85. 
149 Ibid, 96. 
150Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 97. According to Huckaby, one member of the Little Rock 
Nine had particular difficulty complying with these instructions- Minnijean Brown. When Brown 
responded to provocation on two occasions she was suspended, and then expelled. This administrative 
decision drew harsh criticism in the national media, particularly when considered in the light of the school's 
anemic response to harassment instigated by segregationist students. In Crisis at Central High, Huckaby 
defended the administration's decision by arguing that it was impossible to govern the school with 
Minnijean Brown present. In the text, Vice Principal Huckaby implied that Brown lacked the integrity, 
maturity, diplomacy, and the restraint that enabled the other eight black students to survive the year. She 
acknowledged that the segregationist students targeted Brown more than the others, but suggested that 
Minnijean had, at least in part, "selected herself' through her impulsive behavior (Huckaby, Crisis at 
Central High, 151). In a narrative which conceals the names of segregationist perpetrators out ofhope that 
their opinions have changed over time, the degree to which Huckaby dissected Brown's academic 
achievements, personality traits, and student record in justifying the administration's decision is quite 
remarkable. As one reviewer noted, "Mrs. Huckaby's handling of this student [in her narrative] is an 
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However, throughout Crisis at Central High, Elizabeth Huckaby does not accept 
full responsibility for the compromises that were made in the course of the year. 
Although the vice principal acknowledged that the school administration's disciplinary 
policies in relation to the harassment of the black students may not have always been 
effective, fair or just, she contended that their decisions permitted the school to continue 
functioning on a daily basis. In her opinion, the polices and practices she adopted were 
necessary to keep the school operative. Huckaby contended that "the complete burden of 
desegregation" had been placed on the school, 151 and that she, Principal Matthews, and 
Vice Principal Powell were charged with making the plan a success with only the support 
of the superintendent, five of six school board members, and "a few guards." She noted, 
"The 'moderate' leadership of the city was paralyzed. Federal officials were apparently 
not going to prosecute or punish those who were obstructing and opposing federal court 
orders. And there was the constant indication that the state government was actually 
assisting in, if not directing, the harassment." Under these circumstances, she asserted, 
"we could only try to outlast them."152 
At the end ofthe school year, the school board filed a petition for a delay in the 
implementation of the desegregation plan, arguing that it was impossible to maintain high 
exercise in blaming the victim" (Lee Lorch, book review of Crisis at Central High, by Elizabeth Huckaby, 
Freedomways 22, no. 4 [1982]: 261-263). As an adult, Minnijean Brown Trickey has refuted Huckaby's 
description of her as a "volatile" student, and believes she was targeted for harassment because she refused 
to conform to the racial expectations of white students and administrators (Elizabeth Jacoway and 
Minnijean Brown Trickey, ''Not Anger but Sorrow: Minnijean Brown Trickey Remembers the Little Rock 
Crisis," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 64, no. 1 [Spring 2005]: 12, 21, 23-25). 
151 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 218. 
152 1bid, 140. 
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standards of educational quality while teachers and students were distracted by the 
controversy surrounding desegregation. Huckaby's testimony in court bolstered this 
argument (and was cited in the Judge Lemley's decision granting the delay) when she 
admitted during questioning that she had been forced to abandon her English classes and 
devote her full time toward mediating conflicts between students, that there had been a 
breakdown in school "decorum" and "routine," and that "hoodlumism and vandalism" 
had been prevalent through the year. When cross-examined by Thurgood Marshall, she 
denied that she desired a return or retreat to segregation, but stated that she hoped that if 
the petition for a delay was denied that administrators "could get the full cooperation of 
the court that ordered desegregation" in terms of convicting those that violated 
injunctions against interference with the school plan and that she and her peers would 
"not be left as school people to handle the problems alone."153 
In Crisis at Central High, Elizabeth Huckaby made it clear that she felt public 
officials failed the students and faculty of Central High. She asserted that the city was 
devoid of moderate political leadership and compared Little Rock to Nazi Germany, 
pointing to "leaders in school and town silenced by physical threats, principally to 
children, and by economic boycotts." Segregationists speaking for a "rough and rather 
inarticulate mob" stepped into this void of leadership. 154 Although the segregationists 
were well organized, Huckaby did not believe they would have wielded much influence if 
others had not abdicated their responsibilities, and the Arkansas Democrat had not 
153 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 217-218; Gordy, Finding the Lost Year, 14-21. 
154 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 66. 
332 
published their "ridiculous charges" and "lies."155 She wrote, 
Our worst error in judgement had been underestimating the opposition to 
integration. The local leaders of that cause were, in general, not people 
one would call the backbone of the community .... [W]e did not understand 
that their lack of stature was fully compensated for by backing of the 
elected leaders of state government and- a realization that was much 
slower to come and even more bitter to accept- by the decision of the 
federal government, under various political pressures, not to act further in 
this crisis unless it was forced to do so. 156 
Indeed, while Huckaby placed the "major blame" for the crisis on Arkansas Governor 
Orval Faubus, she was very critical of the federal government's failure to support and 
enforce its own court orders. While Huckaby praised the "astonishing efficiency" of the 
101 st Airborne troops President Eisenhower deployed to Little Rock, she noted that 
mounting "political pressures" discouraged the federal government from intervening any 
further. She wrote, "the 'troops' had been a political mistake and the Eisenhower 
administration did not want to make any others."157 Consequently, the Justice Department 
did not prosecute any of the individual arrested outside the school for obstructing court 
orders, and military officials were eager to drawn down troop levels as quickly as 
possible- first the 101 st Airborne, and then the federalized Arkansas National Guard. 158 
From her perspective, the ongoing trouble in the school was exacerbated by the reduction 
155 On the reports of the Arkansas Democrat see Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 39, 
62. The Arkansas Democrat routinely reported the accusations of student segregationists that they were 
being treated unfairly by school administrators. In effect, the paper sustained ''the credibility of their 
charges without investigating their basis in fact" (Anderson, Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central 
High School, 103). 
156 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 51-52. 
157 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 51-52, 168. 
158 Ibid, 168. 
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of guards. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be underemphasized that Huckaby framed her account as a 
success story. Since she viewed the crisis as an administrative problem, she restricted her 
narrative to the events of the 1957-58 academic calendar. In her book, Ernest Green's 
successful walk across the stage to receive his diploma was described as the culmination 
of Huckaby's efforts throughout the school year. The administrator recalled, "We were 
delighted with the success of graduation, ebullient with the lifting of the tensions of the 
school year." Both the faculty and the leaders of the National Guard were glad to "to be 
relieved of their responsibilities."159 The book ended with no acknowledgment that Judge 
Lemley granted the school board a "tactical delay," or that this decision was overturned 
by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. It made no mention of the 
fact that Governor Faubus closed all four of Little Rock's high schools during the 1958-
59 school year to further prevent the implementation of the school desegregation plan, or 
that his action was declared unconstitutional in tum. Moreover, it offered no discussion 
of the teacher "purge" that specifically targeted Huckaby, Powell, and Matthews as 
"integrationists" or at best "cooperationists" along with 44 other teachers. It contained no 
reference to the efforts of the Women's Emergency Committee and the Stop This 
Outrageous Purge campaign to recall pro-Faubus school board members. 160 
Since these developments were not directly addressed, the text left the impression 
159 Ibid, 202-217. 
16° For more on the "Lost Year" of 1958-59 see Murphy, Breaking the Silence; Brewer, The 
Embattled Ladies of Little Rock; Gordy, Finding The Lost Year. 
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that everything proceeded smoothly after the school administration survived its crisis 
year. Indeed, the Epilogue jumped from 1958 to 1980 without pause, and Huckaby 
declared with pride, "The word in Little Rock now is not segregation. It is progress." 
She reported that Central remains a "great school." It maintained a 50/50 balance of 
white and black students through "a fleet of eighty buses that crisscross the town," and 
had been administered by two black principals. It had maintained is academic standards, 
and has retained a "tremendously loyal group of graduates." Huckaby asserted, "It stands, 
a living memorial to those students and adults whose fortitude helped it endure." After 
the commencement of 1958, she implied, Central graduated to the next phase of its 
existence .. 161 
After carefully crafting her account, Huckaby sent it to literary agent to find a 
publisher in the early 1970s, but there was no interest. 162 Twelve years after the crisis, 
the former vice principal's account was too dated to be considered "current" and too 
recent to be considered "history." Random House rejected the text, and wrote that the 
"material was interesting and salable five or ten years ago" but "the time for its 
publication is past." Other publishers concurred. W.W. Norton & Company praised 
Huckaby's writing but apologized: the "manuscript seems to us ten years to late." 
Likewise, Dial Press queried, ''why on earth didn't she write the book 10 years ago?" On 
the other side of the spectrum, American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc. rejected the 
161 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 221-222. 
162 Huckaby, "The Gun Cabinet and Chance on the Long Road to the Publication of CRISIS AT 
CENTRAL IDGH 1957-1958," n.d., Huckaby Papers UALR. 
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account as "too recent." Other publishers refused the manuscript because it did not "offer 
enough fresh material," was "written from too narrow a scope," or was "overdetailed." 
One publisher felt that they "would have a difficult time in reaching the market" with a 
book focused on civil rights and school integration because of backlash against "Black 
Power, etc."163 
However, by 1980, in a new political climate which encouraged a sense of 
detached distance from the civil rights struggles of the past, Huckaby's persistence finally 
paid off. After a book editor mentioned her account to a film producer, Huckaby's 
manuscript was picked up by Time-Life Films and readapted as a television docudrama 
by screenwriters Richard Levinson and William Link. When the project was first 
proposed, Huckaby was unenthusiastic about the prospect. She later recalled, "A movie 
was not what I really wanted. I wanted a book- something real" [underline original]. 
However, she agreed to sell the rights to her manuscript with the understanding that a 
book might be more salable if her story was broadcast on television. The strategy 
worked. After the script was written in the fall of 1979 and the film was in production, 
Huckaby finally found a publisher for her memoir- Louisiana State University Press- the 
same publisher which had picked up Brooks Hays' final autobiography Politics is My 
Parish. LSU Press moved quickly to try to get Huckaby's book published before the 
docudrama appeared on television, and Huckaby's "true narrative" hit book stands in 
October of 1980, nearly five months before the film aired on CBS in February the 
163 "Publishers' assessments of THAT YEAR AT CENTRAL HIGH by Elizabeth Paisley 
Huckaby," n.d. , in Folder 3, Box 7, Huckaby Papers UALR. 
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following year. 164 
When Time-Life Film acquired the rights to Huckaby's book for adaptation, they 
hired screenwriters Richard Levinson and William Link to write the teleplay and produce 
the film. Together, the writers had created the popular television series Columbo, and 
had written a number of "long form" television movies that explored controversial social 
issues such as The Whole World is Watching (student protest), My Sweet Charlie (racial 
stereotypes), That Certain Summer (homosexuality), The Gun (gun violence), and The 
Execution of Private Slovik (military execution). The two screenwriters believed that it 
was "possible to confront issue-oriented material head-on" and maintain ratings if it was 
done ''without polemicizing, without self-congratulatory grandstanding, and without 
putting the audience to sleep." Above all, they argued, it was important to maintain 
certain aesthetic standards; the exploration of controversial material should not become a 
gimmick or an end in itself. 165 When adapting material for a screenplay, Link and 
Levinson strove to remain "faithful" to the source material and to preserve the essence of 
what had appealed to them in the original text. 166 Consequently, the screenwriters wrote 
the teleplay from Elizabeth Huckaby's 800-page manuscript, and read her account against 
164 Huckaby, "The Gun Cabinet and Chance on the Long Road to the Publication of CRISIS AT 
CENTRAL HIGH 1957-1958," n.d., in Huckaby Papers UALR. See also Elizabeth F. Shores, "Central 
High teacher's journal to become film," Arkansas Democrat, October 10, 1979, in Folder 6, Box 5, 
Huckaby Papers UALR. 
165 Richard Levinson and William Link, Stay Tuned: An Inside Look at the Making of Prime-Time 
Television (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 27, 105-106. 
166 Ibid, 31. 
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other books, public records, and interviews they conducted with other participants.167 
The seasoned screenwriters were attracted to the idea of writing the script from 
the perspective of a vice principal inside Central High School. In press interviews, 
Levinson said, "What fascinated us was dealing with a major historical event without 
dealing with Eisenhower and Faubus ... You hire actors to play Eisenhower and Faubus 
and you wind up with a waxworks tableau."168 He recalled, "What appealed to us was the 
workings of a school under an extraordinary crisis."169 In the 1980s, "relatability" was a 
guiding principle in movies created for television. Networks striving to target their 
primary audience, women ages 18 to 49, created and supported storylines that this 
audience could relate to. Consequently, many television films from this era featured 
white, middle-class, female, and mostly suburban protagonists. Making a movie about 
the crisis at Central High from the perspective of Elizabeth Huckaby was in keeping with 
this broader trend. 170 
Although they wanted to retain historical veracity, Link and Levinson reworked 
the narrative, restructuring characters and dialogue "for dramatic effect," and placing a 
strong emphasis on Huckaby's actions in the script. Despite these changes, the 
screenwriters seemed to capture the essence of Huckaby's narrative on the screen. Like 
167 "VOICE asks the authors of 'Crisis at Central High': Is the way it Actually Happened?," 
Scholastic Voice 65, no. 9 (9 January 1981): 6-7. 
168 Jerry Buck, AP Television, The State, January 30, 198l,in Folder 6, Box 4, Huckaby Papers, 
UALR. 
169 "VOICE asks the authors of 'Crisis at Central High': Is the way it Actually Happened?," 6-7. 
170 Steven Lipkin, "US Docudrama and 'Movie of the Week," in New Challenges for 
Documentary, 2nd edition, Alan Rosenthal and John Comer, eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2005), 457. 
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the author, they restricted their story to the events of the school year and focused on 
developments inside the building rather than the constitutional drama often emphasized 
elsewhere. Huckaby's criticism of the "silent majority," local moderate leaders, and 
federal officials was more muted in the film than the book, but her critique of vocal 
segregationists and Governor Faubus was clearly evident. The film portrayed a school 
.administration struggling to keep the school open in a nearly "impossible" situation. 171 
As the date of broadcast approached Time-Life Films and screenwriters Link and 
Levinson actively promoted the project, picking up on Huckaby's emphasis on Little 
Rock's progress and describing the televised version of Crisis at Central High as "an 
American success story."172 Producer Fryeda Rothstein assured the local press that the 
film would not rebrand Little Rock as a "city filled with hate." Rather, she contended 
that the production should be viewed as an opportunity to "change Arkansas' image." 
She suggested, "It's a very pro-American story, that says cooler heads did prevail... We're 
not doing this to excoriate, to sensationalize." She hoped the film would demonstrate 
"how far we've come."173 In press interviews, screenwriter Richard Levinson was 
careful to distance the film from contemporary arguments about education and race. He 
was quick to point out that his film was about integration, "not about bussing." He stated, 
"There is ... a legitimate debate about bussing. But about integration there simply should 
171 Crisis at Central High, written by Richard Levinson and William Link, produced by Robert A. 
Papazian, directed by Lamont Johnson, based on the book by Elizabeth P. Huckaby., New York: HBO 
Videos, Time Life Productions, Inc., 1980. 
172 "VOICE asks the authors of'Crisis at Central High': Is the way it Actually Happened?," 6-7. 
173 Elizabeth F. Shores, "Central High teacher's journal to become film," Arkansas Democrat, 
October 10, 1979. 
339 
be no debate. It's the law of the land."174 Of course, this was a false distinction. As 
noted in Chapter Three, court-ordered busing was also the "law of the land" in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and in many residentially segregated communities, including Little Rock, it 
provided the only means of achieving substantial integration of the public schools. 
Indeed, the 50150 ratio of black and white students at Central High promoted by 
Huckaby's publishers and film producers was only achieved after the school district was 
ordered to achieve racial balance through busing. 
Nevertheless, this narrative emphasis was well-received by the national media. 
After broadcast, the television press applauded the performances and Joanne Woodward 
was nominated for an Emmy for her portrayal of Huckaby. 175 The national media 
embraced the film and asserted that it offered an "important lesson" about a "traumatic 
period" in United Stages history-- namely that despite the difficulties and the 
controversies involving race and the schools, the "good guys"- black and white- and the 
nation had emerged victorious.176 Bob Wisehart praised the film for refusing to "knuckle 
under to sensationalism, hyperbole or knee-jerk liberalism always popular with the 
Southern California film crowd." As he put it, the film was not a "an ode to a mean, dark 
time," but rather "a legitimate American success story" about a revolution "reasonably 
174 "VOICE asks the authors of 'Crisis at Central High': Is the way it Actually Happened?," 6-7. 
175 Martha Douglas, "33rd Emmy Awards Show Drops Streamlined Format, Brings on the Stars," 
Arkansas Gazette, September 12, 1981, in Folder 6, Box 4, Huckaby Papers UALR. For national reviews 
of the docudrama see John J. O'Connor, "TV: Little Rock, 1957: 'Crisis at Central High,"' The New York 
Times, February 4, 1981; Tom Shales, "High Noon in Dixie: 'Crisis at Central High'; 'Crisis' in Little 
Rock," The Washington Post, February 4, 1981, p. Bl. 
176 "Great drama, and history too," The Oak Ridger, February 11, 1981, in Folder 6, Box 4, 
Huckaby Papers UALR. 
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peaceful" in the making.177 Following the film's release, the faculty and staff at Central 
High commended Huckaby for her "role in preserving the image of Central High."178 The 
author also received kind letters of support from family, friends, former teachers, and 
some students (few of whom attended during the crisis years). Huckaby was "delighted" 
with this response. 179 
However, the book and film were not universally praised in Little Rock. Huckaby 
reported, "When this book came out and the movie, I heard such comments, what does 
she want to bring up all that old stuff for?"180 Some felt that the film vilified the citizens 
of Little Rock and demonized the white students at Central in order to underscore the 
tenacity of the Little Rock Nine and the heroism of a faculty under pressure. Despite the 
fact that Huckaby had dedicated her book to "those hundreds of boys and girls who were 
at Central during the integration crisis but whose names are not in this story because they 
were too busy just getting their lessons and helping at home ... to pay much attention to 
their elders' stir and confusion over the color of their classmates' skin,"181 she was 
criticized by Central High alumni for placing too much emphasis on the activities of 
segregationist students. 
177 Bob Wisehart, "A reluctant, 'little' hero," The Times-Picayune, February 1, 1981, in Folder 6, 
Box 4, Huckaby Papers UALR. 
178 Richard Maple to Elizabeth Huckaby, February 5, 1981, in Folder 5, Box 2, Huckaby Papers 
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179 Elizabeth Huckaby to Richard Maple, February 8, 1981, in Folder 5, Box 2, Huckaby Papers 
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180 Elizabeth Huckaby, interview with Sarah Murphy, August 18, 1992, in Folder 31, Box 1, 
Murphy Papers. 
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Ralph Brodie, President ofthe student body in 1958, released a public statement 
asserting that Huckaby's account was "distorted." Brodie argued, that because of 
Huckaby's narrow focus, 
her manuscript does not develop a historical background with which to 
judge the events or other people of that year; nor does it present with much 
force the attitudes or actions of the responsible white students at Central 
High, over 90% of the student body who, along with the faculty, obeyed 
the law and held the school together that year. Rather the docu-drama 
emphasizes the troublemakers who were a very small minority of the 
nearly 2,000 students at Central. Even though the news media made no 
distinction, the problems experienced inside Central that year were 
relatively minor compared to the problems outside Central and those 
invented by the media itself. In fact, those problems now seem 
insignificant compared to the problems other schools have experienced 
when faced with integration. There is a reason for that- there were many 
responsible people inside Central who, regardless of their personal feelings 
about integration, believed in both the rule oflaw and their obligations as 
citizens to obey and uphold the law. This part of Central's story is not as 
dramatic as the political confrontation nor as significant as the social 
change made that year, yet in the face of history I believe that it is equally 
important. 182 
Brodie emphasized that the vast majority of students had accepted Brown v. Board as the 
law of the land, along with the decision of the court in Cooper v. Aaron that Little Rock 
Central High would have to be desegregated. 183 He bridled at the suggested that the 
majority of students were "indifferent" about the integration process- "to say we were 
'indifferent' implies that we didn't do something we should have done, or that we did 
182 "Docu-drama Reflects Important 'Omission,' Ex-Student Leader Says," Arkansas Gazette, 
February 1, 1981, in Folder 13, Box 12, Subseries 5, Series 5, Bates Papers. 
183 Indeed, when asked as a student whether he thought the Little Rock Nine should be admitted to 
Central, Brodie replied, "Sir, it's the law. We are going to have to face it some time ... If it's a court order, 
we have to follow it and abide by the law" (Arkansas Gazette, September 10, 1957, as quoted in Chappell, 
"Diversity within a Racial Group: White People in Little Rock, 1957-1959," 188. More broadly, Chappell 
has argued that Central High school students expressed more moderate racial views than their parents). 
342 
something we shouldn't have done. And I don't think that's true." He also rejected the 
contention that even students who did nothing were "culpable" because they hadn't 
stopped the harassment. 184 In a small survey of members ofthe Class of 1958, the 
Arkansas Gazette reported that Brodie's classmates "generally agreed with him about the 
actions and attitudes of Central High students in 1957-58." Collectively they argued that 
"peace and quiet prevailed inside the school as far as they could tell... they had little 
contact with the black students and witnessed little or no harassment of them ... they 
didn't comprehend the significance ofthe event at the time ... [and] that they have no 
apologies to make."185 
In her correspondence, Huckaby responded to several students who had expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the docudrama directly. As a former English teacher, she 
pointed out that the TV version of her account was necessarily "built around conflict" and 
suggested that the film exaggerated the activities of the segregationist students because of 
the requirements of"good drama." She urged her critics to read her written account, 
asserting that it provided a more balanced picture. 186 
Huckaby believed that complaints about Crisis at Central High were due to the 
constraints of docudrama as a medium not her own limited perspective. In her 
correspondence with critics and in public statements, she repeatedly distanced her "true" 
184 Doug Smith, "What About the Others At Central High in 1957?" Arkansas Gazette, February 1, 
1981, in Folder 13, Box 12, Subseries 5, Series 5, Bates Papers. 
185 Doug Smith, "Class of '58 Vowed the Conflict Wouldn't Spoil Their Senior Year," Arkansas 
Gazette, n.d., in Folder 13, Box 12, Subseries 5, Series 5, Bates Papers. 
186 Huckaby, "The Gun Cabinet and Chance on the Long Road to the Publication of CRISIS AT 
CENTRAL HIGH 1957-1958," n.d., in Huckaby Papers UALR. 
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written narrative from the televised docudrama and insisted that she had little to do with 
the script or the film's production.187 Although William Link suggested that Huckaby's 
account already contained the "stuff of good drama," the former school administrator 
demurred: "My writing did not contain drama, so film writers have to put it in the script." 
Huckaby noted that the format required a "necessary consolidation of several characters, 
including teachers and students, and of different incidents."188 She expressed the most 
anxiety about her own portrayal in the film. Although Huckaby recognized the need to 
center the conflict around a "star," she worried that docudrama would make her actions 
seem "noble" and "dramatic," when she simply could not imagine how she "would have 
acted any other way."189 
Moreover, the vice principal privileged the veracity and accuracy of written 
accounts over visual presentations. Huckaby wrote, "No film that attempts to recreate 
events is entirely 'true."' The author noted, "Even documentary films which use only 
footage shot during the events themselves are 'untrue"' due to the limited perspective of a 
individual cameras, the selection, editing and reordering of footage, and narration which 
reflects the filmmaker's "perception" of the "significance or meaning" of events. Of 
course, written memoirs also suffer from similar limitations- the singular experience of 
187 Shores, "Central High teacher's journal to become film," Arkansas Democrat, October 10, 
1979. See also Roosevelt Thompson, "CBS to Air Movie on 1957 Crisis: Based on Diary Kept by Vice 
Principal," The Tiger, Central High School student newspaper, October 26, 1979, in Folder 6, Box 4, 
Huckaby Papers UALR. 
188 Thompson, "CBS to Air Movie on 1957 Crisis: Based on Diary Kept by Vice Principal," The 
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189 Shores, "Central High teacher's journal to become film," Arkansas Democrat, October 10, 
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the narrator, the selection and presentation of illustrative of events, and the interpretation 
of their significance. However, the vice principal asserted that docudramas take "further 
liberties with truth." The former English teacher noted, "Being a drama, [the film] must 
present a problem to be solved and must use events to build to a climax or conclusion, 
after some complications."190 
Huckaby seemed to think the film provoked controversy because it 
"fictionalized" her narrative. 191 In their book, screenwriters Richard Levinson and 
William Link acknowledge that the docudrama format can be particularly controversial 
when used for film on television. Although "Crisis at Central High" was not shot in a 
journalistic style, and the final edited product did not gesture toward the conventions of a 
documentary or attempt to capture the aura ofhistorical veracity through the use of black-
white film, its presence on the small screen and its broadcast through the same medium 
that had spread the iconic images of the crisis in 1957 threatened to collapse boundaries 
between fact and fiction. While novelists and playwrights have re-presented historical 
events for centuries, Levinson and Link observed, "There are those who are convinced 
that the TV viewer cannot easily distinguish between reality and dramatic truth, especially 
when they cohabit the same piece offurniture."192 Moreover; in a context in which even 
the legitimacy of archived footage from NBC news broadcasts was questioned as a 
190 Untitled document typed from notes written in Huckaby's hand, n.d., in Folder 1, Box 10, 
Huckaby Papers UALR. 
191 Elizabeth Huckaby to Johnny Heflin, February 1981, in Folder 5, Box 2,.Huckaby Papers 
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representation of"truth," it is hardly surprising that a format which re-enacted andre-
presented the iconic images of 1957 generated concern and criticism. 
Furthermore, the translation of a first-person written narrative into a visual 
presentation may have had an impact on the story's reception. In a book written in the 
first-person, the reader is continually reminded that the narrative represents the perception 
of a single individual. Indeed, in her text, Huckaby called attention to the fact that the 
book presented events and information "as I saw it, and it was told to me from day to day 
by those who were there." This disclaimer was repeated at the beginning of the film, but 
the viewer's attention was not called back to the Huckaby's unique perspective or 
reminded that the movie is based on her interpretation of events through the use of the 
first-person singular. Rather, viewers saw events unfolding from the camera's third-
person perspective. 193 The third-person perspective of the camera lens may have 
interfered with the viewers ability to understand the film as the product of Huckaby's 
unique experience, memory, and narrative choice (coupled with those of the 
screenwriters, the director, and the producer of the film). Consequently, the film lent 
Huckaby's subjective description of events a concrete sense of reality. 
However, complaints about Huckaby's narrative had as much to do about the 
content of her message as its mode of presentation. It should be noted that Central High 
student body president Ralph Brodie offered a critique of the vice principal's manuscript, 
not the televised docudrama. Overall, the film may have provoked more commentary 
simply because it reached a larger audience. Indeed, a close reading of the film and 
193 Crisis at Central High, HBO Videos, Time Life Productions, Inc., 1980. 
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Huckaby's text suggests that the film was actually more sympathetic than the book in its 
portrayal of Central's "silent majority" of white students. While the majority of white 
students "going about their business" were largely absent from the pages ofHuckaby's 
narrative, they had to be represented in the film because the medium required their 
presence as extras filling hallways, classrooms, stadiums, and stairs. Indeed, even the 
film's portrayal of the segregationist students was relatively mild since the filmmakers 
selected representative incidents of racial harassment to stand in for the litany of daily 
occurrences that make up a good portion of Huckaby's book. 194 
What was similar in the two presentations was Huckaby's description of constant 
conflict and tension throughout the school year, the lack of community support for the 
desegregation plan or sympathy for the school administrators' efforts, and the 
orchestrated efforts of segregationists to close the school and undermine public educators. 
Consequently, Huckaby's explanations did not appease many of Central High's white 
alumni. From their perspective, the school administrator and the screenwriters had 
exaggerated Central High's problems with desegregation and demphasized the successes 
of the year. In service of a carefully crafted narrative of local and national progress, the 
white students of Central High felt they had been demonized and vilified in order to 
underscore the bravery of school administrators and the Little Rock Nine, and to 
demonstrate how the city and nation had come from the dark days of segregation. 
Moreover, if some whites in Little Rock challenged Huckaby's account by arguing 
that the city had always been more racially progressive than its reputation allowed, many 
194 Ibid. 
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African Americans asserted that the book and the docudrama told the story from the wrong 
perspective. They argued that the "Crisis at Central High" was more than a series of 
administrative difficulties and disciplinary decisions, it was a constitutional crisis that 
raised questions about whether the nation would act decisively to protect African 
American civil rights affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. The principal 
players were not Vice Principal Huckaby, Principal Jess Matthews, or Superintendent 
Blossom. Rather, they were the members of the Little Rock Nine, their brave parents, and 
their mentors from the NAACP- Daisy Bates and Thurgood Marshall. While the stories 
of these figures may not have been considered "relatable" as television producers defmed 
the term, Little Rock's black newspaper, The Southern Mediator, asserted, "The Little 
Rock Story is Being Told Without the Help of Major Participants." Daisy Bates told 
reporters that she had prepared a screenplay based on her memoir published in 1962, but 
there was little interest because it was "the wrong color." Bates and several members of 
the Little Rock Nine refused to sign waivers to permit their real names to be used in the 
television docudrama based on Huckaby's narrative. 195 From their perspective, if the 
195 Tee Dolphus, "The Little Rock Story is Being Told Without the Help of Major Participants," 
The Southern Mediator, June 27, 1980, in Folder 13, Box 12, Subseries 5, Series 5, Bates Papers. See also 
Jacqueline Trescott, "Crusader from Little Rock: The Quiet Courage of Daisy Bates, The Washington Post, 
March 31, 1981, in Folder 6, Box 2, Huckaby Papers UALR. It must be noted that this preoccupation with 
the perspective of Little Rock's white citizens has shaped academic scholarship as well. It was not until the 
late 1990s that historian John A. Kirk began to publish the work that became his definitive study ofblack 
activism in Little Rock, Redefining the Color Line (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002). As 
Kirk has noted, for more than thirty years, ''the only black perspective on the school crisis was the memoir 
of Daisy Bates." In contrast, Kirk notes, firsthand accounts as well as secondary works "have focused on 
Governor Faubus, massive resistance and the White Citizens' Councils, local white clergymen, local white 
women, the local white business elite, white judges, and the interaction of (largely white-dominated) 
national and local political and legal issues" (Kirk, "The Little Rock Crisis and Postwar Black Activism in 
Arkansas," 224-225). Legal historian Tony A. Freyer has also underscored the importance of African 
American mobilization in Little Rock and has suggested that the "limited" victory secured by local black 
activists makes the outcome ofthe Little Rock school desegregation crisis more representative of the 
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school year could be characterized as a "success" it was because of the tenacity of the 
African American students and the black community at large, not because of school 
authorities. 
Some members of the Little Rock Nine and the city's black community not only 
challenged Huckaby's defense of administrative decisions and her description of a 
"successful" school year, they also refused to allow their story to be co-opted into the 
uncritical narrative of "progress" she and others penned and promoted. Like many others 
in Little Rock, Huckaby suggested that the city had overcome its problems with school 
desegregation. Indeed, the administrator even went so far as to assert that Central ran 
"much more smoothly" than "some of the newer desegregated schools" because of its 
"long experience" with integration.196 However, as noted in Chapter Five, while Huckaby 
bolstered these claims by pointing to the school's nearly 50/50 ratio ofblack and white 
students and record of high academic achievement, Little Rock was experiencing 
demographic changes and "white flight" that would soon result in racial imbalance, urban 
decay, and the "resegregation" of its schools. In the following years, calls for local control 
of schools, an end to cross-town busing and court oversight, the proliferation of private 
schools, and the creation of specialized magnet programs would become the new grounds 
for white resistance to school integration. In this context, Little Rock's transcendence and 
trajectory of the civil rights movement than the "clear-cut showdowns" enshrined in civil rights 
historiography (Freyer, "The Little Rock Crisis Reconsidered," 361-362). 
196 "Reminiscences of Elizabeth Huckaby," interview by Eisenhower Administration Project, 1972, 
transcript, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, New York, p. 6. 
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triumph over the past would be called into question with more and more frequency. 
Nevertheless, as these transformations were taking place in the early 1980s, book 
publishers and broadcasters promoted the narratives of figures they believed the majority 
of readers and viewers could relate to and respect. If Governor Orval Faubus' state's 
rights rhetoric failed to attract the interest of publishers, the respect of the city's 
newspapers, or the attention of many readers, the accounts of southern white moderates 
Brooks Hays and Elizabeth Huckaby were widely read, watched, and broadly discussed. 
While some criticism of these works was articulated by members of Little Rock's white 
community, for the most part, critics suggested that the "moral" position these "law-
abiding" citizens of the city had described was more widely shared than the authors 
allowed. The city's newspapers, and political figures like Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, 
embraced their stories as representations of the moderate forces at work in Little Rock in 
1957, and celebrated the ultimate triumph of their ideals. 
Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that during the early 1990s many whites 
in the city continued to embrace many of the "moderate" principles Hays stood for in the 
1950s thirty years later- gradual change, minimal compliance with court orders, local 
control of school desegregation, residential school attendance, the integration of 
"exceptional" students in "special" programs, and flexible application of federal law. Or 
that in the future, Elizabeth Huckaby's successors in Little Rock's school administration 
would continue to defend their policies and attempt to explain tumbling test scores, 
disciplinary problems, and racial isolation within Central High by suggesting they were 
doing the best they could under difficult circumstances with little or no assistance from 
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city, state, or national leaders. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
"YOUR INTERPRETATION DEPENDS ON YOUR DENOMINATION": 
REVIEWING AND REVISING THE DESEGREGATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
1990-1997 
When the gth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the District Court's 
consolidation order uniting Greater Little Rock's suburban and city schools, many 
observers in the city acknowledged that the limited interdistrict remedy applied to 
segregation in Pulaski County was just that- limited. School district officials hoped that 
the relatively balanced "elementary academies," interdistrict and magnet schools would 
help the city retain white school patrons, support for the public schools, and effortlessly 
integrated classrooms. However, the measure of Little Rock's desegregation plan would 
also rest on the success or failure of its "incentive schools" located in historically black 
neighborhoods. 
Unfortunately, by the mid-1990s it had become clear that many of the provisions 
outlined in the original desegregation settlement were not working: the number of white 
students in the district continued to decline, the incentive schools were not attracting 
diverse student populations, and compensatory education programs were not improving 
the achievement gap between white and black students. In this context, the Little Rock 
school district would argue with increasing force that the desegregation settlement was 
too detailed and hampered its ability to address these ongoing problems creatively. 
Officials also advanced a new definition of their obligations under the agreement. School 
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officials contended that they could only control whether or not programs outlined in the 
plans were implemented as promised- they had no control over whether specific 
provisions produced results. With the support of Supreme Court decisions issued in the 
1990s, district officials asserted that Little Rock's schools were being held to 
"unreasonable" standards that far exceeded those imposed on other school districts. By 
the eve of the 401h anniversary of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, the district 
and the African American plaintiffs involved in the case returned to the drawing board to 
reconsider and revise Little Rock's desegregation plans once again. 
Failing Incentive Schools 
For the district judge overseeing Little Rock's implementation of the settlement 
agreement, Susan Webber Wright, the children attending the city's incentive schools and 
the quality of their education were "at the heart of this controversy, at the heart of this 
case."1 The incentive schools were predominantly African American elementary schools 
located in the city's historically black neighborhoods. They had been accepted by the 
courts because the concentration of black pupils in these facilities allowed other schools 
to maintain a more even racial balance in Little Rock's majority-minority school district. 
The incentive schools were also provided with double funding to finance the 
implementation of compensatory education programs meant to remedy educational 
deficits that were the product of generations of racial discrimination and segregation. 
Publicly, Little Rock school district officials expressed hope that extra programs offered 
1 Cynthia Howell, "Judge to Let Schools Try Home Remedies: Wright Eases Desegregation Away 
From Court Supervision, Toward Local Control," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 4, 1995, p. lA. 
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at the schools- like preschool, after school activities, and summer instruction- would 
provide an "incentive" for white transfer students to voluntarily desegregate the schools. 
District officials promised to "sell" the programs at the schools and "recruit" white 
students for this purpose. However, some officials, like Superintendent Mac Bernd 
acknowledged that the incentive schools were part of a "deal" struck by the parties who 
negotiated the plan. Bernd asserted, "There was an acknowledgment that it would by 
very difficult to integrate those inner city schools. There was an acknowledgment that the 
whites in the city wanted to go to their neighborhood school. And so the bargain was put 
together as: 'Listen, we'll leave those schools basically black, double fund them, in 
exchange for whites getting their area schools. "'2 
After several years, it became clear that the incentive schools were an ineffective 
desegregation remedy. Although the district's magnet schools continued to attract white 
students from the Little Rock school district, and increasingly, from the surrounding 
suburban districts, the incentive schools located on the east side of the city with 
overwhelmingly black student populations did not hold the same allure.3 Moreover, even 
with the concentration of black pupils in the incentive schools, the favorable racial mix of 
students promised in Little Rock's regular "elementary academies" failed to materialize 
as the percentage of white students attending public schools in the district continued to 
2 Joseph Feldman, et al., "Still Separate, Still Unequal. The Limitations of Milliken II's 
Educational Compensation Remedies" (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Graduate School of 
Education, April1994), p. 31-32. 
3 "Magnet Interest Soaring: Suburban kids transferring to LR," Arkansas Gazette, April 27, 1991. 
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decline.4 Test scores revealed that the compensatory education programs meant to 
address educational deficits among African American students in the city's poorest 
neighborhoods were failing to close the "achievement gap" between white and black 
children. Instead, the achievement gap was widening. 5 At secondary schools, African 
American pupils continued to be tracked into remedial classes, while white students 
attended honors and advanced placement courses in disproportionate numbers. 6 In 
summary, whether one viewed them as a means of maintaining racial balance in the 
majority of the city's elementary schools, "super magnets" designed to attract white 
transfer students through special programs and extra resources, or as centers of education 
specifically designed to prepare the city's most disadvantaged students to compete on a 
more even playing field, the incentive schools were failing on all counts. 
This failure ignited debate in the city about whether the desegregation settlement 
was poorly designed and/or poorly implemented by the school district. John Walker, the 
attorney for the black plaintiffs in the desegregation case, complained that district 
officials had failed to deliver on their promise to actively recruit white students to the 
incentive schools. Indeed, the Office of Desegregation Monitoring confirmed that 
"virtually no recruiting" was done before the beginning of the 1993 academic year and 
that the schools were under-emolled. District Judge Wright found that the school 
4 Cynthia Howell, "LRSD Tries to Redefine 'Balance': Short of Racial Goals, It Seeks to Relax 
Rules," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, March 28, 1995, p. lA. 
5 Robert McCord, senior editor and columnist, "Failing scores mean district must do more for 
students," Arkansas Gazette, May 14, 1991. 
6 Cary Bradburn, "LR schools insensitive, report says: Intervenors see racism," Arkansas Gazette, 
July 26, 1991. 
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district's failure to recruit students and implement special programs in the incentive 
schools was the result of"some serious foot-dragging and delay." Although school 
officials sent 10,000 letters to white parents in the district asking them to consider 
enrolling their children in the incentive schools in 1994, only 5 children applied. 
Federal Desegregation Monitor Ann Brown told the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette 
that while the district's plans looked good on paper, these statistics demonstrated that 
"nothing has been accomplished."7 For example, although the desegregation plan 
indicated that the district's biracial citizens committee would monitor recruiting efforts, 
district officials never made any recruiting reports to the committee and they were not 
requested. The district failed to contact special-interest, community or church groups 
about the program as promised. Parent recruiters hired by the district were not told to 
make incentive-school enrollments a priority. Moreover, the school district perpetuated 
imbalance in the schools by releasing seats reserved for white pupils to black children 
without seeking the approval of the courts. The Office of Desegregation Monitoring 
reported, "The LRSD approached incentive school recruitment in a sporadic, piecemeal 
fashion."8 This lackluster effort to recruit white transfer students indicated that the 
7 Cynthia Howell, "Only 5 Whites Preregister for LR's Incentive Schools," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, March 9, 1994, p. lB. 
8 Cynthia Howell, "Incentive-School Recruiting in LR Gets Bad Report Card," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, March 16, 1994, p. 3B. In September 1994, District Judge Susan Weber Wright did 
grant LRSD permission to release seats reserved for whites in the incentive schools' early childhood 
program to black pupils. Wright stated, "Although the district's failure to recruit white children for 
reserved spaces undermines integration, the court does not wish the district to also deny early childhood 
education to black children." Although the black plaintiffs in the case, the Joshua intervenors, supported 
the decision, they warned that the schools would become even more imbalanced as young children moved 
into upper grades due to the district's ''trickle up" method of attempting to desegregate the schools (Danny 
Shameer, "Judge lets blacks fill school places meant for whites," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 8, 
1994, p. 2B). 
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district had never been seriously committed to desegregating the incentive schools. 
Furthermore, an independent study by the Harvard University Graduate School of 
Education found that the educational programs meant to remedy long-term educational 
deficits attributable to segregation and discrimination in the district had been poorly 
designed. The 1989 Desegregation Plan listed more than 100 specific programs that were 
to be made available to students at the incentive schools. However, scholars Joseph 
Feldman, Edward Kirby and Susan E. Eaton found that most ofthe school officials 
interviewed "characterized the plan as a conglomeration of expensive techniques and 
programs, rather than a coherent, goal-oriented strategy for ameliorating the educational 
deficits of minority students." The research team reported that the educational remedies 
were "developed without specific goals attached to them." Somehow, "it was simply 
assumed that the assortment of programs would ... solve the low achievement ... in the 
heavily minority schools." The district's evaluations focused exclusively on whether 
programs had been implemented, rather than their educational results. Indeed, even if the 
district wanted to alter the programs offered at the incentive schools, the specificity of the 
desegregation plan constrained them from doing so.9 The district could add and fund 
more programs in the schools- the plan was "a floor not a ceiling"- but it could not 
replace any of those in place with new programs without falling out of compliance with 
the settlement agreement. 10 
9 Feldman, et al., "Still Separate, Still Unequal," 32-38. 
10 Appeal of Little Rock School District, Pulaski County Special School District No.1, North Little 
Rock School District, and Mrs. Lorene Joshua, 949 F.2d 253 (8th Circuit 1991). 
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After analyzing conditions in Little Rock and several other cities with similar 
programs, the Harvard scholars determined that although Milliken II compensatory 
I 
remedies were supposed to "restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position 
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct," remedial education programs 
were "often poorly designed" and were rarely rigorously evaluated to determine whether 
the programs had any positive "effect on student achievement or educational 
opportunity." Moreover, some school districts had been allowed to abandon the 
programs without any substantive study of whether educational deficits that persisted as a 
vestige of segregation had been eliminated. Feldman and his colleagues concluded that 
courts and school districts like Little Rock increasingly viewed such programs primarily 
"as temporary financial obligations to the plaintiff class .... a way for school districts and 
states to serve a temporary and superficial punishment for prior intentional segregation." 
More broadly, the research team urged school districts to pair such programs with racial 
integration, noting that racial isolation and high levels of concentrated poverty had always 
been correlated with low achievement.11 In their view, Little Rock's failure to 
desegregate its incentive schools hampered its ability to meet its broader educational 
goals. 
For their part, many Little Rock school officials argued that the district was acting 
in good faith and fulfilling the commitments outlined in the desegregation settlement. 
They attributed the district's ongoing problems to the plan's rigid design, rather than a 
failure to implement its promises. If achievement gaps persisted, they contended, it was 
11 Feldman, et al., "Still Separate, Still Unequal, 64. 
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because the specificity of the plan constrained administrators and educators by not 
allowing them to dismantle ineffective programs and try alternatives. After interviewing 
all of the LRSD's living former superintendents, a University of Arkansas at Little Rock 
(UALR) task force was left with the impression that the courts had unintentionally 
created "an environment so complex" that it "cripple[ d]" local decision making. The 
district was like the giant in Gulliver's Travels, "tied down with a thousand strings" and 
the obligation to fulfil even "minor" requirements outlined in the desegregation plan.12 
Furthermore, officials suggested that the school district had been unable to integrate the 
incentive schools or meet racial-balance guidelines because there simply were not enough 
white students left in the system by the mid-1990s to meet the benchmarks set in 1989.13 
As the UALR task force put it, "all gains [in white student enrollment] from the school 
district boundary changes in 1987 had been erased by 1996."14 Persistent white flight to 
the surrounding county had brought the Little Rock school district back to where it started 
before the application of an interdistrict remedy. 
Reframing Desegregation Obligations 
Increasingly, Little Rock school district representatives argued that the goals 
outlined in the plan were not only virtually unachievable, in light of recent Supreme 
12 University Task Force on the Little Rock School District, Plain Talk: The Future of Little 
Rock's Public Schools (Little Rock: University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 1997), p. 84-86. 
13 The district's regular elementary schools were supposed to maintain ratios between 60 and 40 
percent for black and white students. However by 1995, 67 percent of pupils enrolled in the LRSD were 
black, and only seven of the district's regular elementary schools fell within these guidelines. Even more 
disheartening, four of the city's five incentive schools had virtually all-black enrollments ranging from 92 to 
97 percent (Cynthia Howell, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 31, 1996, p. 1A). 
14 University Task Force on the Little Rock School District, Plain Talk, 38. 
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Court decisions, they were also unreasonable since they held the school district to a much 
stricter standard than other districts that had been declared unitary and released from 
court oversight. 15 Indeed, in the early 1990s, the Supreme Court issued a series of 
decisions that provided lower federal courts with guidelines in determining how and 
when to release previously segregated school districts from court supervision and their 
affirmative responsibility to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination. 
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell (1991), the Court held that 
federal supervision of local school systems was always intended as a "temporary 
measure" designed to facilitate a "transition to a system of public education freedom of 
racial discrimination." School boards were entitled to be released from court supervision 
if they had "complied in good faith" with their desegregation degree, and if they had 
eliminated "vestiges of past discrimination ... to the extent practicable" [emphasis added]. 
Under court supervision, school boards had an affirmative duty to dismantle dual school 
systems and were required to demonstrate that their actions did not perpetuate 
discrimination. However, after a district had been released and declared unitary, school 
boards regained authority over local school decisions and were not obligated to maintain 
patterns of student assignment or other measures that had previously been required by the 
courts. In the future, plaintiffs would bear the burden of demonstrating that a board's 
action, such as a decision to return to racially isolated neighborhood schools, was 
motivated by an intent to discriminate instead of other demographic or educational 
15 Cynthia Howell, "2 Experts Ann Schools for Motions: Districts Want Out of Court 
Supervision," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, May 16, 1996, p. lB. 
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factors. 16 
A year later, the Supreme Court held in Freeman v. Pitts (1992) that districts 
could be released from their desegregation responsibilities "in incremental stages," 
provided that the relaxation of judicial supervision would not undermine a desegregation 
decree as a whole. The court ruled that school districts which had satisfied the court's 
requirements for desegregation in particular areas, such as student assignment or the 
equalization of facilities, could be released from oversight and the application of further 
remedies in those areas. The Rehnquist court held that "partial relinquishment" of court 
supervision could "be an important and significant step in fulfilling the district court's 
duty to return the operations and control of schools to local authorities." In particular, 
Freeman v. Pitts established that district courts could relinquish control over student 
assignment in communities where school boards could demonstrate that racial imbalances 
and racially identifiable schools were not ''traceable" to previous constitutional violations. 
Although school boards bore the burden of proof in this regard, the high court indicated 
that the bar would not be set very high. The court stated that "vestiges of segregation that 
concern the law in a school case may be subtle and intangible, but they must be so real 
that they have a causal/ink to the de jure violation being remedied." The court noted that 
a school board's case was strengthened by the passage of time, and the intervention of 
demographic changes, which made it "less likely that a current racial imbalance in a 
school district is a vestige ofthe prior de jure system." Moreover, the causal link 
between past violations and current conditions was "even more attenuated" if the district 
16 Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
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could demonstrate that it had complied with its desegregation decree "in good faith."17 
In Missouri v. Jenkins (1995), the Supreme Court held that states and school 
districts could be released from their obligation to provide remedial education programs 
(like those in place in Little Rock's incentive schools) even if students had made no 
appreciable gains in achievement. The state of Missouri had been ordered to fund 
Milliken II compensatory and remedial education programs in Kansas City. Once it had 
implemented the programs, the state wanted to be released from future obligations to 
continue funding them. The lower district and appeals courts rejected this petition, noting 
that educational deficits in the district had not been erased. However, the Supreme Court 
held that measurable improvement in test scores and minority achievement was not the 
"appropriate test" in determining whether the state had fulfilled its obligations. In 
Freeman, the Court had suggested that demographic factors independent of de jure 
segregation could affect the racial composition of schools. In Missouri, the Court held 
that "numerous external factors" that were not vestiges of state-sponsored segregation, 
and were beyond the control of school districts or state authorities, could affect minority 
student achievement. Consequently, courts should not hold school districts and state 
authorities responsible for such deficits indefinitely. Rather, remedial programs should 
be tailored to address specific deficits attributable to de jure segregation to the "extent 
practicable." On remand, the majority's opinion noted that remedial education programs 
had been in place in Kansas City for seven years, suggesting that the appropriate test in 
such cases was the implementation of programs for a relatively brief period of time, after 
17 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
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which remaining deficits could no longer be considered "vestiges" of past 
discrimination.18 
In their pursuit of interdistrict consolidation in the 1980s, Little Rock school 
district representatives had convincingly argued that residential housing segregation in the 
city, racially isolated schools, and disparities in white and black student achievement 
were the legacy of decades of state-sponsored discrimination and segregation. However, 
in the wake of these three Supreme Court decisions, district officials increasingly argued 
that they had desegregated the city's schools to the "extent practicable" in the absence of 
a consolidation decree. Moreover, they relied heavily on the suggestion that many of the 
remaining inequalities in the system were the product of "external factors" beyond their 
control. Over the course of the 1990s, the district pushed for a relaxation of court 
oversight, arguing that officials had worked diligently to fulfil their obligations under the 
desegregation settlement. After studying the standards established by the Supreme Court, 
officials believed the school district was entitled to unitary or at least partial unitary status 
and the return of "local control." 
With the Supreme Court's new emphasis on the "duty" of district courts to return 
school operations to local officials as quickly as possible, District Judge Susan Webber 
Wright called the parties in the Little Rock school desegregation case together tore-
examine the settlement agreement. As the revenue stream negotiated with the State of 
Arkansas to fmance expensive programs in the incentive schools was diminishing, Wright 
hoped to help the parties "refine the plans and make them more workable." First, she 
18 Missouriv. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
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planned hearings to determine which parts of the settlement plan had been satisfied and 
could be released from court monitoring under Freeman v. Pitts. Following this step, she 
planned to gather additional information and solicit the opinions of desegregation experts 
about which parts of the plan were not being implemented appropriately or needed to be 
modified. The judge suggested that revising the plan and adequately remedying the 
constitutional violations at issue was the quickest way out of court.19 
In its preparation for the hearings, the Little Rock school district identified 2,097 
desegregation obligations outlined in the 1989 settlement agreement. In July 1995, Dr. 
Russ Mayo, Associate Superintendent for Desegregation, reported that the district had 
"completely complied" with 42 percent of its commitments. An additional 51 percent of 
the commitments were "ongoing" such as efforts to balance enrollments in the city's 
schools. Mayo acknowledged that the school district had failed to meet benchmarks 
established for student assignment, but told the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette that the goals 
established were "mathematically impossible" due to demographic changes. Mayo also 
reported that the district had overlooked or postponed the remaining 7 percent of its 
obligations, but was actively trying to fulfill them or had added them to "the district's list 
of things to do."20 
By the following April, Mayo's estimate had almost inexplicably climbed to 70 
percent compliance. To reach this more optimistic statistic, Mayo had changed his 
19 Cynthia Howell, "Wright Offers to Lead Schools Out of Court," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
March 10, 1995, p. 1A; Cynthia Howell, "School Desegregation Hearing Set: Federal Court Perhaps Will 
Lighten Hand on Local Districts," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, June 21, 1996, p. lB. 
2° Cynthia Howell, "What Must LRSD Do? 2,097 Things: Desegregation Suit Spawns 
Obligations," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, July 20, 1995, p. 3B. 
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measure from "complete compliance" to "substantial compliance." While it was easy to 
determine whether the school district had constructed a school or hired a certain number 
of teacher's aides, other goals were more difficult to assess. Mayo suggested that reading 
the settlement agreement was "analogous to reading the Bible ... Your interpretation 
depends on your denomination." In Mayo's interpretation, the district had substantially 
complied with a measure if it had implemented it, regardless of outcome. "We 
substantially comply when we implement a provision as required by the plan, but that 
doesn't always mean we get the results we want," the associate superintendent of 
desegregation explained. 21 This analysis leaned on the logic of the recent Supreme Court 
decisions: the appropriate test was whether a school district had acted in "good faith" to 
eliminate segregation and discrimination to the "extent practicable." An outcome-based 
measure unfairly held school administrators responsible for the impact of"numerous 
external factors" beyond their control. 
In the spring of 1996, the school district was convinced that its demonstration of 
good faith was sufficient to merit unitary status and complete release from court 
supervision. Miraculously, within a month of Mayo's report of70 percent compliance, 
Little Rock's first African American superintendent, Henry Williams, stood in front of 
Central High School and enthusiastically proclaimed that the district had complied with 
96.3 percent of its 1,753 desegregation obligations (344less than previously reported). 
Williams asserted that the district had amassed "irrefutable evidence" that the district had 
21 Cynthia Howell, "LRSD works to show compliance: officials try to prove they're implementing 
desegregation plan," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, April4, 1996, p. 2B. 
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"done all that we can do." In his view, the presence of some racially isolated schools and 
the widening achievement gap should not preclude the LRSD from moving forward. 
School district attorney Chris Heller stated that the motion he planned to file in court 
would demonstrate that the city's schools were more desegregated than others that had 
been released from court oversight. 22 
Others were less sanguine about the school district's prospects before District 
Judge Susan Webber Wright. The superintendent had made his announcement without 
consulting the school board, and School Board President Linda Pondexter was openly 
skeptical about the administration's claims. "This is nothing short of a miracle," she 
observed. "Six months ago we were told that we an unworkable desegregation plan. 
Today we have 96 percent compliance. I believe in Biblical miracles, but let's get real." 
John Walker, attorney for the African American families in the case, also dismissed 
Williams' claims. In his view, black students continued to receive unequal educational 
opportunities and disparate treatment. Walker said that he might "feel better" about 
circumstances in the LRSD if he saw "evidence" that confirmed Williams report. But he 
warned, "I think it will prove to be very embarrassing to this district if it turns out that 
what he said is untrue."23 
22 Cynthia Howell, "LRSD 96.3% in Compliance, Williams Says," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
May 9, 1996, p. 1A. 
23 Cynthia Howell, "LRSD 96.3% in Compliance, Williams Says," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
May 9, 1996, p. lA. The Joshua intervenors, the black plaintiffs Walker represented, had released reports 
as early as 1991 complaining that the school district was "insensitive to black children and to the black 
community in general," citing the lack of multicultural curriculum, a failure to recruit black teachers, the 
disproportionate discipline of black students, and the placement of black pupils in remedial courses (Cary 
Bradburn, "LR schools insensitive, report says: Intervenors see racism," Arkansas Gazette, July 26, 1991). 
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In the days that followed, the Little Rock School District's case was bolstered by 
the expert testimony of two witnesses in the settlement plan hearings. Dr. Herbert 
Walberg, an educational psychologist from the University of Chicago, asserted that black 
student achievement was strongly correlated to the socioeconomic status of a student's 
parents rather than the degree of integration present in a school. While he acknowledged 
some benefits to having students from different socioeconomic backgrounds attending 
school together, Walberg also cautioned that disadvantaged students could become easily 
"frustrated" in such environments. Moreover, he suggested that educational institutions 
could only have a limited impact on reducing academic disparities, since students spent 
only 1 0% of the time between birth and age 18 in school. Only "extraordinary measures" 
such as strong teaching methods, a longer school year and day, a high-quality curriculum, 
and homework could narrow the achievement gap. When asked if he knew of any school 
district that had successfully reduced the achievement gap, Walberg claimed that he knew 
of none. In short, Walberg suggested that if school districts had no hope of ameliorating 
the "external factors" which impinged on black student achievement, they should not be 
obligated to do so.24 
In the area of student assignment, Dr. David J. Armor, a research professor at 
George Mason University, testified that it was "counterproductive" to try to establish 
racial balance in minority-majority school districts. As a proponent of voluntary 
desegregation programs, Armor spoke favorably of the kinds of institutions Little Rock 
24 Cynthia Howell, "Desegregation Won't Close Black, White Gap, Expert Says," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, May 14, 1996, p. 1A. Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School 
District No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 146. 
367 
had established like magnet schools and neighborhood schools with compensatory 
education programs. However, he suggested that it was unreasonable to apply racial 
balance standards to the district's regular elementary and secondary schools. To meet 
balance standards, like those in Little Rock with a variation of 20%, it would be necessary 
to mandate student assignment, a technique Armor insisted led to white flight. Moreover, 
Armor suggested that such a policy had virtually no benefits and that mandatory 
integration had no impact on black student achievement. Armor claimed that Little 
Rock's goals were more "stringent" than the norm- these "unrealistic and unobtainable" 
benchmarks made it difficult for the school district to comply with the plan's standards. 
Armor reported that other school districts had been released from court supervision 
without meeting racial balance requirements after they were exempted from compliance 
due to "extenuating circumstances. "25 
However, the third school desegregation expert to testify in the case, Dr. Gary 
Orfield of Harvard University, provided a different perspective on Little Rock's persistent 
problems. Orfield characterized Walberg and Armor as "resegregationists." He 
countered their claims that integration had a limited impact on achievement disparities, 
noting that the test scores of black students had improved across the nation in the 
previous generation. He also rejected their arguments that educational programs could 
not continue to build and improve upon this success. As the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette 
25 Cynthia Howell, "Strict Racial Standard Astounds School Expert," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
May 15, 1996, p. 1A. For more of David J. Armor's views, see Forced Justice: School Desegregation and 
the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special 
School District No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 146. 
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summarized his testimony: "Students learn in school... otherwise there would be no use 
for education." Orfield urged the school district to weed out programs that did not 
produce results through an ongoing evaluative process. He also encouraged the Office of 
Desegregation Monitoring to measure student achievement instead of focusing on the 
mere implementation of promised programs. After the hearing, Little Rock School Board 
President Linda Pondexter applauded Orfield's "educational philosophies" and suggested 
that they offered the district a more productive blueprint for the future.26 
Nevertheless, Superintendent Henry Williams asserted Orfield's statement did not 
damage the district's case and that Walberg and Armor's testimony substantiated his 
belief that the district was more desegregated than other school systems that had already 
been released from court supervision. Attorney Chris Heller hoped that the testimony 
gave the parties in the case and the community-at-large a "better perspective" on the 
successes of the school districts in Pulaski County. "It looked like the districts were 
failing to achieve certain goals, when, in reality, the problem was that unrealistic goals 
were set in the first place," he stated. "We believed when we developed the plans that 
certain things could be done. But no one in the country has been able to achieve them.'m 
Indeed, many ofLittle Rock's opinion-makers seemed to have come to the same 
conclusions. For example, a widely-distributed University of Arkansas at Little Rock 
26 Chris Reinolds, "Harvard Professor Rebuts 2 Other Segregation Experts," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, May 31, 1996, p. lB. For more of Gary Orfield's views see Orfield, et al., Dismantling 
Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education (New York: The New Press, 1996). 
27 Cynthia Howell, "2 Experts Arm Schools for Motions: Districts Want Out of Court 
Supervision," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, May 16, 1996, p. lB; Chris Reinolds, "Harvard Professor 
Rebuts 2 Other Segregation Experts," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, May 31, 1996, p. lB. 
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(UALR) task force report, Plain Talk: The Future of Little Rock's Public Schools, 
contended that the "major cause of resegregation" and white flight from district was the 
"continued insistence of the federal courts that racial balance be achieved" rather than 
persistent racial prejudice. 28 The report also suggested that there was "little reason to 
expect any appreciable narrowing of the test score gap in the foreseeable future." The 
task force asserted, 
School districts in fact control their employees, their facilities, their 
budgets, and their curricula; and they can deliver on commitments 
involving these matters. But school districts do not control the decisions 
of parents or students. Nor do they control the motivation and learning of 
students- at best they can work to influence them.29 
The UALR task force concluded that the desegregation plan had become an "impediment 
to progress" and "business as usual revised one more time" would make little impact on 
conditions in the district. Instead, the task force emphasized that federal courts had begun 
to "back away from the desegregation paradigm" prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
encouraged the district to seek unitary status and relief from court oversight. In a more 
flexible environment, the UALR task force hoped the community would overcome racial 
mistrust and develop a voluntary plan that made a "credible commitment" to "quality 
educational opportunities for all children of the city."30 
Columns and editorials in the city's newspapers also asserted that the district's 
28 Although the task force report was not released until1997, academics involved in the project 
spoke with school officials and conducted surveys in the district during the 1996 calendar year. University 
Task Force on the Little Rock School District, Plain Talk, 26-27. 
29 University Task Force on the Little Rock School District, Plain Talk, 107. 
30 University Task Force on the Little Rock School District, Plain Talk, 91-92. 
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intractable problems were beyond the control of school administrators. Robert McCord, 
senior editor and columnist of the Arkansas Gazette (and former editor of the Arkansas 
Democrat in 1957), asserted that the public schools had "solved their discrimination 
problems better than anyone else." Larger issues that affected the schools- such as 
"poverty, crime, segregated neighborhoods, unemployment, shortages of minority 
teachers"- were "byproducts of discrimination that the schools cannot solve." 
Applauding the Supreme Court's decision in Oklahoma v. Dowell, McCord appealed for 
the return of local control and neighborhood schools. The city's problems could only be 
solved "by responsive politicians working in governments that allow everyone to have a 
say," not the courts. McCord dismissed claims that a return to majority rule would 
undermine minority rights. Only a "super cynic," he said, could believe that the schools 
would resegregate under an integrated staff, faculty, and school board.31 
Persistent reports about the widening achievement gap in the district provoked 
more comments in the local press. In columns and editorials, the relatively liberal 
Arkansas Gazette attributed the declining scores of black students on performance tests to 
the legacy of segregation and poverty, and urged schools and students to attack the 
problem directly. Senior editor Robert McCord stated firmly, "There's no evidence of an 
31 Robert McCord, senior editor and columnist, "Court turns comer on busing," Arkansas Gazette, 
January 24, 1991. For McCord's views on the Little Rock school desegregation crisis of 1957 see his 
essay, "An Unexpected Crisis," inA Life is More than a Moment: The Desegregation of Little Rock's 
Central High, 50th ann. ed., (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 9-26. McCord asserts that Little 
Rock was relatively progressive, and that the crisis itself"stunned" the city. He minimizes the violence that 
gripped the city that September in comparison to "other school-integration crises around the country, 
several of them much more serious than Little Rock's." The eruption of a confrontation related to school 
desegregation had to happen somewhere, he concludes. 
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inability to leam."32 However, after the Gazette was purchased by its more conservative 
rival the Arkansas Democrat, this kind of assessment became more muted. John R. Starr, 
the managing editor who led the campaign to put the Gazette out of business, continued 
to write columns in the 1990s. Starr, who had "already given up on Little Rock public 
schools," urged readers to consider "the possibility that the gap in performance is not the 
fault of the schools" and could not be closed there. Black and white students in the city 
were being offered the same educational opportunities. Consequently, he argued, the 
"real reasons" for achievement disparities were "either hereditary or environmental." 
Starr acknowledged that some observers claimed that poverty put black students at a 
disadvantage, but he dismissed these arguments as "convenient excuse[ s ]" that had not 
been accepted when he was in school. This left readers to consider hereditary deficits. In 
this regard, Starr suggested that it would be "futile" to advance an argument that black 
students were genetically inferior to their white counterparts, not because it was incorrect 
but because anyone who dared to do so would be "trashed" and people in positions of 
power refused to "consider that possibility."33 
With opinions like these circulating in the city, it was no surprise that despite 
strong encouragement from District Judge Wright to revise and improve their 
desegregation plan, Little Rock School District attorneys filed a motion seeking release 
from court supervision in 1996. The district assured the court that if it was granted 
32 Robert McCord, senior editor and columnist, "Falling scores mean district must do more for 
students," Arkansas Gazette, May 14, 1991. 
33 John R. Starr, columnist, "Gloomy School News Performance Gap Widens," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, July 14, 1995, p. 7B. 
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release, LRSD would not return to a segregated system. District attorneys underscored 
the fact that the power structure of the system had changed- both the superintendent of 
schools and the school board president were African American.34 In response, John 
Walker- attorney for the black plaintiffs- filed a motion ofhis own asking the Judge to 
create an independent director to oversee the incentive schools, arguing that the district 
had failed to implement the program properly in eighteen different areas.35 Previously, 
Walker had accused the district of mismanaging and even sabotaging the incentive 
schools by failing to implement promised programs, permitting high staff turnover, and 
cycling students in and out of the institutions. 36 
Wright did not receive the school district's petition hospitably. "Mr. Walker has 
more or less thrown down the gauntlet now," Wright warned the attorneys. "He has 
stopped just complaining to me about my failure to do something about the Little Rock 
School District's failure to implement the plan. We now have a motion before the 
court .... And I must rule on it." Regardless of whether the plan was poorly designed, the 
district had not implemented it well. "Maybe it was too hard; maybe you just didn't do it. 
But your district agreed to do it," Wright stated. Indeed, the judge underscored the fact 
that the settlement agreement in question had not been imposed by the courts but crafted 
34 Cynthia Howell, "Desegregation Job Done, So Let Go of Schools, LR District Asks Court," 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, May 18, 1996, p. 1A. 
35 Cynthia Howell, "School Desegregation Effort Heads into Crucial Exams," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, June 10, 1996, p. 1A. 
36 Cynthia Howell, "Judge to Let Schools Try Home Remedies: Wright Eases Desegregation Away 
from Court Supervision, Tow~d Local Control," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 4, 1995, p. 1A; 
Cynthia Howell, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, November 26, 1995, p. 1A. 
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by the parties themselves, including the school district. Once again she called on the 
parties to negotiate towards appropriate revisions and modifications. 37 By the beginning 
of the 1996 school year, Judge Wright formally refused to release the district from federal 
court oversight after reviewing a number of reports that indicated the district had "fallen 
short" of complying with its desegregation obligations.38 
Renegotiating the Settlement Agreement 
Negotiations over revising Little Rock's desegregation settlement in 1996 and 
1997 were undoubtedly influenced by the Supreme Court's most recent school decisions. 
However, the decisions did not have the direct impact in Little Rock that they had 
elsewhere. While other communities operated under court-ordered desegregation plans, 
parties in the Little Rock case had negotiated an agreement- a contract- that passed 
constitutional muster in 1990 and was approved by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. 39 
This court-approved agreement had become the "law of the case."40 Little Rock's 
37 Cynthia Howell, "School Desegregation Effort Heads into Crucial Exams," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, June 10, 1996, p. 1A. Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 
No. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 37. 
38 Cynthia Howell, "Board to Judge: Reconsider order on desegregation case," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, September 27, 1996, p. 3B. Although the Little Rock School District was not released 
from court supervision, the district was formally dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit in 1997. This 
was perceived by the district as a "housekeeping matter" and "symbolic reminder" that litigation over 
desegregation issues in the case had ended. The court's remaining role was to monitor that district's 
implementation and compliance with the settlement agreement (Little Rock School District v. Servicemaster 
Management [81h Circ. 1997]; Cynthia Howell, "LR schools win appeal for dismissal from suit," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, December 16, 1997, p. B1). 
39 Little Rock School Districtv. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th 
Circuit 1990). 
40 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 971 F.2d 160 (81h 
Circuit 1992). 
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desegregation obligations were both constitutionally and contractually required.41 
School district attorneys and Attorney John Walker agreed that the Supreme Court's 
decisions did not change the terms of the settlement, and that some of the obligations in 
the plan were stronger than those that had been overtumed.42 
Moreover, in 1991, the appeals court had provided explicit guidelines to the 
district court for considering any modifications to the plans. The court affirmed that the 
desegregation obligations outlined in the plan were "solemn and binding commitments"-
modifications could effect the "margins" but not the "core" of the settlement. The court 
of appeals identified seven "crucial" components of the agreement "with respect to which 
no retreat should be approved" by the district court: 
(1) double funding for students attending the incentive (virtually all-black) 
schools; (2) operation of the agreed number of magnet schools according 
to the agreed timetable; (3) operation of the agreed number ofinterdistrict 
schools according to the agreed timetable; (4) intradistrict desegregation of 
PCSSD according to the agreed timetable; (5) the agreed effort to 
eliminate achievement disparity between the races; ( 6) the agreed elements 
of early-childhood education, at least in the incentive schools; and (7) 
appropriate involvement of parents.43 
Notably, while the appeals court insisted on the operation of balanced magnet and 
interdistrict schools as well as the double-funding of incentive schools, it did not 
41 Little Rock School District v. North Little Rock School District; Pulaski County Special School 
District, 451 F.3d 528 (8th Circuit 2006); Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School 
District No. I, No. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 37. See also Cynthia 
Howell, "Loosen desegregation reins, district asks judge," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 27, 
1997, p. 1A. 
42 Cynthia Howell, "Justices Reject Scores as a Test of Segregation," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
June 13, 1995, p. 1A. 
43 Appeal of Little Rock School District, Pulaski County Special School District No. I, North Little 
Rock School District, and Mrs. Lorene Joshua, 949 F.2d 253 (8th Circuit 1991). 
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underscore the necessity of maintaining racially balanced student bodies in Little Rock's 
traditional schools. On the other hand, the appeals court had emphasized the importance 
of eliminating achievement gaps between black and white students, a desegregation factor 
the Supreme Court had urged judges in other cases to "sharply limit, if not dispense with" 
in Missouri v. Jenkins four years later. 44 
In the negotiations, the Little Rock School District proposed a plan which retained 
the district's cor~ commitments as outlined by the appeals court in1991, but eliminated 
many of the specific obligations enumerated in the 1989 settlement. The district 
contended, "The activity-based system prescribed by the current plan has distracted 
LRSD from its primary mission: education ... The specific activities and timelines in the 
current plan promote a checklist mentality." Moreover, the district noted that most of the 
architects of the plan no longer worked in the district, and many of school system's 
current employees no longer endorsed the programs put in place by their predecessors. 
Rather than specifying compliance mechanisms, the school district's attorneys proposed 
that the parties in the case reaffirm the settlement's core commitments, but provide 
"education professionals" with significant leeway in determining how to meet their 
goals.45 
Little Rock's proposal was entitled the "Revised Desegregation and Education 
Plan." Significantly, it substantially altered racial balance guidelines in the district's 
44 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
45 Cynthia Howell, "Loosen desegregation reins, district asks judge," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
September 27, 1997, p. lA. 
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traditional schools. The plan proposed to eliminate satellite attendance zones designed to 
bring students from distant homogenous neighborhoods together within one school. 
School officials contended that due to demographic changes, many black students were 
no longer being bused to predominantly white schools. Instead, they were being bused 
out of black neighborhoods to attend predominantly black schools elsewhere and the 
satellite zones no longer served their purpose.46 In the future, Little Rock's students 
would be assigned to traditional elementary, junior, and high schools based on 
"reasonably compact and contiguous attendance zones." District officials promised not to 
make "sudden or drastic" changes to the assignment plan, and pledged to reconfigure 
attendance zones to make as many of these neighborhood schools as desegregated as 
possible. However, the proposal emphasized, 
the desegregation of LRSD to the extent practical does not require that 
every LRSD school be racially balanced .... According, nothing in this 
revised plan shall be construed as requiring a particular racial balance at 
every LRSD school or as obligating LRSD to recruit students to obtain a 
particular racial balance in every LRSD school. 
The plan would rely entirely on voluntary desegregation mechanisms, like minority-to-
majority transfers, for schools that fell outside the preferred 40/60 ratioY 
In exchange for this relaxation of racial balance requirements, the district 
recommitted itself to improving and equalizing educational opportunities for all students. 
46 Under the proposed plan, the only school that would retain its satellite was Central High School. 
By the mid-1990s, the neighborhoods surrounding the school were predominantly African American. In 
order to maintain the celebrated integration of this famous "flagship" institution, white students from a 
satellite zone in western Little Rock would continue to be assigned to the school (Cynthia Howell, "Plan 
would re-emphasize neighborhood LR schools," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 2, 1998, p. Al). 
47 Cynthia Howell, "Desegregation plan allows slow change," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
January 20, 1998, p. AI. 
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For example, the district promised to improve minority achievement scores, and to create 
programs designed to ensure that administrators did not discriminate against black 
students in course placement or counseling services. Officials also pledged to reduce 
discrimination in student discipline and participation in extracurricular activities.48 The 
district suggested that its proposal reflected its "belief that excellent education programs," 
rather than student assignment plans, provided "the best (if not only) opportunity for 
meaningful long-term desegregation." Raising the specter of white flight, school 
administrators warned, "Unless LRSD can turn the focus back to education, LRSD will 
likely become a single-race, African-American school district."49 
Although Little Rock school officials had previously downplayed their ability to 
close minority-majority achievement disparities, they now promised to do just that. With 
the district's rejection of an "activity-based system," the plan no longer listed programs 
that should be implemented to address educational deficits. Instead, Little Rock promised 
outcome-based results. Superintendent Les Carnine suggested that these provisions were 
a "safeguard" that would ensure that the district was "more accountable" for student 
performance, and claimed that the revised plan would enable the district to transfer 
resources from "transportation and monitoring" back into the classroom to meet its 
48 Cynthia Howell, "School Board Oks Roberts' revamp of desegregation plan: Judge's approval 
could bring LR district out of federal court supervision by 2001," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 
19, 1997,p.9B. 
49 Cynthia Howell, "Loosen desegregation reins, district asks judge," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
September 27, 1997, p. 1A. 
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goals.50 
Little Rock district attorneys emphasized that this aspect of the plan, as well as 
promises to retain magnet and interdistrict schools, provide early childhood programs, 
and promote parent and community involvement reinforced the "core commitments" of 
the 1989 agreement. 51 It is likely that they hoped this demonstration of good faith would 
persuade the courts and the black plaintiffs in the case to approve their revised plan 
despite its return to neighborhood school assignments. Moreover, the district also had a 
financial incentive to improve minority test scores. The balance of a $20 million loan 
from the state of Arkansas, negotiated to :fmance the original plan, would be forgiven if 
the district could raise the achievement scores of black pupils within 90 percent of their 
white counterparts by the year 2000.52 However, with the deadline looming, a survey of 
Little Rock's teachers indicated that only 2 percent of white teachers and 17 percent of 
black teachers thought it was "very realistic" that this kind of dramatic improvement 
could be achieved in the space of a few years. 53 
Although he initially opposed the LRSD proposal, Attorney John Walker 
eventually agreed to most ofthe proposed changes after consulting with the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund and engaging in negotiations with a U.S. Department of Justice 
5° Cynthia Howell, "Carnine: desegregation plan stresses achievement," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, January 27, 1998, p. B3. 
51 Cynthia Howell, "Hammered-out desegregation plan awaits Wright's OK," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, January 25, 1998, p. Bl. 
52 University Task Force on the Little Rock School District, Plain Talk, 22. 
53 Terence Samuel, "Legally Equal and Very Separate: Some at Little Rock Wonder if 
Desegregation Brought the Opportunities it Promised," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 28, 1997, p. lB. 
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mediator. Walker extracted additional promises to hire a desegregation and education 
expert to help the district develop programs designed to implement the provisions of the 
plan. In the area of student achievement, the district committed to engage in ongoing 
evaluations of its compensatory and remedial education programs, and to modify or 
replace those that were ineffective. As far as Walker was concerned, this provision 
eliminated the district's oft-repeated excuse that the specificity of the previous settlement 
agreement prevented them from reaching their educational goals. The district also agreed 
to hire an ombudsman to act as an advocate for students involved in disciplinary 
procedures and to investigate complaints of discrimination. 54 
In the area of student assignment, Walker may have thought he would be fighting 
a losing battle if he opposed the elimination of the satellite zones and the weakening of 
racial balance guidelines. As noted earlier, intradistrict racial balance was not listed by 
the court of appeals as a fundamental component of the earlier agreement. Moreover, 
Freeman v. Pitts had provided school districts with the means to escape mandatory 
student assignment plans if they could argue, as the Little Rock school district now was, 
that demographic shifts which were not directly linked to de jure segregation and past 
constitutional violations affected a district's ability to maintain racial balance. 55 
Walker also ceded ground in another important area. The proposed term for the 
Revised Desegregation and Education plan was a mere three years, from the fall of 1998 
54 Cynthia Howell, "Rights attorney backs school plan: Walker, LR board members trade hugs; 
accord would end court role," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 17, 1998, p. AI. Little Rock School 
District v. North Little Rock School District; Pulaski County Special School District, 451 F.3d 528 (81h Cir. 
2006). 
55 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
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to the spring of 2001. At that time, under the new agreement, the judge would release 
Little Rock from court supervision and grant the school system unitary status unless 
another party could prove that the district had not complied with the plan. If Walker and 
the black plaintiffs he represented, known collectively as the Joshua intervenors, wanted 
to challenge the district's claims of compliance they would bear the burden of proof in 
demonstrating that vestiges of discrimination remained. 56 Typically, the burden of proof 
did not shift to plaintiffs until after a school district had been declared unitary. This 
concession substantially weakened Walker's position in future negotiations and court 
procedures. 
Attorney Walker's agreement to these conditions surprised many observers. In 
2002, it came to the district court's attention that the school district and the lawyers for 
the African American plaintiffs had been engaged in simultaneous negotiations over the 
settlement plans and attorney's fees. The school district had agreed to pay the Joshua 
intervenor's counsel a lump sum of$2,000,000 to monitor Little Rock's progress with 
school desegregation in the 1990 settlement agreement, and the attorney's request for 
additional payment was denied by the district court in 1996. Nevertheless, during 
settlement renegotiations, LRSD agreed to pay the plaintiffs lawyers nearly $850,000 in 
additional fees for past and future monitoring work. When this agreement came to the 
attention of the district court eight years later, the sitting judge conceded that there was no 
evidence that the exchange of funds had a direct impact on the outcome of the settlement 
56 Cynthia Howell, "Rights attorney backs school plan: Walker, LR board members trade hugs; 
accord would end court role," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 17, 1998, p. Al; Little Rock School 
Districtv. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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agreement, and acknowledged that Walker and his colleagues had "manned the barricades 
of civil rights litigation in Arkansas for over four decades" and earned a "reputation for 
never yielding on matters of principle." Nevertheless, he noted that the timing of these 
simultaneous negotiations "raised troubling questions and lingering doubts" and fed the 
perception that school desegregation litigation district had become a "cottage industry" 
that lined the pockets of lawyers at the expense of the interests of students. 57 
However, in April1998, Judge Susan Webber Wright was unaware of these 
behind-the-scenes developments and approved the revised plan agreed to by the parties. 
In doing so, she expressed serious reservations about its relatively vague outlines. As it 
was written, the revised agreement presented "new challenges in regard to monitoring." 
Although the Little Rock school district rejected the "checklist mentality" imbedded in 
the previous agreement, the enumeration of specific desegregation obligations and 
programs had made it relatively easy for the court to determine whether LRSD was in 
compliance. Conceivably, one's "denomination" could have even more of an influence 
on the interpretation of this new Revised Desegregation and Education Plan. However, 
according to the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Wright concluded that even if a judge was 
"uncertain about whether a settlement agreement will succeed in integrating a school 
district or is concerned that insufficient detail may impede a settlement's successful 
implementation," these concerns in and of themselves did not render the agreement 
"unconstitutional on its face." Ultimately, the parties in the case had agreed to the terms 
57 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 
WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002) 34, 38-44. 
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of the agreement and consented to continued monitoring. 58 Whether or not their plan led 
them out of court quickly was up to them. 
58 Cynthia Howell, "LR desegregation plan OK'd; Schools may be released from court supervision 
by 2001," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, April11, 1998, p. Al. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
"THIS PLACE IS NOT AN ALIBI FOR ATONEMENT": 
THE CREATION AND DEDICATION OF THE CENTRAL HIGH MUSEUM 
AND VISITOR CENTER 
In the midst of these protracted debates about the success or failure of Little 
Rock's school desegregation programs, the city prepared to mark the 40th anniversary of 
the 1957 crisis. Billed as the ''year of reconciliation" by state and city officials, 1997 
offered Little Rock's power brokers the opportunity to celebrate the city's progress in the 
field of racial relations while penitently promising to work toward resolving persistent 
grievances. The anniversary presented the chance to reclaim the mantle of moderation for 
the entire city. However, for some, this shining rhetoric and powerful symbolism stood in 
stark contrast to the ongoing resistance to meaningful racial justice and desegregation in 
the Little Rock school district. As plans to observe the anniversary and establish a 
museum dedicated to the 1957 Little Rock school desegregation crisis unfolded, African 
American community leaders and activists argued that the commemorative efforts were 
little more than a public relations ploy designed to reshape the city's public image and to 
mask the real face of race relations in Little Rock. 
"Past Little Rock": Creating the Central High Visitor Center 
Interest in building a museum or visitor center dedicated to interpreting the history 
of the 1957 school desegregation crisis coalesced in Little Rock during the early 1990s. 
A variety of community groups, organizations and individuals had a vested interest in 
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shaping the history of crisis that would be presented to visitors touring the facility. 
Consequently, during the museum planning process, deliberations about the purpose of 
the museum, the historical narrative it would share, and its mandate in the present 
unfolded over the course of several years. Ultimately, the ability of civic leaders and 
public history professionals to seize control of this process shaped the content of the 
exhibition and its relationship to the rhetoric of "reconciliation" that marked the 40th 
anniversary commemoration as a whole. 
Little Rock's interest in creating a civil rights museum coincided with similar 
efforts in cities across the south. In the space of a few short years, museums and 
institutes dedicated to preserving and interpreting local and national histories of the civil 
rights movement emerged throughout the region, including the Southern Poverty Law 
Center's Civil Rights Memorial in Montgomery (1989), the National Civil Rights 
Museum in Memphis (1991), the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute (1992), the National 
Voting Rights Museum in Selma (1993), the Martin Luther King Jr. National Historic 
Site in Atlanta (1996), and the Ralph Mark Gilbert Civil Rights Museum in Savannah 
( 1996). 1 In the city of Little Rock itself, as many as six new museum projects were under 
development during the 1990s, such as the Arkansas Museum of Science and History, the 
MacArthur Military Museum, and the Mosaic Templars Cultural Center, which was 
dedicated to preserving Arkansas' black history after Reconstruction. The Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette referred to the proliferation of museum projects as the most visible 
1 Jim Aucbmutey, "Tributes to a cause: A roundup of museums and monuments commemorating 
the movement that changed the South- and the nation," Atlanta Journal-Constitution, August 24, 1997, p. 
2R. 
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manifestation of a movement it dubbed "Past Little Rock." The proponents of these 
projects not only viewed them as opportunities to "enlighten, enrich, and encourage" 
Arkansans to "visualize" their history, but also as tourist destinations and economic 
engines that could provide the city with a "gateway to its future. "2 
In Little Rock, as elsewhere, interest in building a museum focused on the city's 
civil rights history was supported by a diverse coalition of individuals and organizations 
pursuing a variety of agendas. Across the region, some civil rights veterans supported the 
creation of these institutions as a means to memorialize the movement, to critique 
contemporary racial relations, and to inspire future activism. As Owen J. Dwyer has 
noted, "antiracist communities have long memorialized the suppressed history" of the 
African American experience, and chronicled acts of ''transgression, resistance, and 
oppression." However, in previous years, these memorial activities had been "largely 
confined to the private and semipublic spaces associated with African-American 
communities."3 For example, in 1987, the national board ofthe NAACP met in Little 
Rock and organized an observance to recognize the 30th anniversary of the school 
2 Jake Sandlin, "Living in the Past: With such a long and varied history, it's no wonder that Little 
Rock is becoming a city of museums. But where will we get all the fmancing?" Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, November 16, 1996, p. IE. 
3 Owen J. Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Place, Memory, and Conflict," 
Professional Geographer 52, no. 4 (2000): 662. Dwyer has also developed his arguments in several other 
publications, including his chapter "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Contradiction, Confirmation, 
and the Cultural Landscape, in The Civil Rights Movement and American Memory, ed. Renee Romano and 
Leigh Raiford (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2006), his dissertation, "Memorial Landscapes 
Dedicated to the Civil Rights Movement" (PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 2000), and Owen J. Dwyer 
and Derek Alderman, Civil Rights: Memorials and the Geography of Memory (Chicago: Center for 
American Places, 2008). 
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desegregation crisis.4 In 1991 and 1992, the organization honored former NAACP State 
President Daisy Bates by sponsoring two consecutive educational summits in her name 
to discuss the "unfinished agenda" of school desegregation and to chart a course for the 
future. 5 The appearance of civil rights museums on the public landscape was, in part, a 
measure of the increased political influence of the African American community and 
sustained efforts to reshape and restructure public cultural institutions.6 
For public historians and academic scholars, civil rights museums also offered an 
opportunity to reshape the memorial landscape. For previous generations, preservation 
efforts and interpretations of the American experience had revolved around the lives and 
homes of the elite. With the advent of the new social history, a new generation of 
scholars attempted to shift the focus to the lives of everyday people. Civil rights 
museums provided public history professionals and academics with a unique opportunity 
to chronicle the development of a social movement from the "bottom up." Moreover, 
instead of valorizing social and economic inequities, civil rights museums provided 
public historians with the opportunity to present a "vigorously public and authoritative 
challenge to white supremacy." That said, most exhibitions focused on the black freedom 
struggle did not escape from the traditional leitmotifs of public history, and the movement 
4 Ronald Smothers, "At Little Rock, 30 Years Later: Starting Over," The New York Times, 
September 27, 1987, p. 1. Elizabeth Darwin Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth 
Anniversary of the Desegregation of Little Rock Central High School" (MA Thesis, University of Arkansas 
Little Rock, 1999), 12-15. 
5 Programs and proceedings related to the1991 and 1992 Daisy Bates Educational Summits are 
housed in the NAACP Papers. See Folders 6 and 9, Box 79, Part VII; Folders 1 and 2, Box 171, Part VIII, 
NAACP Papers. 
6 Brundage, The Southern Past, 273-274, 301-302; Glenn T. Eskew, "The Won Cause," 40. 
387 
was frequently tied to the framework of a more traditional political narrative with an 
emphasis on prominent leaders, institutions, court cases, and legislative victories. 7 
Others who promoted the projects emphasized more pragmatic and profit-driven 
concerns. Real estate developers and urban planners embraced the projects as a means to 
revitalize decaying African American neighborhoods, which were frequently still 
suffering from the crippling effects of previous incarnations of urban redevelopment. 8 
Tourism officials and entrepreneurs pointed to the potential of these sites to tap into a 
growing market for "heritage tourism," particularly for African American travelers. 
However, in his documentation of the development of the Birmingham Civil Rights 
Institute, Glenn T. Eskew observed that in order to "tum a stigmatized past into a 
commercial asset," these memorial sites must offer visitors a "palatable," "constructive 
message" to "accompany the negative racial history." In many of the civil rights 
museums built in the 1990s, exhibit developers placed an emphasis on the "moral 
righteousness of nonviolent protest," the "potential of interracial unity," and the "success 
of qualified integration" at the expense of serious analysis of contemporary racial 
problems and contentious issues.9 Despite concern about the impact the imperatives of 
tourist industry may have on the these sites, other scholars have noted that the promise of 
7 Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Place, Memory, and Conflict," 660-671; 
Eskew, "The Won Cause," 38. 
8 Brundage, The Southern Past, 305; Dwyer, "Memorial Landscapes Dedicated to the Civil Rights 
Movement,"15. 
9 Eskew, "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute and the New Ideology of Tolerance," 29-30, 52. 
W. Fitzhugh Brundage has also commented on the lack of analysis on contemporary concerns (The 
Southern Past, 319). 
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tourist revenue in several communities overrode protests about the presentation of this 
contentious period in the nation's past.10 
Across the region, local and state politicians also embraced these projects. While 
state officials were partially motivated by the desire to court African American votes, 
civil rights museums were also appealing because of their ability to attract investment in 
the tourism industry and local businesses. Moreover, as Owen Dwyer has noted, civil 
rights memorials offered "state actors seeking to solidify (quite literally in granite and 
marble) the discursive foundations of their office ... a way to clearly separate themselves 
from the past and project a progressive image into the future."u Politicians pointed the 
creation of civil rights museums as tangible evidence of racial progress. The construction 
of "history" museums dedicated to the movement provided the palliative reassurance that 
struggles that marked the 1960s and 1970s had been resolved and were relics of the 
past. 12 As Birmingham Mayor David V ann put it in relation to the development of a civil 
rights institute in his city, "the best way to put your bad images to rest is to declare them 
history and put them in a museum." 13 
In Little Rock, all of these constituencies shaped the interpretation of the school 
desegregation crisis presented to the public in the 1990s and beyond. However, not all 
10 Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Place, Memory, and Conflict," 667. 
11 Dwyer, "Memorial Landscapes Dedicated to the Civil Rights Movement," 83. 
12 Brundage, The Southern Past, 310~311; Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Place, 
Memory, and Conflict," 666. 
13 Eskew, "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute and the New Ideology of Tolerance," 29~30, 45-
46. 
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actors involved in the memorialization process have or are able to leverage their 
influence, connections, and political resources as effectively as others. In Arkansas' 
capital, a handful of well-positioned white business leaders and politicians effectively 
steered and controlled the museum planning process, amplifYing their own interpretation 
the 1957 crisis, while defining its relevance and limiting the influence of other 
stakeholders. With their support, public historians and exhibit designers also played a 
significant role in shaping the fmal exhibit, while a community planning committee was 
redefined as an audience "focus group." 
By most accounts, local restauranteur Mark Abernathy was one of the first vocal 
advocates for a civil rights museum in Little Rock. Abernathy felt that the city could not 
move ahead until it dealt with and embraced the events of 1957.14 From his perspective, 
the desegregation of Central High School was nothing to be ashamed o£ "I've been 
amazed that Little Rock has never dealt with the issue," he later told reporters. "There 
were as many heroes as there were villains; a lot took place to be proud of. It was a part 
of history we were sitting on and doing nothing with."15 Abernathy felt that the crisis 
could best be understood as "part of the growth of a nation, [the] growth of a society." 
Little Rock could "celebrate what happened" rather than hide from it. The restauranteur 
believed that part of the reticence to engage with this past was due to ignorance and 
uncertainty about what had transpired four decades earlier. Abernathy contended that few 
14 Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation 
ofLittle Rock Central High School," 18-19. 
15 Elizabeth McFarland, "Central High integration observance brings call for reconciliation," 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, August 17, 1997, p. lB. 
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people his age or younger had a strong grasp of the history of the crisis, and a museum or 
interpretive center could help educate the next generation of Little Rock citizens about the 
events of 1957.16 The development of such a project presented an "opportunity to benefit 
from our past, clear away some debris and move forward," he said. 17 
According to Abernathy, he encountered active opposition to this idea in the 
1980s from several white business leaders. However, in 1991, he convinced the alumni 
board of the Greater Little Rock Chamber of Commerce's Leadership Institute to allow 
him to pursue the museum concept as a possible future project. As he developed his 
thoughts about the museum, Abernathy met informally with African American 
community leaders, including NAACP President Dale Charles, the editor of the state's 
largest African American newspaper and Daisy Bates' successor at the Arkansas State 
Press Janetta Kearney, Arkansas Judge Rev. Wendell Griffin, as well as Central High 
School Neighborhood Association activists Annie Abrams and Ethel Ambrose. Others 
also participated in these informal conversations about the project, such as downtown real 
estate developer Jim Hathaway and Bill Worthen, director of the Historic Arkansas 
Museum.18 
However, the museum project gained real momentum shortly after Arkansas 
16 As quoted in Cathy J. Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering: The Desegregation of Central 
High School in Little Rock, Arkansas: Race, Community Struggle, and Collective Memory" (PhD diss., 
Fielding Graduate Institute, 2004), 229. 
17 Mark E. Abernathy, "A Little History Behind the Central High Museum and Visitor Center," 
Arkansas State Press, October 2, 1997, p. 3. 
18 Mark E. Abernathy, "A Little History Behind the Central High Museum and Visitor Center," 
Arkansas State Press, October 2, 1997, p. 3; Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 
December 2009; Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the 
Desegregation of Little Rock Central High School," 18-19; Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 230. 
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Times editor Max Brantley published an editorial in his weekly newspaper calling for the 
creation of a civil rights museum in Little Rock. Brantley directed attention to the 
popularity of civil rights museums in other cities like Birmingham, Memphis, and 
Atlanta, and acknowledged the effort to recognize the work of Daisy Bates at the planned 
Mosaic Templars Cultural Center. But he characterized the planned African-American 
history museum a "poorly funded, obscure repositor[y]" that simply could not do justice 
to a story with "more than one hero, plenty of villains and world-wide significance." In 
the proper order of things, he argued, such an institution "ought to come second to a 
lasting monument to the school crisis at, or close by, Central High School," built and 
funded with federal assistance. Indeed, the editor suggested that there would never be a 
better time to push for the recognition of Central High School as a national historic site. 
Bill Clinton, the former Governor of Arkansas, occupied the White House, the 
surrounding neighborhood was in need of tourist dollars, and many of the key players 
involved in the events of 1957 were still alive to share their stories. Brantley 
acknowledged that members of the white business establishment might once have balked 
at such a suggestion, but urged the Little Rock community to see the crisis in another 
light. Little Rock "stands for something positive," he insisted: "It represents the federal 
government's commitment to the Constitution: the victory of law over the mob."19 
Several months later, Brantley extended this triumphalist narrative into the present, 
contending that Central High was already a "living monument to the civil rights 
19 Max Brantley, "Build a Museum and They Will Come," editorial, Arkansas Times, November 4, 
1993. 
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movement, with its black principal, its majority black student body and its unparalleled 
record of academic achievement."20 The city had nothing to fear and much to gain from 
the formal recognition of this accomplishment. 
Businessman Everett "Rett" Tucker Ill, the son of one of the "moderates" on 
Little Rock's school board in the late 1950s and early 1960s,21 responded to this appeal, 
contacting Brantley and expressing interest in the museum project. Tucker was the 
incoming chairman ofthe Chamber of Commerce. He was aware that visitors attending 
conferences and conventions in Little Rock frequently asked to see the high school but 
that there was no interpretive information at the site. From his perspective, it was 
unfortunate that tourists had to travel to Memphis to visit the National Civil Rights 
Museum in order to learn about what had happened at Central.22 Tucker acknowledged 
that many Little Rock residents of his father's generation felt that the events of 1957 had 
given the city "a black eye" and believed the less said about it the better. However, he 
felt that people in his generation believed that "what happened in 1957 won't [simply] go 
away." Tucker contended that building a museum about the crisis was one of the most 
productive ways to deal with the desegregation crisis. "We can learn from the past," he 
said. "It can be something we learn from, as we move forward together more." A 
museum project would allow the city to demonstrate that Little Rock had "made 
20 Max Brantley, "Why Not Little Rock?" editorial, Arkansas Times, August 18, 1994. 
21 Everett Tucker Jr. was executive secretary of the Chamber of Commerce in 1957 and was 
elected to the school board in the wake of the school desegregation crisis with the support of the Women's 
Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools (WEC). For more see footnote 101. 
22 Elizabeth McFarland, "Central High integration observance brings call for reconciliation," 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, August 17, 1997, p. lB. 
393 
progress" while acknowledging that the community still had "room to grow."23 
Similarly, Skip Rutherford, a public relations executive who had worked closely 
on Bill Clinton's presidential campaign, also contacted Brantley and commended him on 
the idea. During the 1992 presidential campaign alone, he had escorted over 1 00 people 
to the school grounds at their request. A visitor center or museum would provide people 
with a place to learn more about the crisis. 24 Rutherford could not only bring political 
connections to the project, but he was also a former member of the Little Rock school 
board. Brantley urged the two men to meet and discuss the topic further.25 As he 
recalled, "we all had children in public schools [and] had an interest in an integrated 
society even though [we] failed sometimes as individual[s]."26 
The three men discussed the potential of building a museum dedicated to the crisis 
for several weeks before they learned that similar discussions were underway at Mark 
Abernathy's restaurant Juanita's. They quickly joined Abernathy's group, but became 
frustrated with what they perceived to be a lack of tangible progress on the project.27 To 
23 Danny Shameer, "Clinton to attend Central High Integration anniversary," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, June 14, 1997. 
24 Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 231. 
25 Max Brantley, "40 years and a museum," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 34. See also 
Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation of Little 
Rock Central High School," 21-22. 
26 As quoted in Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 231-232. 
27 This kind of"coffee cup politics" has long prevailed in Little Rock. Businessmen like Tucker 
and Rutherford, acting through the Chamber of Commerce and other civic organizations, have traditionally 
exerted a great deal of influence over the city's public policy. Indeed, Tucker's father, as a member of 
Little Rock's school board also had a tremendous influence on decision-making in the city (Spitzberg, 
Racial Politics in Little Rock, 38). 
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have its greatest impact, Tucker, Rutherford, and Brantley envisioned opening the 
museum in conjunction with the 40th anniversary of the desegregation crisis. To meet this 
deadline, they pushed for what public history student Elizabeth Grobmyer has described 
as a "more aggressive approach" that moved swiftly "from the concept stage to a reality" 
by embracing "structural discipline and political influence to move the process forward 
along official lines." In order to move the project from the "restaurant table to city hall," 
the three men solicited the support of Mayor Jim Dailey. Dailey was equally enthusiastic 
about the project's potential to rehabilitate the reputation of Little Rock and began 
attending the monthly planning sessions. Due to their pre-existing political connections, 
Tucker and Rutherford soon became the project's "liaisons" to the mayor's office. As 
Grobmyer has noted, "Shifting the domain of the project from the vernacular to the 
official had the effect of increasing Tucker and Rutherford's influence over the planning 
process." Moreover, "Linking the opening of the museum to the fortieth anniversary of 
the Central High crisis forced a time constraint on the team proposal that enabled the 
more organized and politically adept team of Tucker and Rutherford to dominate the 
loosely bound grass-roots museum supporters."28 These developments also set the stage 
for conflicts over the purpose of the museum and its historical narrative. 
However, while Tucker, Rutherford, and Brantley may have wanted to move the 
28 Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation 
of Little Rock Central High School," 22-24. Grobmyer's excellent thesis, written under the direction of Dr. 
Johanna Miller Lewis, examines the planning procedures behind the commemoration of the 40th anniversary 
of the crisis, and the conflict between what she calls "vernacular'' and "official" participants in the 
commemoration. However, her analysis of the development of the Central High School museum and visitor 
center ends with the establishment of the 40th anniversary commission and shifts focus to the efforts to plan 
the commemorative ceremony held on the steps of Central High School in 1997. 
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project along quickly through "official" channels, grassroots activists involved in the 
discussions surrounding the museum had their own ideas. In February 1995, Central 
High Neighborhood Association President Ethel Ambrose applied for and received a 
$5,000 community planning grant from the Arkansas Humanities Council related to the 
project. The conditions of the grant stipulated that humanities scholars and members of 
the community had to be involved in project planning and evaluation. The money could 
not be used for construction, renovation, or preservation, nor could it be used to promote 
the fledgling museum organization. Rather, it was provided to facilitate the development 
of the museum's purpose, design, and interpretation ofthe 1957 crisis.29 Ambrose used 
these requirements to carve out space for community involvement. In June 1995, 
residents of the Central High school neighborhood that she represented, African 
American community leaders and political figures, historians and museum professionals, 
as well as school district and city officials were invited into the process. With the 
guidance of Arkansas Humanities Council granting agent John Matthews, work related to 
the establishment of a museum was divided into committees. 30 
This arrangement was formalized when the articles of incorporation for a 
nonprofit 501(c)3, Central High Museum Inc., were drawn up in September1995. 
29 Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, I 7 December 2009; Grobmyer, "A 
History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation of Little Rock Central 
High School," 21-22. For information on stipulations related to Arkansas Humanities Council grants see 
"How to Apply for a Grant for a Humanities Project," Arkansas Humanities Council, 
http://www.arkhums.org/grants/grants.html, accessed 23 February 2010. 
3° Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 232, 238; Max Brantley, "40 years and a museum," 
Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 34. Future exhibit curator and UALR professor, Dr. Johanna 
Miller Lewis, first became involved in the Central High project as a member of this group (Johanna Miller 
Lewis, '"Build a Museum and They Will Come': The Creation of the Central High Museum and Visitor 
Center," The Public Historian 22, no.4 [Autumn 2000], 33). 
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Although Rett Tucker was appointed President of the new organization and director of 
the board, the contributions of the original grassroots group were acknowledged with the 
appointment ofEthel Ambrose as Vice President and chair of the planning committee.31 
Moreover, the role of the planning committee was formally written into the organization's 
by-laws, providing it with substantial influence, and some leverage, over the future 
direction of the museum. Article VI read, 
The Planning Committee shall operate independently from the control or 
supervision of the Board and Officers of the corporation. It shall prepare 
and periodically revise a comprehensive written plan sufficient to guide 
the development and operations of the corporation, subject to approval of 
the Board of Directors. 32 
In the early stages of the museum's development, the board was primarily focused on 
raising money to make the project a reality, soliciting private and public support, and 
acquiring a facility to house the museum, while the planning committee discussed the 
vexing issue of exhibit content and design. 33 
The Central High Museum Board ultimately raised $750,000 dollars to underwrite 
the establishment of the Central High Museum and Visitor Center. In the spring of 1996, 
the board applied for a received at $225,000 community grant from the city of Little Rock 
with the support of Mayor Jim Dailey. State Senator Bill Walker also acquired an 
addition $75,000 in funding from the state of Arkansas. Several hundred individual 
31 Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation 
of Little Rock Central High School," 24. 
32 Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 239. 
33 Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 December 2009; Grobmyer, "A 
History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation of Little Rock Central 
High School," 24-25. 
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donors and businesses also made contributions. This support allowed Central High 
Museum Inc. to purchase a decaying gas station immediately across from the high school 
to house the museum for $45,000. In 1957, reporters had used the pay phones at the 
Mobil station to file their reports. It was one of the only historic commercial structures 
still standing in the residential neighborhood surrounding the high school. The board 
utilized the political connections of Skip Rutherford and Arkansas Senator David Pryor to 
pitch a proposal to Mobil Oil. With an old picture of the gas station under his arm, Rett 
Tucker requested $100,000 to help refurbish the building. The project was approved, and 
Mobil Oil donated old gas pumps and period signage to complete the exterior restoration 
of the station .. 34 The board envisioned transforming 900-square-foot interior into a small 
visitor center, with the two service bays functioning as exhibit space and the rest of the 
facility accommodating a book store and gift shop. A small addition behind the building 
was planned to provide room for restrooms and office space.35 
Members of the planning committee were concerned about the cramped 
dimensions of the proposed museum and visitor center. According to committee member 
Elizabeth Jacoway, members were "encouraged at every meeting to 'think big' and plan a 
34 Max Brantley, "40 years and a museum," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 34; Danny 
Shameer, "Huckabee endorses Central High project: National status sought for historic site," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, February 18, 1997, p. 1A; Frank Wolfe, "Fund drive for Central in high gear," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, April20, 1997; Leslie Newell Peacock, "A Place to Learn: At last, a museum to 
remember the Central crisis," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 14; "Central High Museum: History 
of the Site," Arkansas State Press, October 9, 1997; Cathy J. Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 233-
234. 
35 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 31. 
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museum that could be a model of its type."36 While most acknowledged the need to open 
a facility for visitors before the 40th anniversary of the 1957 crisis, many participants 
agreed that this effort should only be Phase I of a two part process. A small visitors 
center could serve as an introduction, but committee members felt that the significance of 
the Little Rock school desegregation crisis merited the development of a much larger 
museum or even a civil rights institute that encouraged research and discussion of race 
relations. While the board pressed forward to meet their impending deadline, the planning 
committee continued to discuss their long-term vision for the evolution of the site.37 
While Central High Museum Inc. President Rett Tucker acknowledged these more 
ambitious plans, he insisted that the organization stay focused on its immediate goals. 
According to news reports, Tucker estimated that it might take as long as five years and 
$2-3 million to develop a large museum. Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce chairman 
recognized that raising the funds necessary to support such a project could be difficult. 
The board faced the challenge of raising funds in a competitive environment- not only 
were six new museums be developed within Little Rock itself, but civil rights museums 
in other cities like Birmingham, Savannah, Atlanta, Selma, and Memphis had already 
36 Elizabeth Jacoway, "Understanding the Past: The Challenge of Little Rock," in Understanding 
the Little Rock Crisis: An Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation, ed. Elizabeth Jacoway and C. Fred 
Williams (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999), 2. 
37 Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 December 2009. In a August 
2009 conversation, Dr. Lewis noted that members of the Planning Committee were very impressed with 
Birmingham Civil Rights Institute and saw it as a potential model (Laura Miller, telephone interview by 
author, 4 September 2009). 
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exhausted other potential streams of revenue. 38 Moreover, the effort to build a facility 
dedicated to telling the story of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis provoked 
some controversy locally. Although the nonprofit received some donations from locals, 
others rejected the project. Rett Tucker kept one returned solicitation to remind himself 
of this reality. A message scrawled across the card read: "[This] is a disgraceful waste of 
taxpayer money. We ought to forget all about 1957 and how federal intervention 
destroyed a fine institution."39 While other potential donors did not express as much 
hostility to the project, or integration, many felt ambivalent about it. As Arkansas Times 
editor and board member Max Brantley put it, some in the community felt, "It is one 
thing to give money to ease the suffering of children, another thing to build a monument 
to such suffering. "40 
With these considerations in mind, some members of the board believed it was 
more realistic to raise enough funds to open the small visitors center and operate it for a 
few years with the hope of turning control of the facility over to the state or even the 
federal park system.41 With Arkansan Bill Clinton in the White House, board members 
approached Senator Dale Bumpers about pursuing designation as a national historic site. 42 
38 Jake Sandlin, "Living in the Past: With such a long and varied history, it's no wonder that Little 
Rock is becoming a city of museums. But where will we get all the financing?" Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, November 17, 1996, p. IE; Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,'" 30. 
39 John Brummett, "Flag flap settlement: Fight was ill-advised," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, June 
24, 1997, p. 7B. 
40 Max Brantley, "40 years and a museum," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 34. 
41 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 31. 
42 Michael Maddell, Superintendent, Central High School National Historic Site, interview by 
author, 26 April2007. 
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Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee announced his support for this plan and promised to 
help secure state funding to operate the center while the organization pursued federal 
recognition. At the ground-breaking ceremonies for the renovation of the Mobil station, 
Huckabee explained that he hoped state support would help build a "bridge ... from a local 
to a federal project."43 By the Spring of 1997, Democratic Representative Vic Snyder 
announced that the National Park Service was considering the site as a federal park, and 
Rett Tucker was confidently telling reporters, "Our goal all along has been to open the 
doors with no debt and two years operating funds in the bank" [emphasis added].44 The 
board was not particularly concerned about developing Phase II of the project, 
anticipating that federal officials and public funds would shape the site in the future. 
The board's decisions sharply curbed the role community representatives would 
play in developing the site through the planning committee. As these events unfolded, 
planning committee members were troubled by the board's narrow focus on the visitor 
center and their relative lack of interest in pursuing the development of a more substantial 
museum. As Cathy Collins, the Executive Director of Little Rock's Racial and Cultural 
Diversity Commission and planning committee member, explained, 
By the ... fall [of 1996], the relationship between the Board and the 
Planning Committee had become strained. The Planning Committee 
operated from a vision of the Visitor Center being only the beginning 
piece in a larger effort. The intense focus on the Visitor Center by many 
of the Board members left the impression that [they believed] the Visitor 
43 Danny Shameer, "Huckabee endorses Central High project: National status sought for historic 
site," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, February 18, 1997, p 1A. 
44 Frank Wolfe, "Fund drive for Central in high gear," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, April20, 
1997. 
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Center was sufficient.45 
Moreover, if the site became a state or federal park in the future as the board envisioned, 
and the second phase of development continued under government stewardship, it was 
not clear what role community representatives would play in the years to come. It quickly 
became evident that the board's control over fundraising, its manipulation of its political 
contacts, its plans for the future of the site, and the decisions it made over site location 
(such as purchasing the small gas station rather than available lots across the street)46 had 
substantial impact on the planning committee's function, one that narrowed the future 
institution's options and narrative scope considerably. 
Rather than developing or defining a long-term vision for the site, the planning 
committee's focus was restricted to creating a small exhibit within the service bay of a 
gas station. By its very nature, the planning committee represented diverse points of view 
on the crisis and its members discussed and debated this history and its presentation for 
several months. These conversations were shaped by decades of contested memory about 
what had transpired in 1957. Under the conditions of the Arkansas Humanities Council 
grant, two historians had been invited to participate in the grourr- Dr. Elizabeth Jacoway, 
an independent scholar who had been studying and writing about the crisis for two 
decades, and Dr. Johanna Miller Lewis, a UALR professor who directed the university's 
museum studies track and had recently completed an exhibit with the alumni organization 
45 Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 239-240. Collins was the first Executive Director of 
Little Rock's Racial and Cultural Diversity Commission. Her dissertation, a reflexive etlmography written 
from the perspective of a participant observer, captures many of the debates about race and the memory of 
the crisis circulating in Little Rock during the 1990s. 
46 Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," footnote 290. 
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of Little Rock's black high school. Both have commented on what they saw as a lack of 
"historical" knowledge within the planning committee. 
From Jacoway's perspective, few of the participants "had a real grasp of the very 
complex legal, political, and social issues that converged to create the crisis in Little 
Rock."47 Repeatedly, she urged other members of the group "to consider the 
background and context!" She found herself"stewing about the shortcomings of the 
planning committee" and the "misperceptions, justifications, distortions, and 
oversimplifications" that marked its deliberations. Black and white participants were 
divided by decades of mistrust, which Jacoway attributed to a "distorted or incomplete 
understanding of 1957." She also was troubled by divisions among white participants 
about the attitudes and motivations that explained white actions during the crisis, and 
African American concerns about the "lionization" of the Little Rock Nine and the 
"ultimate wisdom of desegregation." She wrote, 
[as] the lone southern historian in the group, it was a humbling experience 
for me to realize that everyone on the committee had their own 
interpretation of the Little Rock crisis- replete with their own set of 
information and experiences- and that my perspectives on the past carried 
no more weight than anyone else's. 
Jacoway noted wryly, "I could see from the outset that what we were about was not the 
kind of historical reconstruction I had learned about in graduate school."48 
Participants privileged their personal memory and perceptions about the crisis 
47 As quoted in Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 32. Lewis also 
points to Jacoway's comments about her experience as a member of the committee. 
48 Jacoway, "Understanding the Past: The Challenge of Little Rock," 2-3. 
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over an academic narrative of the event. Lewis noted that "the amount of passion people 
displayed about their ideas and memories increased as they moved along a continuum 
from being alive in '57, a Southerner, an Arkansan, a resident of Little Rock, or a 
viewer/participant in actual events." Little Rock natives on the committee questioned 
whether outsiders could "truly understand what had happened."49 Some believed that the 
Eisenhower's enforcement of the Brown v. Board of Education decision had a positive 
impact in relation to African American civil rights, while others believed that the crisis 
and federal intervention had a negative impact on public education. 50 Lewis wrote, 
"committee members showed no deference towards us [the professional historians] in 
terms of expressing their opinions on what type of facility the museum should be, or 
exactly why and how the 1957 crisis occurred."51 From Lewis' perspective, planning 
committee members showed "little interest .... in knowing the facts," and at times 
expressed "outright hostility to what historians had written about the crisis." Lewis 
recalled that one committee member dismissed academic scholarship outright, stating, 
"we don't care what the historians say."52 
In part, this indifference to an academic narrative could be attributed to long-
standing complaints that outsiders, journalists, and historians have not treated Little Rock 
49 In public forums, some local residents routinely express concern that the perceptions of outsiders 
have been unduly influenced by media accounts. Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will 
Come,"' 34. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 32. 
52 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,'" 34. 
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kindly or fairly over the years. However, in 1993 and 1994, a national telephone survey 
that explored popular attitudes towards "historymaking" found that most respondents 
privileged intimate, personal, and eyewitness accounts of the past over interpretations 
they believed were "mediated" by political and cultural agendas or professional and 
commercial ambitions. The survey found that respondents trusted the stories of family 
members or conversations with eyewitnesses more than historical narratives offered by 
college history professors, high school teachers, or books. These trends were even more 
pronounced among African American respondents who criticized traditional histories and 
nurtured powerful "countemarratives" focused on the black experience. 
In the broader survey, academic history fared better than popular or commercial 
history in terms of trustworthiness, but was often described as "dull" or "boring" because 
it failed to engage respondents. Those surveyed preferred the interactive experience of 
visiting museums or historic sites, which they also rated as the most trustworthy of 
historic sources. The surveyors found that "many respondents felt that the best of each of 
the other sources could be found in museums." Museums gave visitors "a sense of 
immediacy- of personal participation- that respondents associated with eyewitnesses; 
they evoked the intimacy of family gatherings; and they encouraged an interaction with 
primary sources that reminded respondents of independent research." Moreover, 
respondents seemed to be most attracted to historical narratives that were useful-- that 
could be used to evaluate the present and chart a course for the future. 53 Perhaps this was 
53 For more see Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen, The Presence of the Past: Popular Uses of 
History in American Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), quotation from p. I 05. 
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the kind of museum and museum experience members of the planning committee hoped 
to create. 
From Lewis' perspective, members of the planning committee seemed to think 
that their "ideas about the crisis alone were enough to fill the exhibit." Dr. Jacoway 
attempted to redirect the energy of the committee by distributing a list of secondary 
sources with the hope that committee members would read these materials and familiarize 
themselves with political, legal, economic and social issues related to the crisis that 
concerned professional historians like herself. 54 Jacoway also decided to organize a 
professional conference designed to provide the city of Little Rock with a "crash course 
in southern history and race relations" in conjunction with the anniversary. 55 Dr. Lewis 
suggested that committee members should immerse themselves in primary sources, like 
newspapers and magazines, but was disappointed when no one volunteered to undertake 
this research. Lewis became frustrated with the "overwhelmingly democratic" nature of 
the committee's conversations and the endless debate about the public memory of the 
crisis. Ultimately, she decided to ask the public history students in her History Museum 
Interpretation class at UALR to research the exhibit as a group project. 56 
Lewis asked her public history students to construct a detailed timeline from 
primary and secondary sources to establish a strong foundation for the exhibit's 
54 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 32-33, footnote 3. 
55 A book was published as a result of this conference. See Understanding the Little Rock Crisis: 
An Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation, eds. Elizabeth Jacoway and C. Fred Williams 
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999). Jacoway describes the impetus behind the conference's 
creation in her introduction. 
56 Johanna Miller Lewis, '"Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 32-33, footnote 3. 
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development. Public history graduate student Laura Miller led the project, which 
stretched beyond the 1957 and 1958 school years to include an investigation of the period 
from statehood in 1836 through the 1970s. However, the majority of the students' efforts 
focused on the crisis years. Students explored newspaper accounts and archival 
collections throughout the state to produce a document that chronicled events in day-to-
day detaiL 57 Lewis asked them to produce an abbreviated timeline that contained the 
information they thought should be included in the exhibit. By the spring of 1996, the 
students presented their work to the planning committee, and Lewis distributed copies of 
the timeline and a bibliography to the board. According to Lewis, her students had played 
a "vital role" by filling the "giant, previously empty hole known as 'content."' The board 
was "very pleased" with their work and developed an appreciation for the role the 
university could play in translating its ideas into reality. 58 
Indeed, Dr. Lewis would soon become the exhibit's project manager and curator. 
The UALR professor was the only individual on the planning committee or the board 
who had any experience curating an exhibit or contracting with companies for its 
fabrication. As the board selected an architect to restore the Mobil station, Lewis sat in 
on the meetings. Although several of the architects suggested that they could design the 
exhibit as well, Lewis encouraged the board to contract separately with a dedicated 
57 Laura A. Miller, telephone interview by author, 4 September 2009. 
58 Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 December 2009. See also Johanna 
Miller Lewis, '"Build a Museum and They Will Come,'" 33. According to Cathy Collins, the planning 
committee discussed the timeline at their June 26, 1996 meeting and at least one member raised concerns 
about the number of African Americans quoted in the document (Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 
243-244). 
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exhibit designer. According to Lewis, few board members had interest in the 
presentations given by designers in response to the request for proposals and the 
community planning committee took the lead in selecting Quatrefoil Associates to help 
design, fabricate, and install the exhibit. This decision was formalized by a vote of the 
board in the fall of 1996. On September 10, Lewis was also officially named "liaison to 
exhibit designer and architect."59 
The board asked Lewis and a small exhibit team to continue their research, solicit 
ideas for their exhibit, and report back to the board. Lewis forged ahead with exhibit 
designer Abbie Chessler of Quatrefoil Associates, public history graduate student Laura 
Miller, and Ronnie Nichols, a board member and the director of Arkansas' Old State 
House. Lewis and Miller sat down with Chessler, reviewed their edited timeline, and 
selected events they felt should be included in the exhibit. Chessler repeated this exercise 
with the community planning committee in order to determine which events were most 
important. The exhibit designer returned to the timeline and broke it into chronological 
groups, suggested themes that could be explored in each section, and made 
recommendations about the amount of space that should be dedicated to various parts of 
the exhibit. Miller and Lewis organized their research, determined which themes would 
be used, and wrote the exhibit text. The exhibit team also focused on collecting visual 
material- photographs and news footage- that would help them tell their story and 
connect visitors to the powerful imagery that defined the crisis for people across the 
59 Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 December 2009. 
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nation in 1957.60 
At this point, the planning committee's role in the design of the exhibit was 
limited. The exhibit team had effectively taken control of the planning process, and the 
committee was redefined as an "audience focus group." As Lewis acknowledged, the 
committee was used to "assist us in devising our message" [emphasis added].61 
Throughout the fall of 1996, the exhibit team continued to work with the planning 
committee, soliciting their feedback on a variety of issues. Committee member Cathy 
Collins recalled discussing various aspects of the exhibit design, including "outdoor 
lighting, windows, signage, themes, historical concepts, word choices, and media 
opportunities- artifacts, photographs, video, computer interaction, etc."62 However, while 
the exhibit team solicited feedback from the planning committee, it sought official 
approval of its ideas from the board.63 
There is evidence that some members of the planning committee were not fully on 
board with the historical chronology being assembled by Lewis and her team. The 
mission of the museum had been defmed as: "To empower, infonn, enlighten and 
challenge people by interpreting, documenting, discovering and preserving the history of 
60 Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 December 2009; Laura A. Miller, 
telephone interview by author, 4 September 2009; Johanna Miller Lewis, '"Build a Museum and They Will 
Come,"' 33. 
61 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 34. 
62 Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 243-244. Collins utilizes planning committee meeting 
minutes in her possession to support her memory. 
63 Laura A. Miller, telephone interview by author, 4 September 2009; Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail 
correspondence with author, 17 December 2009. 
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the 1957 Central High crisis and its context."64 As a professional historian, Lewis was 
primarily focused on informing her audience by interpreting the crisis. What she learned 
:from listening to the planning committee's deliberations was that even this group, 
"composed of people who were somewhat familiar with the crisis," had little knowledge 
of"the facts" and "no patience for the nuances ofhistorical interpretation." What was 
needed was an exhibit that informed members of the community about the "basics of the 
story" and "concentrated on the events and the major players of the crisis" in a clear and 
chronological narrative. Moreover, given the contested nature of the history of 1957 and 
the heated debates within the committee itself, Lewis was determined to make the exhibit 
as "historically accurate" as possible by utilizing quotes that "let the various participants 
tell their own story," while avoiding "potentially explosive and probably unanswerable 
question[ s] .'.t>5 
According to Collins, some planning committee members embraced this emphasis 
on historical accuracy, but others "wanted to utilize the historical events as means for 
promoting current day racial healing."66 These individuals placed more emphasis on 
aspects of the mission statement that called for empowering and enlightening Little Rock 
residents through an active process of discovery. In their view, the construction of a 
chronological historical account may not have been as imperative. On October 2, 1996, 
Annie Abrams, a neighborhood resident, civil rights activist and lay historian, expressed 
64 Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 December 2009; Jacoway, 
"Understanding the Past: The Challenge of Little Rock," 2. 
65 Lewis, '"Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 33-35. 
66 Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 243-244. 
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her frustration that some people seemed to view the purpose of the exhibit "as returning 
to 1957" or "authentically recreating the thing." In her view, the purpose of the museum 
was to "learn from but not return to" the events of the crisis years.67 In contrast, historian 
and committee member Elizabeth Jacoway rejected the notion that finding "solutions to 
the myriad problems of Little Rock's ongoing racial conflicts" was the committee's 
charge. Moreover, she found it difficult to understand how the community would be able 
to heal its wounds or learn from the events of 1957 without a "reasonably accurate 
historical understanding" of what had happened. 68 
By December 1996, some members of the planning committee spoke frankly 
about their inability to influence the direction of the exhibit. Annie Abrams felt that the 
board was turning a deaf ear to the planning committee's effort to discuss the long-term 
goals of the site. Janetta Kearney, editor of the Little Rock black's newspaper, stated 
baldly, "We are not being included. We are being ignored." Moreover, from her 
perspective, community representatives were being sidelined and African Americans 
were not participating fully in the "decision-making process." Kearney complained that 
there was "no color in anything that the group is doing" and suspected that the board 
intended to "disband the Planning Committee." Bill Asti, a white committee member, 
suggested that board members were typical "CEO types" who needed to be learn that the 
67 From planning committee minutes excerpted in Cathy Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 
244-245. 
68 Jacoway, "Understanding the Past: The Challenge of Little Rock," 3-4. 
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"community can do this work. "69 
At the board meeting in January 1997, the board officially tabled discussion of 
Phase II of the project and redefined the role ofthe planning committee. Moving 
forward, the planning committee would no longer operate independently of the board or 
determine its own agenda. Instead, the board would establish the "direction the Planning 
Committee will take" at its annual meeting and would select the board members who 
would serve on it. The board expressed its hope that these "changes will facilitate a more 
effective relationship between the Board and the Planning Committee."7° Committee 
member Cathy Collins suspected that the "participatory nature" of the exhibit review 
process was the "impetus for redefining the role of the Planning Committee." The 
committee's conversations were perceived to be contentious and unproductive. In her 
opinion, the board's "power play" effectively strengthened its ability to "control and more 
effectively define the boundaries around the construction of the official memory of the 
desegregation of Central High School."71 Johanna Miller Lewis had a different 
perspective. The "parting of ways" between the board and the planning committee 
eliminated the need to try to satisfy two different constituencies. According to Lewis, by 
early 1997, the planning committee had become "superfluous" to exhibit planners, "since 
they didn't control any money, didn't want to do any work and rarely agreed with the 
board." With the fortieth anniversary months away, she and her team started reporting 
241. 
69 From planning committee minutes excerpted in Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 240-
7° From board minutes excerpted in Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 243. 
71 Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 243. 
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directly to the board about the exhibit's development.72 
In the spring of 1997, board members debated the finer points of the exhibit script 
but did·not challenge the overall direction ofthe exhibit team's plan. Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette editor and columnist John Brummett characterized most "official 
points of dispute" as relatively minor: "Why display a quote from Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. when, in fact, he had no role in Central high or the events leading to it? Why 
not a quote from Thurgood Marshall or Daisy Bates? Good point, and it properly 
prevailed." Only one point of contention arose which threatened to become a public 
controversy. Two African American members of the board, state Senator Bill Walker and 
state Representative Irma Brown, objected to the display ofthe Confederate battle flag in 
the portion ofthe exhibit that addressed the Civil War. Walker argued that the presence 
of the flag might anger and alienate some black visitors, and its display at the visitors' 
center might be courting "unnecessary trouble." Ronnie Nichols, another African 
American board member and the only member of the board represented on the exhibit 
team, defended its inclusion in the name ofhistorical accuracy. Nichols suggested that 
museum displays that provoke strong reactions actually help bring "history to life" for 
visitors. Central High Museum Inc. President Rett Tucker expressed his support for 
Nichols position, arguing that removing the Confederate flag from the visitors' center was 
the like ''wanting to remove any Nazi symbols from the Holocaust museum.'m As a 
72 Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 December 2009. 
73 In fact, during the development of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, which 
opened in 1993, there was considerable debate about the use of Nazi symbols and words in the exhibits. 
Some felt that allowing the "perpetrators" to "speak" in the exhibit "so that visitors could penetrate the 
murderous logic of their world ... threatened to contaminate what for many was a commemorative space." 
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compromise, Walker continued to advocate removing the flag, but supported the display 
of period photographs featuring segregationists carrying the flag in defiance of school 
integration. Ultimately, the board took this position and the "flag flap" quickly died 
down. As John Brummett noted, this controversy hardly addressed a core element ofthe 
planned presentation. 74 Lewis and her exhibit team were willing to change these kinds of 
"minute details" and were determined to "pick their battles carefully."75 
The board and the exhibit team also sent copies of the script out to the Little Rock 
Nine and Central High School student body representatives from the 1957 and 1958 
school years for their comments. Lewis was primarily concerned with how the Little 
Rock Nine would respond to the script. She has reported that the feedback from the 
group was generally positive, particularly in response to a timeline that chronicled the 
harassment that continued inside the school during the 1957-58 school year.76 However, 
this was precisely the part of the exhibit that provoked the most negative reaction from 
white members of Central's student body. Craig Rains, 1958 Class President, 
Exhibit designers consciously "avoided putting out a lot of Nazi memorabilia" out of fear that these objects 
would be "perversely fascinating" for visitors. They avoided glamorizing Nazi leaders through the use of 
portraits, and instead chose images that featured Nazis "at work" and committing war crimes (Edward T. 
Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America's Holocaust Museum [New York: Viking 
Penguin, 1995], 199-210). 
74 John Brummett, "Bill Walker's version: The Rebel Flag and other things," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, May 17, 1994, p. liB; John Brummett, "Flag flap settlement: Fight was ill-advised," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, June 24, 1997, p. 7B. See also Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will 
Come,"' 36-37; Collins, "Forgetting and Remembering," 244. 
75 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,'" 36. 
76 Based on sealed comments held as part of the Central High Museum Historical Collections, now 
held by the National Park Service. Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 30-
31, 41; Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 December 2009; Laura A. Miller, 
telephone interview by author, 4 September 2009. 
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complained that the exhibit made the students "look bad" by focusing on the "ugliness" 
of the school year. Sounding a familiar theme, Rains contended that exhibit failed to 
illustrate that "95% of the white students took no part in it.'m Rains and 1958 Student 
Body President Ralph Brodie threatened to organize a protest unless their perspective was 
included in the exhibit. The board tried to defuse this threat and address their concerns by 
inserting a small panel entitled, "View From Inside the School" that emphasized that 
most students obeyed the law and only "a handful of students verbally and physically 
terrorized the Nine." 
Johanna Miller Lewis has suggested that the inclusion of this panel did not 
undermine the exhibit's historical integrity or "detract" from the sections that described 
the experience of the Nine. Pragmatically, she has argued that a "rigid or stubborn 
adherence to theoretical standards" without a "little diplomacy can doom a project from 
the beginning," but there is no question that the board made a significant change to the 
script, involving more than a "minute detail," at the request of the white students. 78 This 
incident enhanced the perception is some quarters that the museum and the fortieth 
anniversary commemoration really represented an attempt by white business leaders to 
enhance the image of the city of Little Rock and capitalize on tourist dollars with a 
77 Craig Rains to Rett Tucker, 14 Aprill997, as quoted in Johanna Miller Lewis, '"Build a 
Museum and They Will Come,"' 41-42; Max Brantley, "40 years and a museum," Arkansas Times, 
September 19, 1997, p. 34. 
78 Johanna Miller Lewis, e-mail correspondence with author, 17 December 2009; Collins, 
"Forgetting and Remembering," 244-246. 
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minimum of fuss. 79 
The Central High Museum and Visitor Center formally opened on September 20, 
1997 in a dedication ceremony featuring Governor Mike Huckabee, Little Rock Mayor 
Jim Dailey, the Central High Museum Inc. Board and Planning Committee, members of 
the Little Rock Nine, and several hundred onlookers. During the invocation, planning 
committee member and African American activist Annie Abrams prayed that the museum 
would serve as a "flagship" that would help guide the community of Little Rock through 
"the turbulent waters that we will encounter as we travel the long journey toward 
understanding our history in all its complexity." But she also implored God to provide 
museum planners with the "courage and strength to go forward from here to complete the 
wisdom of Mission Statement" and to fulfil the planning committee's larger vision. A 
job, she implied, that was far from fmished.80 
After participating in the ceremony and cutting the ribbon to open the museum, 
Elizabeth Eckford carefully folded a piece of the gold and black ribbon as a keepsake.81 
As the only member of the Little Rock Nine who still lived in Little Rock in 1997, 
Eckford had been approached early on about participating in the planning process. She 
walked out on an early meeting, and later told reporters, "I perceived that these people 
79 Max Brantley, "40 years and a museum," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 34; Collins, 
"Forgetting and Remembering," 245-246, 259. 
80 Jacoway, "Understanding the Past: The Challenge of Little Rock," 14. 
81 Richard Benedetto, "After 40 years, a return to Central High," USA Today, September 25, 1997, 
p. 8A. 
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were trying to use me."82 However, after some reflection, she decided to participate in 
:fundraising efforts for the museum and was named to the Board of Directors in the hope 
that the legacy of Central High School and the events of 1957 would be preserved "with 
the kind of dignity it deserves."83 As she later recalled, Eckford realized that the Central 
High crisis "had meaning for a lot of people for a lot of reasons." While she was 
normally reluctant to talk about her experiences she was "trying to be cooperative" in the 
spirit of the anniversary. But as she prepared to see the exhibits for the first time, some of 
her ambivalence about the commemoration and visitor center resurfaced. She told 
reporters that she planned to avoid looking at the famous photographs taken of her 
walking through the mob outside Central forty years earlier by not wearing her glasses in 
the exhibit. "I plan to stay about four feet away, and it will be a blur," she remarked. 84 
And she had a very clear message for the museum's planners and its visitors: "This is a 
place where we can begin the process of reflection," she warned, "but this place is not an 
alibi for atonement. "85 
"All the World is Watching Us: Little Rock and the 1957 Crisis" 
When the Central High Museum and Visitor Center was completed and installed 
82 Kim Cobb, "Girl's pain has lasted a lifetime; Elizabeth Eckford still suffers from her battle for 
desegregation," The Houston Chronicle, September 26, 1997, p. A3. 
83 Danny Shameer, "Central High on '96 Endangered List: National Preservation Group Calls 
Attention to Historic Places that Need Fixing Up," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, June 18, 1996, p. 2B; 
Frank Wolfe, "Fund drive for Central in high gear," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, April 20, 1997, p. lB. 
84 Kim Cobb, "Girl's pain has lasted a lifetime; Elizabeth Eckford still suffers from her battle for 
desegregation," The Houston Chronicle, September 26, 1997, p. A3. 
85 Robbie Moreland-Adams, "Elizabeth Eckford Recalls Her Long Walk Into Little Rock History," 
Christian Science Monitor, September 24, 1997, p. 18. 
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in the gas station's former service bay, Johanna Miller Lewis and the exhibit team had 
pieced together an exhibit that provided a streamlined interpretation of the 1957-58 
school year. Throughout the exhibit, the textual panels were brief and succinct. By 
focusing on documentable and widely-known "facts" in these panels, and representing the 
views of various parties through published quotes, the exhibit team navigated through the 
treacherous shoals of memory and public opinion about the crisis and mid-century race 
relations. However, this approach contained its own limitations due to gaps and elisions 
in the documentary record. Much of the daily harassment experienced by the Little Rock 
Nine inside Central over the course of the school year was unrecorded. As might be 
expected, in the years that followed, white students and members of the Little Rock Nine 
advanced very different interpretations about what had happened inside the school and the 
number of students who bore some responsibility for the terrorization of the African 
American students. Many white students denied any involvement, and white student 
leaders resented and resisted efforts to present a picture of the student body as 
sympathetic to the segregationist cause. As Ernest Green noted wryly the year before the 
visitor center opened, "I can't find anyone that I went to school with now that was 
opposed to my being there .. .I go back to Little Rock and they're all my closest friends 
today."86 Consequently, at times, the exhibit's focus on the documentable and the 
unchallengeable minimized any accounting of the harassment experienced by the nine 
black students, just as the decision of school administrators forty years earlier- to only 
86 Lois Romano, "Civil Rights Symbol Slides Into Decay; Little Rock's Historic Central High 
needs $6 Million in Repairs," The Washington Post, September 28, 1996, p.Al. 
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address those incidents witnessed by a teacher- had done the same. 
As visitors approached the exhibit, an introductory panel framed the significance 
of Central High School's place on the memorial landscape in a manner that was in 
keeping with the broader themes that echoed throughout the fortieth anniversary 
commemoration.87 In 1957, Little Rock became a "landmark battleground in the struggle 
for civil rights" when "the state resisted the admission of black students to all-white 
Central High School." The school desegregation crisis "tested" students, public figures, 
and Arkansas citizens, but ultimately justice prevailed. Central was not a symbol of mob-
violence, white resistance, or undisguised racism. Rather, the exhibit suggested, "Central 
stands today as a concrete symbol of the Constitution's guarantee of equal rights under 
the law." The visitor center itself was described as "a place to learn about a pivotal time 
in history." It was also "a place to learn about how far we've come" and "how far we 
have to go." The Central High School Museum and Visitor Center, unlike other civil 
rights museums that preceded it, did not attempt to educate visitors about the entire scope 
of the civil rights movement. From the beginning, the exhibit was dedicated to telling a 
local history that had national and global impact. 
Nevertheless, within the limited space available, Lewis and her team did try to 
provide visitors with some necessary context. Inside the exhibit space, the first 
87 The following analysis is based on a visit to the exlubit in the Central High Museum and Visitor 
Center located in the refurbished Mobil Gas Station on April25, 2007. All quotations from the exhibit 
unless otherwise specified are taken from the author's notes and photographs of the exhibit text. When it 
opened, the exhibit also featured a period television set that replayed news broadcasts from 1957- at the 
time of the author's visit, this part of the display was not functioning. Exhibit planner Abbie Chessler 
hoped that the use ofthe historic footage would "transport" visitors "back in time" ("A Place to learn: At 
last, a museum to remember the Central crisis," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 12-14). 
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interpretive section entitled "All Men Created Equal?" briefly addressed the period 
between the Declaration of Independence and Plessy v. Ferguson. Johanna Miller Lewis 
later explained that this portion of the exhibit was designed to "set the stage for some of 
the later legal issues of desegregation."88 The next portion of the exhibit, "Can Separate 
Be Equal?: 1897-1954" built from Lewis' previous work with the alumni association at 
Dunbar High School. It exposed the inherent inequities built into the southern system of 
segregation through a direct comparison of the facilities and resources provided to 
students at all-white Central High School and all-black Dunbar High School. In public 
education, the exhibit asserted, "funding was barely enough for one system of education, 
let alone for two"- in this context, equality "rarely occurred" under the Plessy doctrine, 
and "education for blacks suffered as a result."89 Despite the dispiriting statistics it 
presented to bolster this claim, the exhibit provided a nuanced interpretation of the 
educational experience of Dunbar students. Building on Dr. Lewis's previous work with 
the Dunbar Alumni Association, the exhibit was careful to note that Dunbar's excellent 
academic reputation attracted black students from rural communities without accredited 
high schools from all over the state. The school played an important role in "nurturing 
the children of Little Rock's black community." Even when the opportunity arose, many 
88 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 36. 
89 The exhibit noted that after the Little Rock school board spent $1,500,000 on building what 
became known as Central High School in 1927, it lacked the funds to build a high school for African 
American students. Dunbar was built with the philanthropic assistance of the Rosenwald Fund's school 
building program for $400,000. The facility was much smaller than Central and did not have a gymnasium 
or athletic fields. Moreover, black students were provided with out-of-date textbooks and a library half of 
the size of that offered to white students. African American teachers were paid lower salaries. Historian 
John A. Krrk chronicles these inequities in his book Redefining the Color Line, 18. See also Vinzant, 
"Little Rock's Long Crisis," 31-36. 
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parents chose not to expose their children to Central High School's "less supportive 
environment. "90 
The exhibit then turned to Little Rock's response to the Supreme Court's 1954 
Brown decision. Like many histories of school desegregation, the exhibit's narrative 
unfolded as a series of school board decisions, lawsuits, and court rulings. In a section 
titled "Struggle for Direction," the exhibit noted that shortly following the Supreme 
Court's declaration that segregation in public education was inherently unequal, the 
NAACP petitioned the Little Rock school board for immediate integration, but the school 
board adopted a gradual desegregation plan instead. The NAACP took its case to the 
courts. As a representative of the NAACP explained, the school board's proposed 
desegregation plan looked "more like the old run-around deception, than an honest and 
conscientious plan of the school board to integrate." The exhibit explained that although 
the appeals court upheld the board's gradual desegregation plan, it retained jurisdiction 
over the case. However, it did not illuminate why this was significant- as the crisis 
developed, judges would not permit any retreat from the court-approved plan. In the 
midst of this legal maneuvering, the exhibit noted, "political resistance to integration 
began to stiffen." Again, the text focused on the actions of the Governor and state 
legislators, and the passage of four segregation statutes in the spring of 1957. The exhibit 
avoided a potentially more controversial assessment of how average citizens in the city 
90 In her survey of Dunbar alumni, Faustine Childress Jones found that most of her respondents 
believed the school provided them with a strong academic background while nurturing them as students and 
future citizens (Faustine C. Jones, A Traditional Model of Excellence: Dunbar High School of Little Rock 
Arkansas [Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1981]). Terrence Roberts, member of the Little 
Rock Nine, also supported this assessment of Little Rock's black schools in his recently published memoir 
Lessons from Little Rock, 24-25, 29, 31, 33. 
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felt about the Supreme Court's decree. 
The most conspicuous omission in this first third of the exhibit was any sustained 
discussion of local black activism in Little Rock. Although a small sidebar made note of 
a suit filed to equalize the pay of black and white teachers in Little Rock during the 
1940s, the exhibit did not chronicle other campaigns for equal rights like the voter 
registration drives that had preceded the school desegregation crisis. Moreover, no 
distinctions were drawn between the strategies of the national NAACP and local 
concems.91 Despite her prominence in most 1957 media accounts, the exhibit did not 
profile Daisy Bates, the local leader ofthe NAACP and editor of the state's largest black 
newspaper. Even more notably, it did not feature any in-depth information about why the 
students who became known as the "Little Rock Nine" chose to emoll at Central, or how 
their parents, neighbors and friends felt about the political machinations and legal 
maneuvers that unfolded in August 1957. These elisions were consistent with exhibitions 
at other civil rights museums that minimized the significance of social networks and local 
organizing. As Owen J. Dwyer noted in his study, 
Within the major museums, the movement is represented as having been 
won on the streets, :from the pulpit, and in the courtroom- places 
intimately associated with masculinized leadership in the movement's 
iconic legacy. Little or no mention is made of the private and semipublic 
spaces of citizenship: schools, neighborhoods, and homes where activists 
found food, shelter, and community.92 
91 For more information on these topics see John A. Kirk, Redefining the Color Line. Glenn Eskew 
has also noted that civil rights narratives frequently lack a "sense of the importance oflocal conditions for 
organizing, as well as the deeply ambiguous connections between local activists and national leaders and 
their institutions" (Eskew, "The Won Cause," 38). 
92 Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Place, Memory, and Conflict," 663-664. 
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The activities of local activists- particularly women- in these spheres were rarely 
illuminated. 
The central part ofthe exhibit, "A Time of Courage & Fear, 1957-58," focused on 
the events that have come to be known as the Little Rock school desegregation crisis. 
The largest wall of the exhibit space was covered with oversized reproductions of historic 
photographs. These pictures included some of the most searing images captured during 
the crisis: the mob surrounding Elizabeth Eckford as she tried to enter Central High 
School, the 101 st Airborne stationed outside the school, students burning an effigy, troops 
escorting the nine African American students inside the front door of Central, Ernest 
Green processing in his graduation robes. As exhibit team manager Dr. Johanna Miller 
Lewis stated, many of these images had become "ingrained in the nation's memory." 
Consequently, the team decided to utilize these resources to tell the story of the Little 
Rock desegregation crisis as much as possible.93 To the right and immediately below 
these photos, the events of the year unfolded in a dated timeline drawn from the research 
completed by Lewis' public history students. 
In the time line's opening statement, the exhibit explained, "Opponents of 
desegregation argued that the Supreme Court and the federal government lacked the 
authority to impose its decisions on the states." This statement framed the crisis as a 
constitutional conflict, rooted in arguments about states' rights. It did not focus attention 
on the ideology of white supremacy that undergirded organized resistance to 
desegregation. The timeline went on to chronicle documented facts about the tension 
93 Johanna Miller Lewis, '"Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 30, 34. 
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filled days of September 1957- suits filed in court, public speeches made by the governor, 
the national media attention focused on the city as the students were denied entrance to 
Central High School, Orval Faubus' conference with President Eisenhower, the removal 
of the Arkansas National Guard, rioting outside the building while the Little Rock Nine 
attended their first day of classes, the deployment of the 1 01 51 Airborne, and the escort 
provided for the African American students as they returned to classes. The exhibit 
adroitly avoided speculation about the motives of various historical actors who 
participated in these events. For example, it did not attempt to explain why Governor 
Faubus deployed the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the Little Rock Nine from 
entering Central High School- racism? political expediency? public safety? states' rights? 
Moreover, it hardly acknowledged the public discussion and historical debates over these 
questions. 
In the second half of the timeline, the exhibit turned its attention to the "discipline 
problems" which recurred at Central for the "remainder of the year" after responsibility 
for protecting the nine African American students was turned over to the Arkansas 
National Guard. Dr. Lewis hoped that this portion of the exhibit would fmally "answer 
the all-important question of exactly what happened in the school" out of view of 
reporters and cameras.94 The exhibit highlights physical attacks, racial slurs, and 
vandalism directed at the Little Rock Nine after November 14, 1957. Although the 
events chronicled on the timeline were well documented in school records, the exhibit 
acknowledged that at least one story was not "made public" due to a desire to "preserve 
94 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 41. 
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the myth that everything inside Central was fme." The exhibit did not explain that many 
other incidents were never recorded because of the school administration's policy of 
ignoring attacks that were not witnessed by a teacher. At least half of the altercations 
between white and black students recounted in the exhibit were related to the expulsion 
ofMinnijean Brown. The timeline related the series of events which led to her departure 
from the school, presenting the harassment Brown endured, her reaction to the taunts of 
white students, and the disparate punishments meted out by the school district. On the 
day Brown left Little Rock to fmish her education in New York, segregationist ringleader 
Sammie Dean Parker was reinstated. The timeline also highlighted other representative 
incidents. However, the use of this format could have left visitors with the impression 
that the events featured were the sum total of those experienced by the Nine. 
Even more troubling was the panel added to the exhibit at the insistence of 
Central High student body leaders from 1957-58. This panel, titled "The View From 
Inside the High School," was added to the exhibit to assuage complaints from some of 
Central's white alumni that the exhibit painted an unfair portrait of"95% of the white 
students who took no part in it. "95 The added text emphasized that the majority of 
Central's students did not participate in the harassment of the Little Rock Nine. Instead, 
they assumed a guise of "sensible, peaceful neutrality" in the conflict between the African 
American students and their segregationist tormentors. Student government leaders 
95 Quoted from a letter from Craig Rains to Rett Tucker, 14 April 1997, unprocessed Central High 
Museum Historical Collection, recently relocated to Central High School National Historic Site, in Johanna 
Miller Lewis, '"Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 41. The author was unable to access these 
documents. 
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"pledged to obey the law and asked the student body to follow their example." The panel 
underscored: "Most students did" [emphasis original]. Although some involved in the 
exhibit planning process opposed the addition of this panel, Johanna Miller Lewis 
asserted that "it did not detract" from the exhibit's overall interpretation of"the Little 
Rock Nine's experiences."96 
However, it should be noted that this interpretation ofthe views ofthe majority of 
Central students was also evident in the selection of published quotations that 
accompanied the exhibit timeline. Three of the four quotes included in the exhibit from 
white Central students expressed relatively moderate sentiments. For example, the 
anonymous statement of a white 16-year-old female, "If parents would just go home and 
let us alone, we'll be all right.. .. We just want them to leave us be. We can do it," 
accompanied a photograph ofMinnijean Brown Trickey laughing as she stood outside the 
school surrounded by white students. Exhibit designer Abbie Chessler and project 
manager Johanna Miller Lewis both expressed their hope that the use of quotations in the 
exhibit would allow the museum "to tell the story from many different points ofview."97 
However, the relative lack of quotes from vocal white supremacists within the school, or 
white students resigned to obeying the law despite deeply ingrained and clearly stated 
segregationist beliefs, suggested that few white students opposed the presence of the 
Little Rock Nine. 
96 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 41. 
97 Chessler as quoted in Leslie Newell Peacock, "A Place to Learn: At last, a museum to remember 
the Central crisis," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 12. 
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For their part, the African American students interpreted the "sensible, peaceful 
neutrality" of the majority of their peers much differently. To some degree, the 
concessions made to white students in the development of the exhibit were balanced by 
Elizabeth Eckford's poignant comments in a videotaped film that played in a constant 
loop at the end of the exhibit. As Eckford explained, the harassment the Little Rock Nine 
endured from a small "organized group" would not have been as pervasive without the 
"tacit cooperation" of the rest of the white student body.98 Eckford's comments drew 
attention to what some scholars have referred to as more "mundane and insidious form of 
racism" that are often neglected at civil rights museums that focus on ''white supremacy's 
most violent and widely scorned forms."99 Nevertheless, Eckford's view of this issue was 
presented as her personal opinion, while the perspective of Central High's white student 
leaders was seamlessly and invisibly incorporated into the body of the exhibit text. 
The next part of the exhibit informed visitors about "The Lost Year" of 1958-59 
when all public schools in Little Rock were closed to avoid desegregation. The exhibit 
explained that Governor Faubus closed the schools "pending a public vote on the issue of 
immediate integration of all grade levels." However, the exhibit did not explicitly state 
that the majority of Little Rock voters ratified the Governor's decision in that election, 
98 Johanna Miller Lewis also makes note of this in her article, '"Build a Museum and They Will 
Come,"' 42. 
99 Dwyer, "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Place, Memory, and Conflict," 666-667. See 
also Glenn Eskew, "The Won Cause," 38. 
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voting to keep the schools closed rather than proceed with desegregation.100 The text 
focused on the creation ofthe Women's Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools and 
its efforts to reopen the public high schools by electing "moderate" candidates to the 
school board, and recalling "segregationist" members who voted to "purge" teachers who 
had "upheld the law" during the crisis. The exhibit did not make it clear that some of the 
WEC's "moderate" candidates, including Central High Museum Inc. President Rett 
Tucker's father, Everett Tucker Jr., were self-described segregationists who only 
supported court-ordered token integration as a means of avoiding complete desegregation 
and retaining public education.101 Moreover, it did not reveal that the WEC itself refused 
to take a position supporting desegregation and refused to admit African American 
women to its ranks. However, unlike many narratives of the crisis that attribute the 
reopening ofthe public schools to the activism of this group, the exhibit did note that 
high school education in the city did not resume until the federal courts ruled that the 
100 Also noted in Cynthia Howell, "Gas station near Central lives again: Structure reborn as visitor 
center," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 18, 1997, p. lB; Jack Schnedler, "Sizing up our newest 
tourist site," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 28, 1997, p. IE. 
101 Everett Tucker Jr. was executive secretary of the Chamber of Commerce in 1957 and was 
elected to the school board in the wake of the school desegregation crisis with the support of the Women's 
Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools (WEC). Tucker was a self-proclaimed segregationist who 
nonetheless supported keeping public schools open and opposed the attempted purge of 44 public school 
teachers during the 1958-59 school year. Because of this position he was accused ofbeing an 
"integrationist" and a ''puppet of the federal govemmenf' by Gov. Orval Faubus. Tucker survived a recall 
effort led by the segregationist organization CROSS. When he became school board president, he worked 
to keep integration to a minimum through the establishment of a pupil placement plan and the selection of 
school sites in racially homogeneous neighborhoods. Indeed, as David Gene Vinzant has recently noted, 
"Tucker's support for tokenism in school integration had birthed the epithet 'Tuckerism'" (Vinzant, "Little 
Rock's Long Crisis: Schools and Race in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1863-2009," 121). See also Murphy, 
BreakingtheSilence, 58,107,161,171-172,181,186,196-197,225-226. 
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state's school closing laws were illegal.102 
The final portion of the exhibit, "The Continuing Struggle: 1960-1997," noted that 
while 1960 "may have marked a new beginning for Little Rock's public schools" it was 
"hardly a perfect one." The progress of the desegregation plan was "slow" and the black 
community "impatient." The exhibit clearly stated that the gradual desegregation of 
schools in the city was due to enforcement of the law by the federal courts. As this 
process unraveled, the exhibit suggested that the "biggest change from 1957" was that 
"Little Rock was no longer the sole battleground of school desegregation." Conflicts in 
communities like Boston revealed "that the rest of the United States was not immune to 
these problems." Despite its struggle with desegregation, Central continued to be a 
"symbol of academic excellence." The fmal photograph in the exhibit, a large picture of 
Central's integrated graduating class of 1996, underscored this assessment. As Johanna 
Miller Lewis explained, this portion of the exhibition was designed to demonstrate that 
102 The WEC has been lionized in several accounts and is frequently given credit for the reopening 
of the city's schools during the 1959-1960 school year. Despite the fact that the WEC took no principled 
stand on the school desegregation issue, and many of its members opposed desegregation, Elizabeth 
Jacoway has described their efforts as both a "moral and political movement" (Jacoway, "Down from the 
Pedestal: Gender and Regional Culture in a Ladylike Assault on the Southern Way of Life," Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 [Autumn 1997]: 345-352). In her account, Lorraine Gates notes that many of 
the organization's members preferred segregated education, but she contends, "the women ofthe WEC 
publicly challenged the segregationists at every tum, and their actions were instrumental in the defeat of the 
extremists and the reopening of the city schools" (Gates, "Power from the Pedestal: The Women's 
Emergency Committee and the Little Rock School Crisis," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 66, no. 2 
[Summer 2007]: 195). It would be more accurate to say that an equally important- and instrumental- role 
was played by the NAACP and the black plaintiffs who took their case to the federal courts, which found 
the school closing laws unconstitutional. Legal historian Tony Freyer has observed that there is a tendency 
to emphasize the importance of the school board recall over this court litigation. However, he asserts, "it is 
unlikely that the moderates would have acted when they did had not the Supreme Court finally closed the 
channels of political maneuver sanctified by appeals to constitutional symbols of states' rights and 
interposition" (Freyer, Little Rock on Trial, 21 0). Moreover, it must be noted that without the bloc vote that 
the African American community supplied in the school board recall election, the moderate candidates 
would not have been elected over their segregationist counterparts (Spitzberg, Jr., Racial Politics in Little 
Rock, 29, 110; Anderson, Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School, 191). 
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"despite the crisis and some other racial problems over the years, integration did 
eventually take place."103 
Notably, however, the exhibit did not address Little Rock's recurrent problem of 
white flight, the rising percentage of African American students in the city's schools, 
Central's special status in the school district which contributed to its integrated 
enrollment and academic success, or the ongoing school desegregation litigation. Again, 
this was in keeping with other civil rights museums in the region. As W. Fitzhugh 
Brundage has noted, these institutions rarely "address the benefits that whites in recent 
times received from the maintenance of white supremacy," and topics like residential 
segregation, police brutality, or economic inequality are "seldom considered."104 A 
reporter from the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette described the exhibit's parting salvo as 
little more than a series of"platitudes" that did little to illuminate the evolution of race 
relations in the city. 105 Exhibit designer Abbie Chessler put a more positive spin on the 
exhibit's interpretation, telling reporters that the planners intentionally "left the story 
open ended."106 
"The Stage is Set": The Fortieth Anniversary Commemoration 
However, if the city's power brokers had been able to use their position on the 
103 Johanna Miller Lewis, "'Build a Museum and They Will Come,"' 43. 
104 Brundage, The Southern Past, 319. 
105 Jack Schnedler, "Sizing up our newest tourist site," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 28, 
1997, p. IE. 
106 Leslie Newell Peacock, "A Place to Learn: At last, a museum to remember the Central crisis," 
Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 14. 
430 
museum board to limit community deliberation about the historical narrative presented in 
the exhibit, and to frame it within the context of the rhetoric of reconciliation and 
progress that surrounded the 40th anniversary, they were less able to control the debate 
and discussion that surfaced in public forums and events designed to mark the milestone 
throughout the city. Many of Central High Museum Inc.'s board members were also 
involved in planning the anniversary commemoration. Most prominently, Everett Tucker 
ill, president of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce and Central High Museum Inc. 
also served as co-chairman of the city's anniversary commission. Little Rock Mayor Jim 
Dailey hoped Tucker's appointment would result in seamless coordination between the 
museum plans and commemorative activities.107 As the official anniversary calendar 
developed, two events anchored the week-long schedule of events- the museum opening 
and a dedication ceremony featuring President Bill Clinton, Governor Mike Huckabee, 
and the members of the Little Rock Nine. 
Skip Rutherford had been involved in the museum project almost from its 
inception. As a public relations professional, he had argued for coordinating the exhibit 
opening with the 40th anniversary. Once that project was underway, he turned his 
attention toward soliciting support for a large public ceremony and museum dedication. 
Rutherford envisioned a ceremony held on the steps of Central High School that would 
present a dramatically different image of Little Rock than the one broadcast to the world 
107 Dailey had initially requested that Tucker serve as the chair of the commission. Tucker 
accepted but suggested that Dr. Gail Reede-Jones, a black physician and member of Central's PTA, serve as 
his co-chair in the spirit of"inclusiveness." Daisy Bates also served as an honorary chairman (Grobmyer, 
"A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation ofLittle Rock Central 
High School," 27-28). 
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in 1957. Again, he solicited the support of political figures: Democrat Mayor Jim Dailey, 
Republican Governor Mike Huckabee, and President Bill Clinton. He sought assurances 
from the White House that the President would participate in the ceremony, recognizing 
that the presence of the Arkansas native would assure national news coverage and 
exposure.108 Mayor Dailey was equally enthusiastic about the project and quickly created 
the "Central High School Celebration Commission," with Tucker at its head, and charged 
it with orchestrating the commemoration plans, preparing the school and its surrounding 
neighborhood for worldwide attention, and promoting a positive picture of progress in 
Little Rock. 109 Soon after the city's commission was established, its members agreed to 
reach out to the Little Rock Nine, informing them about the city's plans and requesting 
their input and involvement. 110 
At the beginning of the year, Huckabee and Dailey delivered addresses 
proclaiming 1997 as the "year of reconciliation." In his State of the State speech, 
Huckabee- a skilled politician and pastor- announced his intention to use the fortieth 
anniversary as an opportunity to "make amends" and to distance himself from the legacy 
of his predecessor Governor Orval Faubus. He declared, 
On that day in September, as the 'Little Rock Nine' come back to Central 
High School, they will not be met by a governor who says, 'You can't 
108 Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation 
of Little Rock Central High School," 26-27. 
109 After complaints from representatives of the black community, the commission changed its 
focus from "celebration" to "commemoration" of the anniversary (Grobmyer, "A History of the 
Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation of Little Rock Central High School," 33, 
44-45). 
110 Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation 
of Little Rock Central High School," 35-36. 
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come in,' but met by a governor who says, 'Please, come in and accept our 
sincere apologies and give us your forgiveness for ever allowing such a 
thing to take place among enlightened, supposedly God-fearing people. 111 
Although some state legislators em~raced the governor's statement as "a beginning" that 
was "long overdue," others expressed resistance to the anniversary commemoration or 
skepticism about its purpose. Rep. Ode Maddox, a Democrat who had been sitting in the 
legislative chamber since 1957, thought the planned ceremony ''just pours oil on the fire." 
From his perspective, the desegregation crisis had "been discussed thousands of times" 
and overemphasized by the media. "I think it's over and the least said about it the better," 
he said. "It's been apologized for, so why just keep on?" On the other side of the 
spectrum, Rep. Judy Smith expressed support for marking the anniversary, but cautioned, 
"One activity does not bring about reconciliation or a change in attitude. " 112 
Indeed, discontent about the state of race relations in the state's capital city 
provoked strong opposition to the anniversary commemoration. Dale H. Charles, 
president of the Little Rock and Arkansas chapters of the NAACP, threatened to picket 
the ceremony at Central High School unless the city addressed the serious concerns of the 
black community, including dissatisfaction with the distribution of city contracts to 
minority businesses, police brutality in African American neighborhoods, and ongoing 
problems with the school system. Moreover, Mayor Dailey had failed to appoint an 
NAACP representative to the anniversary commission. Although he apologized for this 
"oversight," Charles expressed his disbelief that the nation's largest civil rights 
m Kevin Freking, "Huckabee aim for Central stirs reaction: Legislators ponder 'reconciliation' 
fete," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 23, 1997, p. 8A. 
112 Ibid. 
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organization, which had played a crucial role in 1957, had merely been overlooked. After 
all, the NAACP had orchestrated the 30th anniversary commemoration ten years earlier. 113 
Charles asserted, ''Now, with the focus on the Little Rock Nine and racial healing, 
everybody is talking about the new Little Rock. But the new Little Rock is the same as 
the old Little Rock." While he acknowledged that the city had made "a few little gains," 
he insisted, ''there have been a lot of relapses as wel1."114 
Joy Springer, a monitor for school desegregation attorney John Walker, 
emphasized that the Little Rock school system was still segregated, and that black 
students were denied access to equal educational opportunities due to academic tracking 
and disciplinary procedures. "What do we have to celebrate?" she asked. "Because 
they're all in the same building? They're still being treated differently. The idea was to 
provide equal education." Based on her work with the school system, Springer 
concluded, "We have nothing to celebrate, from 1957 until now."115 The desegregation 
monitor insisted that the planned events were "not about race relations and 
reconciliation." Rather, they were an attempt by "the city of Little Rock and the 
Chamber of Commerce" to bring in tourist revenue that would shore up "the power 
structure." She asserted, "This is just hype, a public relations sort of thing, to say, 'We 
want to show the world that Little Rock is on the way to solving the problem' ... They 
113 Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation 
of Little Rock Central High School," 53-54. 
114 Larry Copeland, "40 Years After School Desegregation, The Struggle Continues: Little Rock 
Still Gripped By Race Tension," The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 18, 1997, p. AI. 
1151bid. 
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want you to believe that."116 
Critics pointed to Little Rock's efforts to clean up the neighborhood surrounding 
Central High School in time for the fortieth anniversary celebration as example of the 
city's preoccupation with symbol rather than substance. The high school was freshened 
up with new paint and landscaping, and City Director Joan Adcock created an adopt-a-
house program to "spiff up the tattered, weather-worn facades" of the houses across the 
street. City officials also scrambled to repair sidewalks and remove trash from the inner-
city neighborhood. A disaster-cleanup crew from Michigan was even brought in to "tidy 
up" vacant lots. Adcock insisted that his was about more than a "picture-taking" 
opportunity, and Mayor Dailey suggested that these efforts were merely a "springboard" 
for a "long-term" effort to revitalize the area. 117 
Representatives of the Central High Neighborhood Association expressed 
skepticism about these assertions, noting that little had been done to address the long-
standing complaints of residents in the area until the approach of the anniversary 
celebration. Moreover, they resented the city's decision to proceed with their plans 
without consulting them. The association had already developed plans to make the area 
more hospitable to pedestrians, which included improved lighting, wider sidewalks, and 
better landscaping. Instead, a $28,000 donation from Nations Bank resulted in the 
116 Peter Baker, "40 Years Later, 9 are Welcomed: Little Rock Marks Civil Rights Milestone," The 
Washington Post, September 26, 1997, p. AI. 
117 Linda S. Caillouet, "It's costly, but Central High shaping up," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, July 
8, 1997, p. lB. While visiting Little Rock for the 50th anniversary commemoration, the author witnessed 
new attempts to give the Central High historic district a "face lift'' as lawns were resodded in preparation for 
the event. 
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creation of a brick logo in the middle of the intersection of 14th and Park, designed to give 
the neighborhood a "sense of place." The new Central High Neighborhood Association 
President Cliff Riggs described the addition as an "embarrassment" that did little to 
enhance the neighborhood for its residents. Annie Abrams, a local activist and museum 
planning committee member, told reporters that she hoped the damage from the city's 
efforts could be minimized. Just as the contributions of community representatives in the 
museum planning process had been sidelined, she felt this was another example of what 
"they do for us instead of do with us."118 
For his part, John Walker, the attorney representing the black plaintiffs in the 
ongoing school desegregation litigation, described a starkly different reality than the 
image cultivated by the commemoration's planners through its carefully timed clean-up 
efforts. "We have something comparable to Johannesburg in South Africa during 
apartheid," he told reporters. "You have the black section and the white section, and you 
have a repressive police force that views its mission as keeping blacks in their place." 
The anniversary plans were a farce. Like Springer, Walker asserted, "To establish Little 
Rock as a place that has overcome the bigotry and racism of the 1950s is a public-
relations venture more than anything." The symbolism surrounding the planned 
ceremony was not an indication that the time was right for the federal courts to return 
118 John Brummett, "Central district looks past Thursday," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 
21, 1997, p. 5J; John Brummett, "Central: a beginning, but of what?" Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, October 
26, 1997, p. 5J; Collins "Forgetting and Remembering," 251-252. 
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control of the schools to local officials. 119 For Walker, the opposite was true. Over the 
last forty years the school board had operated in "bad faith," and had used the passage of 
time "to defeat the noble purposes of the Brown decision." Rather than being a symbol of 
success, Walker suggested, "Those who said 'never' can point to Little Rock and see that 
the promised concept of unity likely will not be implemented and the concept of separate 
and ultimately unequal will continue to reign." After "40 years of noncompliant 
conduct," there was little to celebrate other than the fact that most of the Little Rock Nine 
had chosen other places to live as adults. Walker argued that black children in Little 
Rock were still fighting for their constitutional rights in court and they continued to "wait 
for the day when the city's actions measure up to its often stated good intentions."120 He 
warned that the issues surrounding the schools would never be resolved until a plan was 
mandated by the court "that delivers for black children."121 
Comments like these encouraged members of the press descending on Little Rock 
for the anniversary celebration to take a closer look at the city's schools. Throughout the 
month of September, story after story made note of the academic disparities at Central: 
the low number of black students enrolled in honors and advanced placement courses, the 
persistent achievement gaps on standardized tests, and the disproportionate number of 
119 Scott Parks, reporter for the Dallas Morning News, "Past Relived; As the Little Rock enter the 
school house door four decades later, residents examine their segregated past and present, and wonder how 
far the city has advanced," Tampa Tribune, September 20, 1997, p. 4. 
120 John W. Walker, "No reason to celebrate: A civil rights lawyer sees scant progress," Arkansas 
Times, September 19, 1997, p. 32. 
m Scott Parks, reporter for the Dallas Morning News, "Past Relived; As the Little Rock enter the 
school house door four decades later, residents examine their segregated past and present, and wonder how 
far the city has advanced," Tampa Tribune, September 20, 1997, p. 4. 
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black students subject to disciplinary sanctions. Reporters also took note of the self-
segregation and social isolation of students in the hallways and cafeteria; most white 
students ate a tables outside in the courtyard, while their black peers sat with friends 
inside the building.122 Local columnist John Brummett noted that despite the attempts of 
city hall to dress up the city and the neighborhood immediately surrounding Central for 
the media, reporters from around the country were not taken in by the "trumped-up 
phoniness." US. News & World Report's coverage did not focus on the "superficially 
enhanced houses" across from the school painted and resodded for the anniversary, 
but on what was happening inside the building. Like other publications, the news 
magazine tested the city's claims and "produced a story about how white kids get put 
into honor classes disproportionately while black kids get left behind disproportionately." 
Even more embarrassing, "they published a picture of a non-honors class, predominately 
black, a couple of kids with their heads on their desks, perhaps asleep." Brummett 
acerbically commented, "City fathers apparently forgot to transfer black students to honor 
classes for that particular week." The lesson to be learned? "You can't fake it," the 
columnist concluded.123 
122 For examples see Kevin Sack, "Civil Rights Anniversary Points to Unfinished Tasks," The New 
York Times, September 21, 1997, p. 1; Richard Benedetto, "After 40 Years, a return to Central High," USA 
Today, September 25, 1997, p. 8A; Peter Baker, "40 Years Later, 9 Are Welcomed: Little Rock Marks 
Civil Rights Milestone," The Washington Post, September 26, 1997; Danny Shameer, "Leaders look at 
status of integration today," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 26, 1997, p. 13A. Interest in student 
seating patterns in the cafeteria may have been prompted by the publication of Beverly Daniel Tatum's 
book "Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?" and Other Conversations About 
Race (New York: Basic Books, 1997). 
123 John Brummett, "Central: a beginning, but of what?" Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, October 26 
1997, p. 5J. Brummett was pointing to an article by Julian E. Barnes, "Segregation, now," US. News & 
World Report, September 22, 1997, p. 22. 
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Skip Rutherford had been designated to coordinate public relations activities 
related to the anniversary. He attempted to minimize any damage to the city's reputation 
by emphasizing that the racial inequities on display in Little Rock were commonplace 
throughout the nation. "Little Rock's disparity gap is America's disparity gap," he said, 
"no different than you find in Dallas, Detroit or Chicago."124 This explanation borrowed 
from the same logic that undergirded the school district's attempt to escape from court 
oversight in the 1990s. It had also been written into the Central High Museum and 
Visitor Center exhibit text, which noted that Little Rock was no longer the "sole 
battleground" in the desegregation struggle and "that the rest of the United States was not 
immune to these problems." For many who argued from this perspective, ongoing 
inequities in the city's school system were not the product of local decisions, 
administrative actions, or educational policies. Rather, they were so widespread that 
Little Rock and other communities should be absolved of any responsibility for 
addressing them. This rhetoric obscured, perpetuated, and naturalized racial injustice, 
just as claims about an immutable and unchangeable "southern way of life" had forty 
years earlier. 
In this context, John Walker and the local NAACP actively discouraged the Little 
Rock Nine from participating in the anniversary commemoration. 125 However, after years 
124 Scott Parks, reporter for the Dallas Morning News, "Past Relived; As the Little Rock enter the 
school house door four decades later, residents examine their segregated past and present, and wonder how 
far the city has advanced," Tampa Tribune, September 20, 1997, p. 4; Scott Parks, "Anniversary also 
marked with NAACP demonstration," The Dallas Morning News, September 25, 1997. 
125 Sandra Sobieraj, "Clinton says battle of 'Little Rock Nine' still not over," Associated Press, 
September 25, 1997; James Jefferson, "Group says struggle for access to equal opportunity continues," 
Associated Press, September 24, 1997; Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth 
Anniversary of the Desegregation ofLittle Rock Central High School," 57-58. 
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of relative public silence, the group of former students collectively decided that the time 
was right to return to Little Rock and use their story to effect change. In her recently 
published memoir, Carlotta Walls LaNier recalled, "I wanted to see Little Rock 
acknowledge its past, as ugly as it was, but it was equally important to me that 
participants in the commemoration not get stuck there."126 After multiple conference 
calls among themselves, the members of the Little Rock Nine decided to participate in 
the events planned for the anniversary as a group. However, they refused to publicly 
endorse the project until they anniversary commission provided them with information 
about the schedule of events. According to Elizabeth Grobmyer, "The Nine wanted a 
pledge that there would be maximum student involvem~nt, adequate minority 
representation in the events, and a guarantee that this event enjoyed the support of both 
the government and the general public."127 After President Clinton announced his 
intention to use the fortieth anniversary as the occasion to launch a national conversation 
about race relations, the Little Rock Nine formally committed to the event. 128 The 
President's "Initiative on Race," and his emphasis on persistent discrimination in 
America, dovetailed with their own ideas about how to mark the anniversary. In the days 
leading up the formal ceremony, the Nine applauded the progress the city had made over 
the intervening forty years, but spoke out boldly about ongoing problems in the city's 
schools and the academic tracking documented in Central's classrooms. 
126 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 247-248. 
127 Grobrnyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation 
of Little Rock Central High School," 58. 
128 Ibid, 68-69. 
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Melba Pattillo Beals, a journalist and public relations executive familiar with the 
media made it clear that the Little Rock Nine did not view the commemoration as a 
victory celebration. "What we're celebrating is the second phase of a war," she said. 
"The battle won't be won ... until we can see equal and be seen as equal."129 Beals 
insisted that the battle for integration was always about more than putting bodies together 
in a classroom. "Does anybody really think we wanted to go to Central High School 
because we wanted to sit next to white people?" asked Beals. "We wanted to go to 
Central High School because they were getting Rhodes Scholarships there. We wanted 
equal access to opportunities."13° Central's relatively balanced racial ratios were a mark 
of progress, but they meant little ifblack students were not participating in the 
institution's celebrated advanced placement and honors courses. 
Terrence Roberts, a college professor and clinical psychologist, echoed and 
expanded on these comments in an editorial published in the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette 
forty years after he had been escorted up the steps of Central High School by the 101 st 
Airborne. Writing in the "name of civil rights for all people," Roberts made it clear that 
the anniversary was not an occasion for celebration. The anniversary was a "time for 
reflection" and a "time for remembering the past so the future can be better informed." 
But Roberts wrote, 
as Little Rock's schools remain under federal court orders to desegregate, 
as affmnative action programs are being dismantled across the country, as 
129 James Jefferson, "Group says struggle for access to equal opportunity continues," Associated 
Press, September 24, 1997. 
13° Kevin Sack, "Civil Rights Anniversary Points to Unfinished Tasks," The New York Times, 
September 21, 1997, p. 1. 
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statistics continue to show disproportionate contributions of income and 
wealth between racial groups, as one social barometer after another 
mirrors the dismal state of black people in the poorest strata of our 
economic hierarchy, it is clear to me that the time for celebration must be 
postponed .... racism is very much alive in America. 
To those who suggested that Roberts was "oversensitive" or "paranoid" and blind to the 
"stellar accomplishments" of the present, he countered, "I cannot in good conscious 
celebrate what some would label progress while so many of my fellow citizens of color 
remain oppressed." 
Roberts also rejected the rhetoric of"reconciliation" that had swirled around the 
anniversary from its inception. He reminded his readers, ''to be reconciled there must 
have been some friendship or harmony then in existence that can now be restored." In 
this simple statement, the civil rights veteran swept away claims that Little Rock had been 
a beacon of racial progress and harmony in the years before the school desegregation 
crisis. He urged Little Rock to "confront the past" and "learn from it" rather than 
promote and foster a version of history more to its liking.131 In regards to the city's 
schools, Roberts insisted it was time to move beyond "cosmetic" change, time "to stop 
playing games about resegregation and integration and go about the business of building a 
society that has in it the mechanisms that allow each and every citizen to do what he or 
she has the ability to do."132 
Later that day, the anticipated public ceremony unfolded on the steps of Central 
131 Dr. Terrence J. Roberts, "The ongoing battle for equality," op-ed, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
September 25, 1997, p. 13B. 
132 Richard Benedetto, "After 40 years, a return to Central High," USA Today, September 25, 1997, 
p. 8A; Cynthia Howell, "Opportunity the true prize, say eight who integrated," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, September 25, 1997. 
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High.133 Little Rock Mayor Jim Dailey recognized distinguished guests and cabinet 
members. He introduced Daisy Bates, the families of the Little Rock Nine and attorneys 
Thurgood Marshall and Wiley Branton. In his opening remarks, the Mayor glossed over 
the Arkansas State NAACP's decision to boycott the ceremony. He also ignored the 
three dozen members of the local branch of the organization who were picketing the 
event. Dale H. Charles told reporters who made inquiries about demonstration, "The 
Little Rock Nine should not have accepted the invitation to come into this farce."134 State 
Representative Michael Booker carried a sign that read, "Isn't the celebration 
premature?" Others carried posters stating, "Forty years later, Racism is alive and well 
in Little Rock." Booker told the press, "The whole nation and world were watching this 
event, and we wanted people to know that all is not well in Little Rock."135 Nevertheless, 
Dailey blithely welcomed "former and current members of the NAACP and NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund from throughout our city, state, and nation" joining the ceremony 
and thanked them for their "many contributions both past and present." Finally, the 
mayor introduced Republican Governor Mike Huckabee by noting that unlike his 
predecessor 40 years ago, this political figure had "been the voice of reason and fairness." 
Huckabee's address drew on his experience as a Baptist pastor. He framed the 
nation's problems with race relations as a "sin problem" not just a "skin problem." For 
133 The following is based on transcriptions from the broadcast of 401h anniversary commemoration 
ceremony, taped 25 September 2007, in possession of author. 
134 Sandra Sobieraj, "Clinton says battle of 'Little Rock Nine' still not over," Associated Press, 
September 25, 1997. 
135 Scott Parks, "Anniversary also marked with NAACP demonstration," The Dallas Morning 
News, September 25, 1997. 
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the Governor, the ceremony and the museum exhibition open across the street, amounted 
to a kind of public confession of sin and wrongdoing in preparation for true 
reconciliation. Drawing a Biblical analogy, Huckabee noted, "In Proverbs it says, he who 
conceals his sins does not prosper, but whoever confesses and renounces them will find 
mercy." Just as the children oflsrael had wandered in the wilderness for 40 years, 
Arkansans had ''wandered around in ambiguity, all kinds of explanations and 
justifications" for what happened at Central in 1957. But he stated unequivocally, "today 
we come to say once and for all that what happened here 40 years ago was simply wrong, 
it was evil, and we renounce it." The actions of the individuals who participated in the 
mob "may be forgivable" but they were "not excusable." These were themes he had 
addressed throughout the city and state's self-proclaimed ''year of reconciliation." 
As a politician, Huckabee acknowledged the controversy surrounding the public 
ceremony but tried to tum public objections to his own advantage. To those who said 
that the event was little more than a public relations ploy designed to burnish the image of 
local politicians, Huckabee suggested that he arid Mayor Jim Dailey had been aware that 
people might view the event that way from the start. "We had a great anxiety and fear," 
he said, "that we would end up with little more than simple ceremonies and testimonies 
of those of us who are politicians coming to congratulate ourselves for all the things we 
had done." However, Huckabee insisted that none of the political figures sitting on the 
platform would claim that they were the ones who had "moved this generation." Instead, 
he pointed to the bravery and courage of the Little Rock Nine, their parents, and the white 
students at Central who had welcomed their peers and "also had to put up with the jeers 
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and with the insults." For those who thought that the ceremony would only "open up old 
wounds," Huckabee echoed the words of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Letter from 
Birmingham City Jail and insisted that a little "tension every now and then" could be a 
necessary and positive spur to change. For those who objected to the notion that Little 
Rock had something to "celebrate," Huckabee noted that the official name of the event 
had been changed from a celebration to a commemoration.136 In his view, Little Rock 
could "celebrate progress" and the "long way" it had traveled in 40 years, but the city and 
the state were "not home yet." The city would have to "deal with" the legacy of the 
school desegregation crisis until Dr. Martin Luther King's dream that "we will judge 
people by the character of their hearts and not by the color of their skin" lived within each 
citizen. 
Yet, in the final part ofhis speech, Huckabee subtly undercut President Clinton's 
planned remarks on his Initiative on Race. Drawing on his belief in the limited role of 
government, Huckabee cautioned, "Let me remind us, government can do some things, 
but only God can change people's hearts." Government could put children in the same 
classrooms, "but government can't make classmates go home and be friends when school 
is out." The Governor insisted, "Only God can give us the power to love each other and 
respect each other and share life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness with every 
American regardless of who he or she is." Huckabee's statements suggested that there 
was no further role for government in the arena of race relations- the work that remained 
136 This change was made at the request of representatives ofLittle Rock's black community 
(Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation of Little 
Rock Central High School," 44-45). 
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was moral and personal, and could not be addressed through structural or institutio:q.al 
changes. 137 He hoped that the new exhibit in the Little Rock Visitor Center would be a 
catalyst for this internal change, a call to all people to stand up against overt expressions 
of racism and violence, so that no one could ever ask again, "Why didn't somebody do 
something?" 
Following the Governor's remarks, First Lady Hillary Clinton introduced Ernest 
Green, who spoke on behalf of the Little Rock Nine. Green also pointed to the 
importance of individual action and personal responsibility, but urged his audience "to do 
something" about the structural inequities and injustices that continued to mark American 
society. The lesson to be drawn from the events of 1957, was not, as Huckabee had 
suggested, that people did not speak out and act against racial injustice, but that the Little 
Rock Nine, their parents, and supportive members of the black community did. 138 As the 
courts reconsidered Little Rock's desegregation plan in the months leading up to the 40th 
anniversary, school administrators and various experts had testified that there was nothing 
that could be done about disparities in black and white student achievement and persistent 
patterns of residential segregation. Green acknowledged that the current "general 
consensus" among many scholars and social scientists was that the "chasm that exists 
between the races .... is so great in length, breadth, and scope that no one can offer real or 
137 Huckabee did make a personal commitment a year later when his daughter Sarah enrolled as a 
student at Central High (Counts, A Life is More than a Moment, 67). 
138 While interviewing black and white residents of Little Rock in the 1990s, Beth Roy observed 
that these distinctive ways of framing the crisis were relatively widespread. She wrote, "My interviews in 
Little Rock often dwelt on this matter of agency in painful, personal detail. Most of the white people who 
talked with me, especially those who populated the school itself, portrayed themselves at best as innocent 
bystanders, at worst as the real victims of the piece. Black people, however, more often saw themselves as 
activists, making personal choices to reshape society'' (Roy, Bitters in the Honey, 110). 
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viable solutions to bridge that gap, at least not any time soon." Green rejected this 
perspective, boldly stating, "I believe they are unequivocally wrong." 
Drawing a parallel between past and present, Green noted that his parents and his 
peers had rejected the claims of"recognized experts" forty years earlier who claimed that 
the structure of American society could not be changed. The parents of the Little Rock 
Nine took this stance because they recognized "the promise, the possibilities, and the 
unlimited potential of an America united- one nation under God, indivisible with liberty 
and justice for all." These "keepers ofthe flame" were "visionaries" who saw the 
disparity between "the American dream and the American reality," but were willing to 
"sacrifice their own personal comfort to merge the two." Forty years earlier, there were 
also those in the white and black communities who said that if African American students 
wanted an equal education than "the answer was simply study longer and work harder" in 
the educational institutions available to them. "They were wrong," Green said, and 
implied that those who made similar claims in 1997 were mistaken as well. "What we 
needed was the same thing to which all young people are entitled," he asserted, "a 
community that wanted to see us blossom not bleed, a society that encouraged us to reach 
for our dreams and recognized us as whole persons." The Little Rock Nine endured 
assaults on their bodies, attacks on their character, and attempts to suffocate their spirits, 
because Little Rock was their home, they were determined to shape their own destinies, 
and they had an obligation to be of service to the greater community. "Power concedes 
nothing without a struggle" in the past or the present, Green insisted. For Central High's 
first black graduate, his forty year journey had been painful but it was "well worth it." 
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What he hoped young people would take from his story was "the belief that he or she can 
open a door, succeed against the odds, dream the impossible dream, turn no into yes, or 
navigate uncharted waters." This anniversary was an occasion to turn the Little Rock 
Nine into the "Little Rock 10, 1 0-hundred, 1 0-thousand, 1 0-million" as the nation faced 
the challenges of the present. It was an opportunity to recruit the next generation of 
social activists. 
As Green finished his speech, the crowd erupted in applause. Fatima McKindra, 
Central High School's student body president and member of the anniversary 
commission, introduced Arkansas native Bill Clinton.139 Clinton built on Green's speech 
and pointed to areas where discrimination persisted and needed to be addressed. The 
President claimed that watching the events in Little Rock unfold as a young man fifty 
miles away had "made racial equality a driving obsession" in his life. The image of the 
mob surrounding Elizabeth Eckford gave the nation a "very disturbing glimpse 
ourselves." The desegregation crisis, the mob violence in Arkansas' capital, and the 
deployment of the 101 st Airborne and forced him and his white peers to ask themselves, 
"Where did we stand? What did we believe? How did we want to live?" As Clinton 
addressed his audience, it was clear he hoped to use the anniversary as an opportunity to 
honor the Little Rock Nine and to pose these questions once again. 
Forty years after the desegregation crisis at Central High, Clinton emphasized, 
"there is still discrimination in America." Access to academic excellence and education 
139 Parts of Clinton's speech were released by the Federal Document Clearing House. See 
"Excerpts from President's Comments on School Desegregation," New York Times, September 25, 1997, p. 
A20. 
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was still not equal. In 1997, children at Central and schools across the nation were 
tracked into different academic programs. "Children of every race walk through the same 
door but often walk down different halls ... they sit in different classes," Clinton said. The 
President pointed to the self-segregation that marked students' social lives, noting that 
black and white students frequently ate at separate cafeteria tables or sat in different parts 
of the bleachers, "retreating into comfortable enclaves of ethnic isolation." In other 
communities, many schools were composed entirely of one racial or ethnic group. In 
America, Clinton asserted, "segregation is no longer the law, but too often separation is 
the rule." The stubborn persistence of these trends had prompted "many Americans of all 
races .... to give up on the idea of integration and the search for common ground." The 
President made it clear that he found these trends alarming. Moreover, he warned, ''the 
alternative to integration is not isolation or a new separate but equal. It is disintegration." 
The eruption of civil wars and genocide around the globe illustrated that Americans 
turned away from the vision of a United States of America at their peril. 
Clinton spoke of the lessons the nation had learned from Little Rock and the civil 
rights struggles that followed. The campus of Central High was "historical ground" just 
as surely as Independence Hall or the battlefield at Gettysburg, locations where the nation 
took "another giant step closer to the idea of America." In contrast to Governor 
Huckabee's statement, Clinton insisted that the 1957 crisis had illustrated that the federal 
government must act to protect the constitutional rights of its citizens. The nation needed 
strong civil rights laws upheld by the courts and enforced by the executive. The sacrifices 
of the Little Rock Nine demonstrated that freedom "ought to be" but "can never be" free. 
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Freedom could only be realized with "responsibility for self, family, and the duties of 
citizenship" and "a commitment to building a community of shared destiny and a genuine 
sense of belonging." This realization was a call to action in the present. All Americans 
should embrace "the vision of a color blind society," the President said, "but recognize 
that we are not there yet, and we cannot slam shut the doors of educational and economic 
opportunity." In direct contrast to the rhetoric surrounding achievement gaps in Little 
Rock, Clinton also urged communities to set high academic standards for all school 
children so that they would not replace "the tyranny of segregation with the tragedy of 
low expectations." 
Clinton's Presidential Initiative on Race was primarily an appeal for "a candid 
conversation" on the state of race relations, in hope of creating a national dialogue that 
would inspire citizens and public figures to take action. In Little Rock, the President 
urged his audience to reach out to others who were "different from themselves" and begin 
a frank discussion about these issues.140 Ultimately, Clinton's Initiative on Race would 
be described as a failure that inspired "talking about talking bluntly about race" but no 
concrete policy initiatives.141 To many, it seemed like anemic response to organized 
efforts to unravel civil rights victories won in the 1950s and 1960s. When Clinton's 
advisory board on race relations finally released its recommendations in early 1999, it 
140 In Little Rock, the National Conference of Christians and Jews did sponsor a conference during 
the 40th anniversary commemoration specifically to discuss the issue of education ("Central anniversary 
schedule of events," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 3). 
141 Jim Lehrer quoted in "Clinton at Race Forum, Is Confronted on Affirmative Action," New York 
Times, July 9, 1998, p. 23, and in Renee M. Smith, "The Public Presidency Hits the Wall: Clinton's 
Presidential Initiative on Race," Presidential Studies Quarterly 28, no. 4 (Fall1998), p. 783; Hugh B. 
Price, "Actions Speak Louder," Arkansas State Press, October 23, 1997, p. 7; Manning Marable, "A 
Conversation on Race," Arkansas State Press, October 2, 1997, p. 5. 
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was dismissed in some quarters as little more than "a list ofplatitudes."142 Arguably, 
Clinton's address in Little Rock set the tone for the initiative's outcome. He viewed the 
anniversary of the crisis as an opportunity to take stock of how far the nation had traveled 
since 1957, what it had learned, and what its challenges were in the present. He also used 
the occasion to call for a kind of public engagement that might produce consensus about 
where the nation should move in the future. He urged his audience, "let us resolve to 
stand on the shoulders of the Little Rock Nine, and press on with confidence in the hard 
and noble work ahead." However, he did not use his keynote address to outline specific 
policies, legislative initiatives, or plans of action. 143 
At the end of Clinton's address, the President, Governor of Arkansas, and Mayor 
of Little Rock, climbed the steps to the front door of Central High School. The Little 
Rock Nine left their seats and slowly followed as cameras rolled and the audience 
watched. Reaching the fmal flight of stairs, they stopped, stood in a line, and waved in 
response to a roar of applause. Carlotta Walls LaNier described the moment, 
Thousands of people of all races, local residents as well as guests from all 
over the world, assembled at the school to welcome us home. They 
applauded and stood to their feet as we were presented. Then the nine of 
us ascended the steps to the front entrance of our alma mater. President 
Clinton and Governor Mike Huckabee were waiting there and held open 
the door for us- a gesture that touched all nine of us deeply. Forty years 
earlier, we had entered those doors under the protection of gun-toting 
federal troopers, against the will of the state's segregationist governor. 
Now, the president of the United States and a very different Arkansas 
governor stood at the door to usher us through. There were few dry eyes 
142 Steven A. Holmes, "Clinton Panel on Race Urges Variety of Modest Measures," The New York 
Times, September 18, 1998. 
143 Smith, "The Public Presidency Hits the Wall," 781, 784. 
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among us.144 
As the final student stepped across the threshold, a voice intoned, "Ladies and 
Gentleman, history_is again made at Central High School." 
This was the image that Skip Rutherford and the others involved in the 
anniversary plans hoped with speak louder than any controversial statements from those 
who opposed the commemoration. They hoped this image would mark a turning point in 
how the world viewed Little Rock. This occasion was "historic"in its own right. Some 
members of the Little Rock Nine were among the first to recognize the power of their 
return to Central. Terrence Roberts told reporters, "I felt like I was taking part in a very 
important symbol-making ceremony .... The symbols of 1957 were still there, and today 
we were making a totally new symbol. Symbols are important. They're like rites of 
passage."145 Minnijean Brown Trickey concurred, "It was pretty strong symbolism, 
exactly the kind of drama that must happen so that people realize that we are taking this 
seriously." She continued, "How do we undo 40 years ago the governor saying no? We 
reverse it, we tum it around and do it over."146 
Despite the tone of reconciliation and recommitment struck by local, state, and 
national political figures at the official 401h anniversary commemoration, not everyone in 
Little Rock was thrilled with the picture of the city presented to the world- past or 
144 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 248-249. 
145 Terrence Samuel, "After 40 Years, 9 Return to Little Rock," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
September26, 1997, p 1A. 
146 James Jefferson, "President hails blacks who integrated Central High School," Associated 
Press, September 26, 1997. 
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present- or the calls to action articulated at the event. Jim Johnson, the segregationist 
candidate who had challenged Orval Faubus and pressured him to prevent the 
desegregation of Central High School or face electoral defeat, wrote an editorial 
articulating his take on the so-called "Central High School crisis."147 News writers, 
historians, and politicians were reluctant to "recognize or understand the states' rights 
issue of this constitutional conflict," he complained. This refusal had caused Johnson to 
"implore the Lord" to spare him "the intolerance of those who have piously made a career 
of advocating tolerance." From Johnson's perspective, the actions of Little Rock Nine 
were not heroic, but rather, were a "belligerent intrusion into the lives of over 2,000 
Central High students." Although they had become "proficient in reciting 'all the 
troubles they've seen,"' Johnson suggested that many Central students in the last 40 years 
also had stories to tell about racial violence that were directly related to the presence of 
African American students and gangs in the school.148 In another published statement 
Johnson claimed that the results of the city's "experiment in social engineering" was a 
lack of control over local schools and dictatorship by the federal government, forced 
busing and "race mixing," reverse discrimination and the application of"quotas," the 
establishment of elite private schools, and a school district that was "progressively" 
147 Johnson ran against Faubus during the Democratic primary in 1956. A strident segregationist, 
he founded the Association of Citizens' Councils of Arkansas (ACCA) in 1956 and actively campaigned to 
get an interposition amendment placed on the ballot during the general election. (McMillen, "The White 
Citizens' Council and Resistance to School Desegregation in Arkansas," 129; Freyer, "Politics and Law in 
the Little Rock Crisis," 154; Badger, "'The Forerunner of Our Opposition,'" 354-355). 
148 Jim Johnson, "Someday, a true reconciliation," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 25, 
1997, p. 13B. 
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moving toward resegregation. 149 White parents of school children in Little Rock were 
"reconciled" to the reality of integration in the city, he said, so reconciled that they moved 
away to white suburban communities to avoid emolling their children in the school 
system. They did so, not "because of bigotry or hate," Johnson maintained, but because of 
their responsibility to keep their children safe. Johnson ended his comments with an 
appeal for a color blind society devoid of the agendas of "special interests" and 
"pandering to voting blacks" that would release the school district from ludicrous claims 
that Central was still segregated. "If that could happen," he wrote with heavy sarcasm, 
"we could have true reconciliation and with great conviction fmally sing that old spiritual, 
'Free at last, free at last, thank God Almighty, I'm free at last."'150 
John R. Starr, a columnist for the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette who frequently 
derided the school district's desegregation efforts and called for the return of local 
control, was provoked by the NAACP demonstrations protesting the city's celebration of 
racial progress. The complaints of John Walker and other black leaders "clucking their 
tongues" about the lack of change were "hogwash," Starr claimed. "We're not where we 
should be," he admitted, "but it should have become obvious by now that we're not going 
to get there by government coercion." Echoing the words of Governor Huckabee, Starr 
asserted that the "last step in the civil rights movement will be a change in the hearts of 
men." But unlike the Governor, Starr did not believe that this change would be inspired 
149 Jim Johnson, "Civil rights decision led to 'social engineering': Resister says Supreme Court 
struck at a way of life," Arkansas Times, September 19, 1997, p. 19-21. 
150 Jim Johnson, "Someday, a true reconciliation," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 25, 
1997, p. 13B. 
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by "dwelling on the evils of slavery and Jim Crowism" or by visiting the Central High 
Museum and Visitor Center. Starr stated, "However much we may regret past 
mistreatment of minorities in this country, that is behind us." The editor dismissed 
claims that discrimination persisted in the city and the nation as a whole. He urged black 
leaders who had "made fortunes" out of civil rights litigation, and white advocates who 
preached about but did not participate in integration, "to sit down and quit telling the rest 
of us to live together." "The Constitution guarantees equality of opportunity," he wrote, 
"not equality of result." He went on to posit that ifthe wealth and resources ofthe 
country were pooled and divided equally among all citizens, within a year differences in 
income, status, and station would reassert themselves. Just like test scores and other 
measures of academic success, these distinctions were the result of inherent differences. 
Starr concluded, "I'd be willing to bet that the same folks would be in essentially the 
same conditions then as now." 151 Ironically, these conclusions, written by the Arkansas 
Democrat's former managing editor and a columnist for the capital's newspaper of 
record, unwittingly supported the claims of the local NAACP that not much had changed 
in Little Rock after all. 
Wesley Pruden, editor and chief of the conservative Washington Times, also. 
weighed in on the commemoration. Pruden's father had been a leader of the 
segregationist resistance in the city in 1957, and he objected to Little Rock's attempt to 
showcase its progress through "denunciations of the past and everyone in it." The editor 
151 John R. Starr, editorial, "A good civil rights idea gone bad," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
November 9, 1997, J5. 
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described the events as "Holier Than Thou Week down home," an opportunity for the 
"Nice People of Little Rock" to bask in the "raucous music of piety, pretense, and self-
congratulation." Figures like Orval Faubus, and vocal segregationists made convenient 
villains that allowed "white merrymakers .... to remember how noble they were when 
everybody else was bad." The occasion also allowed politicians like Bill Clinton, "whose 
career grew out of the culture of deceit and double-dealing that made 'the Little Rock 
crisis' inevitable" to pose for the cameras. Pruden felt it was unfair and unwarranted to 
call those who vocally and demonstrably resisted desegregation in the city "evil." Like 
most southerners at the time, "they were men and women imprisoned in the own 
experience." Moreover, the editor reminded his readers that even those who "counseled 
desegregation" in 1957 did so to avoid "real integration," and only after they had built a 
new high school for the "Episcopalian precincts" in the wealthier areas of the city so that 
their own children would not participate in it. The real legacy ofLittle Rock, was an "old 
story" of "rich liberal whites prescribing for others the medicine they had no intention of 
taking themselves," Pruden insisted. 152 
For their part, white student leaders from the class of 1958 continued to believe 
that they were being unfairly cast in the same mold as Orval Faubus and members of the 
mob outside the school. They wanted to be counted among the ''Nice People of Little 
Rock." Student body president Ralph Brodie and senior class representative Craig Rains 
announced their intention to write a book that would tell the "whole story" about "what 
152 Wesley Pruden, editor in chief, "Taking a week to be holier than thou," The Washington Times, 
September 26, 1997, p. A4. 
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did- and more importantly- what did not- happen inside Central."153 Despite revisions to 
the exhibit text, Brodie referred to the newly opened museum exhibit as an exercise in 
"civic masochism." He asserted, "To invite visitors to our city just to show them our 
warts with none of the positive I think is terrible." The former student body president felt 
the actions of the vast majority of students at Central had gone "unrecognized" in the 
commemorative events. 154 
Craig Rains had been a sitting member of the anniversary commission, and as a 
public relations professional, had initially been assigned the responsibility of working 
with the media during the anniversary. However, these duties were reassigned to Skip 
Rutherford after Rains voiced his objections to a draft of the museum exhibit and 
Chairman Rett Tucker concluded he could not be a "team player" and stay on message. 
Rains told UALR public history student Elizabeth Grobmyer that he hoped to use his 
position on the commission to disseminate his perspective on the Central High crisis. 
Grobmyer noted that the former student representative, "pointed to his choice of material 
for use on the Central High School website as an opportunity to tell his side of the 1957 
story."155 Indeed, on the 40th anniversary's official website, Rains archived editorials 
153 Ralph Brodie and Craig Rains, editorial, "Show of moderation inside CHS," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, October 17, 1997, p. 11B. See also "Central alumni writing a book," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, October 5, 1997, p. 6A. 
154 Brian Cofer and Chris Reinolds, "Memories haunt whites," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
October 5, 1997, p. 1A. During her interviews with former white students in the 1990s, Beth Roy observed, 
"Universally, the white students' storyline was about how their year, their world, their rights had been 
violated. They portrayed themselves as non-actors who innocently found themselves swept up by events not 
of their own making" (Roy, Bitters in the Honey, 145, 205). 
155 Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration ofthe Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation 
of Little Rock Central High School," 59-60. 
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from Central's student newspaper The Tiger to provide readers with "an idea of how the 
2,000 students at Central faced the historic desegregation process from inside." The web 
text assured visitors that these materials were "guaranteed open your eyes." On this 
public interface, Rains minimized the harassment endured by the nine black students and 
suggested that they had been welcomed by their white peers. The site asserted that "for 
every act of harassment" in the school '"there were 100 acts of acceptance." Students felt 
obligated to obey the law and were committed to getting a "first-class" education. 
"Many" white students "helped the black students try to achieve the same thing, even 
though they were faced with pressures that were very difficult for teenagers to 
comprehend. "156 
In a public statement issued after the anniversary, Brodie and Rains expressed 
their belief that the city and the state could and should take "pride in the attitude and 
conduct of Central's 1957-58 faculty and student body and their positive contribution to 
America's desegregation process." The student leaders acknowledged that the black 
students were subjected to "sporadic harassment from a very small group" of Central 
students, but claimed that 97 percent of students had sent a "powerful message" by 
ignoring the demagoguery surrounding the integration of their school and going about 
their studies. "Looking back," Brodie and Rains wrote in an editorial, "it is easy for some 
to be critical ofthe students for not taking more active stands," but they insisted, "the 
truth is that most white students did what they felt was right and all they knew how to 
156 See http://www.centra1high57.org, accessed August 21, 2009. 
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do."157 These student leaders were not only asking for public recognition that they had 
minded their own business during the crisis, they were asking to be commended for it. 158 
They seemed to be offering more of the ambiguous explanations and justifications 
Governor Huckabee had explicitly and unequivocally renounced in his address at the 
commemorative ceremony. 
But more than these public expressions of discontent and dissatisfaction, perhaps 
the most serious betrayal of the anniversary commemoration's purported purpose- its 
calls for social justice and a recommitment to equal opportunity for all people-- was the 
Little Rock School District's decision to present its proposed Revised Desegregation and 
Education Plan the very next day in federal court. As noted in the previous chapter, this 
plan proposed an elimination of satellite zones, a reduction in busing, and a return to 
neighborhood schools. Moving forward, integration in the city would be promoted 
through voluntary mechanisms like minority-to-majority transfers or emollment in 
magnet and intradistrict schools. School officials believed that a tum away from 
mandatory measures and efforts to maintain racially balanced schools would reduce white 
flight. Although the city promised to improve minority student achievement, equalize 
educational opportunities, and reduce racial disparities in discipline, its programs aimed 
at achieving those goals to date had proven ineffective. 
157 Ralph Brodie and Craig Rains, editorial, "Show of moderation inside CHS," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, October 17, 1997, p. liB. See also John Brummett, editorial, "Shedding Defensiveness: 
One of Central's Challenges," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, October 25, 1997, p. 9B. 
158 John Brummett, editorial, "Shedding defensiveness: One of Central's challenges," Arkansas 
Times, October 25, 1997, p. 9B. 
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Speaking at the "People's Celebration" held at the historically black Philander 
Smith College on behalf ofthe Little Rock Nine, Dr. Terrence Roberts directly addressed 
this issue. The People's Celebration had been organized by Arkansas State Press editor 
and planning committee member Janetta Kearney as an alternative to the events organized 
by the anniversary commission which she believed had been developed without 
substantial minority representation. 159 As he addressed the gathering, Roberts stated 
forthrightly, "In this national dialogue about... whether desegregation is still important, 
the Little Rock Nine are firmly committed to the desegregation of schools." He called for 
a ongoing commitment to integration and the kinds of improvements the school district 
outlined in their plan. Roberts clarified, "We are talking about total access. We want it 
all. We don't just want a taste."160 
Despite the President Clinton's warning that there was no "new separate but 
equal," and that abandonment of the integration ideal would only lead to national 
"disintegration," the Little Rock School District forged ahead with plans that would result 
in more racially isolated schools. District officials accepted the "general consensus" 
rejected by Ernest Green that the "chasm" between the test scores of black and white 
students could not be breached. They pointed to the same national trends Skip 
Rutherford's public relations team had used to deflect criticism ofLittle Rock's schools. 
"Little Rock's disparity gap is America's disparity gap," they reasoned. Persistent 
residential segregation, white flight, and other factors which undermined stable racial 
159 Grobmyer, "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Desegregation 
ofLittle Rock Central High School," 42-44, 82-83. 
160 "Clintons Pray with Little Rock Nine," United Press International, September 27, 1997. 
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balance in the school system were beyond their control or the control of other government 
officials. Like Governor Huckabee, they argued that local government had done 
everything it could to address segregation and discrimination in education. Further 
progress in the field of race relations would depend on individual changes ofheart. The 
majority of Little Rock's residents, like the majority of white students at Central High 
School forty years earlier, maintained a position of "peaceful neutrality" in relation to the 
school district's proposed plans. They too, stood in silent witness as the city presented a 
"desegregation" plan designed to appease white parents concerned about rising African 
American enrollments and the "blackening" of the school system. 
The position of the Little Rock School District suggested that the city had been 
more interested in "talking about talking about race," and racial progress, than actually 
working towards it. The school system's effort to escape both court oversight and a 
commitment to real and lasting desegregation that could undermine racial discrimination, 
confirmed the charges of the NAACP that the fortieth anniversary had been little more 
than a "public relations venture" designed to escape the past rather than learn from it. 
Little Rock, like other southern cities, seemed convinced that "the best way to put your 
bad images to rest is to declare them history and put them in a museum." 
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CHAPTER NINE 
"THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH": 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNITARY STATUS, 1998-2009 
The Revised Desegregation and Education Plan (1998) was approved by all the 
parties in the long-running Little Rock school desegregation case and designed to last for 
a period of three years. At the end of the term, in 2001, the Little Rock school district 
would be presumed unitary and released from court supervision unless it could be 
demonstrated that it had failed to make a "good faith" effort to meet its obligations under 
the plan. Notably, an important footnote stipulated that the district did not actually need 
to "obtain any of the goals" enumerated in the plan, it merely had to try to reach those 
goals by following the "strategies described in the plan and polices, practices and 
procedures developed" to remove vestiges of discrimination to the extent practicable.1 
Presumably, this demonstration of good faith would assure the court and the black 
intervenors in the case that LRSD would continue to work toward creating an equitable 
educational environment even after court -release. 
In the spring of2000, the Little Rock school district voluntarily filed an Interim 
Compliance Report detailing its efforts to fulfill the terms of the Revised Plan. School 
officials hoped that the preparation of this document would help the district assess its 
own progress and provide the other parties in the case with an opportunity to make 
1 Footnote 2, as described in Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District 
No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 60. 
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comments or suggestions about the format and content of the report before the 2001 
deadline. The document was also designed to "reassure the court, the parties, and the 
community of the District's good faith efforts to be in total compliance with the Revised 
Plan." No objections to the report, or the policies and procedures described in it, were 
filed by the African American plaintiffs or their representatives. 2 
Consequently, as the 2001 deadline approached, the Little Rock school district 
operated under the assumption that it would granted unitary status by the federal court 
soon after it filed its Final Compliance Report. In anticipation of this return of local 
control, the Little Rock school board adopted a "Covenant for the Future" in which it 
pledged to continue to provide schools with equitable resources, to work toward 
improving the academic achievement of all students, and to maintain a nondiscrimination 
policy. Essentially, school administrators and board members promised not to return to 
"old practices" after being released from court supervision. As board member Baker 
Kurrus explained, "I would simply say that at all times we should be doing the same, both 
before and after unitary status, and that it would be my hope and endeavor that we always 
would do these things and that we would never forget about our mission."3 
However, despite the district's optimism, this quick denouement did not unfold as 
planned. The Joshua intervenors, who represented the African American schoolchildren 
2 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. I, No. 4:82CV00866 
WRW/JTR (Dist. Court:, ED Arkansas, 2002), 42. 
3
" Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," Little Rock School District v. 
Pulaski County Special School District No. I, LR-C-82-866 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 14-15. See 
also Kimberly Gillespie, "Desegregation vow: No backsliding at LR Schools'; Pledge comes as court 
release nears," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 12,2001, p. B2. 
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in the district, filed a number of objections to the fmal compliance report. While they 
acknowledged that the district had employed most of the practices and procedures listed 
in the Revised Plan, they charged that the district continued to operate under a 
"compliance mentality." The intervenors argued that district employees had deployed the 
strategies described in the plan mechanically without any intent to or belief that they 
actually could eliminate racial disparities, and thus had failed to meet their "'good faith 
obligation" to at least try to do so. This argument and others, particularly related to 
student achievement and its assessment, stretched the school desegregation litigation well 
into its fifth decade through a series of reports, objections, decisions, and appeals that 
were not resolved until2009. 
As this process unraveled, some African American members of the school board 
began to question whether it was in the best interest of the school district to pursue 
unitary status if the they meant to preserve the relatively desegregated schools that 
remained within the district's boundaries. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
Supreme Court decisions made it increasingly clear that unitary districts would not be 
permitted to maintain student assignment plans that took race into consideration, despite 
the fact that those plans were designed to maintain diversity. Moreover, in Little Rock, a 
declaration of unitary status threatened to cut off the flow of millions of dollars of 
desegregation aid from the state of Arkansas that was used to fund voluntary programs 
like magnet schools and interdistrict student transfers. If the board had adopted its 
"covenant for the future" in "good faith," some members wondered whether it would be 
possible to fulfill those promises without the legal protection of a court order. It became 
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increasingly clear that the school board would not be able to do "the same, both before 
and after unitary status." Unitary status could change everything. 
Partial Release 
On March 15, 2001, the Little Rock School District filed its Final Compliance 
Report with the U.S. District Court, which supplemented and updated the Interim Report 
it submitted one year earlier. The district maintained that it had fulfilled all the 
obligations listed in the Revised Plan and petitioned for an immediate declaration of 
unitary status. The Joshua intervenors conceded that the school district had fulfilled its 
promises related to the hiring of faculty and staff, provisions for special education, efforts 
to increase parental involvement, and school construction and closings. They also did not 
raise any objections about patterns of student assignment in the district, since the Revised 
Plan had permitted a return to geographic attendance zones and weakened racial balance 
requirements. However, Joshua did argue that the district was not in substantial 
compliance with the plan in six areas, including their obligation to implement the plan in 
"good faith," and efforts to remediate racial disparities in student discipline, academic 
achievement, advanced placement classes, extracurricular activities, and guidance 
counseling.4 
From the perspective of the African American intervenors involved in the case, 
many of these shortcomings were interrelated. Their attorneys argued that the district had 
done little or nothing to remediate the achievement gap. Although the district had 
4 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 
WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 6-8. 
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implemented a number of programs designed to improve African American achievement 
and test scores on standardized tests, it had not fulfilled its obligation to evaluate those 
programs in order to determine which were working and to replace those that were not. 5 
The district's own test scores revealed an achievement gap ranging from 30-45% between 
African American students and their white counterparts. Moreover, disparities became 
more pronounced as students moved through the system. The intervenors noted, "the gap 
starts off wide and gets wider with the active aid of district officials. Clearly, the longer 
the Black students stay in the Little Rock School District, the farther behind they get."6 
Indeed, the intervenors argued that the district's policies actively worked against 
narrowing the achievement gap. When the district courted white families and encouraged 
them to enroll their children in the public schools, officials "promised a different 
education for ... white students." Because white students were a minority in the school 
district, they were more likely to be admitted to magnet schools and other special 
programs. Moreover, two-thirds of white students in the district were in enrolled in 
enriched or advanced placement classes. The Joshua intervenors argued that guidance 
counselors were not encouraging African American students to take advantage of the 
same programs, and noted that regular and remedial sections were "primarily black" and 
racially identifiable academic tracks were evident throughout the district's schools. The 
intervenors concluded, "The district is thus one of substance for white students and staff, 
5 "Joshua Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Opposition to the 
LRSD's Request for Unitary Status Regarding the Plan Sections," Little Rock School District v. Pulaski 
County Special School District No. I, No. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 3-
6,26. 
6 Ibid, 3-4, quote on 28. 
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especially those who are within the sphere of influence of the economic and political 
activities of the area, and one of show for the Black students and much of its staff."7 
For their part, school district administrators testified that they had not promised to 
close the achievement gap in the Revised Plan. Rather, they had promised to create 
programs designed to improve African American achievement. From their perspective, if 
they had implemented those programs, they had fulfilled their obligations. As 
Superintendent Les Carnine explained the district's position, "We adopted programs to 
remediate [the achievement] of African-American students. We believed that by doing so 
we would effectively close the gap. But those are two separate things."8 Joshua argued 
that this attitude was an indication ofbad faith. The African American attorneys argued, 
It would be farcical for the court to approve relief upon the premise that 
unitization has occurred when we have schools within schools, and where 
the future holds great promise for a good education for those who start off 
in the system doing best. The court is asked to require that the plan be 
implemented as promised and that the district be disabused of the notion 
that all it has to do is provide paperwork to the court to show the court 
what it plans to do without having to be held accountable for actual 
accomplishments. 9 
From the perspective of the black plaintiffs, the argument that the district did not have "to 
deliver" on the plans was unacceptable and was an indication that Little Rock school 
administrators had never taken their obligations seriously. 
7 Ibid, 23, 29, 39-41, 32. 
8 Kimberly Dishongh and Cynthia Howell, "Judge says LR schools appear to be complying: 
Desegregation goals met except in achievement, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, July 7, 2001 p. Bl. 
9 "Joshua Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw in Opposition to the 
LRSD's Request for Unitary Status Regarding the Plan Sections," Little Rock School District v. Pulaski 
County Special School District No. I, No. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 
quote on 34-35, 5-6, 31. 
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Little Rock's newspaper of record, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, dismissed 
these objections as frivolous. The newspaper's editorial page repeatedly insinuated that 
African American Attorney John Walker continued to pursue his case against the district 
in order to rack up more legal fees. 10 Walker rebutted these allegations, but frequently 
refused to grant interviews to the newspaper's reporters because of the editorial board's 
hostile position. 11 Columnist Dana D. Kelley led the charge against the lawsuit, 
dismissing Walker's case as "hooey" and resurrected many of the same arguments that 
had been wielded in the past. According to Kelley, students in schools and residents in 
neighborhoods segregated themselves voluntarily- "not as adversaries, but just as a result 
of human nature." The achievement gap was not the product of discrimination, but low 
levels of parental involvement in the African Americ~ community and high numbers of 
single-parent, female-headed households. 12 From Kelley's perspective, the Joshua 
intervenors "might have a better case pushing for a social indictment against black 
deadbeat dads, whose irresponsibility creates family situations in which the outcome of 
children as students is statistically predictable, regardless of the quality of the school they 
attend." Kelley proceeded to trot out other stereotypes in support of her argument-
complaining that African American activists never objected to racial disparities when 
they worked in their favor and pointing to the disproportionate number of black athletes 
10 For example, see Dana D. Kelley, "A dismal record of court-run schools," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, January 16, 2004. 
11 Kimberly Dishongh and Cynthia Howell, "LR schools stay under sway: Aid to blacks falls short, 
judge says," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, July 1, 2004. 
12 Dana D. Kelley, "Separation of school and court,"Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, November 30, 
2001, p. B9. 
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in the National Basketball Association. Kelley objected to the kind of identity politics 
associated with the "hyphenated American," suggesting that class-action lawsuits such as 
the one being argued in Little Rock "marginalize[ d] national identity and create[ d] a 
distorted sense of kinship." Kelley suggested that the litigants should embrace the 
benefits and privileges they enjoyed as Americans. "African-American activists, 
curiously, never want to extend the comparisons of their lot in life with their counterparts 
in Africa, the bulk of whom would trade places with them in an instant," she remarked. 
This script harkened back to the 1950s. Indeed Kelley even raised the specter of 
communism, comparing "coercive and often divisive government policy" designed by 
federal courts to remove racial disparities to the procedures of a "ruthless dictatorial 
government." Even the communists, the writer noted, had failed to eliminate differences 
in "health, education, employment level and social status." These disparities were 
unalterable "facts oflife."13 
However, while listening to testimony related to these issues, U.S. District Judge 
Susan Weber Wright seemed to think Walker's case had some merit and expressed her 
own concerns about African American student achievement. In the wake of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, the district was not constitutionally obligated to 
close the achievement gap. Nevertheless, the Revised Plan was a contractual agreement 
and under section 2. 7 it required the district to implement "policies, programs, and 
procedures designed to improve and remediate the academic achievement of African 
13 Dana D. Kelley, "Some disparate facts of life," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, June 7, 2002, p. 
B9; Dana D. Kelley, "Logic takes a vacation," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, August 2, 2002, p. B7. 
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American students." The LRSD was also required to assess each of these programs to 
determine if they were effective. If they were ineffective, the district was required to 
modify or replace the programs. 14 
Judge Wright was particularly concerned that about the assessment provisions of 
the plan. The district claimed it had conducted informal assessments, not written 
evaluations, of the programs on a year-to-year basis. District Attorney Chris Heller 
argued that the plan did not stipulate that the assessments had to be in writing. Wright 
rejected this argument, asking him, "Typically assessments like that, if they're going to be 
monitored [by a court], would have to be in writing, wouldn't you agree?"15 A few 
months later, Wright expressed even more irritation with the district when it became 
evident that several evaluations referred to in its Final Compliance Report had not been 
completed or were only in draft form when the document was filed. These inaccuracies 
threatened not only to undermine the district's claims that it was in substantial 
compliance with section 2.7, but also its contentions that it was taking its obligations 
seriously and operating in good faith in its reports to the court. 16 
Shortly thereafter, LRSD attorneys filed a motion to remove Wright from the case 
after she publicly expressed skepticism that the district had fulfilled its obligations. 
Wright refused to recuse herself, indicating that the timing of the motion implied that the 
14 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 
WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 3-4. 
15 Kimberly Dishongh and Cynthia Howell, "Judge says LR schools appear to be complying: 
Desegregation goals met except in achievement," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, August 1, 2001, p. AI. 
16 Cynthia Howell, "District warned to prove report; Judge: claims it met requirements for 
desegregation seem untruthful," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, October 18, 2001, p. Bl. 
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district felt the hearings were not going well. "The [district] may harbor fear that its 
'litigatory milk is about to curdle,"' she suggested. "The LRSD's sudden fear, whether 
justified or not, does not provide good reason for this court to recuse. The hearing will go 
forward." 17 
Ultimately, Judge Wright did step down from the case when scheduled hearings 
were delayed, and Judge William R. Wilson Jr. became the third federal judge to oversee 
this phase of the litigation. In the final days of the hearings overseen by Wilson, Terrence 
Roberts, one of the Little Rock Nine, testified about the attitudes he had encountered 
while working as a desegregation consultant for the district. The Revised Plan required 
LRSD to hire a professional like Roberts to help implement its provisions.18 Roberts 
suspected that the district's decision to hire him was "strictly public relations." As he put 
it, "They could dangle me out in front of the public and say, 'See how good we are?' 
We've actually hired Terry Roberts." Nevertheless, as he later recalled, he decided to 
take the job to "get within the system and begin to try to figure out how to do some things 
that could spark some change from inside."19 As a consultant and clinical psychologist, 
Roberts had visited schools and spoken with administrators. He concluded that "racist 
attitudes were widespread" among district personnel, so he developed workshops 
designed to help district employees cope with difference and understand their own 
17 Kimberly Dishongh and Cynthia Howell, "LR schools ask judge to quit case: she stays on," 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, November 17,2001, p. Bl. 
18 Cynthia Howell, "Member of Little Rock Nine to serve district as consultant: Roberts 1 of2 to 
help implement revamped desegregation, education plan," Arkansas Democrat-(Jazette, July 28, 1998, p. 
B5. 
19 Terrence Roberts, telephone interview by author, 29 March 2010. 
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attitudes toward diversity.20 Roberts felt that many of the 500 to 600 workers who 
participated in the program "came kicking and screaming ... many were openly resistant 
throughout." In his opinion, administrators were willing to maintain only "surface 
involvement" and "agreed basically to go through the motions."21 In his testimony in the 
court hearings, Roberts accused district officials of adopting a "compliance mentality." 
Their interest was in "meeting the letter of the law" in order "to be released from court 
supervision." The focus of the administration was not, "Let's do this because we are 
interested in providing the most effective education plan we can devise for kids.'m This 
preoccupation with fulfilling the requirements of the settlement agreement, in lieu of a 
deeply-rooted commitment to addressing problems in the school district, raised concerns 
for Roberts about what the district would do once it attained unitary status and was no 
longer required to work toward addressing racial discrimination. Roberts predicted that he 
would no longer be asked to serve as a consultant without the court mandate.23 
In his recently published memoir, Terrence Roberts reflected on his testimony and 
the moments immediately before he was called to appear before the court. In preparation, 
he spoke with attorney John Walker and asked him what he thought would happen if the 
courts ruled in favor ofLRSD. As Roberts recalled, Walker replied, "We will get due 
20 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 146-149. 
21 Terrence Roberts, telephone interview by author, 29 March 2010. 
22 Cynthia Howell and Kimberly Dishongh, "Testimony ends in case regarding school integration: 
LR Nine member says district focused on court release instead of students," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
July 25,2002, p. B1; "Judge asks for briefs in desegregation case, testimony ends," Associated Press State 
& Local Wire, July 25, 2002, BC Cycle. 
23 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 150. 
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process, but we will not get equal protection." Roberts concurred with this assessment. 
For him, the proceedings carried an undertone of traditional southern justice, where white 
defendants [in this case plaintiffs] were put on trial and declared "NOT GUILTY!!!" He 
later wrote, "As I waited my tum to testify in the district's case, my eyes wandered 
around the room, and suddenly it hit me: I was staring into the faces of all the past 
justices of the court. Their portraits were arrayed along the walls, and they all stared back 
at me in silent monochromatic assent that this was their courtroom, not mine."24 
After reviewing the briefs, testimony, and evidence in the case, Judge William 
Wilson granted the Little Rock school district partial unitary status, releasing it from 
court supervision in all areas except its obligation to assess and modify programs related 
to improving African American achievement. In his opinion, Wilson acknowledged 
Roberts testimony, accepting his observations, but rejecting his interpretation of the 
district's "compliance mentality." Wilson wrote, "it is one of the bedrock principles of 
school desegregation litigation that a school district can only emerge from federal court 
supervision after it has carefully dotted all the I' s and crossed all the T' s necessary to 
establish that it is operating in unitary and constitutional fashion." The compliance 
mentality Roberts observed, Wilson concluded, was not due to indifference. Rather, it 
was a "inevitable negative long-running byproduct" of the litigation itself. Removing the 
district from court supervision would allow teachers and administrators to focus on the 
24 Ibid, 150-152. 
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education of their students.25 
When negotiating the terms of the Revised Plan, the Joshua intervenors had 
accepted the burden of proving that LRSD had not fulfilled its obligations successfully.26 
This decision had dramatic and substantial consequences. In the normal course of a 
school desegregation case, the Little Rock school district would have been responsible for 
proving that it had dotted every I and crossed every T. In this case, it was presumed that 
the district had done so, unless the intervenors could prove otherwise. And in Wilson's 
assessment, the "isolated and anecdotal evidence" presented by Joshua failed to meet this 
threshold. "There can be no question," he wrote, "that LRSD administrators, principals, 
and teachers took their responsibilities under the Revised Plan seriously and exercised 
their best efforts to comply with each section of the document." Wilson found that the 
district had operated in "good faith" and expressed confidence "that LRSD can be trusted, 
25 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. I, No. 4:82CV00866 
WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 90-92. 
26 While Wilson acknowledged that this was unusual, he suggested it was appropriate because of 
the unusual circumstances surrounding the filing of this phase of the litigation, noting that the particular 
case under consideration- Little Rock v. Pulaski County Special School District et al.- had originally been 
filed by the district itself after it had become alarmed that it would not be able to retain racial balance in its 
schools do to a shrinking pool of white students. When the case was filed, the Little Rock district initiated 
it as a plaintiff in order to pursue the consolidation of all three districts in Pulaski County. Wilson wrote, 
"In this case, LRSD has never been adjudicated to be a 'constitutional violator."' Instead, as a plaintiff, the 
district had "voluntarily agreed" to commit itself to the Revised Plan, which went well beyond commitments 
that had been mandated by the Supreme Court. This was an interesting reading of the history of the 
litigation. While it is true that the district had filed the case as a plaintiff, it had never previously been 
declared unitary and was under court supervision precisely because it had violated the constitutional rights 
of African American students by maintaining a system of segregated education. As a plaintiff, the district 
made the case that the state of Arkansas, and the school systems of North Little Rock and Pulaski County 
had contributed to the segregation of Little Rock schools, but Little Rock officials were also involved in the 
boundary changes and student transfers that produced the interdistrict violations that prompted the original 
settlement agreements and their subsequent revisions (Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special 
School District No. I, No. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR [Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002], 12-20, 51, 74). 
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in the future, to operate the Little Rock school system in compliance with the 
Constitution, without the need for federal court supervision in those areas in which I 
decide it is unitary.'m 
The only area where Joshua had amassed sufficient evidence to prove that the 
Little Rock school district had not substantially complied with the settlement agreement 
was in its commitment to assess programs related to student achievement. Wilson 
accepted the district's argument that it had no obligation to close the achievement gap. 
While the district had made the commitment to do so in the original settlement agreement 
in 1989, the Revised Plan accepted by the parties in 1998 stipulated that the district only 
had to implement "policies, programs, and procedures designed to improve and remediate 
the academic achievement of African-American students.'' Wilson found that the district 
had implemented "many dozens" of programs and policies designed with this goal in 
mind. While the district's test score results were "far from where they need to be," the 
court determined that this was irrelevant.28 However, Wilson found that the district had 
done more than merely promise to implement programs. It had also promised to 
professionally assess the programs to determine whether they were effective, and 
promised to modify or replace those that were not producing results. In court, the Joshua 
intervenors uncovered e-mail communication between district officials related to 
deficiencies in the evaluation program, and were able to produce evidence that 
27 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. I, No. 4:82CV00866 
WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 93-94. 
28 Ibid, 79-84, 147-149. 
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evaluations of some of the programs listed in the district's Final Compliance Report had 
not been completed. The district's argument that it made informal and unwritten 
assessments of programs from year-to-year was insufficient. Judge Wilson found that 
LRSD's commitment to assess these programs was "crucial" and that the purpose of this 
section of the plan was to make sure that the programs implemented "actually worked." 
The district would remain under court supervision in this area alone for at least another 
two years. School officials were ordered to complete the evaluations enumerated in the 
district's Final Compliance Report that were in draft form or based on insufficient data. 
Officials were also required to keep written records of all annual program assessments in 
the future and to contract external professional evaluations of"key programs."29 
The lawyers for the Joshua intervenors expressed their dismay in the wake of the 
ruling and promised to appeal it. "Our position is the schools have become resegregated, 
with the approval of persons in positions of responsibility," John Walker explained. 
"You cannot have a desegregated school district when black students are treated 
differently."30 Dale Charles, President of the Little Rock and Arkansas conference of 
branches of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
decried the decision, calling it "The Second Crisis in Little Rock Public Schools." From 
Charles' perspective, African American students found themselves in a worse position 
than their predecessors in 1957. "In 1957 we could rely on the courts for some relief," he 
29 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 
WR W /JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 150, 168. See also Cynthia Howell and Kimberly Dishongh, 
"Court frees LR schools, with proviso," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 14, 2002, p. A I. 
30 James Jefferson, "Judge Ends School Desegregation Plan," Associated Press Online, September 
23,2002. 
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said, "but today we cannot depend on the courts to enforce the law." The low test scores 
of black children in the district refuted claims by the school board and the courts that 
"everything is fme." He called on voters to elect school board members who would be 
committed to closing the achievement gap with or without the help of the courts.31 
For their part, school district officials embraced Wilson's decision as a historic 
milestone. "It validates the good work that has gone into removing those vestiges of the 
past," Superintendent Ken James asserted. "It gets us beyond the stigma of being under 
court monitoring on an ongoing basis."32 School Board member Baker Kurrus expressed 
his surprise that the NAACP would continue to criticize the district after the District 
Court affirmed that administrators had successfully eliminated vestiges of discrimination 
from the system. "It's not a situation where there are winners or losers. It is a statement 
by the court validating everything that you would think the NAACP would want to 
know," he said. "It's unbelievable that they [the NAACP] continue to look backwards 
and they continue to think of the Little Rock district in terms of a 1960s race case when 
we have transcended that. We have just got to focus on our mission, which is to help all 
our students, most of whom are black. "33 
Walker and his team were not reassured by Kurrus' assessment that black students 
in the district were doing "exceedingly well." They pursued an appeal of Wilson's 
31 Cynthia Howell, ''NAACP calls LR district's court release 'second crisis,"' Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, September 18,2002, p. B3. 
32 James Jefferson, "Judge Ends School Desegregation Plan," Associated Press Online, September 
23,2002. 
33 Cynthia Howell, ''NAACP calls LR district's court release 'second crisis,"' Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, September 18,2002, p. B3. 
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decision, but the district court's order granting partial unitary status was affirmed by the 
gth Circuit Court of Appeals in March 2004.34 Within days, the Little Rock school district 
filed a new compliance report, asserting that it had worked diligently towards complying 
with Wilson's remedy and fulfilling its obligations to assess the programs related to 
African American student achievement. They petitioned the court for an immediate 
declaration of unitary status. Predictably, Walker refuted this claim, arguing that the 
district's two global assessments of 1) literacy and 2) math and science test scores did not 
fulfill the district's commitment to evaluate key programs designed to improve African 
American achievement. 35 
Judge Wilson agreed with the Joshua intervenor's position. After reviewing the 
reports, Wilson expressed his consternation that "both the Literacy Evaluation and Math 
and Science Evaluation contained only broad generalizations about [white and black] 
student achievement based solely on standardized test data." They only analyzed whether 
"literacy" or "math and science" scores had improved for a sample of grade levels. 
Neither evaluation contained a "specific analysis of which of the dozens of Section 2. 7 
programs actually worked in improving African-American achievement in the areas of 
literacy, math, and science and which of those programs needed to be modified or 
eliminated." LRSD needed to more than survey literacy test scores in general; it was 
required to determine which programs- Reading Recovery, Accelerated Reader, Reading 
34 Little Rock School District v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Circuit 2004). 
35 "Bids filed to end Little Rock desegregation case," The Associated Press State & Local Wire, 
March 16, 2004, BC Cycle. 
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for All, Early Literacy Reading, Effective Literacy, etc.- had a measurable impact.36 
Without conducting these key "step 2" evaluations, district officials were only making 
educated guesses about which programs were effective. 
In turn, Little Rock administrators objected to this requirement. They asserted 
that the programs they had implemented to improve African American achievement had 
been pioneered elsewhere. The school districts that developed them had already 
demonstrated their efficacy, and there was no need to verifY their success in LRSD.37 
Little Rock school district attorney Chris Heller contended that no district in the country 
conducted formal evaluations of each and every program it put in place- to do so would 
cost millions of dollars.38 
In his 2004 decision redirecting the school district back to the drawing board, 
Judge Wilson dismissed Little Rock's claim that the evaluations were too costly. "It 
seems to me," he wrote, "there is no higher or better use ofLRSD's resources than to 
seek to improve the academic achievement ofthe overwhelming majority of its students 
who are currently scoring at a discouragingly low level on standardized tests." Moreover, 
he noted, the provisions requiring assessment and modification of curricular programs 
had been formulated by the school district and approved by the court in 1998. "This is 
medicine that LRSD knowingly and voluntarily decided it must take in an attempt to cure 
36 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 
WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002), 30, 13-14,26,47. 
37 Ibid, 55-56. 
38 Cristina Rodriguez, "LR school district remains under court supervision of evaluation process," 
Associated Press State & Local Wire, June 15,2004, BC Cycle; Cynthia Howell, "LR schools' new bid to 
shed court case excites board chief," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, March 16, 2004. 
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the historically low academic achievement of so many African-American students." 
Wilson encouraged school officials to "realize that LRSD must make the long-term 
commitment to solve this problem, not because a federal court says that it must, but 
because it is the right thing to do." To this end, Wilson indicated that the district would 
need to demonstrate in the future that it had "deeply embedded" a curriculum evaluation 
process into its system so that he could be confident that the district would "dutifully 
continue" the "battle" to improve African American student achievement even after it 
was granted unitary status. 39 
In the wake of this 2004 opinion, Little Rock school district officials and their 
attorneys continued to protest that the burdens imposed by the district court were too 
onerous and went far beyond their understanding of what was required when they agreed 
to the Revised Plan. While interim superintendent Morris Holmes seemed resigned to the 
court's decision, he worried that a preoccupation with evaluation threatened innovation, 
creativity, and morale in the district. He also speculated that "the Little Rock School 
District is facing the most rigorous evaluation program in modem time for schools.'"'0 
According to the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, School Board member Baker Kurrus also 
feared that debate over "two sentences" in the desegregation plan was costing the district 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in lawyers' fees and "additional millions of dollars to do 
program evaluations, which we are not geared up to do.'' As part of.its order, the district 
39 Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 
WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2004), 37-39,67-68. 
40 Kimberly Dishongh and Cynthia Howell, "Judge: LR district 'short of compliance,"' Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, June 16, 2004. 
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court required LRSD to "reinvigorate" its department ofPlanning, Research, and 
Evaluation by hiring an expert with a doctorate degree and experience with statistical 
analysis. Kurrus complained, "We are not a research institution. We are being blown out 
of the tub because we don't know how to evaluate programs; nobody else does either, 
incidentally."41 
On appeal, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Wilson's order, although it 
expressed reservations about the "highly detailed, complex nature" of the remedy. In 
response to the district's professed confusion about what was expected of them, Wilson 
had gone to great lengths to spell out how many and what kinds of evaluations needed to 
be completed, and the standards by which they would be evaluated. He even suggested 
what kinds of credentials internal and external professional evaluators should carry. The 
Court of Appeals lent some credence to LRSD's contention that some of these 
stipulations went ''well beyond those agreed upon by the parties in the Revised Plan" and 
that the district court had "come close to crossing the line between proper judicial 
enforcement of an agreed-upon undertaking" and the imposition of new requirements. 
Nevertheless, the appeals court noted that LRSD had not challenged the court's decision 
in 2002 when it first insisted on formalized written evaluations of key programs, and 
consequently, the district court did "not clearly err" when it reinforced those provisions in 
2004. The Court of Appeals' decision was hardly a ringing endorsement ofWilson's 
remedy, and the circuit judges left the door open to revisiting the requirements again if 
41 Cynthia Howell, "LR school officials balking at judge's order," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
July 9, 2004. 
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the case resurfaced in another appeal. 42 
Proposing a New Settlement 
In the meantime, the Little Rock School District was required to rework its 
evaluation process and resubmit materials proving they had complied with this provision 
of the Revised Plan for a third time. The completion of this assessment obligation was 
the only thing standing between the district and a declaration of unitary status. However, 
it should be noted that the district had been operating under "partial unitary status" since 
2002- in every area except for assessment and evaluation, the district had been released 
from court supervision. It no longer had to seek approval for changes in a wide range of 
school operations, including student assignment, hiring, school construction, academic 
placement, and discipline. Under Freeman v. Pitts (1992), the district operated as if it 
were unitary in these areas. Some of the changes associated with this shift, particularly 
changes in the student assignment plan and negotiations over state desegregation funding, 
indicated that unitary status signified more than a return of local control. Partial unitary 
status created new legal concerns and financial problems for the district, and some school 
board members began to question whether completely escaping court supervision was a 
desirable goal. 
The shift in the school board's approach became particularly evident in 2006 
when the residents of Little Rock elected a majority-black school board for the first time 
in the city's history, increasing the number of African American representatives on the 
seven-person board from two to four. Several of the new board members had 
42 Little Rock School District v. North Little Rock School District, 451 F.3d 528 (81h Circuit, 2006). 
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campaigned on issues related to the school desegregation litigation, and Attorney John 
Walker had actively supported their election.43 Robert Daughtery, the board's president, 
told the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette that these electoral victories indicated that the 
community was "looking for change" and had elected a board capable of opening a 
dialogue with the Joshua intervenors. "In the near future, you'll see the district working 
more closely with the other stakeholders in the city," he promised. 44 
Indeed, based on his understanding of the views of the majority of board 
members, John Walker approached district representatives about settling the case out of 
court instead of proceeding with hearings on the third round of program evaluations. 
Walker told Judge Wilson that he doubted that the board's black majority saw "eye-to-
eye" with Little Rock school district attorney Chris Heller.45 In his proposal to the board, 
and in conversations with Heller and representatives of the Office of Desegregation 
Monitoring, Walker suggested that he would settle the case out of court if the board was 
willing to make a commitment to raising the average scores of black students within at 
least 80 percent of the average scores earned by white students.46 
Heller discouraged board members from signing on to such a proposal, noting that 
once the district was declared unitary, the board could adopt any measures it desired in 
43 Cynthia Howell, "LR schools seek attorney's disqualification," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
December 13,2006. 
44 Andrew DeMillo, "Little Rock School Board Mostly Black," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
December 12, 2006. 
45 Linda Satter, "Lawyer: Final deal feasible at LR desegregation hearing," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, December 12, 2006. 
46 Cynthia Howell, "LR schools seek delay in free-of-court hearing; Board votes to join Joshua 
intervenors regarding sessions on unitary status," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 18, 2007. 
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order to improve African American achievement without the burden of new obligations in 
a renegotiated settlement agreement. If John Walker was so confident that the board 
supported his position, Heller asked, why not remove the case :from court altogether? 
"What is there that ought to be done for kids, particularly African-American kids, that 
this board is not willing to do? What requirement can Judge Wilson impose that the 
board would not voluntarily adopt if it believed it was in the best interest of the children 
in the district?" Heller queried.47 
Walker countered that settling the case out of court, instead of pursuing unitary 
status, would allow the board to accomplish several objectives. First, regardless of any 
future electoral outcomes, a decision to settle out of court and a contractual commitment 
to raising test scores would bind all future boards even if they did not support efforts to 
maintain racial diversity or targeted programs designed to improve African American 
student achievement. A settlement was this school board's opportunity to permanently 
stamp its perspective on school district operations. Second, under the settlement, district 
administrators would be required to comply or face future consequences in court. If the 
board took on this responsibility itself after a declaration of unitary status, members could 
be subject to retaliation :from disgruntled voters. The settlement would provide them with 
political cover.48 And finally, Walker warned the board that the pursuit of unitary status-
meaning that the district operated as a single, desegregated system rather than a dual 
47 Cynthia Howell, "LR schools seek del~y in free-of-court hearing; Board votes to join Joshua 
intervenors regarding sessions on unitary status," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 18, 2007. 
48 Cynthia Howell, "Judge won't delay hearing on LR schools: Federal court session to be held 
Saturday as scheduled despite 2 sides' request," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 19, 2007. 
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system of racially identifiable schools- jeopardized the stream of state desegregation aid 
that came to LRSD as a product of the original1989 settlement. Without this money, the 
district could be facing a budget shortfall of over $30 million a year and might be forced 
to abandon voluntary desegregation programs like magnet schools and interdistrict 
transfer programs that were popular with parents and enrolled roughly 10% of public 
school students in Pulaski County49• 
Moreover, by 2007, it had become clear to the board that the achievement of 
unitary status in areas like student assignment did not mean that they could necessarily do 
the "same, before and after" the system was recognized as desegregated. Before a 
declaration of unitary status, the Little Rock School District had been required to adopt a 
variety of racial balance guidelines, transportation strategies, magnet and incentive 
schools, and student transfer programs. However, after a declaration of unitary status, 
these very same mechanisms- which were once constitutionally required- became 
constitutionally suspect precisely because they considered a student's race when making 
school assignments. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
sharply curbed school districts' ability to continue these kinds of desegregation practices 
voluntarily, after they were released from the oversight of federal courts. Under the 
weight of these decisions, unitary status signified more than the return of local control; it 
also curbed local school boards' ability to utilize race-based strategies designed to 
49 Cynthia Howell, "LR schools seek delay in free-of-court hearing: Board votes to join Joshua 
intervenors regarding sessions on unitary status," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 18, 2007; "Pulaski 




Student Assignment and Racial Classifications 
By 2007, Little Rock's school board had become aware of a strong trend towards 
the resegregation of the city's schools as it changed its assignment policies in relation to 
these decisions. Under the Revised Plan adopted in 1998, the Little Rock School District 
had returned to a student assignment plan that assigned most students to schools based on 
their residential location. The district abandoned the use of satellite zones that brought 
students from distant neighborhoods together within the same school. District officials 
maintained that changing demographics in the district had limited the zones' 
effectiveness- in some cases black students from the central city were being bused to 
schools that were once predominantly white but had become predominantly black. 
Central High- the district's most closely watched school- was exempted from this change 
and retained the large west Little Rock satellite zone that allowed it maintain racial 
balance under the glare of the media spotlight. 50 
However, although school officials suggested that the use of satellite zones had a 
negligible impact on school desegregation, it quickly became clear that their abolishment 
had a significant effect. Before the satellite zones were eliminated, only four of the 
district's schools had enrollments that were more than 90% African American. With the 
return to neighborhood student assignments, nine of the district's schools had enrollments 
that were predominantly black, and an additional four elementary schools had enrollments 
5° Cynthia Howell, "Plan would re-emphasize neighborhood LR schools," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, September 2, 1998, p. A 1; Cynthia Howell, "LR school zone plan earns unanimous OK," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, November 20, 1998, p. Al. 
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that were predominantly white. 51 The district continued to maintain voluntary 
desegregation mechanisms, including magnet schools, incentive or specialty schools, and 
student transfer programs. Nevertheless, despite these provisions, almost 70% of the 
city's middle and elementary schools fell outside the 40/60 ratio the district had formerly 
used to determine if a school was "truly desegregated." 
District officials maintained that the return of racially identifiable schools did not 
signify the return of "inherently unequal" schools because they were committed to 
distributing resources equally to every campus regardless of its racial composition. But 
the Brown decision had maintained that segregated schools were inherently unequal, 
regardless of whether facilities or other tangible factors were equalized because of the 
stigma associated with racial isolation. And certainly, the district's own statements 
suggested that they had adopted this new plan in order to appease white parents who did 
not want to send their children to predominantly black schools. Repeatedly, district 
officials emphasized that the return of neighborhood schools had stemmed the tide of 
white flight and allowed LRSD to maintain steady levels of enrollment. This suggested 
that the district implicitly recognized that, at least for these white parents, there was a 
stigma associated with predominantly black and increasingly-isolated institutions. 52 
These changes preceded the declaration of partial unitary status that released the 
school district from court supervision in the area of student assignment in 2002. The 
51 Cynthia Howell, "LR schools to submit bid to get free of monitoring: Board to send 
desegregation report to U.S. judge," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, March 14,2001, p. AI. 
52 Cynthia Howell, "Falloff in student population eating hole in districts' desegregation purse," 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, March 6, 2002, p. AI. 
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Joshua intervenors had not pushed for racial balance in every school in lieu of negotiating 
for stronger commitments to implement and assess programs related to African American 
student achievement. Given the court battle they now found themselves embroiled in, the 
persistence of the achievement gap and the trend toward racial isolation in the district, 
they may have wondered whether the trade had been worth it. Nevertheless, the 
declaration of unitary status in the area of student assignment produced even more 
changes that went further than district officials themselves felt comfortable with. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled in two cases involving student admission 
policies at the University of Michigan. In Gratz v. Bollinger, the court held 6-3 that the 
University of Michigan's admissions policy for undergraduate students violated the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and unfairly discriminated against 
Caucasians. Michigan routinely awarded students points for admissions factors 
including "high school grades, standardized test scores, high school quality, curriculum 
strength, geography, alumni relationships, leadership, and race." Underrepresented 
minorities were automatically granted 20 points out ofthe 100 required for admission. 
This policy was designed to encourage diversity among the school's student body- and 
the Court found that it certainly resulted in larger enrollments of minority students. The 
Court determined that "virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority 
applicant" was accepted to the school. However, the Court held that the equal protection 
clause and precedent established under Bakke did not permit universities to use racial 
classifications as a "decisive factor" in the admissions process. 53 
53 Gratz et al. v. Bollinger eta!, 539 US 244 (2003). 
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Nevertheless, in a 5-4 companion decision, Grutter v. Bollinger, which evaluated 
admissions policies at University of Michigan's law school, the Court acknowledged that 
the pursuit of a diversified student body at institutions of higher education could be a 
"compelling interest" that justified the consideration of race in admissions, but only plans 
that were "narrowly tailored" to achieve this end could be constitutional. In determining 
whether a plan was narrowly tailored, the Court examined both admissions plans under 
the test of"strict scrutiny." The majority held that "context matters" when reviewing a 
race-based policies: "Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable, and 
strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance 
and sincerity of government's reasons for using race in a particular context." 
In contrast to its decision related to the University of Michigan's undergraduate 
admissions policies, the justices upheld the law school's admissions plan because it 
provided a "holistic" and "individualized" review that considered a student's test scores, 
personal statement, letters of recommendation, grade point and average, and an essay 
"describing how the applicant will contribute to law school life and diversity." The 
policy did not define diversity exclusively in racial terms, but did "reaffirm" the school's 
interest in including African American, Native American and Hispanic students in 
"meaningful" numbers. The Court approved this approach because the policy did not 
reserve seats for underrepresented minorities, nor was race weighted so heavily that it 
effectively "insulated" minority candidates from competing with other applicants. 
Indeed, in some cases it was not considered at all. The Court asserted, 
When using race as a 'plus' factor in university admissions, a university's 
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admissions program must remain :flexible enough to ensure that each 
applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an 
applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application. 
The importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a 
race-conscious admissions program is paramount. 
Significantly, the law school maintained that it did not set hard targets for the number of 
underrepresented minorities enrolled in any given year, but rather sought to enroll a 
"critical mass" of minority students to promote "cross-racial understanding and the 
breaking down of racial stereotypes." The majority of Court approved this policy because 
it :flowed from a pedagogical goal rather than a desire to achieve a proscribed "racial 
balance." (Nevertheless, some members of the Court expressed open skepticism that this 
language was merely camouflage for achieving unspoken racial quotas). 
Despite supporting the law school's narrowly-tailored consideration of an 
applicant's race as a potential "plus factor" in the admissions process, the Court warned 
that even these types of race-conscious policies "must be limited in time." The purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment "was to do away with all governmentally imposed 
discrimination based on race." Consequently, the Court determined, "racial 
classifications, however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they 
may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands" and they "must have a 
logical end point." The Court urged the law school to substitute a race-neutral 
admissions policy as soon as practicaL In the meantime, they urged the University of 
Michigan to attach "sunset provisions" to its admissions practices and to conduct 
"periodic reviews" in order to determine whether the consideration of race was still 
necessary to achieve diversity. In conclusion, the majority inserted its own sunset 
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provision into its decision, predicting, "The Court expects that 25 years from now, the use 
of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."54 
Although the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz (2003) involved 
merit-based admissions policies in institutions ofhigher education, K-12 school districts 
across the country took note of the high court's direction in relation to their own student 
assignment plans. Historically, Supreme Court decisions related to higher education and 
desegregation have been applied as precedent in cases involving public school systems. 
In the wake of Gruffer and Gratz, Little Rock school administrators determined that they 
would have to devise a "race-neutral" system of student assignment, in which a student's 
nice could be considered in school placement but would no longer operate as a "key 
factor." Junious Babbs, the assistant superintendent for administrative services who 
would oversee the change, said the decisions required the district to alter its plan. "We 
may not remain stagnant in our existing student-assignment plan," he explained. "If we 
continue to retain principles that we now incorporate, that would not be a wise move on 
our part." The school district hoped to "retain school choice and student diversity to the 
extent practical," by including other measures of diversity such as socioeconomic status 
and standardized test scores. The district's magnet schools would not be affected by the 
change and would continue to employ racial balance guidelines, and students would 
continue to be able to request majority-to-minority transfers because the other school 
districts in Pulaski County involved in these interdistrict programs had not been declared 
54 Grutter v. Bollinger et al., 539 US 306 (2003). 
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even partially unitary. 55 
However, the change would effect the district's specialty-program schools, 
formerly known as incentive schools, that were located in predominantly black 
neighborhoods. The district had embedded specialty programs in these schools in order 
to provide white families who lived within the district with an "incentive" to help 
desegregate these institutions. The district had reserved seats for white students in hope 
of achieving a 40/60 racial balance. Under the new plan, neighborhood students were 
given first priority for enrollment and seats were no longer reserved. Any remaining seats 
were assigned through a weighted lottery, which took into account a student's race, test 
scores, and family income. The more an individual student's demographic profile 
differed from the profile of the school as a whole, the more times their name was entered 
into the lottery. 56 
Within four years, the impact of this change was significant. King Magnet 
Elementary had been 53% black in 2003-2004, but was 77% black in 2007-2008. 
Likewise, the percentage of black students at Rockefeller Elementary climbed from 58% 
to 82%; from 66% to 80% at Romine Elementary; and from 62% to 92% at Washington 
Elementary. At Dunbar Middle School-located in what had once been Little Rock's 
premiere African American high school- the percentage of black students rose from 58% 
55 Cynthia Howell, "Desegregated one year, LR district plan ignores race in assigning pupils," 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 19,2003, p. 1. 
56 Cynthia Howell, "LR specialty schools letting in more blacks: Race is less of a factor for 
attendance," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 3, 2005. 
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to 73%.57 When these changes began to become public, Assistant Superintendent Junious 
Babbs admitted, "We are not totally taken aback by what's happened." He acknowledged 
that it was difficult for some district administrators who had worked for years to maintain 
racial diversity to change the "paradigm" under which they operated. "We've been so 
entrenched but we're gradually working out of it," he said. As required by the Supreme 
Court, the district had to embrace a much "broader" definition of diversity. 58 
However, just as the Little Rock school board was contemplating whether to 
accept John Walker's offer to enter into a new settlement or continue to pursue unitary 
status, the district was confronted with an even more drastic change. In December of 
2006, the Supreme Court considered two cases from Louisville and Seattle that involved 
student assignment plans that took race into some consideration along with other factors 
when assigning students to schools in order to maintain diversity. The white plaintiffs in 
these cases argued that any voluntary consideration of race in student assignment, that 
was not mandated by the courts in order remedy de jure segregation, violated the 
Constitution. Regardless of the intent of school districts, such plans violated the 
individual rights of white students under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In districts that had never been found guilty of de jure violations or had 
been declared unitary, only a "colorblind" student assignment policy that ignored race 
57 Cynthia Howell, "Pulaski County schools facing time of decision over desegregation plans," 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, February 17, 2008. 
58 Cynthia Howell, "LR specialty schools letting in more blacks: Race is less of a factor for 
attendance," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 3, 2005. 
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altogether was appropriate. 59 
Just as in Little Rock, the school district in Louisville, Kentucky had been under 
court orders to desegregate its schools for twenty-five years. Initially, the city had 
adopted geographic attendance zones and a freedom-of-choice plan, but these limited 
efforts did not effectively dismantle the dual system of schools. During the course of 
litigation, the Louisville school system was consolidated with the predominantly-white 
Jefferson County school district, and was ordered to adopt an extensive busing program 
that enabled it to maintain racial balance in its schools. By the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the district sought to reduce the disruption produced by this plan and to curb white 
flight. A plan titled "Project Renaissance" weakened the district's racial balance 
guidelines, redrew school assignment areas to reintroduce geographic attendance zones, 
permitted majority-to-minority student transfers at the elementary level, magnet middle 
schools, and "open" high school enrollment that introduced school choice within broad 
racial guidelines. These adjustments were similar to those made in Little Rock during the 
same time period, and had the effect of reducing the significance of a student's race in 
school assignment. In 1999, several parents brought a lawsuit petitioning for the 
dissolution of the desegregation order. The Louisville school board opposed dissolution, 
arguing that the system sill suffered from "demographic imbalance" that was the product 
of de jure segregation. However, the federal court ruled in the parents' favor, taking the 
school board's argument as "overwhelming evidence" that the district had fulfilled the 
59 Oral Arguments in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. I, et 
al., and Crystal D. Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, et al., December 4, 2006, as recorded 
by Alderson Reporting Company. 
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"underlying purposes" of the desegregation decree- it was clear the Louisville School 
Board had "treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a legal 
obligation- they consider it a positive, desirable policy and an essential element of any 
well-rounded public school education." The court seemed to express confidence that the 
board would maintain this commitment and granted the district unitary status. After 
attaining unitary status, the school district retained its student assignment policies in order 
to ensure that their schools would not revert to their formally segregated state. Now, the 
school district found itself standing before the Supreme Court trying to preserve the 
remnants of a system that had once been mandated by the federal courts. 60 
These cases produced a split decision under the title Parents Involved v. Seattle 
(2007). As in Grutter and Gratz, the Court reviewed the Louisville and Seattle plans 
under the "strict scrutiny" test to determine whether the use of individual racial 
classifications was "narrowly tailored" to meet a "compelling" government interest. A 
plurality of the court- including Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Ali to-- argued that consideration of race in student assignment, regardless of the intent of 
the school board, was unconstitutional and precluded by Supreme Court precedent 
including Brown v. Board of Education. The plurality argued that the Court's previous 
decisions had only recognized two interests as compelling enough to justify the 
60 This history, and the background of the Seattle case, are outlined in Part I of Justice Breyer's 
dissent. Since Little Rock, like Louisville, was once found guilty of de jure violations, I have smnmarized 
the history of that district here. However, the pattern in Seattle is also very similar-with the distinction that 
Seattle settled its case out of court before being found guilty of de jure violations. Regardless, since all 
three districts were considered unitary in the area of student assignment in 2006, the Supreme Court's 
decision in this case is binding. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. I, 127 
Sup .Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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consideration of race in school settings: 1) the remediation of de jure school segregation 
with race-conscious strategies and 2) the desirability of cultivating diversity in higher 
education. However, these justices emphasized that these cases were not governed by the 
precedent established in the University of Michigan law school case.61 They noted that 
the diversity at issue in Gruffer was not strictly racial, involved an institution of higher 
education, and that the plan had only passed the "narrowly tailored" requirement because 
it involved an individualized review process that was not at issue in these student 
assignment plans. Moreover, for a small minority of students in Seattle and Louisville, 
race was the decisive factor in determining whether a student would be permitted to 
enroll at a particular school. Finally, the number of minority students that the districts 
sought to enroll was not tied to a pedagogical objective, but rather to the school districts' 
overall demographics with margins of error up to 20% points. Consequently, the 
plurality argued that the districts were not trying to achieve diversity but rather "racial 
balance, pure and simple." The justices wrote, 
This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, 
rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of 
diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our 
existing precedent. We have many times over reaffirmed that 'racial 
balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.' 
This pursuit of racial balance- rather than diversity- was not a "compelling interest." 
The plurality argued that the racial classifications used to assign students to 
schools and retain diversity or racial balance in Louisville and Seattle were "inherently 
suspect," because the use of such classifications "demeans the dignity and worth of a 
61 Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas had all filed dissents in the Grutter case. 
496 
person" and promotes "notions of racial inferiority and leads to a politics of racial 
hostility." Citing the implementation order in Brown II and the NAACP's oral 
arguments in the case, the plurality contended that the intent of the Brown decision was to 
"achieve a system of determining admission to the schools on a nonracial basis." They 
concluded, "Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go 
to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not 
carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again- even for 
very different reasons." If the districts and other members of the Court were concerned 
about racial discrimination, they argued, "the way to stop discrimination on the basis of 
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 
Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg dissented, arguing that the Court 
had long drawn distinctions between the use of racial classifications for the purpose of 
inclusion rather than the purpose of exclusion. The dissenters contended, 
The plurality pays inadequate attention to [50 years of school 
desegregation] law, to past opinions' rationales, their language, and the 
contexts in which they arise. As a result, it reverses course and reaches the 
wrong conclusion. In doing so, it distorts precedent, it announces legal 
rules that will obstruct efforts by state and local governments to deal 
effectively with the growing resegregation of public schools, it threatens to 
substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation, and 
it undermines Brown's promise of integrated primary and secondary 
education that local communities have sought to make a reality. This 
cannot be justified in the name of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In the dissent's view, the Court's decision was not an affirmation but a betrayal of Brown. 
The dissent also rejected the plurality's argument that the Constitution prohibited 
districts who had never been found guilty of de jure violations, or those that had been 
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subsequently found unitary, from adopted voluntary integration strategies. Citing 
precedent, Justice Breyer wrote, "we have understood that the Constitution permits local 
communities to adopt desegregation plans even where it does not require them to do so." 
Specifically, Breyer pointed to a passage in the Court's unanimous decision in Swann 
(1971): 
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate 
and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, 
that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school 
should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the 
proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy 
is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities.62 
This statement had been applied in hundreds of schools districts, like Louisville and 
Seattle, and it had become an established judicial principal in the lower courts. Breyer 
suggested that it was "not surprising" that this distinction between racial classifications 
used to promote inclusion rather than exclusion had been so widely accepted because it 
was "predicated upon a well-established legal view of the Fourteenth Amendment." The 
Amendment sought to bring "into American society as full members those whom the 
Nation had previously held in slavery" by "forbidding practices that lead to racial 
exclusion." The dissent contended that the plurality's opinion overthrew this long-
standing interpretation of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and its application to 
school desegregation, and predicted that its decision would produce upheaval in school 
districts across the nation. 
62 The plurality dismissed this passage as dicta because Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) involved remedial efforts to correct de jure violations. Consequently, any 
passage taken from the case that was not specifically related to the remediation of de jure violations was 
technically not part of the Court's holdings. Nevertheless, this passage provided school districts with 
guidance on how the Court in 1971 would have ruled if such a case had come before them. 
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The dissent argued that the entire purpose of subjecting the use of racial 
classifications to the test of "strict scrutiny" was to determine whether the classifications 
were designed to promote exclusion rather than inclusion. The dissent contended that the 
districts were pursuing a "compelling interest" in "maintaining hard-won gains" and 
seeking to "combat the remnants of segregation caused in whole or in part by ... school 
related policies, which have often affected not only schools, but also housing patterns, 
employment practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes." These four justices 
rejected the argument that the tools local officials had used in order to remediate de jure 
segregation could or should not be applied after a declaration of unitary status. Several of 
the conservative justices who contributed to the plurality opinion had repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of returning educational administration over to local control-
it was on these grounds that they had relaxed the legal thresholds required to attain 
unitary status in the 1990s. Breyer pointedly highlighted the irony that these same 
justices now sought to limit the actions of local school boards when they voluntarily 
pursued integration strategies after achieving that milestone. 
The dissent also cited educational benefits related to school integration, including 
the minimization of the achievement gap between black and white students, and a 
democratic interest in preparing children to live and work in a pluralistic society. These 
were the kind of interests that the majority found compelling in University of Michigan's 
law school's diversity policy. And the dissenters argued that they were equally 
compelling, if not more so, in a K -12 setting. 
The dissenters also argued that the plans passed the narrow tailoring requirement. 
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The plans did not establish "quotas," but depended on broad ranges in order to ensure 
that their efforts were effective- such measures had been used by federal courts 
themselves since Green v. New Kent County (1968). The dissent rejected the contention 
that race was the decisive factor in the admissions process, noting that the plans promoted 
student choice and took other factors into consideration. Race only entered into the 
equation if a school was over-subscribed and fell well outside the general racial 
distribution in the school district as a whole. Finally, the dissent rejected the notion that 
the districts' assignment plans substantially harmed white students. Unlike the University 
of Michigan cases, these students were not denied admission. They were assigned to 
another school which provided equal educational opportunity. Moreover, the dissent 
noted that the school board's were not overly reliant on race-conscious tools, and in fact, 
had sought to diminish their use over time in consultation with other community 
stakeholders and school patrons. However, both districts had determined that race-
neutral strategies alone did not allow them to retain the diversity they desired. 
For these reasons, the dissenters would have upheld the plans in Louisville and 
Seattle as logical applications of the established law surrounding school desegregation 
reaching back to the Brown v. Board of Education decision. School segregation, they 
argued, involved more than assigning students to schools based on the color of their skin. 
It also perpetuated a caste system "rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80 years of 
legalized subordination." To suggest that the student assignment plans at issue here were 
the equivalent ofthose in Topeka, Kansas in 1954 was a "cruel distortion ofhistory" that 
trivialized the inequality that accompanied the system of segregation. 
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Despite these arguments, the dissent fell short of the five votes needed for their 
view to prevail. As the deciding swing vote, Justice Kennedy concurred with the plurality 
and struck down the Seattle and Louisville plans. Nevertheless, he emphasized that just 
as in higher education, the pursuit of diversity in the public schools was a "compelling 
interest." School districts did not have to accept or ignore the "status quo" of racial 
isolation in schools- they could take steps to address it and encourage a kind of student 
diversity that took race into consideration as well as other demographic factors. 
However, in Kennedy's view, the pursuit of this race-conscious objective did not justify 
the use of invidious racial classifications that systematically typed individuals by race. 
He urged the districts to pursue race-neutral means to achieve their race-conscious ends, 
by utilizing strategies such as the selection of new school sites, the redistribution of 
geographic attendance zones, and the establishment of special programs and magnet 
schools. Because these strategies did not utilize racial classifications, they would not be 
subjected to "strict scrutiny."63 Kennedy's approach to this question now governs the 
way school districts must formulate their student assignment plans. Theoretically, his 
opinion allows school districts to adopt voluntary strategies designed to foster diversity. 
However, in practice, many school administrators note that the kind of techniques he 
advocated will not be sufficient to prevent the resegregation of American schools. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved required the Little 
Rock School District to eliminate any use of racial classifications from its student 
assignment plan. In recent proposals, the district's attorneys have suggested substituting 
63 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 Sup .Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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eligibility for free- and reduced-price school meals as an appropriate criteria for balancing 
enrollments at magnet schools. Likewise, the majority-to-minority student transfer 
program would be substituted with a program that allowed students from areas with high 
poverty rates to transfer to more economically diverse schools. Officials hope that 
programs designed to encourage economic diversity will result in racial diversity as well 
because approximately 80% of Little Rock students eligible for free- or reduced-price 
lunch are African American.64 Although the use of socioeconomic status is not subject to 
the same "strict scrutiny" as race, it remains to be seen whether such plans, which attempt 
to approximate the results that would have been achieved by using race as a factor in 
student assignment, will withstand constitutional challenge. 
Unitary Status 
This jurisprudence and the changes it required established that unitary status and 
the return of"local control" meant that Little Rock's majority-black school board would 
not necessarily be able to retain policies it believed benefitted African American school 
children. Moreover, the types of strategies outlined in Justice Kennnedy's opinion in 
Parents Involved required substantial outlays of funds. Resiting educational facilities or 
building new schools required significantly more resources than simply relocating 
students to the facilities available. From the perspective of some board members, 
LRSD's ability to marshal the financial resources necessary to retain any semblance of 
diversity in its system could be jeopardized by a final declaration of unitary status. In 
64 Cynthia Howell, "LR district takes plan to officials," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, April 21, 
2010. For early reactions to the decision, see Heather Hahn, "Ruling's effect in state unclear: Immediate 
Pulaski County impact unlikely, attorneys say," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, June 29, 2007. 
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2007, the district continued to receive more than $30 million dollars a year in 
desegregation aid from the state of Arkansas that it used to fund magnet programs and 
majority-to-minority transfers. State legislators indicated that these dollars would be 
phased out once desegregation had been "accomplished."65 As the district contemplated 
the future, its ability to continue these popular programs in the absence of state assistance 
was uncertain. 
Indeed, concerns over this issue were so acute that all four African-American 
board members testified against the school district in the third round of unitary status 
hearings involving student achievement and assessment. Members of the board testified 
that "they either did not believe, or did not have enough information to know" if LRSD 
had fulfilled the compliance remedy outlined by the District Court in 2004. Moreover, 
they expressed "reservations about whether it was in LRSD's best interest to be declared 
unitary because LRSD could use millions of dollars of state funding that it now receives 
under the settlement agreement with the State of Arkansas." Judge Wilson rejected this 
line or argument, acknowledging the Board's concerns but finding that "a potential loss 
of state funding ... cannot be, an appropriate consideration in determining whether the 
65 LRSD negotiated an agreement with the state of Arkansas when it filed its first Revised Plan 
fmal compliance report in 2001, which stipulated that the district would continue to receive desegregation 
aid until at least 2008 (Cynthia Howell, "Deal can ease LR schools' loan burdens: Lawyers for state, district 
work out possible solution," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, March 16, 2001). Although there was no 
agreement that desegregation aid to the three school districts in Pulaski County would cease in 2008, 
Arkansas state legislators made it clear that the funds would not be provided indefinitely and pressured 
North Little Rock and Pulaski County Special School District administrators to file their own petitions for 
unitary status to bring the case to an end (Cynthia Howell, ''2 districts looking for desegregation-case exit: 
NLR, Pulaski County Special Schools to seek court declaration of at least partial compliance," Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette, April16, 2006). 
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District is unitary."66 However, arguably, such a concern could be taken into 
consideration, particularly if the majority of members on the school board believed that 
district schools would revert back to racial isolation in the absence of state aid and the 
programs it funded. Surely, such an outcome would suggest that the vestiges of state 
discrimination had not yet been erased. 
Regardless of the preference of the majority of the school board, the Eastern 
District Court of Arkansas found the Little Rock School Board unitary in February of 
2007. In so doing, Judge Wilson abandoned the portion of his 2004 remedy that required 
the district to "deeply embed" the program assessment process in its curriculum, and 
submitted to the opinion of some members of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals that this 
requirement went beyond the stipulations of the 1998 Revised Plan. Wilson expressed 
his confidence .that district administrators had assessed programs designed to improve the 
academic achievement of African American students as the plan required. Evaluations 
revealed that some of the programs had a positive educational impact and improved 
achievement, while others demonstrated no statistical benefit. The Judge was pleased 
that administrators and board members had recognized the importance of assessing 
programs in order to determine which were effective and which were not.67 
Consequently, Wilson released LRSD from court supervision and monitoring, 
announcing, "LRSD's Board can now operate the district as it sees fit; answerable to no 
66 "Order Declaring the Little Rock School District Unitary," Little Rock School District v. Pulaski 
County Special School District et al., No. 4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2006), 47-
48. 
67 Ibid, 23-36. 
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one except LRSD's students and patrons and the voters who elected them to office .... I 
want to express my heartfelt best wishes as LRSD begins to operate, as our Founders 
intended, under control of the citizens of the City of Little Rock. "68 
Unsurprisingly, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette embraced the declaration, 
parodying Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream Speech" and proclaiming, "Free at last, 
thank God almighty free at last!" The paper's editorial board suggested that the 
"principal function" of the case had been "to support generations oflawyers." Now that 
the "legal detritus" had been cleared away, the district could focus on education. Any 
credit or blame for conditions in the school district would fall on administrators, teachers, 
and school patrons, and "folks in Little Rock"(including the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette) 
would no longer be "able to blame any and all ofthe school's problems on the courts 
anymore." Since the city had long born the stigma associated with the 1957 Little Rock 
school desegregation crisis, the editorial board welcomed the court's decision as an 
opportunity for Arkansas' capital to become "a national byword for academic 
achievement." The paper also expressed its hope that the city's black and white residents 
would be reconciled in the wake of the court's decision, moving forward with optimism, 
"for there's no more efficient force in the world, as Judge Wilson recognized, than good 
faith."69 
But many of those directly involved in the litigation were less sanguine. Although 
68 Ibid, 49. 
69 "Editorials: Out of the court at last, Little Rock's schools get their chance," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, February 27,2007. 
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Little Rock School District Superintendent Roy G. Brooks applauded the decision, telling 
the Associated Press, "I think this is a clear indication that 1957 is not 2007," Attorney 
John Walker rejected Brooks' claim that the court's decision placed significant distance 
between 1957 and 2007. Rather, he suggested, "In 2007, we have people in neckties 
living in big houses celebrating the return to 1957, a return to the concept of white 
supremacy." School Board President Katherine Mitchell, one of the four black board 
members who had testified against the district, promised to provide district principals, 
teachers, and staff with the resources to continue programs that had been effective, but 
felt some trepidation as she looked toward the future. "I just hope and pray that the 
district will do what it is supposed to do, that we really do select the programs and embed 
those that help students be successful," she said. 70 
Sensing this trepidation, Attorney John Walker floated another settlement 
proposal, promising not to appeal the federal district court's decision if the district agreed 
to his terms. Walker proposed expanding the authority of the Planning, Research and 
Evaluation office responsible for developing programs related to African American 
student achievement. More controversially, he also requested that the district pay up to 
$1 million in his legal fees, hire his long-time assistant Joy Springer as an in-house 
monitor, and retain his services if the district decided to go to court to preserve state 
desegregation aid. One board member rejected the proposal as a "long-term employment 
70 Steve Barnes, "Federal Supervision of Race in Little Rock Schools Ends," The New York Times, 
February 24, 2007, p. A13; Cynthia Howell and Charlotte Tubbs, "U.S. Court releases LR schools," 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, February 24,2007. 
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contract" that would absorb educational resources, rather than a serious settlement.. 71 
School District Attorney Chris Heller encouraged the board, once again, to reject 
Walker's proposal, expressing his confidence that the judgement would be affirmed in the 
8th Circuit Court of Appeals. "There is just no reason," he said, "to trade an opportunity 
to end this lawsuit for good, which is very likely to happen in the gth Circuit Court very 
soon, for more obligations that can be enforced in Court .... Even though the district would 
be unitary, we would still be subject to enforcement of a complicated written agreement." 
Despite these concerns, the majority of the board agreed to move ahead with negotiations. 
However, the 8th Circuit's settlement director refused participate in any conference related 
to the proposal because of the circumstances surrounding it.72 John Walker proceeded 
with his appeal, but the district court's judgement was affirmed in April2009 and the 
Little Rock School District was permanently removed from court supervision. 73 
Despite the official end to the school desegregation case, the Little Rock School 
District continues to face substantial challenges related to race more than fifty years after 
nine African American students attempted to enter Little Rock Central High School. 
71 Cynthia Howell, "Board gets deal offer on schools," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, January 18, 
2008; Cynthia Howell, "Walker pitches deal to drop LR School District appeal," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, June 15, 2007; "LR district, intervenors talk deal," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, July 13, 2007; 
and Meredith Oakley, "Turning the tables won't change the issue," editorial, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
July 18, 2007. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Little Rock School District v. North Little Rock School District (8th Circuit, 2009). See also 
Cynthia Howell, "Reinstate case for LR district, attorneys plead: Black students' lawyers file to appeal Feb. 
23 court order," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, October 3, 2007; Linda Satter, "Ruling on LR district right, 
brief tells court; Schools fight appeal from black families," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, November 22, 
2007; Cynthia Howell, "LR schools declared desegregated; After 26 years, district gets 8th Circuit all-clear," 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, April3, 2009. 
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Even the city's school board is deeply divided along racial lines as it considers the 
district's future. Long-time resident Brownie Ledbetter has noted that "the tension 
around the change from a white majority to a black majority" school board indicates that 
the transition "seems to be an enormous change to many people." In her view, 
controversy surrounding the board, and the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette's references to 
the four-person majority as the "Gang of Four" are part of the historical power struggle 
that have gripped the city for decades. 74 
In a city that is majority-white, the city schools are predominantly black. The 
city's overall population is 55 percent white, but the school-age population is only 40 
percent white since many young families opt to live in the suburbs. Of those who choose 
to live within city limits, a large portion ofthem send their children to the private schools 
that first emerged as the result of the 1957 school desegregation crisis and flowered in the 
wake of court-ordered busing. According to the 2000 Census, roughly 13 percent of 
white students nationwide were enrolled in private schools; in Little Rock, census data 
revealed that 48 percent of white students had opted out of the public schools, placing the 
capital among the top ten cities in the nation with the highest percentage of white children 
attending private schools.75 
74 Jennifer Barnett Reed, "Fifty years on: Race still dominates the LRSD half a century after 
integration," Arkansas Times, September 20, 2007, p. 44-47. 
75 Phillip Reese, "Races Apart: Not by law but by choice Little Rock has become a city of mostly 
black public schools and mostly white private schools," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, October 26, 2003. 
This situation has led Irving Spitzberg, a Lost Year student, to conclude that many white families in the 
Little Rock school district are not invested in education. While elements of Little Rock's white community 
mobilized in 1958-59 to reopen Little Rock's schools because of their commitment to public education, 
Spitzberg asserts, "If today the governor closed the public high schools in Little Rock, I am afraid that the 
public reaction might be a yawn and an 'oh isn't that too bad?' And, that is a very sad situation indeed" (As 
quoted by Gordy, Finding the Lost Year, 172-173). 
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The city suffers from severe residential segregation, and neighborhoods are carved 
up and divided by race along two major interstates: I-430 and I-630.76 White flight 
continues to move farther and farther west. Hall High School, built in Little Rock's silk-
stocking district in order to provide the city's wealthiest white families with the means to 
escape token integration in 1957, is now 92% African American. With the end of racial 
balance guidelines and the use of satellite zones, white students in the district are now 
concentrated in as few as a twelve schools- many of these, including Central High, are 
magnet schools, or facilities located in predominantly white neighborhoods in northwest 
Little Rock. 77 However, even though magnet schools continue to promote some diversity 
in the district, these programs are also under threat as the district contemplates the loss of 
state desegregation aid. 78 
Moreover, despite the protracted litigation surrounding programs designed to 
improve African American student achievement and the assessment process, the 
achievement gap lingers. In 2007, during the fiftieth anniversary of the school 
76 Jay Barth, "LR in black and white: We're more segregated today than in 1957," Arkansas Times, 
September 20,2007, 54-55. 
77 Jennifer Barnett Reed, "Fifty years on: Race still dominates the LRSD half a century after 
integration," Arkansas Times, September 20, 2007, p. 44-47. 
78 Negotiations with the state of Arkansas about how long desegregation aid should continue are 
currently at a stand still. The Little Rock School District has recently filed a lawsuit charging the state with 
undermining desegregation efforts in the city and violating the 1989 settlement agreement by 
indiscriminately approving charter schools within the district that pull students out of district schools. If the 
district wins this case, it may be entitled to continued support from the state of Arkansas (Seth Blomeley, 
"Desegregation case sincerity is questioned; Legislator calls out LR district," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
October 21, 2008; Cynthia Howell, "Challenge to charter school law explored," Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, November 25, 2008; Carolyne Park, "LR School District asks judge: Step in, it says state Ok of 
charters violates '89 deal," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, May 20, 2010. See also Vinzant, "Little Rock's 
Long Crisis," 306-312). 
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desegregation crisis, African American students scored 30 to 45 percentage points below 
their white peers on standardized tests. 79 Many of the African American students who 
emoll at Central High School enter as freshman with third grade reading levels. As a 
result, many people in the city question whether the kind of "integration" being promoted 
in Little Rock's magnet schools is real. Magnet programs, enriched classes, and 
advanced placement courses are predominantly white, while regular or remedial classes 
are predominantly black. Brandon Love, student body president in 2006-2007, referred to 
this phenomenon as the "Tale of Two Centrals."80 In this context, it is easy to question 
whether African American students are really being provided with equal educational 
opportunity and preparation for their life after graduation: 83% of white juniors at Central 
passed proficiency tests in 2006, while only 28% of their African American peers could 
say the same; whites in Little Rock are twice as likely to have completed a four-year 
college education; and the median household income for black families is roughly 
$20,000 less than the average for white families in the city.81 
These types of problems confront urban school districts across the nation, and 
some school administrators point to this fact as evidence that the educational challenges 
79 Jennifer Barnett Reed, "Fifty years on: Race still dominates the LRSD half a century after 
integration," 
Arkansas Times, September 20,2007,44-47. 
80 See Brandon Love, "Desegregated but not integrated," Arkansas Times, May 10, 2007. Love 
shared his thoughts in a Vanderbilt college application essay that was leaked to the press and widely 
distributed among LRSD officials. This phenomenon was also exposed in its saddening reality in an HBO 
documentary produced for the 50th anniversary titled Little Rock Central: 50 Years Later, dir. Brent and 
Craig Renaud, HBO Fihns, 2007, DVD. 
81 Steven Brawner, "Little Rock marks a civil rights victory," Christian Science Monitor, 
September 26, 2007, p. 2. 
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that confront the Little Rock School District are deeply rooted in social problems. This 
perspective seems to promote a kind of fatalism- the problems are so large, so huge, that 
they seem insurmountable. However, if the history of Little Rock has taught us anything 
it must be that even the most unequal educational systems, and those that operate as an 
entrenched part of the social fabric, are vulnerable to challenge. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
"JUSTICE IS A PERPETUAL STRUGGLE": 
THE LITTLE ROCK NINE CONNECTING PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
Over the course of fifty years, many voices have weighed in on the history of the 
Little Rock school desegregation crisis-- reporters, pundits, and politicians; government 
agencies and civil rights organizations; small documentary companies and giant media 
corporations; professional historians and exhibit designers; school board members and 
federal judges. But for many years, nine of the most important voices were relatively 
absent from the public memory of the crisis- those of Melba Pattillo Beals, Elizabeth 
Eckford, Ernest Green, Gloria Ray Karlmark, Carlotta Walls LaNier, Terrence Roberts, 
Jefferson Thomas, Minnijean Brown Trickey, and Thelma Mothershed Wair. Many of 
the Little Rock Nine shunned the public spotlight for thirty years or more, and several did 
not even discuss the crisis in the privacy of their own homes. But recently, this group of 
civil rights pioneers has intervened more forcefully in the public discussion of the history 
they know so intimately and have made the collective decision to take an active role in 
shaping how their story is told. 
As the only senior in 1957-58 and the frrst to graduate from Central High School, 
Ernest Green maintained the most public profile and was frequently called on in the 
1970s and 1980s to share his perspective. Green's involvement in politics as a member 
of the Carter administration and as a close friend of President Clinton made him one of 
the most visible members of the Little Rock Nine. However, there is no question that 
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each of the nine students has their own story to tell, and collectively, the group has come 
to recognize that no single individual can serve as a de facto spokesperson for the entire 
group. 1 In the last fifteen years, each of the Little Rock Nine has struggled to find his or 
her own voice, his own perspective on the past, her own message to students in the 
present, and her own vision for the future. This transition has been marked by the 
publication of three memoirs, countless speaking engagements, hundreds of public 
statements in the press, and the development of the Little Rock Nine Foundation. 
Symbolically, it was recognized at the fiftieth anniversary commemorative ceremony. 
While Ernest Green delivered a powerful address in 1997 on behalf of the entire group, in 
2007, each of the Little Rock Nine addressed the audience gathered in front of Central 
High School. 
From Silence to Speech 
Even in the midst of the media attention that accompanied the crisis in 1957, the 
Little Rock Nine were encouraged to maintain a certain level of silence about their 
experience. Their mentor, NAACP State President Daisy Bates urged them to minimize 
their accounts of harassment inside Central High School. Arkansas Governor Oval 
Faubus had based his opposition to desegregation on reports of mob violence and public 
resistance to compliance with the Brown v. Board of Education decision. As an 
experienced journalist, Bates feared that too many comments about the organized 
harassment of the students might provide segregationists with the ammunition they 
1 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009; LaNier with Page, 
A Mighty Long Way, :xii, 76. 
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needed to end integration in Little Rock. 2 Melba Pattillo Beals, for example, breathed a 
sigh of relief when she was not one of the students called testify in court about her first 
attempt to enter Little Rock Central High School. She feared that her public testimony 
about the lynch mob that greeted her and her mother on the first day could be used by 
Faubus as "yet another excuse to keep us out of schooL. lfl told the judge about the men 
chasing us and shooting through our windows, the governor could use my words as 
weapons against us."3 When speaking to reporters, she "kept our instructions in mind: 
Accentuate the positive- don't complain too much." The spin she put on her encounters 
with white students in school "was not the whole truth but a version that wouldn't 
jeopardize the integration. If I had told what really happened, one of the officials might 
say we couldn't go back. I composed the story in a way that would make my day sound 
okay."4 
Some members of the Little Rock Nine even withheld information from their own 
families, both to spare them the pain of knowing about the daily abuse and because they 
feared their parents would not let them return to Central if they were aware of the extent 
of the harassment. Elizabeth Eckford has described her mother as a hyper-protective 
parent who earned the nickname "the Queen ofNo." Eckford maintained her silence 
2 In December 1957, Bates herself told reporters that the nine students were "comparatively 
happy'' and only had to deflect the "scattered" insults of 50 to 100 "agitators" inside Central. This 
statement and others like it have been used by some citizens and scholars to suggest that conditions at 
Central High School were not as difficult as the Little Rock Nine have described them in later years instead 
I 
of being interpreted as evidence of Bates' desire to undercut Faubus' position. For example, see Chappell, 
"Diversity within a Racial Group," 188. 
3 Beals, Warriors Don't Cry, 88. 
4 Melba Pattillo Beals, Warriors Don't Cry, 123; LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 108. 
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about the daily harassment she encountered in Little Rock's Central High SchooL "I 
knew that if I told my mother what it was like, I would not be able to continue at 
Central," she recalled. Even years later, Eckford concealed the true depth of what she had 
experienced, neglecting to tell her parents when a documentary about the crisis was 
scheduled to air on television. "My mother died in 1992," she has said, "not knowing 
what it was really like."5 Terrence Roberts also kept quiet about the physical and 
psychological pain he experienced in the halls of Central. But he has noted that his 
mother also did what she could to protect him from more anxiety at home. "My mom 
kept information to herself because she didn't want me to worry about her," he wrote. "I 
withheld information from her as well. While I could not conceal scratches or abrasions, 
I did keep much of what happened to me each day away from her. She burned my hate 
mail, and I lied about the pain I felt each day. We tried hard to shield each other."6 
For some members of the Little Rock Nine and their families, their trauma 
prevented them from speaking candidly about it with even their closest loved ones for 
decades. Minnijean Brown Trickey never revisited the 1957-58 school year with her 
mother. "By the time I thought it was important, it wasn't possible," she said. "Because 
[my mother] said she didn't want to relive that."7 She was also reluctant to discuss the 
crisis with her children. As she told historian Elizabeth Jacoway, "You can't talk about 
5 Elizabeth Eckford, public speech at Little Rock Central High School library recorded by author, 
28 April 2007. 
6 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 115. 
7 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009. 
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inhumanity to somebody who is sweet and innocent. You don't even want them to know 
that exists. I didn't want to discourage them at a young age, so I didn't tell them."8 In her 
recently published memoir, Carlotta Walls LaNier also revealed that she never directly 
spoke to her husband about the crisis or told him she was a member of the Little Rock 
Nine for more than a decade. She spoke to her children about it when the television 
docudrama based on vice principal Elizabeth Huckaby's Crisis at Central High was 
scheduled to air, but the subject did not come up again for many more years. Moreover, 
LaNier and her mother "still have never sat down and held a serious conversation about 
that time .... the wounds opened in Little Rock. .. are deep, and in some cases, still raw."9 
Given this reticence to speak about the events of 1957-58 with even the closest 
family members and friends, it is hardly surprising that many members of the Little Rock 
Nine declined to make public comments about their experience or the civil rights 
upheavals of the 1960s. In the sequel to her widely-read memoir Warriors Don't Cry, 
Melba Pattillo Beals discusses the immediate aftermath of her year at Central High 
SchooL While living in California and completing her education, local branches of the 
NAACP periodically asked Beals to speak or participate in interviews. When she 
declined, she recalled, "I felt I was betraying them."10 She felt guilty about not 
participating in the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, or marching in protests for equal 
8 Jacoway and Trickey, "Not Anger but Sorrow," 2. 
9 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, xi, 235, 240. Trickey also discussed the crisis with her 
fourteen year old daughter for the first time when Crisis at Central High aired (Jacoway and Trickey, ''Not 
Anger but Sorrow," 2). 
10 Beals, White is a State of Mind, 119. 
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housing and economic opportunity. However, she refused to accept invitations to 
participate in those events. "The last thing I wanted was to be cast in the role of a civil 
rights leader," she wrote. "The thought of being in any 'struggle' at that time frightened 
and depressed me." Her overriding desire at the time, as recorded her diary, was to "be 
quiet and creep within myself."11 Likewise, Carlotta Walls LaNier refused to take a 
service representative position with a local telephone company in Denver after she 
learned she would be the first African American employee to work in that capacity. She 
took another job with the company at a lower grade because she "didn't want to be the 
center of attention, a racial symbol, or the standard-bearer of anyone's expectations. "12 
When reporters and journalists were able to track down members of the Little 
Rock Nine for special reports or articles on an upcoming anniversary, the pain of reliving 
that experience could be traumatic. Elizabeth Eckford's solitary walk in the midst of the 
mob gathered in front of Central High School was captured and immortalized in a 
photograph that has become an iconic symbol of the crisis. It was her image which drew 
the world's attention to events unfolding in Arkansas' capital. She was also the only one 
ofthe nine students who continued to live in Little Rock for many years. Consequently, 
she was frequently sought out by reporters even as she battled with depression and 
anxiety stemming from her experience at Central High School. "To my kids," she 
recalled; "reporters coming by were people who interrupted our lives and made mom 
11 Beals, White is a State of Mind, 214,231. 
12 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 221. 
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cry."13 When she did not feel like talking, she told her sons to tell persistent reporters that 
she was dead. Even fifty years later, Eckford told Vanity Fair writer David Margolick 
that the long conversations they were having in preparation for a feature article and his 
upcoming book were too taxing. According to Margolick, Eckford told him, "Those calls 
cause some backwash in my life that's hard to deal with .... I'm having trouble sleeping at 
all."14 
However, when the history of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis began to 
be recognized on a much larger and public scale in the 1980s, several of the Little Rock 
Nine started to work towards coming to terms with the events of 1957-58. In their 
memoirs, both Carlotta Walls LaNier and Melba Pattillo Beals describe the thirtieth 
anniversary commemoration sponsored by the NAACP in Little Rock as an important 
turning point. Carlotta Walls LaNier was bombarded with emotions and memories as 
she walked the halls of Central High School for the first time since her graduation. She 
realized "that burying a painful past doesn't necessarily mean you've moved beyond it. 
It's often still there, simmering, waiting for some unexpected moment to erupt, spewing 
forth every hurtful thing that you thought had gone away." When she found herself 
crying on the front steps of Central High thirty years after leaving her hometown, she 
knew, "even though I had built a new life clear across the country, I hadn't moved an inch 
from Little Rock." She used the experience to reconnect with the other members of the 
13 Elizabeth Eckford, public speech at Little Rock Central High School library recorded by author, 
28 Apri12007. 
14 David Margolick, "Through a Lens, Darkly," Vanity Fair, September 24, 2007. 
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Little Rock Nine, and left with the determination to "make peace with my past." As 
LaNier put it, her emotional reaction "set me on a quest for healing and a greater 
understanding of what we had been through. " 15 
This process of sifting through memories and emotions can be difficult and 
painful work. In the introduction to her book, Beals notes that she began writing about 
her experience at Central High shortly after she left Little Rock, but she "could not face 
the ghosts" that her diary and collected newsclippings called forth. "During intervals of 
renewed strength and commitment," she wrote, "I would find myself compelled to return 
to the manuscript, only to have the pain of reliving my past undo my good intentions." 
After thirty-five years, Beals found that "enough time has elapsed for healing to take 
place, enabling me to tell my story without bittemess.'''6 Terrence Roberts refers to a 
similar process in his text, which was published in 2009. "As I have attempted to put my 
thoughts and feelings on paper in years past," he reflected, "I have invariably come up 
against painful memories and have had to take time to sort through the unresolved 
emotions of my time at Central. Now much of the emotional debris has been cleared 
away, and I am ready to share my thoughts.'''7 This effort to come to a greater 
understanding-- to sift and sort through the emotional debris ofthe past-- is ongoing. In a 
recent interview, Minnijean Brown Trickey explained, "one thing that happens is that I'm 
figuring it out as we speak. I'm continuing to [try to] comprehend it and make it 
15 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, xi, 242-243. See also Beals, Warriors Don't Cry, xxii. 
16 Beals, Warriors Don't Cry, xvii. 
17 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 10-11. 
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comprehensible to other people."18 
Despite the emotional backwash, the Little Rock Nine are determined to wade 
through this process and share their personal experiences of the 1957 school 
desegregation crisis. In the months leading up to the fortieth anniversary commemoration 
in 1997, the group of former students collectively decided that the time was right to return 
to Little Rock and use their story to effect change. In her recently published memoir, 
Carlotta Walls LaNier recalled, "I wanted to see Little Rock acknowledge its past, as ugly 
as it was, but it was equally important to me that participants in the commemoration not 
get stuck there." LaNier called her other eight "comrades" and suggested it was time "to 
take as much control as possible of our own legacy." The Little Rock Nine had long felt 
that others had capitalized on their name. LaNier asserted, "We're grown now, and it's 
time to stop complaining about people using us .... Let's take control of our name and get 
on the same page about what we accept and not." After years of relative silence, the . 
Little Rock Nine trademarked their name and launched the Little Rock Nine Foundation, 
a non-profit organization dedicated to educating youth about their experience and 
promoting the importance of academic excellence.19 
Rewriting History 
In part, this shift was motivated by the desire to put the historical record straight 
before they could no longer lend their voices to this task. While sharing their experience 
18 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009. 
19 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 247-248. Minnijean Trickey also mentions this meeting 
in a published interview (Jacoway and Trickey, "Not Anger but Sorrow, 13). 
520 
with students and others in recent years, the Little Rock Nine have collectively made a 
number ofhistorical interventions, emphasizing aspects of the crisis and their 
involvement in it that they feel have been neglected and presenting countemarratives that 
challenge some widely held beliefs. As is evident in the proceeding pages, myths, 
falsehoods, and partial truths about the crisis have circulated for years, and in some cases 
their influence has increased over time. 
Over the last five decades, a vocal portion of the city's population has argued that 
Little Rock and Central High School suffer unfairly under the burden of history. 
According to this perspective, the events that captured the nation's attention were not of 
their own making. Rather, they were the product of the political machinations of 
Governor Faubus's race-bating re-election team, or the result ofthe outside agitation from 
groups such as the NAACP and the segregationist Citizens' Councils of America. A 
variety of evidence is offered to support the claim that the crowds outside the school were 
largely composed of individuals from outside ofLittle Rock. To the extent that locals 
participated in the mobs outside or the harassment of children inside the school, these 
individuals represented a small portion of the citizenry drawn from working-class "hard 
core" segregationist sections of the city. In this narrative, the vast majority of Little Rock 
residents accepted Brown v. Board of Education as the law of the land, were taken by 
surprise by the vehemence and violence that overtook their moderate and progressive city, 
and remained silent for fear of economic reprisals and social ostracization.20 
20 This perspective is articulated in a variety of forums, but was effectively captured on the record 
in several (but not all) oral histories collected by Columbia University as part of its Eisenhower 
Administration Project. It should be noted that which "outsiders" are blamed for the crisis varies depending 
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Most of the Little Rock Nine reject the notion that Little Rock was a 
"progressive" or "moderate" city. The rules of segregation were firmly in place as they 
were growing up. Carlotta Walls Lanier learned to "follow them like I learned to walk, 
by observing those closest to me and following their guidance until I knew the steps well 
enough to venture out on my own."21 While much has been made of the fact that Little 
Rock peacefully integrated its buses before the school crisis erupted, Melba Pattillo Beals 
and Minnijean Brown Trickey are quick to point out that Jim Crow reigned almost 
everywhere in the city. Public accommodations, including restaurants, lunch counters, 
movie theaters, swimming pools, and restrooms were rigidly segregated. African 
Americans were denied employment opportunities and membership in local unions. 22 As 
the historian John Kirk has noted, racial change that preceded the school desegregation 
crisis was "little more than a tokenistic tampering with segregation." Moreover, 
concessions were made to preserve the system of segregation by allowing local white 
leaders to maintain control over the pace of change. 23 
Race relations in the city affected personal interactions as well. Terrence Roberts 
on the interviewee's social position and perspective. See particularly the Reminiscences of Orval E. 
Faubus, Nat T. Griswold, Elizabeth Huckaby, James Karam, Sidney McMath, R.A. Lile, Hugh Patterson, 
Wesley Pruden, and William J. Smith held at the Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, New 
York, NY. 
21 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way,16-17. 
22 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009; Beals, Warriors 
Don't Cry, 6, 24. 
23 Kirk, "The Little Rock Crisis and Postwar Black Activism in Arkansas," 231; Kirk, Redefining 
the Color Line, 63-64. 
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recalls that "insulting remarks were commonplace ... and even very young white children 
showed little, if any, respect for people of color." Moreover, Roberts emphasizes that 
racism was not the sole province of the uneducated or working-class segments of the city. 
He insists, "it was the most upstanding citizens ... who, through their actions, both overt 
and covert, presented the most formidable barrier to our full, equal participation in the 
state."24 From Trickey's perspective, the notion that Little Rock was a moderate southern 
city is little more than a widely accepted "social myth." As she puts it, "How in the hell 
can a segregated, by law, town be considered moderate. I don't get it."25 
As teenagers, the Little Rock Nine put this social system under pressure simply by 
volunteering to attend Central High School. In the 1950s, strident segregationists 
frequently suggested that they had been "handpicked" by the NAACP to challenge Little 
Rock's segregated school system. Some even went so far as to suggest that the black 
students were from northern communities and had been brought to the city to disrupt the 
Arkansas' capital's harmonious pattern of race relations. Others contended that they were 
being paid to emoll at Central High. 26 In contrast, the Little Rock Nine recall that they 
24 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock 21, 23, 43, 78-80; Terrence Roberts, telephone interview by 
author, 29 March 2010. This interpretation of race relations in Little Rock stands in contrast to arguments 
advanced by scholars like C. Fred Williams who have argued that class, specifically working-class 
resentment of middle-class insulation from the full impact of desegregation, rather than rampant racism was 
the animating cause of the school desegregation crisis©. Fred Williams, "Class: The Central Issue in the 
1957 Little Rock School Crisis," 341-344). Here, although Roberts also underscores the privileged position 
of Little Rock's wealthy and upper-middle class whites and their ability to insulate themselves from racial 
change, he suggests that this is an indication that the large crowds that gathered outside of Central High 
School were expressing common racial sentiments that shaped Little Rock society from top to bottom 
regardless of class divisions. 
25 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009. 
26 Beals, White is a State of Mind, 169-175; Terrence Roberts, telephone interview by author, 29 
March 2010; Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 125. 
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signed up to participate in the integration of Central High after school administrators 
explained the school board's plan and asked those who lived in Central's residential area 
to indicate their interest by placing their name on a list. Although it was a moment that 
would have enormous impact on their lives, this call for volunteers was treated as a 
mundane administrative detail. Several of the students did not even inform their parents 
that they had signed up.27 Furthermore, as the historical record makes clear, it was not 
the NAACP but school Superintendent Virgil Blossom who screened the students who 
would be admitted to Little Rock's white high schooJ.28 As Carlotta Walls LaNier 
explained it, the students who ultimately became the Little Rock Nine "were not just the 
best and brightest students academically, but we were student leaders from working- and 
middle-class families whose backgrounds had been deemed acceptable by the school 
system's white leaders for the moment at hand."29 
When describing the decision-making process behind their decision to attend 
Central High, several of the Little Rock Nine stress that in doing so they were not 
rejecting the all-black institutions that had nurtured them through grade school, nor were 
they acting out of an overriding desire to attend classes with white students. Indeed, 
several of the Little Rock Nine had family members that worked in the city's all-black 
schools. These institutions had their own strong educational tradition, despite the fact 
27 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, xiii, 44; Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 86; Beals, 
Warriors Don't Cry, 28. 
28 For details see Virgil T. Blossom's memoir, It Has Happened Here (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1959). 
29 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 60. 
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that the city's African American teachers had to cope with outdated course materials, 
fewer resources, and lower pay.30 As Gloria Ray Karlmark recalls, 
Back then, we looked up to our teachers who taught us out of 
professionalism and love, but also with the disgracefully disproportionate 
public means at their disposal in the public schools in our community. 
The community relied on their skills, their dedication to make up for what 
our school lacked in publicly funded resources. It was difficult for us, but 
we would show that despite the discrimination that we could excel.J1 
Terrence Roberts also has nothing but praise for the instructors that made the most of the 
resources at their disposal. "Black teachers labored hard to help us become 'executives in 
charge of our own education,"' he writes. "[They] were not only concerned with our 
success as students in their specific disciplines, but in our success as human beings ... 
They cared about who we were and what we were doing, or not doing, and encouraged us 
not to stray from the accepted norms of behavior and performance." As a result, students 
not only learned academic basics, but they also learned important survival skills that 
would enable them to succeed even in the segregated South.32 
Terrence Roberts and others assert that they were not seeking a "better education" 
in terms of the quality of instruction they would receive at Central High. 33 Indeed, 
arguably, some (if not most) ofthe white teachers at Central refused to embrace and 
30 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 34, 36; Jones, A Traditional Model of Educational 
Excellence; Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 108-112; Margolick, "Through a Lens, Darkly." 
31 Gloria Ray Karhnark, public comments at Little Rock Central High School 50th anniversary 
commemorative ceremony, 25 September 2007, transcription from videotape of television broadcast in 
author's files. 
32 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 24-25,29,31, 33. 
33 Terrence Roberts, telephone interview by author, 29 March 2010. 
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encourage them. However, they were aware that students at Central were given more 
access to resources, including laboratory equipment and instruction in classes that were 
not offered at Horace Mann.34 Moreover, several of the students believed that Central's 
national reputation might provide them with access to a wider field of choices in higher 
education.35 "Access to options," Roberts explains, "gives you more ways to respond to 
life's demands, more ways of understanding what is happening around you, more 
information about how to realize the potential that is yours to develop."36 This 
fundamental promise of access to opportunity was embedded in the Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, and as Carlotta Walls LaNier has noted, at fourteen, she was "old 
enough to understand the historical significance of ... enrollment in Central."37 
What the African American students did not expect was the reaction their decision 
to attend Little Rock's flagship educational institution would provoke. LaNier was 
convinced that after getting to know her, her white counterparts would see her as just 
another student who wanted "a fun an unforgettable high school experience." While she 
was eagerly anticipating the first day of classes, she says, "I had no clue that ... enraged 
white parents and other citizens- including the Arkansas governor, who had gotten my 
34 Margolick, "Through a Lens, Darkly." 
35 Elizabeth Eckford, public speech at Little Rock Central High School library recorded by author, 
28 April2007; LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 45. · 
36 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 30. 
37 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 57. These comments reflect the ambiguity that 
surrounds discussion of school desegregation in some African American communities. The closure of 
historically black institutions, the loss of African American faculty and educational traditions, and the 
hostile environment black students encounter( ed) in formerly white institutions has generated its own 
narrative of nostalgia and loss (Adam Fairclough, "The Little Rock Crisis: Success or Failure for the 
NAACP?," 372; Brundage, The Southern Past.) 
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parents' vote in the last election- were organizing to keep me away."38 Elizabeth Eckford 
felt some anxiety about attending Central, but mostly because it was so much larger than 
the school she was accustomed to. "My biggest concern was being able to fmd my 
classes in such a big school, because I expected there would be some ugly talk at first, but 
I thought that when people got to know me, they would accept me," she recalls.39 Even as 
Eckford approached Central and saw the mob gathered there, she remembers feeling ''just 
a little bit nervous." The teenager believed that the Arkansas National Guardsmen 
stationed around the school to "preserve the peace" would protect her. 40 
When young people express surprise at this perspective, Minnijean Brown 
Trickey explains, "We're forgetting what happened ... You're supposed to think that 
you're just going to school! ... Nobody knew what was going to happen." Trickey 
believes that Daisy Bates' memoir, which discusses attempts to organize some protection 
for the students on the first day they tried to Central, has been used and interpreted in a 
way that "does a lot of damage" and confuses readers. "I don't care how much people try 
to revise history, I don't think anybody had a clue what was going to happen because it 
hadn't happened before! And that's the, the kind of thing that disturbs me is that people 
reach back, revise, and it becomes 'truth' somehow."41 Collectively, the Little Rock Nine 
38 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 57. 
39 Elizabeth Eckford, public speech at Little Rock Central High School library recorded by author, 
28 April 2007. 
40 Elizabeth Eckford, "Little Rock, 1957: The First Day," Southern Exposure 1 (1979), 38. 
41 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009. Trickey also 
discussed this in her interview with Elizabeth Jacoway. "Daisy didn't know any more how to analyze this 
than anybody else," she said (Jacoway and Trickey, "Not Anger but Sorrow''). 
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seem to want to preserve some understanding of the historical contingency of the 
moment. They were not acting out the stage directions of a predetermined script, but 
were reacting to events as they unfolded around them. The disillusionment they 
experienced as a result of the crisis- the loss of their innocence, as both LaNier and Beals 
describe it in their memoirs- is a fundamental part of what they sacrificed in their effort 
to improve access to educational opportunity for all students. 42 
Some of the former students also chafe at the suggestion that Arkansas Governor 
Orval Faubus alone was solely responsible for the mobs that gathered outside Central 
High. From Terrence Roberts' perspective, the governor acted ''with the complicity of 
the people" when he provoked the crisis in 1957 and closed public high schools in the 
city in 1958-59.43 Certainly, the majority of Arkansas' voters did not reject Faubus' 
racial politics when they re-elected him to another four terms of office. Faubus, Roberts 
contends, 
did not act alone in blocking our admission to Central; he was simply the 
identified leader of the opposition ... The Guard had been instructed to bar 
all nine ofus from entering the school's premises. And if the Guard had 
not stood in our way, then most certainly the angry, shouting, deranged 
mob of white protestors assembled in front of the school would have 
fulfilled that assignment.44 
42 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 66; Beals, Warriors Don't Cry, 2. Indeed, Congress 
explicitly recognized this when awarding the Little Rock Nine Congressional Gold Medals. In addition to 
acknowledging that the Little Rock "risked their lives" as civil rights pioneers, the "Little Rock Nine 
Medals and Coins Act," H.R. 2560, also recognizes that the "Little Rock Nine sacrificed their innocence to 
protect the American principle that we are all 'one nation, under God, indivisible."' 
43 Dr. Terrence J. Roberts, "The ongoing battle for equality," op-ed, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
'september 25, 1997, p. 13B. 
44 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 88. 
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For those who might suggest that the mob itself was composed of undereducated, 
"hillbillies" from rural parts of Arkansas, Roberts replies, it was "the average white 
citizen" not "some demented, deluded interloper, who filled the ranks of the mobs 
surrounding Central High. "45 
While making the case that the harassment they experienced in 1957-58 was an 
outgrowth, and not an aberration from the state of race relations in Little Rock, the nine 
former students also point to the fact that resistance to integration continued once they 
were inside Central High School and attending classes with teenagers who had been 
steeped in the region's social mores. "Getting inside Central," Carlotta Walls LaNier 
recalls, "was just the beginning of a brand new struggle. "46 The Little Rock Nine refer to 
themselves as "soldiers," "warriors," and "comrades," who entered into a daily "war" or 
"battle" to claim the rights the Supreme Court had declared theirs in 1954.47 In their 
accounts, they endured constant torment and suffered under the threat of even more 
extreme violence. They are convinced that without the protection of the 101 st Airborne, 
45 Dr. Terrence J. Roberts, "The ongoing battle for equality," op-ed, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
September 25, 1997, p. 13B. The notion that mob gathered outside of Central High was composed of"real 
red necks" from Arkansas' eastern delta has been widely discussed in Little Rock since the 1957 crisis. 
Superintendent Blossom reported in his 1959 memoir that city reporters had determined that most of the 
cars parked around or near the schools carried license plates from other counties or states (Blossom, It Has 
Happened Here). This assertion, and others like it, have been used to assert that the "people of Little Rock" 
unfairly "bore the stigma forever after for the disgraceful occurrences of September 23, 1957" (Jacoway, 
Turn Away Thy Son, 172). As historian Karen Anderson has observed, this narrative permits "locals to 
deny any responsibility for events occurring in their midst and to project racism and violence onto people 
from another place, social class, or political standpoint .... This view not only enabled Little Rock residents 
to save face, it also allowed them to believe that their actions and political commitments were not at issue" 
(Anderson, Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School, 6). In countering this narrative, 
Roberts demanded that city residents accept some degree of responsibility for the events that unfolded in 
September 1957. 
46 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 99. 
47 Melba Pattillo Beals develops this analogy the furthest in her memoir Warriors Don 't Cry. 
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or even the less vigilant oversight of the Arkansas National Guard later in the year, one or 
more of them could have been seriously injured or killed.48 A group of committed 
segregationists inside the building "was willing to do whatever they could think of to 
persuade us to reconsider our decision to come to Central," Roberts maintains. "They hit, 
kicked, pushed, shoved, slapped, tripped, scratched, spat on, and verbally abused us 
constantly."49 The Nine adopted a variety of survival strategies and attempted to ignore 
the taunting and name-calling, but at times LaNier remembers, the insults "smashed my 
spirit like bricks. "50 Melba Pattillo Beals describes her own low moments this way: 
"Nothing in my life was the same anymore. I felt so empty inside, like somebody had 
scooped out the warm sweet part of my spirit that made me smile and feel grateful to be 
alive."51 Even the white students who stood by silently and ignored the Little Rock Nine 
had an impact. By turning their backs, they failed to acknowledge the humanity of their 
black peers or their suffering. This was devastating in itself. 52 
In recent years, white student leaders from the Class of 1958 have become more 
vocal about their very different perspective on the crisis. An integral part of the defense 
ofLittle Rock's reputation for "good race relations," is the contention that the harassment 
reported inside Central High School has peen "exaggerated" by news reporters seeking 
48 Beals, WarriorsDon'tCry, 309-310. 
49 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 110. 
50 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 66. 
51 Beals, Warriors Don't Cry, 155. 
52 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 181. 
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headlines, historians casting the crisis as a black and white morality play, and more 
recently, by the Little Rock Nine themselves. 
In the 1990s, sociologist Beth Roy documented the reaction of some white 
students to Melba Pattillo Beals' Warriors Don't Cry, the first memoir released by one of 
the Little Rock Nine in 1994. In her interviews with Central High alumni immediately 
after the book was released, Roy noted that white students dismissed and discredited 
Beals' account. According to her informants, the physical abuse the Nine characterized 
as racial would more accurately be described as harmless adolescent pranks, and the 
social ostracization they experienced was common for new students white and black. 
Some contended that Beals' account of harassment in the school was an outright lie, 
others suggested it was an exaggeration, and many asserted that they never witnessed any 
of the events described. Some simply suggested that Beals' account could not possibly be 
true because they could not imagine that any American teenager could have endured such 
torment. In Roy's words, the alumni argued that "Melba's book was a strategic construct 
designed to discredit the white students, many of whom ... deserved credit for human 
kindness to the black students." A few informants suggested that Beals had lied because 
"she was hurt and resentful that she was ignored."53 
While it is anything but certain that Beals wrote her memoir because "she was 
hurt and resentful that she was ignored," it is certain that Central High alumni feel that 
their perspective has been ignored by historians, the media, and commemorative events. 
It may be this resentment that motivated them to contribute their stories for an anthology 
53 Roy, Bitters in the Honey, 243-269. 
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put together by student body president Ralph Brodie that was published in conjunction 
with the fiftieth anniversary of the crisis in 2007. This project gave the alumni control 
over how their stories were presented. Many refuse to speak about their experience in 
other public forums and white students have even boycotted participation in the National 
Park Service's oral history project for fear that their words will be taken out of context in 
displays and exhibits at the national historic site. 54 Student body representatives such as 
Ralph Brodie contend that the vast majority of Central students have been 
misrepresented. According to Brodie, while the majority of students may not have 
heroically defied their peers and befriended the Little Rock Nine, they should not be held 
responsible for the decisions and behavior of a handful of hard-core segregationists. 55 
In Central in Our Lives: Voices from Central High, Brodie and his co-author 
Marvin Schwartz argue that white students at Central should only be held responsible for 
their individual behavior. The students who harassed the Little Rock Nine could be 
found at any school in the 1950s- they were the "side burners" who could be "identified 
by their wearing of leather jackets and the smoking of cigarettes." According to Brodie 
and Schwartz, these students used the desegregation crisis to "express their anti-social 
position."56 However, the text is not focused on explaining the behavior ofthe vocal 
54 Doug Smith, "White Students NOT Enthralled," Arkansas Times, September 20, 2007, 40. 
Ralph Brodie and Marvin Schwartz, Central in Our Lives: Voices from Little Rock Central High School, 
1957-1959 (Little Rock: The Butler Center for Arkansas Studies, 2007), forward and introduction. 
55 Brodie and Schwartz, Central in Our Lives; Roy, Bitters in the Honey. 
56 Graeme Cope's demographic analysis of segregationist students at Central High who signed out 
of classes when the Little Rock Nine first entered the school, or later participated in a walkout sponsored by 
the Mothers' League, provides support for this assertion. While these students generally shared the 
working-class background of many of their peers, many had been previously identified as "troublemakers" 
and few were involved in the school's wide array of extracurricular activities. Nevertheless, Cope did find 
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segregationists. Rather it is focused on articulating the ''third side" of the story and 
defending "1,850 students against the negative historical light in which they continue to 
be cast." Central in Our Lives does not try to argue that white students in the school 
intervened in the harassment. Instead, it offers justifications for why the students did not 
act. The authors argue that the students at Central were repeatedly told "to maintain 
order, avoid publicity, and, at all costs, avoid or immediately contain any confrontation." 
They believed that school authorities would appropriately reprimand troublemakers; they 
should not be held accountable for the failure of the administration to do so. Moreover, 
the authors argue, responsible students probably would have intervened ifthey had seen 
harassment take place. The halls of Central High twist and turn through five stories for 
two city blocks. Purportedly, the actions of segregationist students were easily concealed 
in dark comers and in crowded hallways. Students also should not be blamed for failing 
to reach out to the Little Rock Nine when they had been raised in a society that favored 
segregation. There was little or no preparation to "offset the initial, cautious distance 
between black and white students," the authors write. Moreover, many ofthe Little Rock 
Nine were shy and "kept to themselves." Brodie and Schwartz reject the contention that 
the silence of the vast majority of students "enabled" the segregationists. The students, 
they argue, should not be faulted for failing to exhibit heroic behavior. They write, "most 
that close to a quarter of male sophomores and juniors, and a fifth of male seniors were involved in 
segregationist activity. Female students were half as likely to be identified as culprits. However, Cope 
cautions that students previously identified as troublemakers may have been marked as "prime suspects" 
whose "conspicuous" behavior made it more likely that their activities would be noticed. In contrast, 
segregationist students who were usually "more conformist and compliant'' may have escaped detection. 
See Graeme Cope, '"Marginal Youngsters' and 'Hoodlums ofBoth Sexes'? Student Segregationists during 
the Little Rock School Crisis," The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 63, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 380-403. 
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students had neither the opportunity nor the temperament to be heroes. They simply 
conducted themselves with restraint and composure in an extremely challenging time. 
That behavior may not merit the highest praise, but it certainly does not justify a 
condemnation. "57 
Several members of the Little Rock Nine, including Terrence Roberts and 
Elizabeth Eckford, have acknowledged that they were prompted to speak out when they 
started hearing accounts like these that downplayed or dismissed the harassment they 
experienced.58 At the dedication of the new visitor center at Central High School 
National Historic Site in 2007, Elizabeth Eckford spoke to an audience of hundreds 
gathered for the occasion and a block of empty seats reserved for white members of the 
Class of 1958.59 She offered her perspective on history and the narrative put forward by 
Ralph Brodie and others: 
Allow me to share with you my view of history as recorded in the 
thesaurus- it's a chronicle record, documentation, account, annals, saga, 
diary, memories. We've heard from many, many memorists- the witness 
to the times, the messenger of antiquity (50 years ago was not so long 
ago). A voice sounding forever across the centuries the laws of right and 
wrong, a sort of mask ritually colored, the great dust heap, a fraud agreed 
upon. That terrible mill in which sawdust rejoins sawdust. When I was in 
the fourth grade, my mother gave me an ancient history textbook. I've 
loved history ever since, so I appreciate those who have gone on record 
with their experience. Among all of us, we've struggled to talk bout the 
past. None of us talked about it for twenty to thirty years. I started 
walking through the painful past in the late 1990s when I began to hear 
things that were totally outside my experience. Today I talk to students 
57 Brodie and Schwartz, Central in Our Lives, 30-31, 33,37-38, 50, 54-56,74, 119-121. 
58 Elizabeth Eckford, public speech at Little Rock Central High School library recorded by author, 
28 April 2007. 
59 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009. 
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extemporaneously and I try to be accurate, because I've [read] the books 
written by the historians of late, I read the biographies of late, I read all 
kinds of tales. 
As a "habitual newspaper reader," Eckford was "dismayed" that the local paper suggested 
that Central's student body "welcomed" the Little Rock Nine and that they attended 
school for the rest of the year under the protection of federal troops. "Each of us was 
followed from class to class by an organized group who assaulted us daily," she 
emphasized. Moreover, the harassment she experienced amounted to more than an 
adolescent prank. "Harassment is a very, very mild term. I'll tell you what it was to me." 
Eckford confronted her listeners with the visceral power of her own memory: "It was 
being scalded in the shower. It was being body slammed against the wall lockers every 
day. And my only protection was the binder I held close to my chest to protect that part 
of my body. And to further prevent being body slammed from the front, I stuck straight 
pins all around the binder and bent them so they were not obvious." Each of the 
anniversary commemorations of the crisis have placed an emphasis on racial 
reconciliation, but Eckford insisted that this rhetoric was hollow without a direct 
acknowledgment of her reality. "I know the difference between an apology and someone 
who's just trying to make themselves feel good," she asserted. "lf you can't name what 
you did, it's not an apology. We can never have true reconciliation until we honestly 
acknowledge our painful but shared past."6° From Eckford's perspective, in the absence 
of this kind of reckoning, historical narratives about the crisis would be little more than a 
60 Elizabeth Eckford, public speech at the Central High School National Historic Site visitor center 
dedication ceremony, 24 September 1997. Audio file courtesy ofKUAR- 89 FM available at 
http://www.nps.gov/chsc/parknews/visitor-center-dedication.litm, accessed July 20, 2010. 
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"fraud agreed upon," certainly not a "voice sounding forever across the centuries the laws 
of right and wrong."61 
Similarly, in the introduction to his memoir, Roberts explained that he was 
motivated to record his story in order to leave an accurate account for his children and 
grandchildren, and out of a desire "to counter those ever more vocal revisionists who 
would re-write history to say that things were not as bad as some would suggest, that the 
nine of us were warmly embraced by the majority of white administrators, teachers, and 
students at Central High. "62 Roberts insists that his very different memory of events in 
the halls of Central is bolstered by official documents and reports, archival footage, and 
personal testimonies. "History cannot be rewritten in the face of overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary," he writes, "but that does not seem to deter those who seem convinced 
that things were not at all what they seemed to be." From Roberts' perspective, this kind 
of willful historical amnesia is evidence in itself that "it is not yet time for celebration."63 
Indeed, for Roberts and others, the stakes involved in establishing an accurate 
historical record are high. Roberts writes, "history, all of history, is but the antecedent 
action to all we fmd around us today." As a member of the Little Rock Nine, Roberts 
confronted racism directly. In his view, it is only by understanding how racism has been 
structured in the past that we can understand the institutional forces that continue to 
circumscribe opportunity and access today. He notes, 
61 Elizabeth Eckford, public speech at Little Rock Central High School library recorded by author, 
28 April2007. 
62 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 10-11. 
63 Ibid, 144-145. 
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I write not as one who wishes to 'live in the past' but as one who wishes to 
understand how the past is manifest today. I choose not to join the chorus 
of those who say that we must forget what happened and get on with life. 
I am firmly convinced that we will fail to accomplish our goal of creating a 
truly integrated and equal society if we continue to avoid facing the truth 
about who we are and have been. 64 
In Little Rock, the only "starting point for making real change," Roberts asserts, is "some 
kind of reasonable level of awareness" of what actually transpired in 1957.65 
In recent years, the Little Rock Nine have attempted to force the city of Little 
Rock to look its history squarely in the face. Narratives which ascribe the cause of the 
crisis to outside forces- politicians, rabid rural segregationists, civil rights organizations, 
overbearing federal courts- and excuse the inaction of the majority of the city's citizens 
do not have the power to motivate people in the present to recognize and understand what 
they might to do to challenge the status quo in their own time. This might be convenient 
for those white students or community leaders who want to present their reaction to the 
crisis as natural, understandable, and rational, but it eviscerates what some of the Little 
Rock Nine believe is their most potent legacy and their most important message: that 
people can be agents of change. 
Be the Change 
The message members of the Little Rock Nine share with young people returns 
again and again to their capacity to change their school, their neighborhood, the country, 
and even the world one action at a time. The history they share about the Little Rock 
64 1bid, 164-165. 
65 1bid, 144-145. 
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desegregation crisis and their involvement in it is designed to demonstrate that even 
ordinary teenagers can have a tremendous impact. While they are concerned with 
leaving an accurate historical record, it is this focus that has pushed and motivated them 
to work through the "emotional debris" associated with 1957 and speak about their 
experience. They hope that the story they share- while painful- will also be 
inspirational. As Ernest Green put it at the fortieth anniversary commemorative 
ceremony, "If one young person out there that's seen the story of the Little Rock Nine and 
can take from it the beliefthat he or she can open a door, succeed against the odds, dream 
the impossible dream, turn no into a yes, or navigate uncharted waters ... then the Little 
Rock 9 become the Little Rock 10, 10-hundred, 10,000, 10,000,000."66 The Little Rock 
Nine hope young people will put their story to work in their lives and in society at large, 
particularly in relation to the unfinished business of the civil rights movement. 
For the members of the Little Rock Nine, the work they began in 1957 is not 
finished. "We should not be deluded that we have reached some kind of racial equality in 
our culture. We must not entertain the wishful thinking that racism is a thing of the past," 
Terrence Roberts warns. "The work our courageous ancestors began, and which we risked 
our lives to continue, is far from over."67 In his writing, Roberts points to a number of 
indicators that suggest that institutional and systemic racism continue to shape life in 
America, including the disproportionate number of black males housed in prisons, the 
66 Ernest Green, public comments at Little Rock Central High School 50th anniversary 
commemorative ceremony, September 25, 1997, transcription from videotape of television broadcast in 
author's files. 
67 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 143. 
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disparities between black and white income, and the racial isolation of the nation's 
schools. It has become commonplace, he notes, to justifY these inequalities on the basis 
of stereotypes. However, Roberts cautions, "It simply isn't true that black people are 
somehow unable to compete equally because they are racially inferior, or that they are 
more criminally inclined than white people, or that they simply don't take advantage of 
opportunities to build wealth." Rather, these indicators are a sign that the nation has not 
radically reshaped society in the wake of the Brown v. Board of Education decision or 
undone a political, legal, and social system based on centuries of discrimination. Those 
invested in maintaining the status quo have been unremitting in their efforts to undercut 
Brown, and in Roberts view, "The 'old' school voices," continue to be "much more 
strident and demanding than any speakers of the new gospel."68 
When speaking to students, Terrence Roberts, Minnijean Brown Trickey and 
other members of the Little Rock Nine hope to blur the line between past and present, and 
demonstrate that the lessons of Little Rock are applicable today. Roberts rejects attempts 
to sharply demarcate the "civil rights movement" as an epoch of a distant past. "There is 
a seamless connection ... between the past and the present, and also the future," he says. 
"You cannot separate these time periods. People talk about them as if they were separate. 
They say, 'the past,' or 'that was history.' That's erroneous." He explains, "If you see 
the 'civil rights movement' as something that happened in a particular time frame, and 
68 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 162-163. See also Dr. Terrence J. Roberts, "The ongoing 
battle for equality," op-ed, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, September 25, 1997, p. 13B; Terrence Roberts, 
public comments at Little Rock Central High School 50th anniversary commemorative ceremony, 25 
September 2007, transcription from videotape of television broadcast in author's files. 
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now that's over ... then you do not have the same kind of perspective about what is going 
on today."69 Minnijean Brown Trickey emphasizes that this view that the civil rights 
struggle is "over," "done," or "finished" is widely accepted and has consequences. The 
Supreme Court's recent opinions reflect this view, she maintains. "Even the people who 
are making decisions have little or no kind of comprehension of what the issues are," she 
asserts. Without understanding the legacy of decades of discrimination and its impact 
today, racism and its effects in the present have been naturalized.70 The passage of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act did not mark some sort of final victory in the battle for civil rights. 
"We have to remember that justice is a perpetual struggle," Minnijean Brown Trickey 
asserted at the fiftieth anniversary of the desegregation crisis, "and we've got to keep 
doing it, and keep on doing it until forever .... That's our responsibility and we must take 
that responsibility seriously."71 To bring others into the struggle, Trickey views her job as 
an effort "to link the past with the present." She believes the Little Rock desegregation 
crisis is embedded with "lots oflessons" that students and others can use.12 Terrence 
Roberts also embraces this approach, so much so that his recently published memoir is 
titled Lessons .from Little Rock. 73 
Collectively, the Little Rock Nine do not promote the idea that racism has or will 
69 Terrence Roberts, telephone interview by author, 29 March 2010. 
70 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009. 
71 Minnijean Brown Trickey, public comments at Little Rock Central High School 50th anniversary 
commemorative ceremony, 25 September 2007, transcription from videotape of television broadcast in 
author's files. 
72 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009. 
73 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock. 
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disappear naturally with the passage of time or the appearance of a new generation. In 
their experience, as Roberts puts it, "time itself is neutral, and without concentrated, 
sustained effort by human beings, change will not occur." The civil rights movement had 
a revolutionary impact on daily life in the South because African American citizens, 
including nine teenagers who elected to attend Little Rock Central High School, 
demanded the recognition of their rights. 74 When speaking to young people, these civil 
rights veterans hope that their listeners will take this lesson to heart: change is possible, 
but only if you are committed to it, are prepared to take action, and are willing to sacrifice 
to achieve it. Minnijean Brown Trickey passes on a lesson she learned from Gandhi, 
"Our challenge today and tomorrow and forever is to be the change we want to see in the 
world."75 
In Trickey's view, one of the roadblocks that stands in the way of students fully 
embracing this perspective is the dominant narrative of the civil rights movement. When 
she speaks to young people, they attribute the success of the mid-century black freedom 
struggle to the leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Without a similar charismatic 
figure to lead the way, they think their actions will not have an impact. Trickey offers 
students a different assessment of King's role in the movement, and argues, "Dr. King 
was the kind of leader in that he followed and he did what he was asked to do. He wasn't 
out front screaming, 'come with me!' He was with." The impetus to move forward came 
74 Ibid, 131, 160. 
75 Minnijean Brown Trickey, public comments at Little Rock Central High School 50th anniversary 
commemorative ceremony, 25 September 2007, transcription from videotape of television broadcast in 
author's files. 
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from the people themselves. "As long as we have that sort of idea of leadership as being 
one person, it causes young people not to feel any sense of their own individual and 
collective capacity or capability," she believes. 
In part, this is why Trickey also emphasizes that the Little Rock Nine were not 
handpicked to integrate Central High School by the NAACP or any other civil rights 
organization. She hopes that the independent decision of nine teenagers to claim their 
rights will serve as inspiration to students today and give them confidence in their ability 
to affect change. "We really are the change agents in our lives and in the greater ... 
societal mater. And we have both the responsibility to think .... and do something," 
Trickey says.76 In 1957, "we chose ourselves!" she maintains. "Daisy [Bates] didn't 
choose. Virgil Blossom thinks he chose us. We chose ourselves, and that's the lesson of 
Little Rock. It's about what kids are capable of. This is what I talk to kids about. 
'Choose yourselfl "'77 
In their public statements, several of the Little Rock Nine have suggested that 
change begins with recognizing and embracing this individual responsibility to reshape 
the world. Elizabeth Eckford acknowledges, "people tend to think we're unusual," but 
she asserts, "I am a most ordinary person." Eckford describes herself as an unlikely 
pioneer in the arena of school desegregation, "a very shy, submissive child." But she 
assures students and others, "even that kind of person, can fmd steel."78 Carlotta Walls 
76 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009. 
77Jacoway and Trickey, ''Not Anger but Sorrow," 7. 
78 Elizabeth Eclcford, public speech at Little Rock Central High School library recorded by author, 
28 April 2007. 
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LaNier also emphasizes that the "determination, fortitude, and ability to move the world 
aren't reserved for the 'special people."'79 With this realization that even ordinary people 
can affect extraordinary change, comes the weighty responsibility to remain vigilant and 
challenge injustice wherever it exists even in the face of seemingly insurmountable 
obstacles. 
The Little Rock Nine encourage students to take up this mindset and apply it in 
their own lives, not only the in relation to race but other manifestations of injustice or 
inequality. Whether students are concerned about issues as disparate as the environment, 
war, or discrimination, Minnijean Brown Trickey maintains, "We are talking about the 
same thing- what is the formula that makes it possible to oppress, to make war, destroy, 
all those things. "80 Elizabeth Eckford shares a special message with young people about 
bullying and social ostracization. Even if they do not think they are, "students can be 
powerful," she says. She shares her own story and the harassment she endured daily in 
the halls of Central High, but tells students about two of her peers that stood up against 
popular opinion and spoke with her every day during her last class. Their simple action 
"meant a lot to me," she recalls. "I tell students that they can be somebody's hope, they 
can help somebody live another day. Especially if they reach out and engage a person 
who's being harassed to let them know that not everyone despises them."81 
Regardless of the issue, the Little Rock impress on students that change cannot 
79 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, xi-xii. 
80 Minnijean Brown Trickey, telephone interview by author, 8 September 2009. 
81 Elizabeth Eclcford, public speech at Little Rock Central High School library recorded by author, 
28 April2007; Margolick, "Through a Lens, Darkly." 
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happen without people taking action. The decision not to act in the face of injustice is a 
decision in favor of maintaining the status quo. Although he and his friends sacrificed a 
lot physically and psychologically to integrate Central High School, Terrence Roberts 
believes that it was worth it. "By doing nothing," he asserts, "we would have prolonged 
the system of racial discrimination that restricted our lives simply because we were black 
people."82 By extension, those who chose to do nothing in 1957- including the majority 
of white students at Central High and the citizens of Little Rock- were making their own 
choice to preserve the social system that had undergirded life in the city for decades. If 
white students at Central High do not remember the harassment the Little Rock Nine 
endured, Carlotta Walls LaNier has said, it is because "They turned away. They did 
nothing. They said nothing. They chose not to see." People of conscience must "do 
something," she writes.83 Referring to holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel's concept of silent 
witness, Minnijean Brown Trickey also maintains, "sometimes its not the people who do 
the deed, it's the people who stand by and do nothing" that do the most to perpetrate 
injustice. 84 
Given this emphasis, it is hardly surprising that the fatalism that imbues most 
discussions of racial inequality in the nation's schools today is particularly frustrating to 
some members of the Little Rock Nine. It is not just the refusal of the federal courts to 
82 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 15. 
83 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 119-121, 103. 
84 Minnijean Brown Trickey, public comments at Little Rock Central High School 50th anniversary 
commemorative ceremony, 25 September 2007, transcription from videotape of television broadcast in 
author's files. 
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recognize that persistent double-digit achievement gaps or racially isolated schools are 
vestiges of discrimination that have not been eliminated, but the suggestion that little or 
nothing can or should be done to address these problems that is so dissatisfactory. These 
are not problems that can be fixed by discussing them exclusively in the past tense or by 
pinning hope on the promise that time itself will heal the rift that tears at the fabric of 
American life. In their view, these problems require people of conscience to do 
something and take action. Drawing on the wisdom of her grandmother, Melba Pattillo 
Beals asserts, "Even when the battle is long and the path is steep, a true warrior does not 
give up. If each one of us does not step forward to claim our rights, we are doomed to an 
eternal wait in hopes those who would usurp them will become benevolent. The Bible 
says, WATCH, FIGHT, and PRAY."85 Without concerted action, on the individual, 
social, and political levels, the status quo will remain firmly entrenched. 
Despite their frustration and concern about the problems that continue to plague 
public schools in Little Rock and elsewhere, the Little Rock Nine remain optimistic that 
solutions can be found. However, as the Little Rock Nine know very well, challenging 
the status quo can require tremendous and often unacknowledged sacrifice. They endured 
unrelenting harassment at school and at home for more than a year, suffering physical and 
psychological trauma that continued to affect them well into their adult lives. In some 
cases, their parents lost their jobs and their families were forced to relocate far from the 
social networks that had sustained them in Little Rock simply to fmd work. For the most 
85 Beals, Warriors Don't Cry, 3. 
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part, they believe their sacrifice was worth it. 86 As Melba Pattillo Beals puts it, "I take 
pride in the fact that, although the fight for equality must continue, our 1957 effort 
catapulted the civil rights movement forward a giant step and shifted the fight to a more 
dignified battlefield. "87 
Although the battlefield may be more dignified today than it was in 1957, altering 
the status quo will still require significant sacrifice on the part of students, their parents, 
and school administrators, black and white alike. In the African American community, 
Carlotta Walls LaNier hopes that students and parents can continue to sustain and 
promote the values that nurtured her through her childhood and gave her confidence as an 
adult. "It is hurtful now when I hear than in many urban schools, where the student 
populations tend to be overwhelmingly black, it is not considered cool to be smart," she 
writes. "It makes me downright angry when I hear that smart black kids often feel a need 
to play down their brainpower just to fit in." She calls for concerted action on the behalf 
of parents and community leaders to restore education to its ''vaunted place" as a 
prominent avenue to a better future. 88 
However, in order for students to embrace education, the schools they attend must 
be prepared to embrace them. Terrence Roberts believes there is much that 
administrators and teachers could learn from the black schools that educated him as a 
young man. "I... think all children, regardless of race, need the experience of being 
86 Of the former students, only Elizabeth Eclaord says that the price she paid in 1957 was too high 
and she would not do it again (Margo lick, "Through a Lens, Darkly"). 
87 Beals, Warriors Don't Cry. 
88 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 265-266. 
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totally and unequivocally accepted as worthwhile human beings, whatever school they are 
enrolled in. Anything less is detrimental to their ability to learn and grow," he says. 89 
Without this commitment to black students and their ability to flourish in the classroom, 
African American children are placed at risk in schools in Little Rock and elsewhere.90 
"Today, it is not enough for high schools to offer academic excellence," Gloria Ray 
Karlmark maintains, "they must together with the community excel in motivating their 
students to acquire the kind of knowledge and social values that will benefit the 
community and themselves."91 
But the sacrifices required to maintain truly integrated public schools will not 
have to come just from working-class African American families and public school 
administrators. In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decisions related to unitary 
status, the decision to maintain any semblance of diversity in the nation's classrooms may 
require significant and voluntary sacrifices from white families and middle-class black 
families as well. Gloria Ray Karlmark acknowledged this directly at the fiftieth 
anniversary of the desegregation crisis. In her remarks at the commemorative ceremony 
she noted, "Today it is rather a question of choosing to remain in the community where 
one lives or choosing to move on to another community- one with more resources, one 
that is able to offer public school students more social skills and educational 
89 Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock, 85. 
90 Terrence Roberts, telephone interview by author, 29 March 2010. 
91 Gloria Ray Karhnark, public comments at Little Rock Central High School 501h anniversary 
commemorative ceremony, 25 September 2007, transcription from videotape of television broadcast in 
author's files. 
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advantages."92 In order to work, integration must be a two-way street. In the years to 
come, parents of conscience may have to weigh the measurable benefits of affluent, but 
largely mono-racial, suburban schools against their commitment to diversity and equal 
opportunity. As Carlotta Walls LaNier puts it, "White families who believe in a 
multiracial society have to be willing to make some rough choices and sacrifices too."93 
'-
In order to rejuvenate the struggle for equal access and opportunity, and restore 
diversity to American public education, the work only begins with individuals determined 
to act as agents of change. Terrence Roberts cautions, "It must start with the self, it must 
start with the individual, but it must not stay there." In order to maximize social change, 
he maintains, ''this individual then has to figure out how to create alliances with others, 
like-thinking people, and begin to speak about... the need to change, then how best to 
make all this happen. "94 If the Little Rock Nine can uses their story to inspire and 
motivate individuals, and encourage them to work together in a new movement for racial 
justice, then perhaps the wish best expressed by Minnijean Brown Trickey at the fiftieth 
anniversary may come true. "Just as 50 years ago, the Little Rock desegregation crisis 
catalyzed and invigorated social movements across sectors," she said. "Its my hope that 
this fifty year commemorative ceremony will energize and invigorate the social 
92 Gloria Ray Karlmark, public comments at Little Rock Central High School 50th anniversary 
commemorative ceremony, 25 September 2007, transcription from videotape of television broadcast in 
author's files. 
93 LaNier with Page, A Mighty Long Way, 244-245. 
94 Terrence Roberts, telephone interview by author, 29 March 2010. 
548 
movement that is absolutely called for in 2007."95 
Conclusion: History, Memory, and Civil Rights 
As the members of the Little Rock Nine have begun to speak out about their 
experience individually and collectively, their public commentary has been shaped by two 
overriding goals: 1) An interest in interrogating and challenging the public memory of the 
civil rights movement and the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, and 2) A desire to 
reframe the history of school desegregation and its relationship to the present. These two 
goals have shaped and guided the development of this dissertation as well. Like so many 
other civil rights veterans, the Little Rock Nine not only serve as models for social 
change, but also provide scholars with an intellectual road map for the development and 
articulation of their own ideas about the black freedom struggle and its legacy. Indeed, 
much of the recent scholarship written about the "long civil rights movement" has been 
shaped by this interaction between activists engaged in the struggle and historians 
struggling to understand the evolution of American race relations. However, even as 
these more nuanced histories have gained prominence in academia, ''won cause" 
mythology continues to dominate public discourse. This study has been grounded in the 
belief that it is only by analyzing how this mythology rose to prominence, and 
demystifying its hold on the nation's collective consciousness, that the space for broader, 
more inclusive, and more complicated histories of the civil rights movement can be 
created. 
95 Minnijean Brown Trickey, public comments at Little Rock Central High School 50th anniversary 
commemorative ceremony, 25 September 2007, transcription from videotape of television broadcast in 
author's files. 
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In many ways, Little Rock is an ideal place to begin a re-examination of the 
history and public memory of school desegregation. Perhaps more than any other conflict 
related to the integration of American education, the Little Rock school desegregation 
crisis has been sutured into the nation's narrative of progress. In most textbook accounts 
of the event, the school desegregation crisis is presented as a constitutional showdown 
between the federal government and the forces of massive resistance and states' rights. 
After a brief discussion of President Eisenhower's decision to deploy the 101 st Airborne 
and enforce the Supreme Court's mandate in Brown v. Board of Education, instructional 
materials used in classrooms across the nation move on quickly to other iconic civil rights 
conflicts- the sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, the campaigns in Birmingham and Selma. In 
these kinds of accounts, discussion of the process of school desegregation begins and 
ends in Little Rock, Arkansas. It is as ifEisenhower's "decisive" action in 1957 was 
sufficient in and of itself to bring the nation's promises in line with its practices. 
However, as the history of school desegregation in Little Rock itself reveals, this is far 
from the case. Indeed, the Little Rock school district has experienced and been shaped by 
every phase of school desegregation litigation that has unfolded over the course of the 
long civil rights movement. In this sense, Little Rock is representative of general trends 
in the nation as whole, just not in the way that is usually suggested.96 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the district embraced various forms oftokenism 
96 Legal historian Tony A. Freyer has also suggested that the "limited" victory secured by local 
black activists makes the outcome of the Little Rock school desegregation crisis more representative of the 
trajectory of the civil rights movement than the "clear-cut showdowns" emphasized in civil rights 
historiography (Freyer, "The Little Rock Crisis Reconsidered," 361-362). 
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through pupil placement acts and freedom-of-choice plans. When these approaches no 
longer satisfied federal courts, they adopted geographic attendance zones, but were 
ordered to institute district-wide busing when it became evident that residential 
segregation perpetuated the city's dual school system. While busing produced 
meaningful diversity in the city's schools for the first time in 1970s, some white residents 
continued to resist the full import of the Brown decision by relocating their families to 
surrounding suburbs or enrolling their children in private schools. The Little Rock 
district attempted to address these issues by pursuing an interdistrict remedy that would 
result in the consolidation of city and suburban schools in the greater metropolitan area. 
With the erosion of support for these kinds of sweeping changes in the federal courts, the 
interdistrict remedy was limited to boundary adjustments, majority-to-minority transfers 
across district lines and the development of special magnet schools. 
As Little Rock became a predominantly black school district, it experimented with 
various forms of "compensatory" education including the development of specially 
funded but virtually all-black incentive schools. Like school administrators across the 
nation, the district also tried to curb white flight by reintroducing various forms of 
"controlled" choice, neighborhood schools, and pursuing unitary status in the 1980s and 
1990s. However, as noted in the previous chapter, even many of these mechanisms have 
been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court once a school district has been 
declared unitary. Nevertheless, debate about racial diversity and educational issues 
continues unabated in Little Rock. In an effort to retain the state desegregation aid 
jeopardized by its release from court oversight, the Little Rock school district has filed a 
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case against the state of Arkansas for allowing charter schools to proliferate in the capital, 
arguing that these institutions have pulled pupils out of the public education system. 
Neoliberal educational policies that emphasize individualism and school choice create 
new challenges for civil rights advocates committed to achieving educational equity and 
social justice for all students. The outcome of this next chapter ofLittle Rock's school 
desegregation saga has yet to be written. 
However, even as this story continues to unfold, the dominant narrative of the 
Little Rock school desegregation crisis that is reiterated and represented in various public 
forums tends to focus almost exclusively on the events of 1957-1959. These events are 
defined and bracketed as "history"- as the relic of distant and foreign past that only serves 
to highlight how far the city of Little Rock and the nation as a whole has come in the 
intervening years. Framing the crisis and its relationship to the present as a narrative of 
progress may be reassuring, but it many ways it impoverishes public discourse and 
obscures the long roots of many of the seemingly intractable problems that face the 
nation's schools today and continue to influence conditions in Little Rock. 
As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, other scholars have reflected on 
the crippling effects of the dominant narrative of progress and have uncovered some of 
the interests it serves. While their observations have generally focused on aspects of the 
civil rights struggle other than education or the conditions confronting other communities, 
many of their conclusions seem to apply to the situation in Little Rock and the public 
memory of school desegregation. 
Leigh Raiford and Renee Romano have suggested that this "won cause" 
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mythology serves the interests of the state, enabling the civil rights movement to be "held 
up as a shining example of the success of American democracy" and proof of ''the 
vitality of America's legal and political institutions, and evidence of the nation's ongoing 
quest to live up to its founding ideals of egalitarianism and justice. "97 As Chapter Two 
reveals, the United States government was deeply invested in weaving the story of the 
black freedom struggle into the nation's overarching narrative of progress even before the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision. In the wake of the Little Rock school 
desegregation crisis, the federal government preferred to frame the events of 1957 in this 
context as a triumph over the forces of massive resistance and states' rights in the South. 
This image was projected to the world as evidence of the nation's commitment to 
upholding the rights of American citizens and peoples of color during the Cold War. 
However, the history of the USIA's efforts to reshape global opinion and the production 
of the film Nine From Little Rock also reveals how divorced that narrative progress could 
be from conditions in southern school districts. 
Other scholars, particularly Jacqueline Dowd Hall, have emphasized how "color-
blind" conservatives have utilized "won cause" mythology to support their political 
agenda.98 As Chapter Four noted, the New Right advanced a narrative that defined 
ongoing controversies about access to equal and integrated education, like the battles over 
97 Leigh Raiford and Renee C. Romano, "Introduction: The Struggle Over Memory," in The Civil 
Rights Movement and American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and Leigh Raiford (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2006), xvii. 
98 Jacqueline Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," 
Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1223-63; George Lipsitz, American Studies in a 
Moment of Danger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). 
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bussing that dominated headlines in the 1970s, as categorically different from the efforts 
to attain educational equity that proceeded them. By weaving the iconic conflicts of the 
civil rights movement into a narrative of progress, and framing the civil rights movement 
as an unqualified "success," "color blind" conservatives and others were able to 
undermine ongoing calls for social justice and educational equity. Using this rhetoric, 
they argued that what had been broken had been fixed, and that the passage of corrective 
legislation had purportedly brought the nation's practices in line with its promises. 
Protests and court litigation that surfaced after the passage of the 1964 and 1965 Civil 
Rights Acts were portrayed not as appeals for fair play but preferential treatment. Over 
the last forty years, this view of school desegregation litigation struggled for supremacy in 
the federal courts and has recently underwritten the Supreme Court's decision in Parents 
Involved (2007). 
However, this rhetoric resonated with many white Americans not only because it 
underwrote a political agenda which helped to preserve their prerogatives, but also 
because it resonated with their view of the nation as a beacon of democracy, freedom and 
equality. Media scholars Allison Graham and Edward P. Morgan have suggested that the 
dominant narrative of progress that has been projected to the nation in newspaper 
retrospectives, documentary films, and fictionalized narratives has been underwritten by 
the culture industries precisely because it appeals to white audiences- who wish to 
believe that equality has been achieved. Indeed, the image that these audiences seem to 
find most appealing are stories and films featuring the actions of moderate whites, rather 
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than those focused on the grassroots activism of African American communities.99 As 
Chapter Six illuminated, this was certainly evident in the way that cultural gatekeepers 
responded to the memoirs of Orval Faubus, Brooks Hays, and Elizabeth Huckaby. 
Faubus' narrative, which unapologetically rehashed so many ofthe arguments of the 
1950s and concluded with gloomy predictions about the nation's future, failed to find a 
publisher. Whereas the more optimistic narratives of Hays and Huckaby were promoted 
as the stories of "good people" who tried to do the right thing under difficult 
circumstances, and helped create the climate where the nation's ideals could triumph over 
the forces of demagoguery. 
Glenn Eskew and Owen Dwyer have explored how the dominant narrative serves 
the interests of heritage tourism, urban renewal, and the "new" new South. They argue 
that southern politicians have supported civil rights museums, tours, and guidebooks 
because they "turn a stigmatized past into a commercial asset," simultaneously attracting 
tourist dollars and generating positive public relations.100 As was evident in Chapter 8, 
these forces were definitely in play in Little Rock during the 1990s when the city's 
businessmen and civic leaders rallied behind the creation of a visitor's center across from 
99 Allison Graham, Framing the South: Hollywood, Television, and Race during the Civil Rights 
Struggle (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 13; Edward P. Morgan, "The Good, The Bad, 
and the Forgotten: Media Culture and the Public Memory of the Civil Rights Movement," in The Civil 
Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee Romano and Leigh Raiford (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2006), 138. 
100 Quote from Glenn T. Eskew, "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute and the New Ideology of 
Tolerance," in The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and Leigh Raiford 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 29-30; See also Owen J. Dwyer, "Memory on the Margins: 
Alabama's Civil Rights Journey as a Memorial Text," in Mapping Tourism, ed. Stephen P. Hanna and 
Vincent J. Del Casino Jr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), and "Memorial Landscapes 
Dedicated to the Civil Rights Movement" (Ph. D. diss., University of Kentucky, 2000). 
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Central High School. Their desire to capitalize on the full public relations potential of the 
museum and the 40th anniversary of the crisis overrode their interest in fostering a 
meaningful community dialogue about the appropriate function of the center or the 
history it should encapsulate. 
However, the proceeding chapters have also demonstrated that this dominant 
narrative of progress has not gone uncontested. It would be reductive to argue that a 
collective memory of the civil rights movement is being imposed on the public by the 
state, culture industries and political elites, but not struggled for by activists, intellectuals, 
or other concerned citizens. Those in Little Rock who have had a vested interest in the 
desegregation of the city's schools, and the litigation that was designed to achieve it, have 
not observed the evolution of the public memory of the Little Rock school desegregation 
crisis silently. 
At times, the dominant narrative of progress served the interests of the civil rights 
community, and it is important to be attentive to the way coalitions of interests have 
coalesced and diverged over time in relation to the actual conditions in Little Rock's 
schools. In the 1970s, organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) and the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights presented Little Rock as a "model community" that 
demonstrated that school integration, particularly with the aid of court-ordered busing, 
could be successful. The organizations seemed to believe that if the American public 
could see that a city that had once been a byword for racial discrimination and massive 
resistance to school desegregation was making it work, they might embrace changes in 
their own community. Even more importantly, this narrative was put to work for the 
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LDF and deployed as a means of demonstrating the effectiveness of their efforts in the 
nation's court rooms and as a tool for soliciting additional support that would enable 
them to continue the struggle. 
In Little Rock itself, this narrative of progress did not universally foster 
indifference or a denial of current racial problems. Daisy Bates and the city's civil rights 
community, for example, used Little Rock's new status as a "model community" as a 
vehicle for demanding the recognition of "second generation" school desegregation 
problems, and a platform from which to denounce President Richard Nixon's statements 
and policies in relation to busing. This points to the need to be attentive to not only the 
construction of public memory, but also its reception among different audiences, and its 
practical applications. As Michael Eric Dyson's has observed, a history of black heroism 
and achievement has been "ceaselessly evoked in black communities in oral and written 
form as an inspiration to continued thought and action in the same vein."101 Certainly, that 
impulse was and continues to be at play in Little Rock. 
However, the civil rights community's embrace of progress in Arkansas' capital 
was always tied to an understanding that the gains that had been achieved could be rolled 
back. Indeed, when the tide began to turn against African American litigants in the 
federal courts, particularly when Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s and 2000s 
permitted the release of school districts from court oversight and return to relatively 
homogenous neighborhood schools, it was widely recognized that this narrative progress 
101 Michael Eric Dyson, Making Malcolm: The Myth and Meaning of Malcolm X (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 145-146. 
557 
no longer served the movement. Moreover, it also failed to reflect the reality of 
American public education. 
In this context, Little Rock's NAACP, some members of the Little Rock Nine, 
and other observers have been increasingly critical of the celebration or 
"commemoration" of the city's progress in race relations and its disconnection from 
efforts to generate meaningful change in the present. If scholars and historians have 
observed that this narrative can prevent Americans from recognizing and addressing the 
"unfinished business" of the civil rights movement, civil rights activists in Little Rock 
have worked diligently to assure that this does not happen. In newspaper articles, 
memoirs, public forums, and commemorative ceremonies they have repeatedly contested 
efforts to write off Little Rock's school desegregation drama as a relic of the past. 
However, as noted in the introduction to this dissertation, African American 
communities and their allies are not the only groups fostering and nurturing oppositional 
understandings of the civil rights movement. "Unreconstructed southerners" like Jim 
Johnson have rejected Little Rock's narrative of progress on the grounds that things have 
gotten worse, not better, in the city's schools in the wake of"forced integration." As 
Tony Horowitz has noted, white racists steeped in southern "lost cause" mythology have 
defined the civil rights movement as the "second reconstruction."102 This analogy is 
multivalent- containing a critique of school desegregation as yet another example of 
federal interference and "social engineering," while also pointing the eventual 
102 Tony Horowitz, Confederates in the Attic: Dispatches from the Unfinished Civil War (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1998). 
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"redemption" of the region. Indeed, some legal scholars and students of school 
desegregation believe that under the mantle of recent Supreme Court decisions this 
process is well under way. 103 
Critique of the dominant narrative of progress has come from other quarters as 
well. Some whites in Little Rock, who would not argue that things are worse today than 
they were in 1957, reject this characterization of the city's history on other grounds. 
From their perspective, the city's progress in the field of race relations has been 
overstated- not because of a lack of improvement in the schools- but rather because 
Little Rock has always been a progressive and racially moderate city. As noted in 
Chapter Six and in the pages above, this argument has been advanced with particular 
force by white members of Central High School's Class of 1958 who feel that the 
celebration of the school's diversity today and the courage of the Little Rock Nine has 
come at their expense. 
Clearly, the Little Rock Nine themselves have rejected both these 
characterizations of the city's history. While they are committed to calling attention to 
the ongoing problems in the nation's schools and the unfinished business of the school 
desegregation effort, they certainly do not argue that things are worse today than they 
were under Jim Crow. Nor do they accept the contention that Little Rock has always 
been a bastion of progressive sentiment and moderate race relations. They forthrightly 
103 For an example see Gary Orfield's essay, "Plessy Parallels: Back to Traditional Assumptions," 
in which he outlines the similarities in the arguments made at the turn of the century that underwrote the 
codification of Jim Crow and those made more recently in relation the existence of racially isolated schools. 
In Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal ofBrown v. Board of Education, Gary Orfield and 
Susan Eaton, eds. (New York: The New Press, 1996), p. 23-52. 
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acknowledge that the city has made progress and that much has been accomplished over 
the course of more than five decades to improve conditions for African American 
students in Little Rock's schools. However, this does not preclude them from pointing to 
the work that remains to be done. 
That said, the narrative of progress that has become so prevalent in the public 
memory of the civil rights movement must be reframed if it is to work to legitimize rather 
than undermine on&oing struggles for social justice. It must be utilized as a platform for 
making meaningful changes in our nation's schools that encourage a richer, more diverse 
learning environment. It must be recognized as a source of inspiration for action to come. 
As this chapter has illustrated, the Little Rock Nine have tried to utilize their own 
histories in order to inspire students to "be the change" they want to see in the world. But 
they have also provided a model for scholars, activists, and citizens interested in 
connecting "scholarship with collective struggle, social analysis with social 
transformation."104 Through their efforts to reshape the public memory of the crisis and 
its relationship to the present, the Little Rock Nine have demonstrated that the history of 
the civil rights movement can be translated from the past tense to the future tense, and 
rewritten in active voice rather than passive voice. This is a project that continues to 
resonate with the nation's ideals and aspirations to become a beacon of freedom, equality, 
and justice- but it does so in the "subjunctive" or "prescriptive" sense. 105 
104 Manning Marable, Living Black History: How Reimagining the African American Past can 
Remake America's Racial Future (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2006), 58. 
105 Genevieve Fabre, "African American Commemorative Celebrations in the Nineteenth 
Century," in History and Memory in African-American Culture, ed. Genevieve Fabre and Robert O'Meally 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 72-73. 
560 
REFERENCES 







Huckaby Papers UAF 





Arkansas Council on Human Relations Records, MS Ar4, 
Special Collections, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. 
Daisy Bates Papers, Special Collections, University of 
Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. 
Orval Eugene Faubus Addendum, Special Collections, 
University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. 
Orval Eugene Faubus Papers, 1910-1994, Special 
Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. 
Charles Guggenheim Papers, in the possession of Grace 
Guggenheim, Guggenheim Productions Inc. 
Brooks Hays Supplementary Papers, Special Collections, 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. 
Elizabeth Paisley Huckaby Papers, Special Collections, 
University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. 
Elizabeth Huckaby Papers, Special Collections, University 
of Arkansas Libraries, Little Rock. 
Minutes of Little Rock School District, Board ofDirectors, 
Little Rock School District Administration Building, Little 
Rock. 
Sarah Alderman Murphy Papers, Special Collections, 
University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People Papers, Washington, DC, Library of Congress. 
Record Group 306, United States Information Agency 
Papers, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
561 
COURT DECISIONS CITED 
Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1956). 
Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1957). 
Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1958). 
Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Circ., 1958). 
Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (8th Circ., 1958). 
Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 1959) 
Appeal of Little Rock School District, Pulaski County Special School District No.1, North 
Little Rock School District, and Mrs. Lorene Joshua, 949 F.2d 253 (8th Circuit 
1991). 
Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 369 F .2d 661 (8th Cir. 
1966). 
Clarkv. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 
1970). 
Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 465 F .2d 1044 (8th Cir. 
1972). 
Clark v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District, 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 
1983). 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
Dove v. Parham, 282 F. 2d 256 (8th Circ., 1960). 
Gratz et al. V. Bollinger et al, 539 US 244 (2003). 
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
562 
Grutter v. Bollinger et al., 539 US 306 (2003). 
Faubus v. United States, 254 F. 2d 797 (8th Circ. 1958). 
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
Keyes v. Denver School District No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
Little Rock School District v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2004). 
Little Rock School District v. North Little Rock School District, 451 F .3d 528 (8th Circuit, 
2006). 
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 
(8th Cir. 1985). 
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 833 F.2d 112 
(8th Cir. 1988). 
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 921 F .2d 
1371 (8th Circ. 1990). 
Little Rock School District v. Pulaksi County Special School District No. 1, 971 F.2d 160 
(8th Circuit 1992). 
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, No. 
4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2002). 
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, No. 
4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2004). 
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special school District et al., No. 
4:82CV00866 WRW/JTR (Dist. Court, ED Arkansas, 2006) 
Little Rock School District v. North Little Rock School District; Pulaski County Special 
School District, 451 F.3d 528 (8th Circuit 2006). 
Little Rock School District v. North Little Rock School District (8th Circuit, 2009). 
Little Rock School District v. Servicemaster Management [8th Circ. 1997] 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
563 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
I 
Norwoodv. Tucker, 287 F. 2d 798 (8th Circ., 1961) 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 Sup .Ct. 2738 
(2007). 
Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Circ., 1959). 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (Dist. Court, 1958); 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board ofEudcation, 358 U.S. 101 (1958). 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 91 S.Ct. 1267; 402 U.S. 1; 28 L. 
Ed. 2d 554 (1971). 





Arkansas State Press 
Christian Science Monitor 
Los Angeles Times 
The New York Times 
The New York Times Magazine 
Newsweek 
Southern Mediator Journal 
Southern School News 
Time 
USA Today 
US. News & World Report 
Wall Street Journal 
Washington Post 
WORKS CITED 
Alford, Dale and L'Moore Alford. The Case of the Sleeping People (Finally Awakened 
by Little Rock School Frustrations). Little Rock: Pioneer Press, 1959. 
Anderson, Karen. Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010. 
564 
___ . "The Little Rock School Desegregation Crisis: Moderation and Social Conflict." 
The Journal of Southern History 70, no. 3 (August 2004): 603-636. 
Armor, David J. Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995. 
Ashmore, Harry. Foreword to Crisis at Central High: Little Rock, 1957-58, by Elizabeth 
Huckaby. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980. 
Badger, Tony. "'The Forerunner of Our Opposition': Arkansas and the Southern 
Manifesto of 1956." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 
353-360. 
Bartley, Numan V. "Looking Back at Little Rock." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 25, 
no. 2 (Summer 1966); reprint 66, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 112-124. 
Bates, Daisy. Long Shadow of Little Rock New York: D. McKay, 1962. Reprint, 
Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1986. 
Baker, James T. Brooks Hays. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1989. 
Beals, Melba Pattillo. Warriors Don't Cry: A Searing Memoir of the Battle to Integrate 
Little Rock's Central High. New York: Washington Square Press, 1994. 
___ .. White is a State of Mind: A Memoir. New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1999. 
Belmonte, Laura. Selling the American Way: US. Propaganda and the Cold War. 
Philadelphia: University Press of Pennsylvania, 2008. 
Blight, David. Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory. Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2001. 
Blossom, Virgil T. It Has Happened Here. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. 
Bond, Julian. "The Media and the Movement: Looking Back from the Southern Front." 
In Media, Culture and the Modern African American Freedom Struggle, ed. Brian 
Ward. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2001. 
Borstelmann, Thomas. The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in 
the Global Arena. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
565 
Branton, Wiley A. "Little Rock Revisited: Desegregation to Resegregation." The 
Journal ofNegro Education 52, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 250-269. 
Brewer, Vivion Lenon. The Embattled Ladies of Little Rock, 1958-1963. Fort Bragg, CA: 
Lost Coast Press, 1999. 
Brodie, Ralph and Marvin Schwartz. Central in Our Lives: Voices from Little Rock 
Central High School, 1957-1959. Little Rock: The Butler Center for Arkansas 
Studies, 2007. 
Brooks Hays: Return to Little Rock. Produced by David Solomon. Arkansas Region of 
the National Conference of Christians and Jews, 1980. Videocasette. 
Brown, Robert L. The Second Crisis of Little Rock: A Report on Desegregation Within 
the Little Rock Public Schools, ed. Wendy Margolis. Little Rock: Winthrop 
Rockefeller Foundation, 1988. 
Brown, Robert L. "The Third Little Rock Crisis." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 65, no. 1 
(Spring 2006): 39-44. 
Brundage, W. Fitzhugh. The Southern Past: A Clash of Race and Memory. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005. 
Buell, Emmett H., Jr. with Richard A. Brisbin Jr. School Desegregation and Defended 
Neighborhoods: The Boston Controversy. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1982. 
Bullert, B. J. Public Television: Politics and the Battle over Documentary Film. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997. 
Burk, Robert Frederick. The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights. 
Knoxville: University ofTennessee Press, 1984. 
Caldwell, John Tyler. "A Southern Moderate In Action." The Virginia Quarterly Review 
35, no. 3 (Summer 1959). 
Chappell, David L. "Diversity with a Racial Group: White People in Little Rock, 1957-
1959." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 66, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 181-193. 
Carson, Claybourne. "Civil Rights Reform and the Black freedom Struggle, " in The Civil 
Rights Movement in America, ed. Charles Eagles. Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2006. 
566 
Coakley, Robert W. Operation Arkansas. Monograph prepared by the Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Washington, DC: 1967. 
Cohen, Lizabeth. A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar 
America. New York: Vintage Books, 2004. 
Collins, Cathy J. "Forgetting and Remembering: The Desegregation of Central High 
School in Little Rock, Arkansas: Race, Community Struggle, and Collective 
Memory." PhD diss., Fielding Graduate Institute, 2004. 
Cope, Graeme. '"A Thorn in the Side?': The Mother's League of Central High School 
and the Little Rock Desegregation Crisis of 1957." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 
57 (Summer 1998): 160-90. 
___ . "Honest White People of the Middle and Lower Classes? A Profile of the Capital 
Citizens' Council During the Little Rock Crisis of 1957." Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly 61 (Spring 2002): 36-58. 
___ .'"Marginal Youngsters' and 'Hoodlums ofBoth Sexes'? Student 
Segregationists during the Little Rock School Crisis." The Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly 63, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 380-403. 
Counts, Will. A Life is More than a Moment: The Desegregation of Little Rock's Central 
High. 50th anniversary ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007. 
Crisis at Central High. Written by Richard Levinson and William Link. Produced by 
Robert A. Papazian. Directed by Lamont Johnson. Based on the book by 
Elizabeth P. Huckaby .. HBO Videos, Time Life Productions, Inc., 1980. 
Day, James. The Vanishing Vision: The Inside Story of Public Television. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995. 
Day, John Kyle. "The Fall of a Southern Moderate: Congressman Brooks Hays and the 
Election of 1958." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 59, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 241-
264. 
Days, Drew S., ill. "Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil 
Rights." Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Law Review 19, no. 2 (1984): 309-
348. 
Dittmer, John. "The Civil Rights Movement." In The African American Experience: A 
Historiographical and Bibliographical Guide, ed. Arvarh Strickland and Robert J. 
Weems, Jr. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. 
567 
Dizard, Wilson P. The Strategy ofTruth: The Story of the US. Information Service. 
Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1961. 
___ . Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US. Information Agency. 
Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 2004. 
Douglas, Davison M. School Busing: Constitutional and Political Developments, vol. 2: 
The Public Debate over Busing and Attempts to Restrict its Use. New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1994. 
Dudziak, Mary L. Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
___ . "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of 
American Democracy." Southern California Law Review 70, no. 6 (September 
1997): 1643-1716. 
Dunn, Graham, M.S. and A.V. Seaton, eds. Slavery, Contested Heritage, and 
Thanatourism. New York: Haworth Press, 2001. 
Dwyer, Owen J. "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Contradiction, Confirmation, 
and the Cultural Landscape." In The Civil Rights Movement in American 
Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and Leigh Raiford. Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 2006. 
___ . "Interpreting the Civil Rights Movement: Place, Memory, and Conflict." 
Professional Geographer 52, no. 4 (2000): 660-71. 
___ . "Memory on the Margins: Alabama's Civil Rights Journey as a Memorial Text." 
In Mapping Tourism, ed. Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003 . 
---. "Memorial Landscapes Dedicated to the Civil Rights Movement. Ph. D. diss., 
University ofKentucky, 2000. 
Dwyer, Owen J. and Derek Alderman. Civil Rights: Memorials and the Geography of 
Memory. Chicago: Center for American Places, 2008. 
Dyson, Michael Eric. Making Malcolm: The Myth and Meaning of Malcolm X New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
568 
Eagles, Charles W., ed. The Civil Rights Movement in America. Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 2006. 
Eagles, Charles W. "Toward New Histories ofthe Civil Rights Era." Journal of Southern 
History 66, no. 4 (2000): 815-848. 
Eckford, Elizabeth. "Little Rock, 1957: The First Day." Southern Exposure 1 (1979). 
___ . Public speech at Little Rock Central High School library recorded by author. 28 
April2007. 
___ . Public speech at the Little Rock Central High School National Historic Site 
visitor center dedication ceremony. 24 September 1997. Audio file courtesy of 
KUAR- 89 FM available at www.nps.gov, accessed July 20,2010. 
Egerton, John. "Little Rock, 1976: 'Going Back Would be Unthinkable." Southern 
Exposure 1 (Summer 1979): 40-46. 
---. School Desegregation: A Report Card From the South. Atlanta: Southern 
Regional Council, 1976. 
The Ernest Green Story. Directed by Eric Laneuville. 101 min. Walt Disney Television, 
1993. 
Eskew, Glenn T.. "The Birmingham Civil Rights Institute and the New Ideology of 
Tolerance." In The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. Renee C. 
Romano and Leigh Raiford. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006. 
___ . "From Civil War to Civil Rights: Selling Alabama as Heritage Tourism." In 
Slavery, Contested Heritage, and Thanatourism, ed. Graham M.S. Dunn and A.V. 
Seaton. New York: Haworth Press, 2001 . 
---. "The Won Cause: Memorializing the Movement through the Birmingham Civil 
Rights Institute." In Mapping Tourism, ed. Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del 
Casino Jr. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. 
Fabre, Genevieve. "African American Commemorative Celebrations in the Nineteenth 
Century." In History and Memory in African-American Culture, ed. Genevieve 
Fabre and Robert O'Meally. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Fabre, Genevieve and Robert O'Meally, eds. History and Memory in African-American 
Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
569 
Fair, Paul. "Little Rock: Then and N9w." Theory into Practice, 17, no. 1 (February 
1978): 39-42. 
Fairclough, Adam. "The Little Rock Crisis: Success or Failure for the NAACP?" 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 371-375. 
Faubus, Orval. Down From the Hills. Little Rock: Democrat Lithographing & Printing 
Press, 1980. 
___ . Down From the Hills II. Little Rock: Democrat Printing and Lithographing 
Company, 1986. 
Feldman, Joseph, et al. "Still Separate, Still Unequal. The Limitations ofMilliken IT's 
Educational Compensation Remedies." Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Graduate School ofEducation, April1994. 
Frankenberg, Erica, Chungmei Lee, and Gary Orfield. A Multiracial Society with 
Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2003. 
Fraser, Cary. "Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration 
and the Dilemma of Race for U.S. Foreign Policy." Diplomatic History 24, no. 2 
(Spring 2000): 233-264. 
Freund, David M.P. Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in 
Suburban America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. 
Freyer, Tony A. "The Little Rock Crisis Reconsidered." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 
56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 361-370. 
___ . Little Rock on Trial: Cooper v. Aaron and School Desegregation. Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2007. 
___ . "Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis, 1954-1957." The Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 40, no. 3 (Autumn 1981); reprint 66, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 
145-166. 
Fuller, Jennifer. "Debating the Present Through the Past: Representations of the Civil 
Rights Movement in the 1990s." In The Civil Rights Movement in American 
Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and Leigh Raiford. Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 2006. 
570 
Gates, Lorraine. "Power from the Pedestal: The Women's Emergency Committee and the 
Little Rock School Crisis." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 55, no.l; reprint 66, no. 
2 (Summer 2007): 194-223. 
Gillis, John, ed. Commemorations: The Politics ofNational Identity. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, J 994. 
Goodwin, James. Autobiography: The Self Made Text. New York: Twayne Publishers, 
1993. 
Gordy, Sondra. Finding the Lost Year: What Happened When Little Rock Closed Its 
Public Schools. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas, 2009. 
Graham, Allison. Framing the South: Hollywood, Television, and Race during the Civil 
Rights Struggle. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001. 
___ . "Remapping Dogpatch: Northern Media on the Southern Circuit," The Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 334-340. 
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Ed. 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 
1990. 
Grobmyer, Elizabeth Darwin. "A History of the Commemoration of the Fortieth 
Anniversary of the Desegregation of Little Rock Central High School." MA 
Thesis, University of Arkansas Little Rock, 1999. 
Hall, Jacqueline Dowd. "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the 
Past," Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1223-63. 
Hall, Stuart. "Notes on Deconstructing the Popular., In Cultural Theory and Popular 
Culture: A Reader, ed. John Story. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997. 
Hanchett, Thomas W. Sorting Out the New South City: Race, Class, and Urban 
Development in Charlotte, 1875-1975. Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina 
Press, 1998. 
Hanna, Stephen P.and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr., eds. Mapping Tourism. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003 
Harding, Vincent Gordon Harding. "Beyond Amnesia: Martin Luther King Jr. and the 
Future of America. The Journal of American History 74, no. 2 (September 1987): 
468-476. 
571 
Hays, Brooks. A Hotbed a/Tranquility: My Life in Five Worlds. New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1968. 
___ . Politics is My Parish: An Autobiography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1981. 
___ . A Southern Moderate Speaks. Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 
1959. 
Horowitz, Tony. Confederates in the Attic: Dispatches from the Unfinished Civil War. 
New York: Pantheon Books, 1998. 
Huckaby, Elizabeth. Crisis at Central High, Little Rock 1957-58. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1980. 
Hughes, Mariko Morita. "The National Civil Rights Museum's Memorial Message: The 
Cultural Politics of Historical Representations and the Civil Rights Movement." 
B.A. thesis, Whitman College, 2005. 
Isaacs, Harold R. "World Affairs and U.S. Race Relations: A Note on Little Rock," The 
Public Opinion Quarterly 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1958): 364-370. 
Jacoway, Elizabeth. "Down from the Pedestal: Gender and Regional Culture in a 
Ladylike Assault on the Southern Way of Life." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 
56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 345-352. 
___ . Turn Away Thy Son: Little Rock, The Crisis that Shocked the Nation. New 
York: Free Press, 2007. 
___ . "Understanding the Past: The Challenge of Little Rock." In Understanding the 
Little Rock Crisis: An Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation, ed. Elizabeth 
Jacoway and C. Fred Williams. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999. 
Jacoway, Elizabeth and C. Fred Williams, eds. Understanding the Little Rock Crisis: An 
Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation. Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 1999. 
Jacoway, Elizabeth and Minnijean Brown Trickey, "Not Anger but Sorrow: Minnijean 
Brown Trickey Remembers the Little Rock Crisis," Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly 64, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 1-26. 
Jackson, Kenneth T. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
572 
Jameson, Frederic. "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture." Social Text I (I979): I30-
I48. 
Johnson, Ben F., III. "After I957: Resisting Integration in Little Rock." Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 66, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 258-283. 
Jones, Faustine C. A Traditional Model of Excellence: Dunbar High School of Little Rock 
Arkansas. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, I981. 
Joseph, Peniel E., ed. The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black 
Power Era. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
___ ."Introduction: Toward a Historiography of the Black Power Movement" In The 
Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era, ed. Peniel 
E. Joseph. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
Journey to Little Rock: The Untold Story of Minnijean Brown. Directed by Rob 
Thompson. 52 min. North East Productions, 2001. DVD. 
Kammen, Michael. Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in 
American Culture. New York: Knopf, I991. 
Kelly, Jonathan Kelly. "Politics of School Busing." Public Opinion Quarterly 38, no .I 
(Spring 1974): 23-39. 
Kirk, John A. "The Little Rock Crisis and Postwar Black Activism in Arkansas." 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn I997); reprint 66, no. 2 
(Summer 2007): 224-242. 
___ . "Massive Resistance and Minimum Compliance: The Origins of the 1957 Little 
Rock School Crisis and the Failure of School Desegregation in the South." In 
Massive Resistance: Southern Opposition to the Second Reconstruction, ed. Clive 
Webb. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
___ . Redefining the Color Line: Black Activism in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1940-1970. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002. 
Krenn, Michael. Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945-
1969. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, I999. 
Kruse, Kevin M. White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
573 
LaNier, Carlotta Walls with Lisa Frazier Page. A Mighty Long Way: My Journey to 
Justice at Little Rock Central High School. New York: One World Books, 2009. 
Lauren, Paul Gordon. Power and Prejudice: The Politics of Diplomacy and Racial 
Discrimination, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. 
Layton, Azza Salama. International Politics and Civil Rights Policies, 1941-1960. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
___ ."International Pressure and the U.S. Government's Response to Little Rock." 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 257-272. 
Levinson, Richard and William Link. Stay Tuned: An Inside Look at the Making of 
Prime-Time Television. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 
Lewis, Anthony and The New York Times. Portrait of a Decade: The Second American 
Revolution. New York: Random House, 1964. 
Lewis, Johanna Miller. '"Build a Museum and They Will Come': The Creation of the 
Central High Museum and Visitor Center." The Public Historian 22, no.4 
(Autumn 2000): 29-45. 
___ . E-mail correspondence with author. 17 December 2009. 
Linenthal, Edward T. Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America's Holocaust 
Museum. New York: Viking Penguin, 1995. 
Lipkin, Steven. "US Docudrama and 'Movie of the Week." In New Challenges for 
Documentary, 2nd edition, ed. Alan Rosenthal and John Comer. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005. 
Lipsitz, George. American Studies in a Moment of Danger. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2001. 
___ . Footsteps in the Dark: The Hidden Histories of Popular Music. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2007. 
___ . Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990. 
"Little Rock, 17 years later." Pamphlet. New York: NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, 1974. 
574 
Little Rock Central: 50 Years Later. Directed by Brent and Craig Renaud. HBO Films, 
2007. DVD. 
Lorch, Lee. Review of Crisis at Central High, by Elizabeth Huckaby. Freedomways 22, 
no. 4 (1982): 261-263. 
Lowenthal, David. The Past is a Foreign Country. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985. 
MacCann, Richard Dyer. "Film and Foreign Policy: The USIA, 1962-67." Cinema 
Journal9, no. 1 (Autumn 1969): 23-42. 
___ . The People's Films: A Political History of US. Government Motion Pictures. 
New York: Hastings House, 1973. 
Maddell, Michael. Superintendent, Central High School National Historic Site. Interview 
by author. 26 April 2007. 
Marable, Manning. Living Black History: How Reimagining the African American Past 
can Remake America's Racial Future. New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2006). 
Margolick, David. "Through a Lens, Darkly." Vanity Fair, 24 September 2007. 
Masem, Paul. "Resegregation: A Case Study of an Urban School District." Ed.D. diss., 
Vanderbilt University, 1986. 
Masterson, Mike. "Little Rock, 1979: 'There Have Been Changes." Southern Exposure 
(1979): 46-47. 
McCord, Robert. "An Unexpected Crisis." InA Life is More than a Moment: The 
Desegregation of Little Rock's Central High, 50th ann. ed., by Will Counts. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007. 
McMillen, Neil R. "The White Citizens' Council and Resistance to School 
Desegregation in Arkansas." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 30, no. 2 (Summer 
1971); reprint 66, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 125-144. 
Miller, Laura. Telephone interview by author. 4 September 2009. 
575 
Morgan, Edward P. "The Good, The Bad, and the Forgotten: Media Culture and the 
Public Memory of the Civil Rights Movement. In The Civil Rights Movement in 
American Memory, ed. Renee Romano and Leigh Raiford. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2006. 
Murphy, Sara Alderman. Breaking the Silence: Little Rock's Women's Emergency 
Committee to Open Our Schools, 1958-1963. Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 1997. 
Muse, Benjamin. Ten Years of Prelude. New York: Viking Press, 1964. 
Norrell, Robert J. "One Thing We Did Right: Reflections on the Movement." In New 
Directions in Civil Rights Studies, ed. Armstead L. Robinson and Patricia 
Sullivan. Charlottesville: University ofVirginia, 1991. 
Orfield, Gary·. Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1978. 
___ . "Plessy Parallels: Back to Traditional Assumptions." In Dismantling 
Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal ofBrown v. Board ofEducation, ed. Gary 
Orfield, Susan Eaton, and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation. New 
York: The New Press, 1996. 
___ . "Turning Back to Segregation." In Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet 
Reversal ofBrown v. Board of Education, ed. Gary Orfield, Susan Eaton, and the 
Harvard Project on School Desegregation. New York: The New Press, 1996. 
Orfield, Gary, Susan E. Eaton, and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation. 
Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal ofBrown v. Board ofEducation 
New York: The New Press, 1996. 
Osgood, Kenneth. Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle Home and 
Abroad. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. 
Phillips, Kendell R. and John Lucaites, eds. Framing Public Memory. Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2004. 
Raiford, Leigh. ''Narratives of Redemption: The Birmingham Church Bombing Trials and 
the Construction of Civil Rights Memory." In The Civil Rights Movement in 
American Memory, ed. Renee Romano and Leigh Raiford. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2006. 
576 
Raiford, Leigh and Renee C. Romano. "Introduction: The Struggle Over Memory." In 
The Civil Rights Movement and American Memory, ed. Renee C. Romano and 
Leigh Raiford Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006. 
Reed, Roy. Faubus: The Life and Times of an American Prodigal. Fayetteville: 
University of Arkansas Press, 1997 . 
---. "Orval E. Faubus: Out of Socialism into Realism," Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly 54, no. 1 (Spring 1995); reprint 66, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 167-180. 
"Reminiscences of Elizabeth Huckaby." Interview by Eisenhower Administration Project, 
1972. Transcript. Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, New York. 
"Reminiscences of Orval Eugene Faubus." Interview by John Luter, Eisenhower 
Administration Project, 1971. Transcript. Oral History Research Office, 
Columbia University, New York. 
Rhea, Joseph Tilden. "Memory of a Nation: The Race Pride Movement and American 
Collective Memory." Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1995. 
Roberts, Gene and Hank Klibanoff. The Race Beat: The Press, The Civil Rights Struggle, 
and The Awakening of a Nation. New York: Vintage Books, 2006. 
Roberts, Terrence. Telephone interview by author. 29 March 2010. 
___ . Lessons From Little Rock. Little Rock: Butler Center Books, 2009. 
Robinson, Armstead L. and Patricia Sullivan, eds. New Directions in Civil Rights 
Studies. Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1991. 
Romano, Renee C. And Leigh Raiford, eds. The Civil Rights Movement in American 
Memory. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006. 
Rosenthal, Alan and John Comer, eds. New Challenges for Documentary, 2nd edition. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005. 
Rosenzweig, Roy and David Thelen. The Presence of the Past: Popular Uses of History 
in American Lift. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 
Rowan, Carl T. The Pitiful and the Proud. New York: Random House, 1956. 
Roy, Beth. Bitters in the Honey: Tales of Hope and Disappointment Across Divides of 
Race and Time. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999. 
577 
Sarratt, Reed. The Ordeal of Desegregation: The First Decade. New York: Harper & 
Row, 1966. 
Schwenk, Melinda M. "Reforming the Negative through History: The U.S. Information 
Agency and the 1957 Little Rock Integration Crisis." Journal of Communication 
Inquiry 23, no. 3 (July 1999): 288-306. 
Sokol, Jason. There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 
1945-1975. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006. 
Smith, Renee M. "The Public Presidency Hits the Wall: Clinton's Presidential Initiative 
on Race." Presidential Studies Quarterly 28, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 780-785. 
Spitzberg, Irving J., Jr. Racial Politics in Little Rock, 1954-1964. New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1987. 
Steinhom, Leonard and Barbara Diggs-Brown. By the Color of Our Skin: The fllusion of 
Integration and the Reality of Race. New York: Dutton, 1999. 
Stevenson, Sybil. "Reflections on Little Rock." Theory into Practice, 17, no. 2 (1978): 
179-182. 
Street, Paul Lewis. Segregated Schools: Educational Apartheid in Post-Civil Rights 
America. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Strickland, Arvarh and Robert J. Weems, Jr., eds. The African American Experience: A 
Historiographical and Bibliographical Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
2001. 
Sugrue, Thomas J. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar 
Detroit. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
Tatum, Beverly Daniel. "Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?" 
and Other Conversations About Race. New York: Basic Books, 1997. 
Thelen, David, ed. Memory and American History. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1990. 
Trickey, Minnijean Brown. Telephone interview by author. Tape recording. 8 September 
2009. 
578 
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1995. 
United States Commission on Civil Rights. Milliken v. Bradley: The Implications for 
Metropolitan Desegregation. Washington, DC: 1974. 
School Desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas. Washington, DC: June 1977. 
Your Child and Busing. Clearinghouse Publication No. 36. Washington, DC: 
May 1972. 
United States House Subcommittee No.5 of the Committee on the Judiciary. Hearings on 
the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to 
Transportation and Assignment of Public School Pupils, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 
1972. 
University Task Force on the Little Rock School District. Plain Talk: The Future of 
Little Rock's Public Schools. Little Rock: University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 
1997. 
Vinzant, David Gene. "Little Rock's Long Crisis: Schools and Race in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, 1863-2009." Ph.D. diss., University of Arkansas, 2010. 
"VOICE asks the authors of 'Crisis at Central High': Is the way it Actually Happened?." 
Scholastic Voice 65, no. 9 (9 January 1981): 6-7. 
Walker, Jenny. "A Media-Made Movement? Black Violence and Nonviolence in the 
Historiography of the Civil Rights Movement." In Media, Culture and the 
Modem African American Freedom Struggle, ed. Brian Ward. Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 2001. 
Ward, Bryan. "Introduction: Forgotten Walls and Master Narratives: Media, Culture, and 
Memories of the Modem African American Freedom Struggle." In Media, 
Culture, and the Modern African American Freedom Struggle, ed. Brian Ward. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001. 
Ward, Bryan, ed. Media, Culture, and the Modern African American Freedom Struggle. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001. 
Webb, Clive, ed. Massive Resistance: Southern Opposition to the Second 
Reconstruction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
579 
Williams, C. Fred. "Class: The Central Issue in the 1957 Little Rock School Crisis." 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 341-344. 
Williams, Raymond. "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory." In Problems 
in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays. London: NLB, 1980. 
Woods, Henry and Beth Deere. "Reflections on the Little Rock School Case." Arkansas 
Law Review 44, no. 4 (1991): 971-1006. 
40th anniversary commemorative ceremony. Transcription. Videotape of broadcast in 
author's files. Recorded 25 September 2007. 
50th anniversary commemorative ceremony. Transcription. Videotape of broadcast in 
author's files. Recorded September 25, 2007. 
580 
VITA 
Erin Krutko Devlin is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor in the History Department 
at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia. She has also offered courses in 
the History Department at Washington and Lee University and the American Studies 
Program at the College of William and Mary. Her areas of study and research include 
20th Century United States History, African American Studies, Public History, American 
Memory, and Cultural Studies. 
Erin has explored themes related to these interests throughout her graduate career. She 
earned a Master of Arts in American Studies from the College of William and Mary in 
2004. Her thesis, "Colonial Williamsburg's Slave Auction Re-enactment: Controversy, 
African American History, and Public Memory," examined the creation of and reaction to 
the historical site's only first person interpretation of a slave auction. She also holds 
Bachelor of Arts degree in American Studies and Public Communication from American 
University in Washington, DC. 
While finishing this dissertation, Erin also completed an illustrated history of segregation 
and desegregation in Shenandoah National Park on the behalf of the National Park 
Service. This study, titled Under the Sky All of Us Are Free, is currently in press. 
581 
